Have a personal or library account? Click to login
Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects Cover

Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects

By: Kevin Mulligan  
Open Access
|Dec 2018

References

  1. Austin, J. L. 1961. Other Minds. In Philosophical Papers.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 44-84.
  2. Berridge, K. C. & Robinson, T. E. 2003. Parsing Reward. Trends in Neuroscience26, 9: 507-513.10.1016/S0166-2236(03)00233-9
  3. Correia, F. & Mulligan, K. 2007. Facts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/>.
  4. Engel, P. 2005. Truth and the Aim of Belief. Laws and Models in Science, ed. D. Gillies, 77-97.
  5. Hossack, K. 2007. The Metaphysics of Knowledge.Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001
  6. Johnston, M. 2001. The Authority of Affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research63(1): 181-214.10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00097.x
  7. Kenny, A. 1963. Action, Emotion, and Will, London: Routledge.
  8. Kratzer, A. 2001. Facts: Particulars or Information Units. Linguistics and Philosophy25, 5-6: 655-670.10.1023/A:1020807615085
  9. Mulligan, K. & Smith, B. 1986. A Relational Theory of the Act. Topoi5/2: 115-130.10.1007/BF00139225
  10. Mulligan, K. 1998. From Appropriate Emotions to Values. Secondary Qualities Generalized, ed. P. Menzies. The Monist84, 1: 161-188.10.5840/monist199881114
  11. Mulligan, K. 2004. Essence and Modality. The Quintessence of Husserl’s Theory. In M. Siebel & M. Textor, eds., Semantik und Ontologie. Beiträge zur philosophischen Forschung.Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 387-418.10.1515/9783110327236.387
  12. Mulligan, K. 2004a. Husserl on the ‘Logics’ of Valuing, Values and Norms. Fenomenologia della Ragion Pratica. L’Etica di Edmund Husserl, eds. B. Centi & G. Gigliotti, 177-225, Naples: Bibliopolis.
  13. Mulligan, K. 2006. Facts, Formal Objects and Ontology. Modes of Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic, eds. Andrea Bottani & Richard Davies. Frankfurt: ontos verlag, 31-46.10.1515/9783110327533.31
  14. Mulligan, K. 2008. On Being Struck by Value. Wohin mit den Gefühlen? Emotionen im Kontext, ed. Barbara Merkel, mentis-Verlag, forthcoming.
  15. Oddie, G. 2005. Value, Desire and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  16. Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. 2004. The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value. Ethics114: 391-423.10.1086/381694
  17. Ramsey, F. 1931. Facts and Propositions. In The Foundations of Mathematics. London: Kegan Paul.
  18. Reiner, H. 1934. Das Phänomen des Glaubens.Halle: Niemeyer.
  19. Rumfitt, I. 2000. Yes and No. Mind109: 781-823.10.1093/mind/109.436.781
  20. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What we Owe to Each Other.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  21. Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139173452
  22. Smith, B. 1984. Acta cum fundamentis in re. Dialectica38: 157-178.10.1111/j.1746-8361.1984.tb01242.x
  23. Tappolet, C. 2000. Emotions et Valeurs.Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.10.3917/puf.tappo.2000.01
  24. Teroni, F. 2007. Emotions and Formal Objects. DialecticaVol. 61, Fasc. 3: 395-416.10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01108.x
  25. Thomas, A. 2006. Value and Context. The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/0198250177.001.0001
  26. Vendler, Z. 1967. Linguistics in Philosophy.Ithaca: Cornell University Press.10.7591/9781501743726
  27. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  28. Wittgenstein, L. 1968. Philosophical Investigations.Oxford: Blackwell.
  29. Wittgenstein, L. 1969. On Certainty.New York: Harper.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2007-0010 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 205 - 228
Published on: Dec 31, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2018 Kevin Mulligan, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.