A defence of Fregean propositions
Abstract
Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 39 - 64
Published on: Dec 31, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
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© 2018 Massimiliano Vignolo, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.