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Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance? Cover

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

DANUBE
Volume 5 (2014): Issue 2 (June 2014)
By:   
Open Access
|Jul 2014
References

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/danb-2014-0005 | Journal eISSN: 1804-8285 | Journal ISSN: 1804-6746 (formerly 1804-8285)
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Language: English
Page range: 79 - 104
Published on: Jul 8, 2014
Published by: European Research University
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Keywords:
Public Finance,
Size of Government,
Constitutional Court,
Judicial Review
Related subjects:
Business and economics,
Political economics,
Macroeconomics,
Economic policy,
Law,
European law,
European law, other,
Law, other

© 2014 Jarosław Kantorowicz, published by European Research University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Volume 5 (2014): Issue 2 (June 2014)
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