Key findings from previous studies on business strategies and FD
| Authors | Key findings |
|---|---|
| Bryan, Dinesh & Tripathy (2013), Chen & Keung (2019), Agustia et al. (2020) and Thu (2023) | Adopting an effective business strategy (cost leadership or differentiation) improves financial performance and lowers the risk of FD/bankruptcy. |
| Diab, Eissa & Hamdy (2021) | Firms with either cost leadership or differentiation face lower bankruptcy risk. However, FF increases risk for cost leadership firms (agency costs, overinvestment) while mitigating risk for differentiation firms (innovation support, adaptability). |
| Josephson, Johnson & Mariadoss (2016), Rostami & Rezaei (2021) | Less financially flexible firms adopt defensive cost leadership to survive, while financially flexible firms adopt proactive differentiation strategies that lower FD risk. |
| Lopo & Ferreira (2019) | Cost leadership firms in Brazil are more prone to irregular corporate practices, which increases long-term bankruptcy risk. |
| Wu et al. (2015), Purba, Fransisca & Joshi (2022) and Fedora et al. (2025) | Differentiation firms face less pressure, have higher PMs, rely less on external financing and are less inclined to use EM → lower FD risk. Cost leadership firms have lower margins, depend more on external finance and engage more in earnings manipulation → higher FD risk. |
| Ahmed et al. (2025) | Asymmetric cost behaviour (slower cost reduction during sales declines) may increase vulnerability to FD, especially when managers are overly optimistic. |
| Hassanein & Younis (2020), Hartlieb & Loy (2022) | Managerial decisions to retain costs are influenced by non-monetary factors such as morale and reputation, affecting financial risk. |
| Lefebvre (2025) | Cost stickiness can mitigate effects of sales fluctuations in some firms. |
| Costa & Habib (2023) | Depending on expected sales trends, cost stickiness may have positive or negative effects on financial standing. |
| Misztal & Comporek (2025) | In the Polish market, financially weak firms use anti-stickiness strategies, while financially secure firms LEV cost stickiness to enhance operational efficiency. |
Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Dunn test (Bonferroni-corrected) following Kruskal–Wallis analysis of business strategies and EQ across Z-score zones
| Business strategies | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proxy | Sample 1 – Sample 2 | Test stat. | Std. error | Std. test stat. | Sig. | Adj. sig. |
| STICKYCOGS | Uncertain zone – safe zone | −5.05 | 34.43 | −0.15 | 0.883 | 1.000 |
| Uncertain zone – distress zone | 79.30 | 41.71 | 1.90 | 0.057 | 0.172 | |
| Safe zone – distress zone | 74.24 | 34.29 | 2.17 | 0.030 | 0.091 | |
| STICKYSG&A | Safe zone – uncertain zone | 6.14 | 34.43 | 0.18 | 0.858 | 1.000 |
| Safe zone – distress zone | 23.08 | 34.29 | 0.67 | 0.501 | 1.000 | |
| Uncertain zone – distress zone | 16.94 | 41.71 | 0.41 | 0.685 | 1.000 | |
| ATO | Distress zone – safe zone | −96.44 | 34.29 | −2.81 | 0.005 | 0.015 |
| Distress zone – uncertain zone | −294.97 | 41.71 | −7.07 | <0.001 | 0.000 | |
| Safe zone – uncertain zone | 198.52 | 34.43 | 5.77 | <0.001 | 0.000 | |
| PM | Distress zone – uncertain zone | −283.76 | 41.71 | −6.80 | <0.001 | 0.000 |
| Distress zone – safe zone | −546.70 | 34.29 | −15.94 | <0.001 | 0.000 | |
| Uncertain zone – safe zone | −262.94 | 34.43 | −7.64 | <0.001 | 0.000 | |
| EQ | ||||||
| Proxy | Sample 1 – Sample 2 | Test stat. | Std. error | Std. test stat. | Sig. | Adj. sig. |
| SMOOTH | Uncertain zone – safe zone | −89.11 | 34.43 | −2.59 | 0.010 | 0.029 |
| Uncertain zone – distress zone | 413.20 | 41.71 | 9.91 | <0.001 | 0.000 | |
| Safe zone – distress zone | 324.09 | 34.29 | 9.45 | <0.001 | 0.000 | |
| CONS | Distress zone – safe zone | −55.60 | 33.89 | −1.64 | 0.101 | 0.303 |
| Distress zone – uncertain zone | −95.07 | 41.22 | −2.31 | 0.021 | 0.063 | |
| Safe zone – uncertain zone | 39.47 | 34.03 | 1.16 | 0.246 | 0.738 | |
| DACC | Distress zone – safe zone | −78.97 | 34.29 | −2.30 | 0.021 | 0.064 |
| Distress zone – uncertain zone | −87.23 | 41.71 | −2.09 | 0.036 | 0.109 | |
| Safe zone – uncertain zone | 8.26 | 34.43 | 0.24 | 0.810 | 1.000 | |
| |DACC| | Distress zone – safe zone | 104.99 | 34.308 | 3.06 | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Distress zone – uncertain zone | 66.481 | 34.447 | 1.93 | 0.054 | 0.161 | |
| Safe zone – uncertain zone | 38.513 | 41.718 | 0.923 | 0.356 | 1.000 | |
Independent-sample Kruskal–Wallis test results: business strategies vs_ EQ across Z-score zones
| Business strategies | EQ | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. | Null hypothesis | Sig. | No. | Null hypothesis | Sig. |
| 1 | The distribution of STICKYCOGS is the same across different Z-score zones | 0.073 | 1 | The distribution of SMOOTH is the same across different Z-score zones | <0.001 |
| 2 | The distribution of STICKYSG&A is the same across different Z-score zones | 0.797 | 2 | The distribution of CONS is the same across different Z-score zones | <0.001 |
| 3 | The distribution of ATO is the same across different Z-score zones | <0.001 | 3 | The distribution of DACC is the same across different Z-score zones | 0.048 |
| 4 | The distribution of PM is the same across different Z-score zones | <0.001 | 4 | The distribution of |DACC| is the same across different Z-score zones | 0.005 |
PLUM regression results with Cauchit links: Effects of business-related variables and EQ proxies on FD risk (model with DACC)
| Variable/threshold | Estimate | Stand. error | Wald | df | p-value | VIF | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Threshold | Z-score – distress zone | 0.998 | 0.203 | 24.107 | 1 | <0.001 | - |
| Z-score – uncertain zone | 2.531 | 0.212 | 144.981 | 1 | <0.001 | - | |
| Predictors | COVID | −0.026 | 0.122 | 0.046 | 1 | 0.831 | 1.005 |
| TANG | −1.596 | 0.257 | 38.708 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.050 | |
| STL | −2.291 | 0.108 | 449.221 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.098 | |
| LEV | −0.144 | 0.021 | 47.911 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| ATO | 0.719 | 0.071 | 103.275 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.801 | |
| PM | 0.069 | 0.019 | 13.451 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| STICKYCOGS | −0.119 | 0.033 | 13.168 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.027 | |
| SMOOTH | −0.141 | 0.014 | 102.466 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.134 | |
| CONS | −0.001 | 0.001 | 4.695 | 1 | 0.032 | 1.110 | |
| DACC | −0.066 | 0.061 | 1.157 | 1 | 0.282 | 1.752 | |
| Goodness-of-fit – deviance | Model fitting information | Test of parallel lines | Cox and Snell | 0.425 | |||
| c2 | Sig. | c2 | Sig. | c2 | Sig. | Nagelkerke | 0.496 |
| 3,153.633 | 1.000 | 1,132.934 | <0.001 | 7.772 | 0.651 | McFadden | 0.286 |
Key findings from previous studies on EQ and FD
| Authors | Key findings |
|---|---|
| Panigrahi (2019), Debdas, Chanchal & Ananya (2021), Hsiao, Szu & Ai (2010), Habib, Uddin & Islam (2013), Bisogno & De Luca (2015), Muljono & Suk (2018), Viana et al. (2022) and Li et al. (2020) | Firms engaging in accrual-based EM increase their risk of FD; distressed firms rely more on EM, lowering EQ. |
| Agrawal & Chatterjee (2015), Ghazali, Shafie & Sanusi (2015) | Healthier firms engage more in accrual-based EM, while distressed firms show less manipulation, suggesting relatively higher EQ under distress. |
| Franz, HassabElnaby & Lobo (2014), Campa & Camacho-Miñano (2015) and Haga, Höglund & Sundvik (2018) | Distressed firms often substitute real activities manipulation for accrual-based EM, indicating shifts in how EQ is affected depending on the type of EM (Spain, US, UK). |
| Thu (2023) | Firms engaging in earnings manipulation via accounting choices face higher FD risk, as such practices delay problem detection and reduce competitive capacity. |
| Sholikhah & Suryani (2020) | Conditional conservatism improves EQ and significantly reduces the likelihood of FD; conservative accounting accelerates loss recognition and enhances early warning signals. |
| Hsu, O’Hanlon & Peasnell (2011) | Conditional conservatism, via asymmetric recognition of losses vs. gains, improves EQ and provides early warning of FD. |
| Kuang (2021), Allayannis & Simko (2022), Shabani & Sofian (2018) and Martina & Wadi (2025) | Income smoothing and discretionary EM influence FD risk through delayed loss recognition, lower credit quality or constrained managerial discretion; effects vary by context. |
| Lizińska & Czapiewski (2023) | Firms not threatened by FD manipulate earnings through accruals and real activities, especially under defensive working capital policies, showing active shaping of financial results. |
| Comporek & Misztal (2025) | Real EM strongly increases FD risk in Polish listed firms, particularly among firms already in the distress zone; managers use EM to avoid debt covenant breaches, maintain capital access or pursue private benefits. |
PLUM regression results with logit links: Effects of business-related variables and EQ proxies on FD risk (model with DACC)
| Variable/threshold | Estimate | Stand. error | Wald | df | p-value | VIF | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Threshold | Z-score – distress zone | 0.627 | 0.213 | 8.664 | 1 | 0.003 | - |
| Z-score – uncertain zone | 2.391 | 0.22 | 117.919 | 1 | <0.001 | - | |
| Predictors | COVID | −0.079 | 0.129 | 0.375 | 1 | 0.540 | 1.005 |
| TANG | −0.53 | 0.28 | 3.584 | 1 | 0.058 | 1.050 | |
| STL | −2.919 | 0.13 | 504.511 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.098 | |
| LEV | −0.145 | 0.021 | 48.567 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| ATO | 0.534 | 0.074 | 52.52 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.801 | |
| PM | 0.116 | 0.018 | 41.337 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| STICKYCOGS | −0.127 | 0.034 | 13.847 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.027 | |
| SMOOTH | −0.14 | 0.015 | 84.04 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.134 | |
| CONS | 0.174 | 0.022 | 64.311 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.11 | |
| DACC | 0.005 | 0.105 | 0.002 | 1 | 0.963 | 1.752 | |
| Goodness-of-fit – deviance | Model fitting information | Test of parallel lines | Cox and Snell | 0.472 | |||
| c2 | Sig. | c2 | Sig. | 0.552 | Sig. | Nagelkerke | 0.552 |
| 2,826.732 | 1.000 | 4,219.15 | <0.001 | 15.387 | 0.119 | McFadden | 0.330 |
Robustness check of PLUM regression results with Cauchit links: Effects of business-related variables and EQ proxies on FD risk
| Variable/threshold | Estimate | Stand. error | Wald | df | p-value | VIF | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Threshold | Z-score – distress zone | 0.998 | 0.203 | 24.107 | 1 | <0.001 | - |
| Predictors | COVID | −0.495 | 0.193 | 6.587 | 1 | 0.010 | 1.006 |
| TANG | 0.576 | 0.390 | 2.185 | 1 | 0.139 | 1.045 | |
| STL | −1.365 | 0.111 | 150.336 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.081 | |
| LEV | −0.040 | 0.012 | 11.880 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| ATO | 0.700 | 0.117 | 35.994 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.798 | |
| PM | 0.316 | 0.052 | 36.508 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| STICKYCOGS | −0.071 | 0.040 | 3.183 | 1 | 0.074 | 1.025 | |
| SMOOTH | −0.094 | 0.016 | 34.935 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.132 | |
| CONS | 0.003 | 0.001 | 4.221 | 1 | 0.040 | 1.096 | |
| DACC | −0.037 | 0.059 | 0.400 | 1 | 0.527 | 1.751 | |
| Goodness-of-fit – deviance | Model fitting information | Test of parallel lines | Cox and Snell | 0.194 | |||
| c2 | Sig. | c2 | Sig. | - | Nagelkerke | 0.340 | |
| 1,368.703 | 1.000 | 469.214 | <0.001 | McFadden | 0.255 | ||
Mann–Whitney U test results: Business strategies and EQ across ‘G’ INE PAN zones
| Business strategies | EQ | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. | Null hypothesis | Sig. | No. | Null hypothesis | Sig. |
| 1 | The distribution of STICKYCOGS is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | 0.181 | 1 | The distribution of SMOOTH is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | <0.001 |
| 2 | The distribution of STICKYSG&A is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | 0.411 | 2 | The distribution of CONS is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | <0.001 |
| 3 | The distribution of ATO is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | <0.001 | 3 | The distribution of DACC is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | <0.001 |
| 4 | The distribution of PM is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | <0.001 | 4 | The distribution of |DACC| is the same across different ‘G’ INE PAN zones | <0.001 |
Descriptive statistics of business strategies and EQ proxies across ‘G’ INE PAN zones
| Business strategies and proxies | Zones | Statistical measure | Value | EQ proxies | Zones | Statistical measure | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STICKYCOGS | Distress | Mean | 0.425 | SMOOTH | Distress | Mean | 4.464 |
| Median | 0.000 | Median | 1.819 | ||||
| St. dev. | 2.427 | St. dev. | 6.163 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | −0.071 | Safe | Mean | 2.035 | ||
| Median | 0.000 | Median | 0.839 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.817 | St. dev. | 4.393 | ||||
| STICKYSG&A | Distress | Mean | −0.014 | CONS | Distress | Mean | −7.323 |
| Median | 0.054 | Median | 0.000 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.354 | St. dev. | 64.953 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | −0.576 | Safe | Mean | 7.382 | ||
| Median | 0.040 | Median | 0.000 | ||||
| St. dev. | 5.998 | St. dev. | 86.785 | ||||
| ATO | Distress | Mean | 0.781 | DACC | Distress | Mean | −0.383 |
| Median | 0.520 | Median | −0.011 | ||||
| St. dev. | 0.945 | St. dev. | 10.776 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | 1.068 | Safe | Mean | 0.096 | ||
| Median | 0.810 | Median | 0.003 | ||||
| St. dev. | 4.092 | St. dev. | 3.960 | ||||
| PM | Distress | Mean | −3.228 | |DACC| | Distress | Mean | 1.151 |
| Median | −0.093 | Median | 0.057 | ||||
| St. dev. | 4.739 | St. dev. | 10.741 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | 0.036 | Safe | Mean | 0.167 | ||
| Median | 0.054 | Median | 0.045 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.763 | St. dev. | 3.995 |
Descriptive statistics of business strategies and EQ proxies across Z-score zones
| Business strategies and proxies | Zones | Statistical measure | Value | EQ proxies | Zones | Statistical measure | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STICKYCOGS | Distress | Mean | 0.349 | SMOOTH | Distress | Mean | 3.990 |
| Median | 0.000 | Median | 1.345 | ||||
| St. dev. | 2.422 | St. dev. | 5.924 | ||||
| Uncertain | Mean | −0.055 | Uncertain | Mean | 1.842 | ||
| Median | 0.000 | Median | 0.744 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.400 | St. dev. | 4.267 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | −0.101 | Safe | Mean | 2.025 | ||
| Median | 0.000 | Median | 0.856 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.877 | St. dev. | 4.354 | ||||
| STICKYSG&A | Distress | Mean | 0.109 | CONS | Distress | Mean | 3.386 |
| Median | 0.040 | Median | 0.000 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.886 | St. dev. | 119.341 | ||||
| Uncertain | Mean | −0.027 | Uncertain | Mean | 15.637 | ||
| Median | 0.000 | Median | 0.000 | ||||
| St. dev. | 2.233 | St. dev. | 126.983 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | −0.873 | Safe | Mean | 2.102 | ||
| Median | 0.063 | Median | 0.000 | ||||
| St. dev. | 7.044 | St. dev. | 34.982 | ||||
| ATO | Distress | Mean | 0.846 | DACC | Distress | Mean | −0.271 |
| Median | 0.617 | Median | −0.009 | ||||
| St. dev. | 0.938 | St. dev. | 9.110 | ||||
| Uncertain | Mean | 1.147 | Uncertain | Mean | 0.007 | ||
| Median | 1.002 | Median | 0.004 | ||||
| St. dev. | 1.016 | St. dev. | 0.119 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | 1.047 | Safe | Mean | 0.137 | ||
| Median | 0.719 | Median | 0.002 | ||||
| St. dev. | 4.896 | St. dev. | 4.781 | ||||
| PM | Distress | Mean | −2.561 | |DACC| | Distress | Mean | 0.852 |
| Median | −0.012 | Median | 0.0542 | ||||
| St. dev. | 4.388 | St. dev. | 9.061 | ||||
| Uncertain | Mean | 0.008 | Uncertain | Mean | 0.076 | ||
| Median | 0.033 | Median | 0.051 | ||||
| St. dev. | 0.331 | St. dev. | 0.091 | ||||
| Safe | Mean | −0.123 | Safe | Mean | 0.206 | ||
| Median | 0.065 | Median | 0.043 | ||||
| St. dev. | 3.350 | St. dev. | 4.771 |
PLUM regression results with Cauchit links: Effects of business-related variables and EQ proxies on FD risk (model without DACC)
| Variable/threshold | Estimate | Stand. error | Wald | df | p-value | VIF | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Threshold | Z-score – distress zone | 0.993 | 0.203 | 23.891 | 1 | <0.001 | - |
| Z-score – uncertain zone | 2.525 | 0.210 | 144.582 | 1 | <0.001 | - | |
| Predictors | COVID | −0.026 | 0.122 | 0.044 | 1 | 0.835 | 1.006 |
| TANG | −1.595 | 0.257 | 38.637 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.050 | |
| STL | −2.290 | 0.108 | 448.290 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.102 | |
| LEV | −0.145 | 0.021 | 48.029 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| ATO | 0.716 | 0.071 | 102.874 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.800 | |
| PM | 0.069 | 0.019 | 13.353 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.009 | |
| STICKYCOGS | −0.118 | 0.033 | 13.046 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.031 | |
| SMOOTH | −0.143 | 0.014 | 106.758 | 1 | <0.001 | 1.134 | |
| CONS | −0.001 | 0.001 | 4.336 | 1 | 0.037 | 1.112 | |
| Goodness-of-fit – deviance | Model fitting information | Test of parallel lines | Cox and Snell | 0.406 | |||
| c2 | Sig. | c2 | Sig. | c2 | Sig. | Nagelkerke | 0.474 |
| 3,157.575 | 1.000 | 1,202.878 | <0.001 | 6.992 | 0.638 | McFadden | 0.269 |
