Graph 1
Graph 2
Graph 3
Average substitution and income effects from all four experiments
| Substitution effect (for $/h) | Income effect (for $1 000) | |
|---|---|---|
| Husbands | 45 (0.08) | −25 (−0.10) |
| Wives | 101 (0.17) | −22 (−0.06) |
| Single female heads | 78 (0.13) | −55 (−0.16) |
| Substitution and income elasticities in parentheses | ||
Inequalities in Iran (Gini index)
| Year | Expenses per capita | Income per capita |
|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 0.421 | 0.414 |
| 2010 | 0.415 | 0.414 |
| 2011 | 0.382 | 0.367 |
| 2012 | 0.375 | 0.367 |
Work and welfare – a possible situation 1
| Gross Income | Tax | Transfers | BIG | Net Income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Person 1 | $500 000 | $136 800 | $0 | $0 | $363 200 |
| Person 2 | $200 000 | $46 800 | $0 | $0 | $153 200 |
| Person 3 | $100 000 | $16 800 | $0 | $0 | $83 200 |
| Person 4 | $10 000 | $0 | $6 000 | $0 | $16 000 |
| Person 5 | $0 | $0 | $16 000 | $0 | $16 000 |
| Together: $200 400 | Together: $22 000 | Together: $0 | |||
| Government’s net revenue: $178 400 | |||||
Influence of the basic income guarantee
| Predicted positive effects | Predicted negative effects |
|---|---|
| It might increase work incentives (Effect 1#) | Might increase work disincentives (Effect 2) |
| As a cash transfer much more efficient than in-kind | In case of keeping budget-neutrality a very small size of a payment |
| Will increase stability on labour market | A bigger payment requires tax increase → a work disincentive |
| Lower administrative costs than in current programmes | Higher taxes → a bigger deadweight loss |
| Less exclusive and humiliating for recipients | After BIG implementation the needy might loose |
Monthly basic income guarantee per capita equal to current aggregated social services and tax allowances
| Adult | Child (<18) | Poverty line for an individual | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Finland | €527 | €316 | €1074 |
| France | €456 | €100 | €909 |
| Italy | €158 | €158 | €737 |
| Great Britain | £230 | £189 | £702 |
Poverty rate and poverty gap in Iran (percentage)
| Year | Poverty rate | Poverty gap | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Countryside | Cities | Teheran | Total | Countryside | Cities | Teheran | Total | |
| 2009 | 13.4 | 9.8 | 6.2 | 10.2 | 4.0 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 2.8 |
| 2010 | 10.3 | 7.2 | 5.6 | 7.8 | 2.9 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| 2011 | 6.3 | 5.2 | 2.8 | 5.2 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 1.2 |
| 2012 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
Work and welfare – possible situation 2
| Gross Income | Tax | Transfers | BIG | Net Income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Person 1 | $500 000 | $153 120 | $0 | $16 000 | $362 800 |
| Person 2 | $200 000 | $57 120 | $0 | $16 000 | $158 880 |
| Person 3 | $100 000 | $25 120 | $0 | $16 000 | $90 880 |
| Person 4 | $10 000 | $5 200 | $0 | $16 000 | $20 800 |
| Person 5 | $0 | $3 200 | $0 | $16 000 | $12 800 |
| Together: $243 760 | Together: $0 | Together: $80 000 | |||
| Government’s net revenue: $163 760 | |||||
Labour supply changes due to the negative income tax
| Worked hours (yearly) | Employment rate | |
|---|---|---|
| Husbands | −89 (−5%) | −0.3 (−3.5%) |
| Wives | −117 (−21.1%) | −0.6 (−22.5%) |
| Single female heads | −123 (−13.2%) | −0.7 (−15.7%) |
| Youths | −173 (−22.2%) | −0.9 (−20%) |
| In parentheses percentage change | ||