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Contemporary Challenges to Constitutionalism Cover
By: Hanna Suchocka  
Open Access
|Jul 2025

References

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Language: English
Page range: 3 - 13
Published on: Jul 17, 2025
Published by: Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy and the Faculty of Law of Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania)
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 2 issues per year

© 2025 Hanna Suchocka, published by Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy and the Faculty of Law of Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania)
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