A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games

Tamás László Balogh; János Kormos

doi:10.2478/ausi-2014-0019

Abstract

Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.

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A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games

Abstract

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