1. Introduction
This article explores the intersections of representation, temporality, and the logocentric ordering of thought, taking Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll’s House as a starting point. It examines how Nora, the play’s main character, negotiates recognition and agency within Norwegian society, and the article consecutively identifies three forms of systematically silenced voices. The first concerns those constrained by essential conditions, as in Nora’s own case. The second involves voices deferred in time, including children or “future generations” in Hans Jonas’s framework. The third comprises entities excluded on ontological grounds, such as non-human animals and nature, whose expressions are dismissed a priori.
These exclusions reveal a broader logic in which the capacity for representation is narrowly confined to human speech, exposing an anthropocentric and logocentric hierarchy. This structure shapes whose perspectives are deemed legitimate and whose claims are systematically overlooked, raising critical questions about the limits of recognition and the ethical weight of silenced voices. The article argues that the exclusion of many such categories from representation reflects a logocentric and anthropocentric bias, rooted in the presumption that “voice” must be identified with human, “civilized” language – an assumption that merely reflects the particularity, rather than the moral uniqueness, of the human mode of existence (Kim 2020).
From this perspective, the central question of this inquiry may be formulated as follows: if Nora, as a temporal subject, can articulate claims that evolve over time, why should such openness not be extended to non-human beings and ecological systems as well? Yet, if we do embrace this openness, do we not inevitably confront an excessively broad understanding of representation? Is it not the case that meaning can only be grasped within a temporal frame – or, more precisely, within what the article designates as presentism? The article’s positioning at the intersection of representation, temporality, and responsibility is indicative of a deliberate engagement with these tensions, culminating in a challenging of the boundaries of who – or what – counts as a legitimate bearer of claims.
However, I consider it necessary to provide the reader first with a brief insight into the problem of representation in political theory, as well as to answer the question how this article understands the term representation itself.
From a constructivist perspective (Saward 2006, 2010; Disch 2015; Disch 2011; Disch et al., 2019; Disch 2021) critiques have been advanced against the traditional conception of representation as a fixed relationship between a pre-existing, objectively defined constituency and its representatives, whose task is assumed to be the “mirroring” of prior demands (Pitkin 1967; Urbinati 2006). Constructivist approaches, drawing in part on postmodernist accounts of fragmentation (Bauman 2007; Castoriadis, Curtis 1997) argue instead that representational claims are to be seen as a process of constant negotiation, performance, and reconfiguration of positions and identities (de Wilde 2013). Critics, however, note that constructivism risks defining representation too broadly (Schweber 2016; Wolkenstein 2021).
To complicate matters further, I do not confine my inquiry, as I have already stated, to the realm of human beings. Instead, I extend the scope of investigation in an all-encompassing manner, asking how – and whether – animals, other living beings in general, and nature in the broadest sense might be represented. Such an expansive approach is undoubtedly problematic, as it entails drawing connections between phenomena as disparate as the voice of an adult human and the representation of a river. Nevertheless, this broadened framework may generate unexpected connections and disquieting analogies, while cultivating – above all – an awareness that human existence is always embedded within a more-than-human whole, a dimension too easily overlooked.
In adopting this stance, Latour’s notion of a “flat ontology,” which rejects essential distinctions between humans and non-humans (Latour 2018; Brown 2017), together with ecological and non-anthropocentric perspectives (Mengozzi 2024, p. 63), provides a crucial point of inspiration. Complementary insights are offered by actor-network theory, new materialism, and vital materialism (Bennett 2010; Latour 1987; Grosz 2010), as well as by post-humanist accounts of agency (Gallagher 2019a), all of which contribute to rethinking the scope and meaning of representation beyond the human. Finally, my adoption of a holistic approach also derives from a deliberate opposition to the hyper-specialization that increasingly characterizes academic inquiry (Ryan & Flinders 2018).
The concept of political representation, as I understand it, rests on the assumption of the existence of a claim – without, at this stage, specifying the manner of its construction – that is articulated through various channels (which I term “voice”) and, in an ideal scenario, possesses the capacity to transform the ways in which relations within human action (in the polis) are constituted and enacted.1 In the absence of such transformative potential, representation may be regarded as unsuccessful or, indeed, as not existing at all.
One might counterargue that such a definition is excessively broad, rendering virtually any human (and even non-human) act a form of representation. My response to this objection is unequivocally affirmative. Indeed, one of the central arguments of this text is precisely that what we conventionally perceive as political representation is not an inherent or ontologically fixed category, but rather the product of historically contingent modes of thought, rather than any form of theological establishment of the “purpose” of representation.
This also explains my decision to examine the cases of Nora, children, future persons, living animals, and so-called “nonliving” nature. These categories are intended to demonstrate a shared underlying logic and analogous problems of reasoning, while also suggesting that the representation of claims can be conceptualized in broadly similar terms across these domains.
At the same time, the sequence of cases is deliberately structured to move from what appears to us – postmodern observers – as a relatively “natural” and “obvious” instance of injustice, namely, the silencing of women, toward the far more contested and problematic issue of representing nature. In doing so, I aim to highlight the possibility that our present (in)capacity to articulate such representation may, in the retrospect of the far future, come to be regarded as a form of “barbarism,” much as we now judge the patriarchal structures of the past.
I do not regard this broader conceptualization as a weakness or deficiency of the argument; on the contrary, it is its strength. Freed from the constraints of rigid definitional boundaries, we are able to recognize that every definition constitutes a non-essential, provisional decision to perceive something in a particular way. It is precisely our willingness to depart from established definitions that enables us to uncover their constructed and fabricated nature.
The article is structured as follows. The first section examines the role of the main character, Nora, in Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House, offering alternative interpretations to the view of Nora as a young woman without a voice. The second section turns to children and to what Hans Jonas calls “future people,” asking how we might conceptualize the voices of those who are either considered as temporally insufficiently developed (children) or who exist only as potentiality (future generations). The third section considers animals and nature. However broad this category may be, its members are all, in varying degrees, autonomous, mobile, reactive, and in some cases, even capable of producing acts, that we are already used to perceive as recognizable forms of voice (e.g. barking in the case of dogs). Structurally, I distinguish three cases: ontological or essential suspension of voice (Nora is not to be heard – to put it simply – because she is a woman); temporal suspension of voice (children are not to be heard, although they will eventually cease to occupy such a position); and ontological non-existence of voice (animals and nature express themselves through modes that are, in a sense, unrecognizable from a logocentric perspective).
2. Case of Nora – suspension of voice based on essentiality
Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll’s House (1879) is one of the foundational works of modern drama and is frequently read as an early critique of bourgeois marriage and nineteenth-century gender norms. Set within a respectable Norwegian middle-class household (Qi 2017), the play traces the gradual disintegration of the seemingly ideal marriage between Nora and Torvald Helmer. From a feminist perspective, the drama can be understood as exposing the paternalistic structures through which female subjectivity is constrained and infantilized within patriarchal domestic life (Akter 2021).
According to these “classical” feminist readings, Nora appears, at first, as a dutiful wife and mother living in a comfortable, bourgeois household (Qi 2017). However, it gradually becomes clear that her life is built on a hidden act of independence: years earlier, she secretly borrowed money to save her husband Torvald Helmer’s health, forging her father’s signature. Although she believes she acted out of love and necessity, her secret places her in a vulnerable position and exposes the limits of her autonomy within a patriarchal society. As the play unfolds, Nora realizes that her marriage rests not on equality but on control, and that Torvald values her more as an object of affection (as a “doll”) than as an independent person. In the famous ending, she leaves her husband and children to discover her identity and voice.
Within a Norwegian patriarchal order that polices the boundaries of legitimate agency, Nora is structurally denied any recognized channel through which to articulate desire without incurring moral penalty. The forgery thus operates as a clandestine, normatively unsanctioned surrogate for speech: an extra-legal performative that attempts to translate care into action while unavoidably contaminating the purity of its motivating intention. In this sense, the scene dramatizes a structural double bind: love must be enacted through instruments the same order deems illicit, producing a form of structure-induced complicity in which agency appears only in compromised guise.
If Nora’s voice can surface only through such “minor evils of necessity,” this condition may be understood, in the first instance, as indexing the subalternity of her position, in which authorized channels are foreclosed and speech is effectively ventriloquized through improper forms. At the same time, however, it also points to a more general condition of representation as such: namely, a necessarily imperfect mediation in which intention and expression never fully coincide without remainder. The act of forgery can therefore be read simultaneously as a symptom of patriarchal silencing and as an allegory of representation’s ineradicable incompleteness, wherein action in the world is always negotiated through impure means under normatively sanctioned constraints.
Nora’s resolution aligns more closely with what Nancy Fraser would describe as an affirmative strategy of inclusion rather than a transformative reconfiguration2 of the order (Fraser 1997). Politically speaking, the decision staged at the play’s end is not to contest the masculinized architecture of the liberal, patriarchal public sphere but to enter it:3 to become an independent actor recognized as a subject who, ideally, need no longer resort to illicit surrogates of speech such as forgery to give effect to her desires. Yet precisely in adopting the authorized scripts of independence, the figure of Nora reveals how “independence” is normatively predicated upon masculine-coded practices of self-expression and upon access to the socio-economic position historically reserved for men (Derrida 1986). When a woman is permitted to do the same, independence is presumed; when she is not, the task set before her is to attain that position. In such a case, representation is tied to the ability to enact it through very specific forms of action; if this condition is not met, the subject is understood as excluded from representation.
We will now outline three distinct hypothetical hermeneutical scenarios (A, B, and C) that serve to elucidate the possible readings of Nora’s behaviour:
A) In the first scenario, consistent with the “classical”4 conception of representation, Nora’s authentic desires – the “true” Nora – are presumed to exist prior to their articulation, merely awaiting discovery and expression. Her decision to leave her husband thus appears as a straightforward act of representation: her desire for freedom is perfectly mirrored in the performative gesture of voicing this claim through the physical act of departure.
B) The forgery can simultaneously be interpreted as a cause, rather than merely a symptom, of Nora’s future disillusionment. If her love cannot be expressed in morally unproblematic terms, then it cannot be considered a “pure” love. The incompleteness of representation, therefore, is not due to flaws in the process itself, which might supposedly distort the represented. Rather, it stems from the essential imperfection of what is being represented. Put simply, there is no such thing as pure love or pure freedom. In this sense, Nora is unable to confront the unavoidable imperfection of life. It is no coincidence that the play concludes as it does. Nora may not achieve happiness or freedom even after asserting her “independence,” precisely because such states exist only in the idealized realm of her imagination.5 However, the “imperfection” of the representation is then the perfect mirroring of the imperfection of what is being represented.
C) In the final scenario, consistent with a constructivist perspective, Nora’s claims are constituted through the very process of representation (Fossen 2019). There is nothing pre-existing to be discovered; her discontent is produced in the act of articulating her voice. Nonetheless, insofar as Nora is always in a state of becoming, her demands can be critically interrogated from the point of presentism.
To recall the focus of our inquiry, the problem of Nora’s claims changing over time, I focus on the problem of presentism.6 In claiming her independence, Nora must effectively disregard her past self, who understood the situation differently. This past Nora – or the fiction of her prior happiness – must be rendered silent. Which temporal index of subjectivity – her current disenchantment, her former convictions, or her idealized future – should serve as the basis for representation, and on what grounds?
Does Nora’s recourse to masculine-coded modes of agency simply reproduce the very representational structures that once silenced her? After all, we are always “victims of expression” (Laugier 2015, p. 78). Language, in this context, is never entirely her own; it is simultaneously “theirs” (Laugier 2015, p. 65). Nora may, perhaps unknowingly, accept a language, a voice, and a set of claims that are not entirely her own (if there is anything truly one’s own at all). In this respect, her experience resembles that of children, who are “educated” to adopt socially sanctioned modes of behaviour.
3. Temporal suspension of voice
Nora’s character in the play illustrates a subject who is structurally denied the position she seeks – regardless of the purported legitimacy of that aspiration – yet who nonetheless retains the capacity for agency in the present. Her non-representation is not merely contingent or temporary; it is framed as ontological and essentialized. Within a patriarchal order, her status as a woman is taken to preclude parity with men and thereby to foreclose her political standing.
I now turn to two instances that exemplify what I propose to call the temporal dimension of the suspension of voice. Unlike Nora’s ontologized exclusion, the silencing at issue here is indexed to temporality rather than essentialized in terms of identity – though, to be sure, both categories are invariably at play. The first concerns children whose voices are withheld on the grounds of presumed developmental incapacity. The second concerns “future people,” whose interests are profoundly shaped by present decisions, yet who cannot participate directly (or at least as directly as the present people can) by virtue of their non-existence (Thompson 2010; von Uexkull 2009).
Standard approaches to children often describe them as “emerging persons” who are “not yet themselves” (Schapiro 2003, pp. 577, 590). Children are considered to lack the sufficiently developed capacities necessary for moral and responsible agency (Malone et al. 2020). In this view, they are depicted as marginal agents, agents-in-waiting, or non-agents who require paternalistic care. The very same dynamic can be identified in Torvald’s relation to Nora, although in the case of children, the temporal dimension is more significant than the question of essence. Moreover, these approaches typically evaluate development in accordance with universalized behavioural models, which tend to overlook the complexity and non-uniformity of individual children’s trajectories (Carnevale 2021, p. 794). Such frameworks have been criticized from various perspectives, including relational views of agency and approaches that treat childhood more as a social construct than a physical, objective reality (Burroughs 2020, p. 86; Carnevale 2021, pp. 792–793).
For us, the standard approaches are of the main interest. Children are educated in such a way as to reach a state of mind in which they may become actors capable of discerning and articulating their own desires. It is assumed that mere existence is insufficient for creating the claims of representation: one must attain a certain state in which claims can be formulated appropriately – i.e. like an adult (see Foucault´s term of gouvernementalité, Burchell et al. 1991). But ontological, epistemological, and level of values are fundamentally interwoven (Merçon 2025). The tools by which we describe the world are, at the same time, constructing the frame of what can be thought of at all. In other words, not every demand warrant representation or even being heard; some of the child’s claims are designated as illegitimate, and in this sense, not claims at all, properly because they are non-expressible by the “adult” version of logos.
However, after all, children, in some sense, are able to express themselves. Future persons, by contrast, cannot. Their demands must be inferred from assumptions about continuity – or the presumed analogy – between past, present, and future. In the cases of Nora and children, a relationship exists between the actual existence of these entities and our imaginative constructions of what they are claiming to represent and how they are presumed to do so. In this sense, the debate more closely resembles cases B and C, as described earlier in the discussion of Nora (see pp. 6–7 of this paper). Future people, contrastingly, exist only as constructs within our minds. This is further complicated by the fact that “future people” cannot be treated as a uniform or clearly delimited entity (for a generational approach to solve this issue, see Brännmark 2015, pp. 686–687).
We cannot discern their potential perspective on the world. In the context of ecological catastrophe, for example, it is conceivable that future humans might regard self-destruction as humanity’s ultimate telos. In that case, their demands for representation would be directly opposed to Hans Jonas’s assumption (Jonas 1997) that we ought to act to preserve the possibility of an authentically human life.7 Epistemic violence is unavoidable here: representing such future demands today – such as a moral duty to destroy humanity – would simultaneously eliminate the possibility of these future generations existing at all. In other words, the existence of the demand, if applied now, entails the self-destruction of the very possibility of that demand. To give them voice now would mean to constrain them from having a voice and in this sense, their representability automatically leads to their non-representability. In this case, “silencing” future people could paradoxically be understood as representing them adequately – namely, if their hypothetical will would choose self-destruction. In this respect, the situation resembles the patriarchal presumption that society already knows what women should think (and the logic of representation therefore more closely resembles case A), irrespective of cases in which women’s actual voices diverge from these normative expectations – with the obvious difference that future people do not yet exist. From our perspective only,8 however, this distinction is ultimately irrelevant: we can never know, by any means, what future persons will actually think.
The issue is not merely articulating specific claims on behalf of future generations, but preserving the possibility that they may one day be able to formulate claims. In securing the planet for those yet to come, we are not simply safeguarding their survival; we are constructing the notion that future people are worthy of life, consideration, and representation in our present actions. Representation may be unavoidable insofar as living in time and engaging with the world inherently entails the generation of claims on behalf of others. In this respect, the case of future generations differs only in temporal terms: the “response” to our claims may take centuries to materialize, in contrast to Nora, whose requests – to put it very simply – are answered within the compressed timeframe of a single (and perhaps not entirely harmonious) family encounter. We may now turn to living beings who exist in our present yet, from a logocentric and anthropocentric perspective, are understood to lack a voice altogether.
4. Ontological non-existence of voice
The broader interest in animal rights, their agency within urban environments, and their relationships with humans have long been the subject of debate, often framed as a critique of dominant anthropocentric hegemony (Cordeiro-Rodrigues & Duan 2024; Kronenberg et al. 2025, p. 1). The term “expanded politics” has been employed to encompass a range of processes and practices that facilitate more democratic exchanges among the complex of human and non-human groups, individuals, and interests – many of which are arguably marginalized, dismissed, or simply remain unheard within dominant frameworks (Revill 2020, p. 121).
Consider the example discussed in If a Swift Could Fight for Their Existence with Words: Nonhuman Interests and Politics (Kronenberg et al. 2025). Activist Hannah Bourne-Taylor, advocating for the rights of swifts, ostensibly articulates what these birds cannot convey through human language. This argument relies on a hypothetical – and therefore non-falsifiable – assumption: what a swift might say if it were able to speak, which creates a very similar situation to the problem of the future people. Prosopopoeia9 raises a further concern, as the swifts are effectively “humanized,” ascribed human characteristics such as family, history, and attachment to its homeland (Kronenberg et al. 2025, p. 2).
Here, there is a clear risk of epistemic violence. The activist effectively fills a void in the human agora, prescribing a sense, characterization, of what swifts are, since the animals neither have the capacity nor – at least – the apparent need (apparent for us, humans) to articulate their concerns in this manner (or perhaps they are so advanced that they choose not to engage – when possible – with human civilization, which seems a reasonable position).
Importantly, the contest over who may speak for the swifts is not primarily between the represented (swifts) and the representing, but takes place within the human agora, which is exactly the burden of anthropocentrism as stated in the introduction. It is a debate among humans over how to conceptualize, interpret, and act toward non-human life. To put it in Fossen’s words, “a portrayal of something as something excludes other things that the portrayal might have been about (potential referents), and other ways in which the referent might have been portrayed (characterizations)” (Fossen 2019, p.832).
Yet this is not merely a question of speaking for the swifts; it is also, in a sense, speaking to them. While communication does not occur through human language, our interventions – shaping habitats, providing nesting sites, or protecting ecological niches – can be understood as constituting a form of dialogue. By positing the swifts’ interests, for instance, assuming they value life and reproduction (at least if we believe in Spinoza’s conatus),10 we construct conditions that allow them to act in accordance with these presumed preferences. The swifts’ “response” is realized through the patterns of life they are able to enact under these conditions (Kim 2020).11 Of course, even in this case, the burden of anthropocentric reasoning is inescapable: I am, in effect, hermeneutically constructing these “events” as instances of communication. It could also be argued – albeit from a decidedly anthropocentric perspective – that animals function as Descartes-like machines (Thomsen et al. 2023), merely reacting to their environment. In this view, the animal responds mechanically to the consequences of (human) interventions. While animals always act according to their environment, we – as meaning-creating beings – interpret these uniform responses as having distinct significance.
Animals appear to act – or, more precisely, we tend to interpret their behaviour as action – because we anthropologically establish a connection to them as atomistically perceived entities. This anthropocentric projection constitutes the primary reason why, once we accept the possibility of representing animals as actors, we encounter considerable difficulty in extending the same status to other constituencies, such as rivers or glaciers, which might, following Latour’s terminology, be understood as actants (Revill 2020; Kim 2020; Latour 2023). Within an atomistic framework, nature is reduced to a mere background against which human beings, conceived as autonomous actors, unfold their actions. Such a conception, however, is no longer sustainable once we begin to acknowledge that even human beings are better understood as actants: interwoven, relational beings rather than atomistic individuals (Gallagher 2019b).12
The distinction between internal and external, which is crucial for the atomistic conception, is thereby undermined. Consequently, the notion of expression itself is also destabilized (or perhaps expanded), since it is typically assumed that what is being expressed originates from some inner point and projects outward into the world. Human epistemic modes of perceiving the world are therefore not to be considered as qualitatively superior; rather, the logos of the human is merely one among many forms of phōnē, just as the human bios is but one among multiple modes of existence (Tønder 2015). Recent studies in bioacoustics serve as evidence supporting this view (Mengozzi 2024, p. 64).
Human modes of understanding the world – whether in relation to animal behaviour or to the functioning of nature – have historically been framed as the incapacity of non-human animals to attain a level of intelligibility defined in terms of human existence itself (Revill 2020, p. 122). Yet this anthropocentric hierarchy can be inverted: the incapacity may in fact belong to us. What evolved within our species is merely language, and it is precisely this singular development that both enables and restricts our capacity to recognize and engage with other epistemic modalities (Chakrabarty 2019, p. 29). When a human being experiences distress, the initial response may be expressed through crying, but this expression is almost immediately translated into logos – we ask what has happened, we seek reasons, we articulate causes, because crying is not understood as a bearer of significance, but rather as an invitation to inquire further into the significance behind the act of crying. Yet, there is no necessity for intelligibility to be tied exclusively to logos. A river in which life is dying, because of toxic pollution, can be understood as epistemologically expressing the same distress: its mode of signification is not verbal articulation but the alteration of its vitality. In the final section, I will attempt to trace some of these lines in a more general manner.
5. Closing perspectives: Temporality, logocentrism, and representation
Nora’s voice is constrained by essentialist notions of womanhood that dictate socially sanctioned forms of self-expression. Temporally, her experience unfolds across a trajectory from past moments of happiness perceived as false to present dissatisfaction and a future aspiration for authenticity. She articulates her claims in the present, yet they remain mediated by patriarchal norms that shape the form and the reception of her voice. Children, by contrast, inhabit a temporally relative position: their past is largely absent, and their present is a constrained rehearsal for the demands of their future selves. Their voices are suspended until they acquire socially recognized modes of expression, resulting in tension between “natural” forms of expression and adult-mediated language.
Future generations indicate an absolute temporal suspension: they do not yet exist and can only be represented indirectly through the interpretations and projections of present actors. Their voices, and the claims that might be attributed to them, are filtered through contemporary logocentric frameworks, reflecting not their own experience but the anticipatory concerns of the living.
Animals and nature further complicate the question of representation. Animals express themselves through life, behaviour, and vitality, yet within logocentric paradigms their voices are largely unrecognized and must be translated into human categories, often via prosopopoeia. Nature, similarly, exists beyond conventional human modes of expression, its claims mediated entirely through symbolic projection and anthropocentric interpretation. Temporally, animals are experienced primarily in relation to human lifespans, while nature is largely atemporal from the perspective of individual human experience.
The further we move along our spectrum from Nora toward nature, the more we tend to shift away from a constructivist framework (Nora is constantly becoming, and her demands are ever-changing, resembling case C) toward more rigorous “material” assumptions (a glacier asserts a requirement of existence and this claim is ever-lasting, resembling case A). Even within ecological critiques of the dominant anthropocentric hegemony, the temporal dimension is often diminished in favour of a more static vision of what humans are supposed to represent with regard to animals (for instance, swifts and their historical relationship to the environments they inhabit) and nature more broadly (such as rivers as pristine, life-filled spaces).
From one perspective, such an approach is entirely understandable: the frameworks for representing animals and nature remain highly uncertain, making it logical to rely on strong, well-defined conceptions of what should be represented – what could be more “robust” than the argument for a good existence? Remember Jonas’s moral imperative of a truly human life: we do not really know exactly what it means, but we can be pretty sure it points to a good life worth living.
From a tactical standpoint, it may even be counterproductive to complicate matters further by imposing rigorous constructivist approaches onto the needs of animals and ecosystems (and, in this sense, it may be sensible to embrace the logic of case B).
However, I do not speak as a tactician, but as a philosopher. I have tried to show that the problem of temporality is fundamentally intertwined with the problem of content, and vice versa. In the case of Nora (the past Nora being interpreted by the present Nora), children (subjected to instruction in proper manners), future people (who do not yet exist), and animals and nature, the basic problem becomes evident: representation is always mediated through our imagination in the present. In this sense, the apparent non-existence of future people is not so different from the other cases. We imagine what they might say if they existed in the present just as we imagine what swifts might say if they could speak human language, expressing their “feelings” about their “families,” or as Torvald imagines what Nora should say if she were the “proper” woman, and even as Nora herself imagines what the “real” Nora should do. In this sense, the content of representation can be understood as an atemporal one: we are always attempting to represent the present state of our minds.
It can be argued that the very construction of the possibilities of representation – how something can be represented – is itself already an act of representation. For instance, if we assume that future people deserve to live on a Jonas-like planet, we are representing them as particular human beings entitled to live in a specific way. Similarly, if Torvald assumes that Nora is supposed to express herself in a certain manner, he is representing her in a particular way. However, this position immediately confronts us with a counterargument concerning the creation of meaning. If we accept it, almost every human act could be considered an act of representation, and the concept of communication would become equally expansive – recall, for example, the possibility of understanding the provision of nesting sites as a form of communication with swifts. Even the attempt to confine the tools of representation to their respective domains – humans representing themselves one way, and, for various reasons, swifts representing themselves another – is ultimately bound to fail, as long as we cannot reach a definitive agreement on how to represent human beings, let alone nature.
Finally, the critique of logocentrism and anthropocentrism can never fully escape the constraints of our condition as human beings. As this text itself demonstrates, such critique is constructed through human language (English, in this case) and its inherent logic. It would be absurd, for instance, to attempt to publish these ideas by imitating chickadee calls rather than composing an academic text. Yet there is something unsettling in the fact that the very same argument – of absurdity – was effectively used to silence Nora, whose case I invoke here to question the assumed absurdity of the former – chickadee’s – case as well. The further we seek to move away from logocentrism, the more we inevitably rely on it – for instance, if I were to use chickadee calls, I would still have to explain them. By the same token, the further we move away from the present moment, the more we remain tied to it – as the example of future people illustrates.
After all, representation is in part a translation of what is meant to be conveyed – and it has long been acknowledged that tradurre è sempre tradire. This, of course, does not imply that we ought to cease our attempts to “translate” or interpret the world around us.
6. Conclusion
Representation is never a simple act of mirroring; it is always mediated, incomplete, and ethically charged. The case of Nora illustrates the extent to which she appropriates the language of a patriarchal society, revealing how her mode of representation is produced outside of her own agency. Much like children must be socialized into appropriate forms of behaviour, the practices of representation are the outcome of normative processes that shape both individuals and collectives. Some demands imposed upon representation may not only exceed actual necessity, but may even foreclose the very possibility of representation itself – as I have attempted to show in the case of “future people.” Animals and nature, if expressing themselves through vitality, behaviour, and environmental change, challenge the human-centred assumption that voice must be linguistic or logocentric. However, the case of animals and nature shows how representation frequently operates according to the logic of wishful thinking: for instance, the desire to represent a bird as a living creature worthy of protection and recognition effectively discursively constitutes the bird as such a being, one that “lives” in this way. Taken together, these cases show that speaking for and to others is an interpretive, moral, and political act: it requires humility, attentiveness to alterity, and recognition of the limits of human understanding.
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Author contributions
The author was responsible for the conceptualization, research, analysis, and writing of the manuscript.
Conflict of interest statement
Author states no conflict of interest.
