Table 1:
Role of responsible entities to develop AMPR activities.
| Responsible | Role | |
|---|---|---|
| Costa Rican National Institute of Fishing and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA) | • | Approve AMPR within two months since submission |
| • | Following of regulations and AMPRs’ objectives | |
| • | Regulating fishery, sanctioning infractions according to law | |
| • | Participate in area delimitation and approve disposals of AMPRs; modification of AMPRs’ decree. | |
| National Coastguard Service (SNG) | • | Patrolling, control and surveillance. |
| • | Illegal gear confiscation; arrestment | |
| Legal (community-based) fisher association | • | Guarantee AMPR rules compliance |
| • | Control and surveillance in coordination with SNG through a surveillance committee; report fishers’ infractions to SNG and INCOPESCA. | |
| • | Report AMPR progress to INCOPESCA through the following committee. | |
| • | Request financing for area maintenance | |
| • | Design the AMPR fishing management plan (POP) | |
| Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), research centers | • | Participation in area delimitation |
| • | Possibility of projects financing; capacity building | |
Source: Decree N° 35502-MAG 2009, Weber de Morais 2017.
Figure 1:
(A) Location of AMPRs examined in the Gulf of Nicoya [orange]. (B) Location of Costa Rica in Central America. Source: Generated by authors.
Table 2:
Semi-structured interviews conducted during field research.
| Case | Informants | Actor group | Semi-structured interviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| Isla Caballo | Association leaders | Community | 2 (M), 1(F) |
| Fishers | 15 (M), 1 (F) | ||
| Development association | Civil society/NGO | 1 (M) | |
| Equipos Básicos de Atención Integral en Salud (EBAIS) (Mobile staff in Venado, Chira, Caballo) | Public sector | 1 (M) | |
| High school director | 1 (M) | ||
| Collection centera (private) | Private sector | 1 (M), 1 (F) | |
| Palito-Montero | Association leaders and ex-leaders | Community | 12 (M), 3 (F) |
| Fishers | 16 (M), 3(F) | ||
| Development association | Civil society/NGO | 1 (M) | |
| Island syndic | 1 (M) | ||
| Collection center (private) | Private sector | 2 (M) | |
| Paquera-Tambor | Association leaders | Community | 12 (M), 1 (F) |
| Fishers | 29 (M), 2 (F) | ||
| Cámara Paquereña de Turismo (CAPATUR) (governance committee) | Civil society/NGO | 1 (F) | |
| Cobano municipality (governance committee) | Public sector | 1 (M) | |
| Collection center (association) | Community | 2 (F) | |
| Governmental agencies | Fishery and Aquaculture Costa Rican Institute (INCOPESCA) | Public sector | 3 (M) |
| National Coastguard Service (SNG) | 2 (M) | ||
| National Institute of Rural Development (INDER) | 1 (M) | ||
| Joint Institute of Social Assistance (IMAS) | 1 (M) | ||
| National Learning Institute (INA) | 1 (M) | ||
| NGO/research centers/other | National University of Costa Rica (UNA) | Civil society/NGO | 1 (M), 1 (F) |
| Cooperativa Autogestionaria de Servicios Profesionales para la Solidaridad Social (CoopeSoliDar) | 1 (F) | ||
| MarViva | 1 (M) | ||
| Asociación de Pescadores Pangueros Artesanales de Puntarenas (ASOPAPU) | 1 (M) | ||
| Collection centers (Puntarenas) | Private | 3 (M) | |
| Total | 127 |
The affiliation and actor group of each interviewee is shown in relation to each AMPR case. The gender of each individual is shown i.e. (M) Male; (F) Female.
aCollection centers are known as places to store the fish captured and sold by fishers. The collection center owners distribute and sell seafood products to the markets.
Table 3:
Social-ecological system framework adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) to fisheries management in the Gulf of Nicoya.
| Social, economic, and political settings (S) S1 – Economic development S2 – Demographic trends S2a – population tendency* S3 – Political stability S4 – Other governance systems S4a – Regulations at national/local level S5 – Markets S5a – Market stability S5b – Access to markets* S6 – Media organizations S7 – Technology S7a – Communication devices/programs | ||
| Resource systems (RS) RS1 – Sector (AMPR resources) RS2 – Clarity of system boundaries RS3 – Size of resource system RS4 – Human-constructed facilities RS5 – Productivity of system RS6 – Equilibrium properties RS7 – Predictability of system dynamics RS8 – Storage characteristics RS9 – Location Resource units (RU) RU1 – Resource unit mobility RU2 – Growth or replacement rate RU3 – Interaction among resource units RU4 – Economic value RU4a – Market value* RU5 – Number of units RU6 – Distinctive characteristics RU7 – Spatial and temporal distribution | Actors (A) A1 – Number of actors A1a – Heterogeneity A2 – Socioeconomic attributes A2a – source of incomes* A2b – access to basic services A3 – History or past experiences A4 – Location A5 – Leadership/entrepreneurship A6 – Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social capital A7 – Knowledge of SES/mental models A8 – Importance of resource (dependence) A8a – Economic dependence* A8b – Subsistence dependence A9 – Technologies available A9a – Heterogeneity (e.g. gears/equipment) | Governance systems (GS) GS1 – Government organizations GS1a – Support in funding* GS1b – capacity building GS1c – support in legal procedures GS2 – Nongovernment organizations GS2a – Support in funding GS2b – Capacity building* GS2c – support in legal procedures GS3 – Network structure GS3a – vertical* GS3b – horizontal* GS4 – Property-rights systems GS4a – Formal GS4b – Informal GS5 – Operational-choice rules GS5a – formal GS5b – informal GS6 – Collective-choice rules GS7 – Constitutional-choice rules GS8 – Monitoring and sanctioning rules GS8a – social monitoring* GS8b – biophysical monitoring* GS8c – graduated sanctions* |
| Interactions (I) I1 – Harvesting I2 – Information sharing I3 – Deliberation processes I4 – Conflicts I4a – Conflicts among direct users* I4b – Conflicts with externals* I5 – Investment activities I6 – Lobbying activities I7 – Self-organizing activities I8 – Networking activities I9 – Monitoring activities I10 – Evaluative activities | Outcomes (O) O1 – Social performance measures O2 – Ecological performance measures O3 – Externalities to other SESs | |
| Related ecosystems (ECO) | ||
| ECO1 – Climate patterns | ECO2 – Pollution patterns | ECO3 – Flows into and out of focal SES |
Table 4:
The main social and ecological characteristics of the three AMPRs examined, organized by the second-tier variables of the SESF (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014).
| SESF | Indicator | Palito-Montero | Isla Caballo | Paquera-Tambor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RS3 – Size | AMPR size (km2) | 6.12 | 1.48 | 200 |
| Number of AMPR spatial divisions | 2 divisions | 1 division | 14 Zones distributed in 3 divisions | |
| RS9 – Location | Location of AMPR in Gulf | Large island; inner gulf | Small island; middle gulf | Mainland; outer gulf |
| GS1 – Government organizations | Number and type with more presence | INDER, INA, IMAS | IMAS, INAMU | INCOPESCA, SNG, INDER, IMAS, SINAC-MINAE, INA, INFOCOOP |
| GS2 – NGOs | Number of fisher associations | ASOPECUPACHI (hand-liners Palito) Save the Gulf (non-hand-liners) ASOMM (hand-liners Montero) | ASCOLOPES (fisher association) | ABUZPA (divers in Paquera) ASOTAMBOR (fishers in Tambor) Asopesplayablanca (fishers in Playa Blanca) APEP (fishers in Paquera) ASPARMAR (AMPR association) |
| Other user associations | Asociación Ecoturística Damas de Chira | No | CATUCO (Cobano Tourism) CAPATUR (Paquera Tourism) | |
| Fisher cooperatives | No | No | COOPEPROMAR (AMPR cooperative) | |
| Other | Development association (AD) | Development association (AD) | MarViva, Pretoma | |
| GS5 – Operational rules | AMPR rules | Hand-line only Three-pronged hook forbidden Aquaculture allowed | Hand-lines Fishing traps Seine nets Aquaculture in the future | Shrimp gillnets 3–3.5″, fin fish gillnet 3.5–8″, lobster gillnet 5 1/8″ with restricted length and height Hand-line with hook size #10, #9 and #12 and with live bait Bottom longline with 500 hooks and size #7 and #8 Fishing traps Recreational diving Commercial diving with equipment restrictions Sport fishing (fishing rod) No fishing zones Other (Gears restrictions depending on zones) |
| A1 – Number of actors | Actors groups | Fishers, community, researchers | Fishers, community | Fishers, divers, tourism sector, community, researchers, municipality |
| Estimated community population | 3000 (on island) | 350 (on island) | Undetermined but more than others | |
| Number of local fishers | 120 (In AMPR zone) | 70–90 (on island) | More than 150 (in AMPR zone) | |
| A2 – Socioeconomic attributes | Level of heterogeneity between actors/groups | Little social and economic heterogeneity between actors (i.e. some wealthy actors) | More social and economic homogeneity between fishers | Economic and social heterogeneity between actor (i.e. different wealthy actors) |
| Access to basic services | Presence of basic services, including freshwater, electricity, education. Irregular health service Absence of waste disposal | Absence of most services including electricity, freshwater and waste disposal. Irregular health service | Presence of basic services including freshwater, electricity and education | |
| A3 – History | Initial efforts | Efforts since 1995. First AMPR legally created in 2009; extended in 2012 | Initial conservation efforts in 2007; created in 2012 | Efforts began in Paquera sector. Initial proposal in 2011. AMPR created in 2014 |
| A5 – Leadership/Entrepreneurship | Leadership in local associations | Some local leaders self-organizing | Few local leaders self-organizing | Different local leaders self-organizing, self-creation of a governance committee |
| Own cooperative/collection centers | two non-functional collection centers | No | Yes, own cooperativeThree functional collection centers | |
| A8 – Dependence | Alternative livelihood options | Aquaculture (in AMPR) Livestock Rural tourism Familiar stores | Minimal rural tourism | Tourism Agriculture/livestock Construction Recreational fishing Aquaculture |
| A9 – Technology | Fishing gear with more use | Hand-line (main) GillnetsLong-line | Artisanal seine nets; gillnets (main) Longline and hand-line | Bottom longline Gillnet |
Table 5:
Common drivers motivating collective action to establish all three AMPRs.
| Common drivers to establish AMPRs across cases | Desired outcome | |
|---|---|---|
| Want to restrict fishing gears and activities (GS4; GS5) with negative impact | • | Protect fishing grounds to increase fish population (RS5), to secure income and sustain their livelihoods over time (A8a; b) |
| Want to improve livelihoods (A2) | • | Trade fish/other products with an additional value (RU4a). |
| • | Reduce intermediaries, increase access to markets (S5b) (Collection centers construction promoted by the NGO MarViva through funding from Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) for this purpose) | |
| Want to develop alternative livelihoods (A8) | • | Generate alternative source of incomes (A2a), such as aquaculture or tourism projects |
| • | Reduce dependence on fishery (A8a) | |
Table 6:
Key variables influencing collective action in each AMPR.
| Ordinal value | Influence on CA | Ordinal value | Influence on CA | Ordinal value | Influence on CA | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clarity of system boundaries (RS2) | Clear spatial boundaries increase likelihood of CA. Easier to tell who is in or out, and to monitor | Partially |  | Unclear | | Partially | |
| Size of resource system (RS3) | Larger areas provide enough resource availability, increasing the likelihood of CA | Small | | Small | | Large |  |
| Smaller areas are easier to monitor as transaction costs decrease, increasing the likelihood of CA. Very large areas are difficult to monitor as transaction costs increase, decreasing the likelihood of CA | Small | | Small | | Large | | |
| Operational rules (GS5) | Formal rules chosen by local actors are implemented, increasing the likelihood of CA | Partially | | Absent | | Partially | |
| Collective-choice rules (GS6) | Allowance of local actors (i.e. fishers using multiple gear types) to participate in designing or modifying rules increases the likelihood of CA | Low | | Low | | Medium | |
| Monitoring and sanctioning (GS8) | Presence of monitoring and graduated sanctioning mechanisms facilitate rule compliances and increases the likelihood of CA. | Presence | | Absence | | Absence | |
| Number of actors (A1) | As the number of actor groups increases, it is more likely that they have heterogeneous interests and practices, making it more difficult to create consensus and agreements. This decreases the likelihood of CA. | Small | | Small | – | Large | |
| As the number of actor groups increase, transaction costs (i.e. monitoring, communication and coordination) increase. This decreases the likelihood of CA. | Small | | Small | | Large | | |
| Socioeconomic attributes (A2) | Economic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of CA (i.e. Wealthy actors can afford transaction costs or invest). | Medium | | Low | | High | |
| History and past experiences (A3) | High frequency of negative experiences with management affects actor’s behavior, decreasing the likelihood of CA. | High | | High | | Medium | |
| Location (A4) | Actors located far apart increases transaction costs (e.g. monitoring, getting together), decreasing the likelihood of CA. | Close | | Close | – | Far | |
| Leadership/entrepreneurship (A5) | Strong leadership and entrepreneurial skills increase the likelihood of CA. | Weak | | Weak | | Strong | |
| Trust/social capital (A6) | High to moderate levels of confidence and close relationship among local actors is likely to increase CA. | Low | | Low | | Medium | |
| Dependence (A8) | High dependence on AMPR resources to obtain incomes and sustain livelihoods increases the likelihood of CA. | High | | Low | | Medium | |
Figure 2:
Buoys damaged in Palito-Montero AMPR (left); oyster aquaculture developed by women in Palito (right).
Figure 3:
A fisher from Isla Caballo displaced to AMPR Distrito Paquera-Tambor and harvested two ‘queen croaker’ (Cynoscion albus) with hand-line gear (left). Water distribution from Puntarenas city to the island (right).
Figure 4:
Association collection center in Playa Blanca sector delivering fish to Puntarenas (left). Meetings for decision-making in Paquera-Tambor, led by the president of the cooperative (standing right).
Appendix 1:
Indicators developed for the measurement of the variables.
| Variable | Theoretical statement of CA | Source: adapted from | Ordinal value description |
| Clarity of system boundaries (RS2) | Clear spatial boundaries increase likelihood of CA. Easier to tell who is in or out, and to monitor | Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010; Basurto et al. 2013; Trimble and Berkes 2015; London et al. 2017 | Clear: geographic and social boundaries are well-defined, making feasible to identify who is in or out Partially: geographic and social boundaries are not clear enough, but some structures (e.g. buoys) and limitations remain identifying who is in or out Unclear: unclear geographical and social boundaries make infeasible to identify who is in or out |
| Size of resource system (RS3) | Larger areas provide enough resource availability, increasing the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 2009 | Small: Perception of a small-size resource system Medium: Perception of a medium-size resource system Large: Perception of a large-size resource system |
| Smaller areas are easier to monitor as transaction costs decrease, increasing the likelihood of CA. Larger areas are difficult to monitor as transaction costs increase, decreasing the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 2009 | Small: Perception of a small-size resource system Medium: Perception of a medium-size resource system Large: Perception of a large-size resource system | |
| Operational rules (GS5) | Formal rules chosen by local actors are implemented, increasing the likelihood of CA | Basurto et al. 2013 | Present: Rules are operating in a maximum or total degree Partially: Rules are still operating at certain degree Absent: Rules are operating in a minimum or null degree |
| Collective-choice rules (GS6) | Allowance of local actors (i.e. fishers using multiple gear types) to participate in designing or modifying rules increases the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010 | Low: Participation of local actors in decision making is minimal or null Medium: Participation of local actors in decision making is moderate High: Participation of local actors in decision making is maximal |
| Monitoring and sanctioning (GS8) | Presence of monitoring and graduated sanctioning mechanisms facilitate rule compliances and increases the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy et al. 2001 | Absence: Minimal efforts are taken to patrol illegal activities within the AMPR, and to apply graduated sanctions for assuring rule compliance. Partially: Efforts are taken but not enough to patrol illegal activities within the AMPR. Enforcement and gradual sanctions mechanisms are sometimes applied with actors that disrespect rules. Presence: Constant efforts are taken to patrol illegal activities within the AMPR. Enforcement and gradual sanctions mechanisms are applied with actors that disrespect rules. |
| Number of actors (A1) | As the number of actor groups increases, it is more likely that they have heterogeneous interests and practices, making it more difficult to create consensus and agreements. This decreases the likelihood of CA | Vedeld 2000; Ostrom 2009; SESMAD 2014 | Small: Description of reduced group size with common interests Medium: Description of moderate-size group with some common interests Large: Description of an extensive group size with different interests |
| As the number of actor groups increase, transaction costs (i.e. monitoring, communication and coordination) increase. This decreases the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 2009 | Small: Description of reduced group Medium: Description of moderate-size group Large: Description of an extensive group size | |
| Socioeconomic attributes (A2) | Economic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of CA (i.e. Wealthy actors can afford transaction costs or invest) | Poteete and Ostrom 2004 | Low: Economic wealth is very similar among actors Medium: Economic wealth is more or less similar High: Economic wealth of actors is different among actors |
| History and past experiences (A3) | High frequency of negative experiences with management affects actors’ behavior, decreasing the likelihood of CA | Torres Guevara et al. 2016; London et al. 2017 | Low: negative experiences among actors have rarely occurred and have not significantly affected actors’ behavior Medium: negative experiences among actors have often occurred and has affected actors’ behavior but not significantly High: negative experiences among actors have occurred more frequently and have significantly affected actors’ behavior |
| Location (A4) | Actors located far apart increases transaction costs (e.g. monitoring, getting together, access to markets), decreasing the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 2009 | Close: Description that location of actors is proximate to each other Far: Description that location of actors is distant from each other |
| Leadership/entrepreneurship (A5) | Strong leadership and entrepreneurial skills increase the likelihood of CA | Vedeld 2000; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Ostrom 2009; Gutiérrez et al. 2011 | Weak: Lack of leadership skills, disagreement with leader actions or actors neglecting to follow leaders Strong: Presence of leadership skills has positive effect on requesting institutional support and being followed and respected by actors |
| Trust/social capital (A6) | High to moderate levels of confidence and close relationship among local actors is likely to increase CA | Cinner et al. 2012; Basurto et al. 2013 | Low: Negative or little confidence, and/or conflictive relationship among actors Medium: Confidence and relationship among actors is intermediate High: Positive confidence or close relationship among actors |
| Dependence (A8) | High dependence on AMPR resources to obtain income and sustain livelihoods increases the likelihood of CA | Ostrom 2009; Basurto et al. 2013 | Low: Negative or little dependence on AMPR fishing resources Medium: Intermediate dependence on AMPR fishing resources High: Positive or strong dependence on AMPR fishing resources |