Table 1:
Evidence of uncertainty effects and positional effects in sequential resource dilemmas.
| Sequential | Positional | Cumulative | Self-paced sequential | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Is the request position known? | Yes | Yes | No | Yes (endogenous) |
| Is the precedent aggregate request known? | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| [Uncertainty Effect]/[Position Effect] | ||||
| Budescu et al. (1992) | [+]/[Yes] | |||
| Budescu et al. (1995a) | [NA]/[Yes] | |||
| Budescu et al. (1995b) | [+]/[Yes] | [+]/[Mixed] | ||
| Suleiman et al. (1996)a | [+]/[Yes] | |||
| Budescu et al. (1997) | [NA]/[Yes] | [NA]/[Yes] | [NA]/[Yes] | |
| Budescu and Au (2002) | [NA]/[Yes] | [NA]/[Yes] | ||
| Au and Ngai (2003)b | [–]/[Yes] | [–]/[Yes] |
aFixed positions in the sequential protocol; bUncertainty in group size rather than in stock size.
The top panel of Table 1 shows the taxonomy of sequential resource dilemmas as a function of the informational structure. The bottom panel of Table 1 lists studies employing at least one of these sequential games. I report, for every game covered in each study, whether uncertainty had a positive [+] or negative [−] effect on the individual requests. Studies without any variation in environmental uncertainty are reported as [NA].
Figure 1:
Summary of the effects of environmental uncertainty on efficiency. Each study is represented in a colored box (pink for coordination games and blue for cooperation games), with the authors’ names and year of publication, the source of environmental uncertainty (in bold); and whether the uncertainty was measurable as risk (box with continuous border), or unmeasurable (box with dashed border). A small icon on the lower right side indicates whether each study’s manipulation of uncertainty leads to an increase, a decrease or has no effect on the efficiency levels. Boxes without such icons indicate that the experimental design manipulates uncertainty, but its effect on efficiency was not directly tested. I list studies chronologically from left to right according to the first time each source of uncertainty was experimentally tested. Coordination games are displayed on top, whereas cooperation games are displayed at the bottom.
Table A1:
Studies included in the survey analysis.
| Year | Title | Authors | Journal | Search engine | Search terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Effects of Threshold Uncertainty on Common-Pool Resources. | Adler | Working paper | E | (CU) |
| 2013 | Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game. | Anderies et al. | ECOL ECON | G | (CUE) |
| 2006 | Does information matter in the commons? Experimental evidence. | Apesteguia | J ECON BEHAV ORGAN | G | (CUE) |
| 2003 | Effects of group size uncertainty and protocol of play in a common pool resource dilemma. | Au and Ngai | GROUP PROCESS INTERG | G | (CUE) |
| 2012 | Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty. | Barrett and Dannenberg | PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. | G | (TUE) |
| 2013 | Linking appropriation of common resources and provision of public goods decreases rate of destruction of the commons. | Botelho et al. | Working paper | E | (CU) |
| 2014 | Time and uncertainty in resource dilemmas: equilibrium solutions and experimental results. | Botelho et al. | EXP ECON | G | (RUE) |
| 1997 | Effects of protocol of play and social orientation on behavior in sequential resource dilemmas. | Budescu et al. | ORGAN BEHAV HUM DEC | G | (CUE) |
| 1995 | Common pool resource dilemmas under uncertainty: qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions. | Budescu et al. | GAME ECON BEHAV | G | (CU) |
| 1990 | Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players. | Budescu et al. | EUR J SOC PSYCHOL | G | (CUE) |
| 1992 | Simultaneous vs. sequential requests in resource dilemmas with incomplete information. | Budescu et al. | ACTA PSYCHOL | G | (RUE) |
| 2002 | A model of sequential effects in common pool resource dilemmas. | Budescu et al. | J BEHAV DECIS MAKING | G | (CUE) |
| 1995 | Positional order and group size effects in resource dilemmas with uncertain resources. | Budescu et al. | ORGAN BEHAV HUM DEC | G | (CUE) |
| 2002 | Individual response, information, and intergenerational common pool problems. | Chermak and Krause | J ENVIRON ECON MANAG | G | (CUE) |
| 2008 | How many of us are there ’: Group size uncertainty and social value orientations in common resource dilemmas. | de Kwaadsteniet et al. | GROUP PROCESS INTERG | G | (RUE) |
| 2007 | Justifying decisions in social dilemmas: Justification pressures and tacit coordination under environmental uncertainty. | de Kwaadsteniet et al. | PERS SOC PSYCHOL B | G | (RUE) |
| 2006 | Social dilemmas as strong versus weak situations: Social value orientations and tacit coordination under resource size uncertainty. | de Kwaadsteniet et al. | J EXP SOC PSYCHOL | G | (RUE) |
| 2004 | An intergenerational common pool resource experiment. | Fischer et al. | J ENVIRON ECON MANAG | G | (CUE) |
| 1999 | Outcome-desirability bias in resource management problems | Gustafsson et al. | THINK REASONING | G | (CUE) |
| 1999 | Overharvesting of resources of unknown size. | Gustafsson et al. | ACTA PSYCHOL | G | (CUE) |
| 1996 | Individual restraint and group efficiency in commons dilemmas: The effects of two types of environmental uncertainty. | Hine and Gifford | J APPL SOC PSYCHOL | G | (RUE) |
| 2009 | The environmentalist who cried drought: Reactions to repeated warnings about depleting resources under conditions of uncertainty. | Joireman et al. | J ENVIRON PSYCHOL | G | (CUE) |
| 2006 | Time, uncertainty, and individual differences in decisions to cooperate in resource dilemmas. | Kortenkamp and Moore | PERS SOC PSYCHOL B | G | (CUE) |
| 1998 | Not only the tragedy of the commons: misperceptions of bioeconomics. | Moxnes | MANAGE SCI | G | (TUE) |
| 2000 | Not only the tragedy of the commons: misperceptions of feedback and policies for sustainable development. | Moxnes | SYST DYNAM REV | G | (TUE) |
| 1996 | Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probalistic Destruction. | Muller and Vickers | Working paper | I | (CUE) |
| 2001 | Bonus and penalty in common pool resource dilemmas under uncertainty. | Rapoport and Au | ORGAN BEHAV HUM DEC | G | (CU) |
| 1997 | Effects of environmental uncertainty and social value orientation in resource dilemmas. | Roch and Samuelson | ORGAN BEHAV HUM DEC | G | (RUE) |
| 1996 | Fixed position and property rights in sequential resource dilemmas under uncertainty. | Suleiman et al. | ACTA PSYCHOL | G | (CUE) |
| 1999 | Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. | Tavoni et al. | P NATL ACAD SCI USA | G | (TUE) |
| 1999 | What information do we use in social dilemmas? Environmental uncertainty and the employment of coordination rules. | van Dijk et al. | J EXP SOC PSYCHOL | G | (RUE) |
| 1992 | Probabilistic destruction of common-pool resources: Experimental evidence. | Walker and Gardner. | ECON J | G | (CUE) |
| 1991 | Greed, efficiency and fairness in resource management situations. | Wilke | EUR REV SOC PSYCHOL | G | (CUE) |
Keys for search engines: Google scholar (G), Mendeley (M), EconBiz (E), IDEAS Repec (I), and PubPsych (P). Keys for search terms: {common pool resource, uncertainty, experiment}: (CUE); {common pool resource, uncertainty}: (CU); {resource dilemma, uncertainty, experiment}: (RUE); {tragedy of the commons, uncertainty, experiment}: (TUE).