Table 1
Resource and user attributes favourable for self-governance: Comparing natural CPRs and the collective reputation of local producers.
| Natural CPRs (Ostrom 2005, 244–5) | Collective reputation of local producers | |
|---|---|---|
| Favourable resource attributes | Feasible improvement of resource conditions | Feasible improvement of the market value of reputation (R1) |
| Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource | Indicators of present and future market value of reputation (e.g. predictions of demand, survey results, prizes, quality signals) (R2) | |
| Predictability of the flow of resource units | Predictability of flow of individual sales revenues (R3) | |
| Sufficiently small spatial extent of the resource system to ensure accurate information on external boundaries and internal conditions | Sufficient proximity of producers to lower the costs of personal meetings and monitoring of individual activities (R4) | |
| Favourable attributes of users | Salience of the resource for users (in terms of income or identity) | Salience of collective reputation for producers (in terms of income or identity) (U1) |
| Common understanding of how the resource system operates and actions affect it | Common understanding of how collective reputation is established, maintained, and affected by actions (U2) | |
| Low discount rate of users for future benefits from resource | Low discount rate of producers for future revenues as a result of collective reputation (U3) | |
| Trust and reciprocity among users | Trust and reciprocity among producers (U4) | |
| Autonomy of users to determine access and create use rules | Autonomy of producers to determine who may use the collective brand and under what conditions (U5) | |
| Prior organisational experience and local leadership | Prior organisational experience and local leadership (U6) |
Table 2
Resource and user attributes in the two communities after 1990.
| Attribute | Tihany | Csopak |
|---|---|---|
| Presence of favourable resource attributes | ||
| Feasible improvement of the market value of reputation (R1) | Modest | Intermediate |
| Reputation downgraded but survived under collectivisation. Slowly emerging demand for high-quality wine, identified by terroir. | Reputation downgraded but survived under collectivisation. Slowly emerging demand for high-quality wine, identified by terroir. | |
| Very small territory – limited potential supply. | ||
| Indicators on present and future market value of reputation (e.g. predictions of demand, survey results, prizes, quality signals) (R2) | Intermediate | |
| Gradual emergence of indirect signals, e.g. prizes, contests, national forums of wine evaluation. | ||
| Predictability of flow of individual sales revenues (R3) | Intermediate | |
| Initial uncertainty in long-term changes in consumption trends but persistence of demand. | ||
| Sufficient proximity to lower the costs of personal meetings and mutual monitoring of activities (R4) | Yes | |
| Communities in small geographic areas. | ||
| Presence of favourable user attributes | ||
| Salience of collective reputation for producers (in terms of income or identity) (U1) | Yes | Intermediate |
| Producers with strong local identity and economic reliance on winemaking. | Heterogeneous producers, incl. outside investors with no initial local identity and partial economic reliance on winemaking. | |
| Common understanding of how collective reputation is established and actions affect it (U2) | Yes | 1990– ~2010: Missing |
| Agreement on importance of quality assurance and no markedly different ideas about desirable quality or grape varieties. | ~2010–: Yes, in a limited circle First, different ideas about desirable quality and grape varieties. Then, agreement among quality-minded wineries to focus on high-quality Riesling. | |
| Low discount rate of producers for future revenues thanks to collective reputation (U3) | Yes | |
| Producers with long-term goals of local production. | ||
| Trust and reciprocity among producers (U4) | Yes Very small, closely knit local community. | Yes Atmosphere of trust despite different visions. |
| Autonomy of producers to determine who may use the collective brand and under what conditions (U5) | Intermediate | |
| Freedom to organise civic associations. Limited autonomy for official wine communes. | ||
| Prior organisational experience and local leadership (U6) | Intermediate experience, existing leadership Minor local civic associations. Experience of cooperation for most winemakers in cooperatives under communism. Strong personal leadership of one winemaker. | Intermediate experience, 1990– ~2010: Missing leadership ~2010–: Existing leadership in limited circle Minor local civic associations. Experience of cooperation for some winemakers in cooperatives under communism. Personal leadership appearing only after 2010. |