Table 1
Design principles, adapted from Cox et al. (2010).
| Design Principle | Description |
|---|---|
| 1a | The presence of the design principle 1A means that individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource must be clearly defined. |
| 1b | The presence of the design principle 1B means that the boundaries of the CPR must be well defined. |
| 2a | The presence of design principle 2A means that appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions. |
| 2b | The presence of design principle 2B means that the benefits obtained by users from a CPR, as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labour, material, or money, as determined by provision rules. |
| 3 | The presence of design principle 3 means that most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. |
| 4a | The presence of design principle 4A means that monitors are present and actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour. |
| 4b | The presence of design principle 4B means that monitors are accountable to or are the appropriators. |
| 5 | The presence of design principle 5 means that appropriators who violate operation rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, officials accountable to these appropriators, or both. Is this design principle present? |
| 6 | The presence of design principle 6 means that appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. |
| 7 | The presence of design principle 7 means that the rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. |
| 8 | The presence of design principle 8 means that appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. |
Figure 1
Diagram outlining the method for post-hoc analysis of cases coded as inconsistent with predictions based on a quantitative large-N case study analysis.
Figure 2
Biases and errors that generate inconsistencies between empirical phenomena and large-N case study results.
Table 2
Present (1), absent (0), and missing design (blank) principles coded by Baggio et al. (2016).
| Case | 1A | 1B | 2A | 2B | 3 | 4A | 4B | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type I inconsistencies (not successful despite at least 8 DPs present) | |||||||||||
| Yuracaré | 1 | 1 | (0) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Ranvahi | 1 | 1 | 1 | (0) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sol y Arena | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1(0) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Sol y Poniente | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1(0) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| La Mancha Oriental | 0 | 1 | 1(0) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Type II inconsistencies (successful despite presence of 5 or fewer DPs) | |||||||||||
| Historical Huaorani | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |||
| Nyamaropa* | 0 | 0 | |||||||||
| Apalachicola | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||
| Lake Chilika pre-1990* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Based on the analysis in this article, we have highlighted suggested revisions of the coding dataset in parenthesis.
Cases with some coder disagreement on success are indicated with a “*”.
Table 3
Identification and characteristics of inconsistent cases.
| Case | Sector | Country | Cause of inconsistency | Potential type of error or bias |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yuracaré forest system | Forestry | Bolivia | Loss of congruence | Procedural and/or substantive |
| Ranvahi forest community | Forestry | India | Lack of graduated sanctions | Procedural and/or substantive |
| Sol y Arena | Irrigation | Spain | Loss of congruence | Procedural and/or substantive |
| Sol y Poniente | Irrigation | Spain | Loss of congruence | Procedural and/or substantive |
| La Mancha Oriental | Irrigation | Spain | Loss of congruence | Substantive and/or procedural |
| The Historical Huaorani | Forestry | Ecuador | Lack of market integrationResource abundance and distributionTime-lag | Investigator, substantive and/or procedural |
| Nyamaropa communal area | Forestry | Zimbabwe | Resource abundance and distribution | Investigator and/or substantive |
| Apalachicola Bay Oyster | Fishery | USA | Social cohesionKnowledgeTechnology | Investigator and/or substantive |
| Chilika lake pre 1990s | Fishery | India | Time-lag | Procedural |