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What incentivizes local forest conservation efforts? Evidence from Bolivia Cover

What incentivizes local forest conservation efforts? Evidence from Bolivia

Open Access
|Mar 2015

Figures & Tables

figures/ijc2015-2015009-001.jpg
Figure 1

A substantial percentage of our sample (more than 15%) gather more than a sixth of locally-collected funds from forestry-related sources. According to estimates from our surveys with local government personnel in the 100 municipalities, more than 10% of all municipalities get more than 90% of their total incomes in the forestry sector from their own collection of local fees and taxes.

figures/ijc2015-2015009-002.jpg
Figure 2

As the importance of forestry as a source of revenue increases, municipalities commit more resources to forestry. Likewise, as the frequency of community organization demands for forestry services increase, spending in forestry increases. This chart was made with all control variables set at their means, except for party, which was set at 1.

figures/ijc2015-2015009-003.jpg
Figure 3

Our statistical models provide some evidence that financial incentives have a greater impact on forest conservation investment when pressures from below are not strong. Here, the effect of financial incentives on the percentage of municipal employees assigned to forestry is significant where community organization pressures are low, but not when they are high. The top graph shows predicted values and the bottom graph shows marginal effects of a shift from forestry activities being “much less important” than other areas to “much more important.” These graphs were made with all control variables set at their means, except for party, which was set at 1.

Table 1

Variables.

VariableObs.MeanStd. Dev.Min.Max.Source(s)
Total employees in forestry2181.221.63010’01 and ’08 mayor surveys, ’08 UFM (Municipal Forestry Unit)
Municipal budget in forestry (pct.)2182.624.71040’01 mayor, ’08 mayor and ’08 UFM survey
Relative importance of forestry212–0.801.08–31.5’01 and ’08 mayor surveys
Importance of forestry as a revenue source2102.181.3705’01 mayor and ’08 UFM surveys
Central government supervision2442.271.2015’01 and ’08 mayor surveys
Frequency of community organization demands on forestry2442.451.1015’01 and ’08 mayor surveys, ’08 UFM survey, ’08 CV (Oversight Committee) survey
Mayor’s education21712.904.22118’01 and ’08 mayor surveys
“Officialist” party2400.430.4901’01 and ’08 mayor surveys
Forest cover (pct.)24455.8241.430100Remote sensing data, ’01 and ’08
HDI (Human development Index)2420.570.080.3470.7592007 Bolivian government statistics
Municipal budget (millions of Bolivianos)21820.3899.5901293.402001 and 2007 Bolivian government statistics
Table 2:

Incentives for Forest Conservation

Dependent variableImportance of forest policyForestry budget (pct. of total budget)Forestry employees
Importance of forestry as a source of revenue0.2920.1810.255
(0.00)***(0.01)*(0.00)***
Frequency of central government supervision0.1730.1020.036
(0.00)**(0.20)(0.60)
Frequency of community demands0.1740.3650.159
(0.01)*(0.00)***(0.04)*
Mayor’s level of education–0.025–0.016–0.033
(0.20)(0.52)(0.13)
‘Officialist’ party–0.0240.0580.304
(0.87)(0.75)(0.05)+
Human Development Index (HDI)–0.898–1.0015.625
(0.36)(0.47)(0.00)***
Forest cover (pct. of municipal area)00.007–0.002
(0.84)(0.03)*(0.54)
Forest area (ln square km.)0.0130.0210.027
(0.79)(0.76)(0.60)
Municipal budget size (millions of)00–0.001
(0.47)(0.81)(0.37)
Constant–1.627–0.685–4.176
(0.01)**(0.45)(0.00)***
Observations178180180
Municipalities104104104
Wald chi-square64.1543.1765.79
Tolerance7.63 e–72.33 e–72.909 e–7
Scale parameter3.991.25

p-Values in parentheses. +significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***significant at 0.1%.

Table 3:

Types of Financial Incentives

Dependent variableImportance of forest policyForestry budget (pct. of total budget)Forestry employees
Forestry income: own income0.0040.0090.008
(0.21)(0.01)*(0.01)**
Forestry income: central government transfers0.0080.0080.006
(0.00)**(0.08)+(0.04)*
Frequency of central government supervision0.190.1690.039
(0.04)*(0.13)(0.64)
Frequency of community demands0.2660.4220.381
(0.03)*(0.00)**(0.00)**
Mayor’s level of education–0.016–0.013–0.05
(0.53)(0.70)(0.05)+
‘Officialist’ party–0.2170.2570.357
(0.39)(0.41)(0.16)
Human Development Index (HDI)–2.632–2.2535.433
(0.10)+(0.28)(0.00)**
Forest cover (pct. of municipal area)–0.0020.0030.002
(0.60)(0.60)(0.63)
Forest area (ln square km.)–0.0010.010.24
(0.99)(0.93)(0.01)*
Municipal budget size (millions of)000
(0.32)(0.83)(0.72)
Constant–0.3080.141–7.313
(0.83)(0.94)(0.00)**
Observations949494
log pseudolikelihood/ deviance–132.01498.5486.33
AIC3.04
BIC–285.8121.44–290.72
Scale parameter1.0911

Robust p-Values in parentheses. +significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.494 | Journal eISSN: 1875-0281
Language: English
Published on: Mar 16, 2015
Published by: Uopen Journals
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2015 Glenn Daniel Wright, Krister Andersson, Clark Gibson, Tom Evans, published by Uopen Journals
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.