Figure 1
On the left corner: Italy, with marked regional borders. The Veneto Region is highlighted on the North-eastern part of the country. Main picture: focus on the Northern part of the Veneto Region (i.e. where regole exist), with marked municipal borders. Municipalities containing regole within their administrative boundaries are numbered with a progressive order (left to right, north to south) and grey colored. The administrations of light-grey colored municipalities were not interviewed; whereas dark-grey colored municipalities were. Municipality #1: Comelico Superiore (4 regole); municipality #2: San Nicolò di Comelico (2 regole); municipality #3 San Pietro di Cadore (4 regole); municipality #4: Cortina d’Ampezzo (11 regole); municipality #5:Auronzo di Cadore (2 regole); municipality #6: Danta di Cadore (2 regole); municipality #7:Santo Stefano di Cadore (4 regole); municipality #8:Vigo di Cadore (1 regola); municipality #9: San Vito di Cadore (3 regole); municipality #10: Colle Santa Lucia (3 regole); municipality #11: Selva di Cadore (3 regole); municipality #12: Borca di Cadore (1 regola); municipality #13: Pieve di Cadore (3 regole); municipality #14: Vodo di Cadore (2 regole); municipality #15: Zoldo Alto (2 regole); municipality #16: Chies d’Alpago (5 regole); municipality #17: Pedemonte (1 regola).
Table 1
Explored key-aspects, sub-key-aspects and format of questions investigated during the interviews administered to municipalities’ officers.
| Key aspects | Sub-key aspects | Rationale | Format of questions |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Coordination mechanisms and patterns | Institution usually/mostly taking the initiative in establishing/looking for municipality-regola relationship/coordination. | Explorative approach, aimed to evaluate municipality proactivity in establishing and keeping contacts with local regole, and vice versa. | Mc, (OEq) |
| Roles and positions of interlocutors responsible for main formal and informal municipality-regola communications. | It’s expected that collegial coordination and more articulated participatory processes lead to stronger institutional coordination. Hypothetically, the higher the role of the person responsible for the interlocution, the stronger the institutional relationship. | Mc | |
| Municipality-regola coordination patterns; prevalence of formal/informal contacts, existence of written memoranda: typologies and scopes (if any), etc. | It’s expected that high levels of formalities correspond to lower degrees of real coordination and positive municipality-regola relationships. | McIf any: OEq | |
| Double-representation of local leaders in municipality and regola administrative boards. If any, roles respectively covered both in regola and regola boards. | Overlapping representative roles in regole and municipalities boards may facilitate the informal communications. On the other side, they may generate various conflicts of interest. | Mc | |
| Institutional communication/coordination patterns among regole and municipality, where more than one regola stand in the same municipality. | Acknowledgement of the existence of multiple and/or nested layers/levels of municipality-regola coordination and joint interaction of different regole with municipalities. | OEq | |
| 2. Mutual administrative constraints | Dependence of municipal actions/activities/policies on regola actions/activities/policies, and vice versa. | Evaluation of municipality degrees of policy and administrative constraint/freedom, being affected by regole in various ways (e.g. territorial development policies to be applied on common lands; compulsory municipality-regola coordination mechanisms on local development predicted by law). | Mc, (OEq) |
| Dependence of municipal policy processes on internal regola governance mechanisms. | Municipalities may need approval by regole for policies on territorial development to be applied on common lands (e.g. building of new facilities for winter tourism). Discussions will be likely processed by regole according their own governance mechanisms. It is to be acknowledged whether, how and to what extent, specific regola governance mechanisms impact on municipality decisions. | OEq | |
| Evaluation of actual and potential municipality-regola coordination, in terms of opportunities and threats. | Some strategic negative responses were expected with reference to the actual situation. Observations on potential situation were expected to mitigate former strategic answers, though some degrees of idealization of the relationship may be revealed as well. | Mc, LsOpportunities and threats: OEq | |
| 3. Circumstances of active municipality-Regola interaction | Projects, activities, actions that municipalities proactively involved regole for, and vice versa, concerning (i) urban development and territorial strategies; (ii) economic development; (iii) forest and environmental management; (iv) social development. | Selection of relevant areas of interest has been driven by responsibilities that the regional law call upon municipalities and regole with, also in terms of mutual coordination – but the range of possible activities spans beyond the strict legal responsibilities. | Yes/NoIf any: OEq, McIf no: Mc, (OEq) |
| Fields of municipality-regola coordination, others than those previously identified; investigation on whether municipalities manage assets of the regole through particular agreements and/or mandates, and vice versa. | Municipality-regola interactions, partnerships, coordination may occur on areas and fields of interest other than those explicitly recalled by the regional law. | OEq | |
| 4. Financial effects on municipality balance sheets due to reconstitution of regole. | Causes, magnitude, and patterns (positive or negative, direct or indirect consequences, continuous or una tantum effects) of impacts on municipality financial sheets, if any, following local reconstitutions of regole. | Relevant changes in tenure arrangements and land ownership come with reconstitution of regole, with valuable shifts in collection of forestry-related revenues. This may have affected municipality balance sheets, resulting in operative limitations for municipalities. | Mc |
| How municipalities reacted – resilient mechanisms, or suffering permanent consequences – to financial impacts (if any) following reconstitution of local regola, and whether such adaptive actions had any impacts on the whole municipal community. | Hypothesis: municipality financial impacts, and subsequent adaptations, might have indirectly impacted on local communities, either positively (e.g. rationalization of public expenditures) or negatively (e.g. higher tax pressure, lower social aids, etc.). | OEq | |
| Assessment of former municipality reinvestment rates of timber-selling revenues in municipal forest assets, prior to reconstitutuion of regole. | It is expected that municipalities mostly limited reinvestment rates to the minimum threshold defined by law, i.e. 10% of timber-selling revenues. | Mc | |
| 5. Occurrence of municipality-Regola legal disputes and/or institutional tensions/contrasts | Occurrence of regola-municipality legal disputes, mainly but not solely related to the definition of property rights over some particular assets, either in the past or still in place. Triggering reasons and foreseeable evolutions/solutions have been investigated as well. | Legal disputes may compromise the effectiveness of both municipalities and regole in managing forest landscapes and socio-economic local resources, as administrative and economic energies are dissipated in such conflicts. | Yes/NoIf any: Mc, OEq |
| Occurrence of regola-municipality institutional tensions, mainly but not solely linked with the allocation of administrative (and policy-making) competences over some particular assets, either in the past or still in place. Triggering reasons, magnitude of such contrasts and foreseeable evolutions/solutions have been investigated as well. | Even though less tough than legal disputes, administrative conflicts and institutional tensions may obstacle a fruitful cooperation between municipalities and regole, even beyond the terms of the specific issues under discussion. | Mc, Ls, OEq | |
| 6. Occurrence of social conflicts, either directly or indirectly triggered by regole, within the municipal communities. | Occurrence, reasons; magnitude of any social issues linked with regole, either in the past or still in place – in this case, foreseeable evolution. | Social tensions may be triggered by claims over resources and rights by non-right-holders, discrimination of non-right-holders by commoners and/or no acceptance of new right-holders, etc. Nestedness of local communities (overlapping between regola and municipality community) is of particular interest here. | Mc, Ls, OEq |
| Evaluation of whether benefits from common membership and/or exploitation of regola lands are shared among right-holders only, or they are somehow shared/extended with/to non-rights-holders as well. | The exclusion of non-right-holders from some benefits was expected to be one of the most contentious issues possibly triggering social conflicts (i.e. impair welfare conditions within the same municipality, due to understood privileges tied to ancient rights passed on only through inheritance). It also acts as a good indicator of regole’s openness toward the external pressures for social change. | McIf any: OEq | |
| Exploration of whether and how municipalities have ever been involved in the regola internal life and regola governance mechanisms. | Some regole may look for municipality involvement/suggestions on their internal life, lato sensu. For example, regole might want to coordinate their social aims and activities with municipalities so as to balance social conditions of right-holders and non-right-holders living in the same municipality. | McIf any: OEq | |
| Positive and negative opinions/remarks by municipality representatives on regola activities and regola integration within the local social environment(s), as perceived by non-right-holders. | Question directly connected to the previous ones. | Ls, OEq | |
| 7. municipality assessment of local regole’s effectiveness | Municipality opinion on regola institutional capacity/effectiveness concerning (i) forest management and environmental conservation; (ii) economic development; (iii) tourism promotion; (iv) social development. | Here, focus is on activities carried out by regole only. Municipality interviewees have been asked to indicate/describe regola actions, to rate the regola commitment (capacity, effectiveness) and justify their opinions stressing regola strengths and weaknesses. | Exploration: OEq, SSaEvaluation: Ls, Mc, (OEq) |
| 8. Further municipality opinions and other information | Possible solutions to strengthen the municipality-regola institutional coordination. Outlooks and future expectations on municipality-regola and regola-regola institutional relationship patterns. | Interest in which actions are possibly to be implemented, in the opinion of municipality representatives, to reinforce municipality-regola coordination, especially in the light of previous questions/answers. | Mc, OEq |
| Any other key-aspect and/or sub-key-aspect of some relevance in the interviewees’ opinion. | Further room for any relevant information that might not have been adequately considered in the questionnaire design. | OEq |
Mc=Question with multiple-choice response; Ls=Question with Likert scale; OEq=Open-ended question with free-form response.
Table 2
Results summary.
| Key-aspects | Main results from interview data | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Coordination mechanisms and patterns | − | Almost all regole were represented in the local town council: often councilors, aldermen, and even mayors were also right-holders in regole. |
| − | Full overlap in institutional responsibilities, with representation of a single person on both town council and an administrative board of a regola is rare, partly due to statutory limitations. | |
| − | In most cases, the mayor held the main institutional ties with local regole. Similarly, usually presidents of regole played an analogous role. | |
| − | Multiple institutional ties between individuals of both institutions were rare: commonly, institutional coordination did not originate out of a collective effort. | |
| − | Usually, informal arrangements between institutions paved the way for formal decisions. Highly formalized relationships between municipalities and regole were rare. | |
| − | Total lack of municipality-regola coordination was rare. Either coordination patterns B, C, and B+C (see Figure 2) were common. | |
| − | More stable institutional coordination mechanisms were seen as worth implementing. | |
| 2. Mutual administrative constraints | − | Municipality-regola consultation initiated either by municipalities or regole. |
| − | Qualitative differences in municipality-regola interaction: regole mainly asking for cooperation to solve administrative and bureaucratic issues, whereas municipalities mainly looking to involve regole in proposals and projects to be applied on common lands. | |
| − | Usually, municipality representatives did not perceive their administrative roles to be seriously constrained on land restitution to regole. Main constraints related to the implementation of territorial strategies on the property of the regole. | |
| − | Positive and negative evaluations were balanced on actual and potential coordination, in terms of opportunities and threats. Nonetheless, the current situation was generally judged less positively than potential scenarios of coordination. | |
| − | Regole able to strongly influence local politics, policy processes and decisions. | |
| − | Municipalities never involved in internal dynamics and governance mechanisms of regole. | |
| 3. Circumstances of active municipality-regola interaction | − | High levels of municipality-regola coordination on matters concerning environmental management and conservation. Particularly, in relation to maintenance and building of local forest road networks (joint application to Rural Development Plan (RDP) funding possibilities), and local hydroelectric power plants, less for urban development and social events. |
| − | Often, multi-year and long-term strategic plans considerd municipality-regola cooperation on local economic development matters. | |
| − | In compliance with regional policy prescription, municipalities often involved regole in projects or plans concerning urban and territorial development. Many other minor and/or local circumstances for municipality-regola cooperation have been found on the ground. | |
| − | Promotion of local culture and traditions seemed to be the weakest field of municipality-regola interaction, as often regole carried out many activities (e.g. cultural, gastronomic and religious initiatives) autonomously. | |
| − | Municipalities did not manage common assets through ad hoc mandate, and vice versa. | |
| 4. Financial effects on municipality balance sheets due to reconstitution of regole | − | Impacts on municipality financial balance sheets due to reconstitution of regole ranged from 50,000 to 200,000 €/year/municipality. |
| − | Fewer negative effects on municipal balance sheets than expected: rarely severe shortages of municipal capital resources. | |
| − | Often, no relevant consequences for the community as a whole in terms of number/quality of services provided by municipality administrations. | |
| 5. Occurrence of municipality-regola legal disputes and/or institutional tensions/contrasts | − | Size and quality of some forest assets returned to regole have sparked legal disputes with municipalities on tenure rights, often triggered by cadastral inaccuracies. |
| − | Recently, some pending legal issues were resolved with corresponding improvement of relationships. | |
| − | Other institutional tensions exist, mainly concerning the allocation of institutional competencies, e.g. duty/right to issue access permits for forest roads. | |
| − | Regole not always inclined to recognize the administrative role played by municipalities in their area. | |
| 6. Occurrence of social conflicts, either directly or indirectly triggered by regole, within the municipal communities. | − | Social conflicts linked with nestedness of regole within municipalities are more frequent and severe compared to institutional ones, possibly undermining the social cohesion within the local community. |
| − | Several reasons were provided for occurrence of social conflicts, including: (i) difficulty in being accepted as members of regole for those who are not descendants of local right-holders; (ii) the hostile attitude of some members of regole towards outsiders; (iii) male-dominated gender balance within regole; (iv) exclusion of non-members from enjoyment of some resource benefits. | |
| − | It seems non-right-holders perceive regole as rather poorly, or not at all integrated, into the local, social environment. | |
| 7. Municipality assessment of local Regole’s effectiveness | − | From most positive to most negative evaluations, as follows |
| − | Forest management and environmental conservation. Pro: Forest management as one of regole’s core areas, higher reinvestment rates in forest management compared to former municipal levels. Cons: traditional mentality precluding development of alternative forest-based enterprises and activities. | |
| − | Economic development. Pro: increase in timber prices and revenues, establishment of new local forest enterprises, application to RDP funding to maintain and further develop the forest road networks. Cons: “ordinary management”, rather than introducing innovative management options, reluctance to innovate by some regole. | |
| − | Tourism development. Pro: some regole directly involved in managing local ski facilities, renewed attention by regole toward pasture management, refurbishment of traditional alpine huts in modern agro-tourist buildings. Cons: some right-holders not in favor of supplying “new” complementary goods and services (incl. recreational services), hostile attitude toward non-rights holders. | |
| − | Social development. Pro: joint municipality-regola welfare opportunities. Cons: difficulties for non-right holders in being accepted as new members of regole, hostile attitude towards outsiders, male-dominated gender balance, exclusion of non-members from the possibility of enjoying some resource benefits, regole should commit themselves to more actively support municipalities in their welfare strategies. | |
Figure 2
The coordination patterns possibly occurring between municipalities and regole within municipal boundaries. Pattern A: rare or weak institutional linkages between municipality and regole, regardless of the degree of cooperation among different regole; Pattern B: well-established institutional linkages between municipality and each single local regole; Pattern C: regole fully coordinating their representation in their relationship with the municipality. Case B+C exists as well in cases in which regole cooperate together with the municipality in addition to cooperating individually with the municipality.
Figure 3
The regional law prescribes compulsory mechanisms of mutual administrative and policy interfacing between municipalities and regole, especially with regards to some particular policies concerning relevant territorial management decisions. It is shown to what extent municipalities rate these obliged relationships as constraining in administrative and policy terms.
Figure 4
Occurrence (%) of either past and current legal disputes between municipalities and regole (often due to controversies regarding ownership rights over valuable natural assets), as well as of other less serious institutional tensions (mainly concerning the distribution of institutional areas of competence). Occurrence of social tensions due to the existence of regole and their relationships with broader communities of local inhabitants are also shown.
Figure 5
Severity of the institutional and social tensions reported in Figure 4, as perceived by local municipality representatives.
Figure 6
In the light of considerations and results shown in Figure 4, respondents indicated to what extent they considered positive or negative their necessity to interface with regole. Grey bars represent their evaluations of the present scenario, whereas black bars display assessments referring to an ideal point.
Figure 7
Interaction between the membership of regole and broader local community, including non-rights holders, may generate various social tensions of different nature and/or intensity. The figure shows respondents’ evaluations of the integration of the local regole within the broader municipal social environment.
Figure 8
The figure shows the results of municipal representatives’ assessments of the effectiveness of local regole in pursuing the objectives laid out by the Regional Law – i.e. environmental conservation and management and socio-economic development of mountain areas. Results are shown in ascending order, from the worst to the best overall evaluation.