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Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules Cover

Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules

Open Access
|Mar 2014

Figures & Tables

figures/ijc2014-2014005-001.jpg
Figure 1:

Average contribution in the PGGs, separated for each round and experimental condition.

figures/ijc2014-2014005-002.jpg
Figure 2:

Average punishment (above) and reward (below) assigned (left) and carried out (right) for different deviations from the average contribution of other group members, separated for each experimental condition.

Table 1:

Tobit regression on contribution decisions with random effects at subject level (5460 decisions, of which 2376 censored, by 182 subjects).

figures/ijc2014-2014005-007.jpg

*Significant at .05-level; ** Significant at .01-level (2-sided).

Table 2:

Tobit regression on contribution decisions in the punishment conditions with random effects at subject level (1638 decisions, of which 345 censored, by 182 subjects).

figures/ijc2014-2014005-008.jpg

*Significant at .05-level; ** Significant at .01-level (2-sided).

Table 3:

Tobit regression on contribution decisions in the reward conditions with random effects at subject level (1638 decisions, of which 981 censored, by 182 subjects).

figures/ijc2014-2014005-009.jpg

*Significant at .05-level; ** Significant at .01-level (2-sided).

Table 4:

Multilevel logistic regression on decisions whether to punish nested in subjects (4914 decisions by 182 subjects).

figures/ijc2014-2014005-010.jpg

* Significant at .05-level; ** Significant at .01-level (2-sided).

Hypothesized effect not significant when only the first treatment is considered.

Table 5:

Multilevel logistic regression on decisions whether to reward nested in subjects (4914 decisions by 182 subjects).

figures/ijc2014-2014005-011.jpg

* Significant at .05-level; ** Significant at .01-level (2-sided).

Hypothesized effect not significant when only the first treatment is considered.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 | Journal eISSN: 1875-0281
Language: English
Published on: Mar 6, 2014
Published by: Igitur Publishing
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2014 Nynke Van Miltenburg, Vincent Buskens, Davide Barrera, Werner Raub, published by Igitur Publishing
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.