Figure 1
Chinantla study site where six communities analyzed are located the dotted line refers to different municipalities.
Figure 2
Assembly’s basic governance structure mandated by Mexican Agrarian Law. CORENCHI Delegates added in 2008.
Figure 3
Early Period of Multi-scale Governance in Communities 1980–2000 (INMECAFE=Mexican Coffee Institute; UNAM=National Autonomous University of Mexico; LNGO=Local or State NGO; NNGO=National NGO).
Figure 4
Multi-scale Governance in Communities during period 2000–2010 (UNDP-GEF=United Nations Development Program-Global Environmental Facility; MIE=Integral Ecosystem Management; CDI=National Commission for Indigenous Development; CONAFOR=National Forestry Commission; SNGO=Small International NGO; INGO=International NGO; NNGO=National NGO; LNGO=Local or State NGO).
Table 1
CORENCHI community territories, ICCA area and PHS areas
| Community | Territory3 | ICCA area (ha)4/date5 | Payment for hydrological services6/date7 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nopalera del Rosario | 5,329.55 | 4200/2009 | 2,299.00/2007 |
| San Antonio Analco | 2,677.14 | 2050/2011 | 1,473.71/2007 |
| San Antonio del Barrio | 2,310.82 | 1500/2004 | 1,150.98/2004; 400.10/2007* |
| San Pedro Tlatepusco | 6,289.68 | 5050/2004 | 2,534.13/2004; 1,443.542/2007* |
| Santiago Tlatepusco | 5,945.60 | 4300/2004 | 1,969.05/2004; 852.63/2007* |
| Santa Cruz Tepetotutla | 12,372.80 | 9670/2004 | 2,534.67/2004; 1,398.139/2007* |
| Total | 34,907.99 | 26,770.00 | 16,056.96 |
*Additional area for PH.
Table 2
Proposed new elements and possible outcomes for common property theory
| Factors or core subsystems | Constitutive elements or enabling conditions | New elements required by CORENCHI case study and others | New possible outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resource system characteristics | Small size, well-defined boundaries, low levels of mobility, Storage of Benefits, Predictability | Perception of conservation value of resource by external actors, Ability to limit or prohibit physical harvests, Possibility of benefits from external actors for conservation | Strict Conservation and Environmental Services |
| Group characteristics | Small Size, Clearly defined boundaries, Shared norms, Past Successful Experiences, Appropriate leadership, Group member interdependence, Endowment heterogeneity, Homogeneity of identities and interests, Low levels of poverty | “Group” expanded to include collective action by neighboring communities or communities in the same region, Leaders who understand possible benefits of multi-scale governance | Inter-community collective action around individual commons, creating a regional commons, in a context of multi-scale governance |
| Relationship between resource system and group | Overlap between user group residential location and resource location, fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources, low levels of user demand, gradual change in levels of demand | Low opportunity costs for conservation | Strict conservation and environmental services |
| Institutional arrangements | Rules are simple and easy to understand, Locally devised access and management rules, Ease in enforcement of rules, Graduated sanctions, Availability of low cost adjudication, Accountability of monitors to users | Local communities and inter-community organizations have spaces within larger frameworks of regulatory law to shape specific local rules, Communities develop capacity to negotiate conflicts with multiple actors in turbulent settings | Coproduction of rules. Sophisticated negotiation and conflict resolution skills |
| Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements | Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources | Ability to maintain rules of strict prohibition on harvests | Strict conservation and environmental services |
| External environment | Technology: low cost exclusion technology, time for adaptation to new technologies; low levels of articulation with external markets, gradual change in articulation with markets, State: central governments should not undermine local authority, supportive external sanctioning institutions, appropriate levels of external aid, nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, and governance | Capacity to intensely engage and negotiate with external market and governmental actors to realize benefits from conservation or productive activities,Ability to create new institutions and organizations that facilitate interaction with multiple actors at other scales. | Turbulent, multi-scale governance |
(First and Second Column modified from Ostrom 2009; Agrawal 2001).