Table 1
Institutional foundations to sustainability under diverse forms of property for “archetypal” NRM challenges.
| Form of resource tenure | Institutional requirements for sustainability |
| Private | The incentives of private ownership will ensure individuals invest in long-term returns on their property. State action is required only to regulate and protect property rights |
| Public | The state will ensure sustainable natural resource management through the unambiguous allocation of use rights and enforcement of regulations |
| Communal | Effective self-governing institutions are required (and sufficient) for managing common property resources sustainably due to their ability to exclude. Key institutional features include:
|
Table 2
Institutional foundations to sustainability under diverse forms of property for an expanded set of “Commons” challenges.
| Form of resource tenure | Theory | Reality | Implication |
| Private | The incentives of private ownership will ensure individuals invest in long-term returns on their property. State action is required only to regulate and protect property rights. | Trans-boundary effects, and inefficiencies and inequities (due to externalities) of individualized solutions, make collective action essential | “Hybrid” governance regimes among interdependent private property owners (self-organized), plus hybrids with recognized public authoritya where needed to ensure compliance with negotiated solutions |
| Public | The state will ensure sustainable natural resource management through the unambiguous allocation of use rights and enforcement of regulations. | Corruption; conflict; management with inadequate information; resentment by holders of customary rights; de facto open access where enforcement is weak | “Hybrid” governance regimes between individuals or collectivities and the state (self-organized or supported by recognized public authority to sanction and enforce) |
| Communal | Effective self-governing institutions are required (and sufficient) for managing common property resources sustainably due to their ability to exclude | Rapid change introduces new drivers and challenges, connecting CPR to other actors and exogenous drivers; difficulty of applying sanctions “from within” | Support to adaptive governance through multi-stakeholder processes involving old and new actors to re-negotiate collective choice rules; “hybrid” governance regimes linking common property regime with recognized “public” authority to sanction and enforce |
[i] aAs Sikor (2008a) points out, this may mean the State, but may also extend to political communities or other publically recognized authorities.