Power and Sensemaking in Radical Policy Implementation: A Case Study from Nagarhole National Park

1.1 Role of the bureaucracy in the implementation of CFRs

Scholarship identifies several determinants of successful community forest rights (CFR) implementation, including collective action by Gram Sabhas, NGO support, leadership by community institutions, bureaucratic behavior, and multi-actor collaboration (Gupta, Lele and Sahu 2020; Kohli and Kuriakose 2025; Kutty et al. 2019; Kutty and Menon 2025; Sahu 2020). Few studies, however, analyze the roles of departments other than the forest department (Kutty and Menon 2025; Sahu 2020; Sahu, Dash and Dubey 2017). Sahu (2020) illustrates that the Vidarbha region’s leadership in CFR recognition stems partly from proactive engagement by departments not directly assigned responsibility under the FRA. In particular, initiatives by the Tribal Welfare Department—through institutions supporting both claim recognition and post-recognition governance—significantly influence outcomes. Despite these insights, scholarship has largely overlooked inter-departmental dynamics among the three main implementing agencies. To better understand how multi-department committees function amid power asymmetries, we draw on policy-implementation literature.

1.2 Ambiguity and conflict in policy implementation

Traditional assumptions that implementers clearly understand policymakers’ expectations are misplaced. Policy implementation is a complex, layered political process (Kgwete 2021). Conflicts emerge when actors depend on each other for outcomes but pursue divergent departmental goals (Hordern 2015; Matland 1995). These conflicts may arise over what needs to be achieved or how it should be achieved (Matland 1995, p. 156), and they may also surface when actors see no benefit in implementing a policy (Hordern 2015, p. 6).

Ambiguity stems from unclear responsibilities, limited expertise, or complex local conditions (Matland 1995, p. 158). Such ambiguity increases misunderstandings and implementation failures (Matland 1995, p. 158). Importantly, ambiguity and conflict are intertwined. Matland (1995) argues that some ambiguity can reduce conflict, since overly clear goals may make actors feel threatened and resist implementation. Coleman et al. (2021, p. 289) clarify this by distinguishing conflicts arising from discretionary interpretation from those rooted in contradictory objectives. This distinction helps determine whether actors are exercising discretion or grappling with legal conflicts. In ambiguous and conflict-prone settings such as the FRA (Fleischman 2012), implementers generate their own interpretations. Kgwete (2021) therefore stresses the need to examine how actors negotiate, interpret, and transmit information, because multi-departmental decision-making is shaped by bureaucratic politics, bargaining, and coercion (Kgwete 2021, p. 45; Matland 1995, p. 156).

1.3 Sensemaking and sensegiving in policy implementation

Sensemaking—comprising information seeking, meaning ascription, and action (Carmel 2019, p. 25; Thomas et al. 1993; Weick 1995a)—explains how bureaucrats interpret policy intent and anticipate behavioral change (Kgwete 2021, p. 4). Implementing radical policy reforms requires bureaucrats to acquire new knowledge, adjust to shifting power relations, and adapt operational practices shaped by departmental priorities and local contexts (Choo 2002; Coleman et al. 2021; Kutty and Menon 2025). Ambiguity accompanying radical reforms triggers sensemaking because it destabilizes established authority (Schildt, Mantere and Cornelissen 2020). Actors rely on past experiences to construct plausible meanings (Weick 1995b), and in multi-actor settings, competing interpretations must be negotiated—making power central to sensemaking (Kgwete 2021). Governance thus involves both meaning-making and the actions guided by those meanings (Carmel 2019, p. 25).

Sensegiving complements these processes by referring to efforts to shape others’ interpretations (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). When actors fail to develop shared meanings, a ‘sensemaking gap’ emerges, prompting strategic sensegiving to influence decisions (Maitlis and Lawrence 2007). In multi-agency committees, powerful actors deploy sensegiving to steer interpretation and limit alternative views.

The sensemaking–sensegiving framework is well suited for analyzing policy implementation rooted in negotiation, interpretation, and language (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). Applying this framework to the FRA shifts attention from compliance to the historical and power-laden contexts shaping implementation (Spillane, Reiser and Reimer 2002). In a setting marked by ambiguity and entrenched power asymmetries, sensemaking and sensegiving reveal how progressive laws may be diluted or selectively implemented. Examining these processes helps identify institutional weaknesses and offers insights for aligning implementation with the FRA’s transformative goals.

3.1 History of land use in Nagarhole

Before British state consolidation in the 19th century, the forests that now form Nagarhole National Park were communal village lands used for grazing, timber, fuelwood, and shifting cultivation (Griffiths and Colchester 2000; Lewis 1897). Jenu Kurubas, a particularly vulnerable tribal group (PVTGs)¹ of Karnataka, whose traditional occupation is honey collection, lived deep within the forest until the 20th century, while other Adivasi groups moved between forest and farmland or interacted with fringe villages (Kudva 2001). Shifting cultivation, hunting, and gathering sustained these communities until colonial authorities banned shifting cultivation in 1860. Many Adivasis were pushed into bonded labor, later permitted to practice limited kumri cultivation at forest department–designated plantation sites (Mahanty 2003).

With the transition from production forestry to conservation in 1972 and the gradual expansion of the protected area (Table 3), Adivasis faced intensified dispossession (Mahanty 2003). The area became a wildlife sanctuary in 1955, upgraded to a National Park in 1983, and declared a Tiger Reserve in 2003; the entire park was notified as a core zone in 2007 with a buffer added in 2012. The wildlife wing of the Karnataka Forest Department now administers the park. Nagarhole’s forests—shaped by commercial logging and prone to fires—have also become a major wildlife tourism destination, but the park remains a site of sustained conflict between Adivasis and the forest department.

Under the Wildlife Protection Act (WLPA), 1972, human habitation inside national parks is prohibited and residents are to be compensated and relocated. Yet, in the mid-1970s, Adivasis were forcibly evicted without compensation (Assadi 2014; Griffiths and Colchester 2000; Mathews 2005). Displaced households argue that demarcation of the park stripped them of customary rights without redress (Mathews 2005; Young, Makoni and Boehmer-Christiansen 2001). A report by the Mysore Divisional Commissioner² confirmed that 1,100 families, including non-tribals, had been displaced since 1972, and highlighted major procedural violations, including denial of opportunities to appeal (Assadi 2006). The report also noted that 3,700 early evictees had been denied the compensation later allotted to those displaced after 1999. As conservation hardened, the forest department systematically ignored Adivasi land rights and sought their removal from the forest (Mahanty 2003; Mathews 2005). Many Adivasis fell into bonded labor (jita) until NGOs mobilized them in the 1980s to demand rights (Kudva 2001; Mathews 2005). Currently, around 1,800 Adivasi families reside within the park (Assadi 2014), whose forest rights remain only on paper.

Forest access, relatively lenient until 1992, was completely restricted after stricter WLPA enforcement in 1994, triggering protests for re-entry and self-governance [Interview: Shrikanth, NGO leader, Hunsur 2021]. In 1999, relocation with compensation began (Assadi 2006). At the same time, the Global Environment Facility–funded India Ecodevelopment Project was introduced, ostensibly for community support but used by the forest department to pressure Adivasis to leave, including through coercion (Fanari 2019; Mathews 2005). They were excluded from relocation planning and project implementation (Cheria et al. 1997; Mathews 2005; Young, Makoni and Boehmer-Christiansen 2001). Meanwhile, the department encouraged tourism and even attempted to permit a luxury resort in the core area—a move successfully opposed in court in 1997.

In 1999–2000, Adivasis filed a public interest litigation seeking compensation for earlier evictions. A court-appointed committee found 1,738 families residing in the forest—more than the department’s estimate—and only 562 compensated (Assadi 2014). Despite court directions, the government has not acted on the findings. Today, Nagarhole and Bandipur remain major wildlife tourism hubs generating substantial revenue (Prasher 2024).

5.1 What does the FRA say on governance?

Section 3(1)(i) of the Forest Rights Act (FRA) recognizes the rights of traditional forest-dwelling communities to ‘protect, regenerate, conserve, or manage’ forests they have historically sustained. Section 5 further empowers these communities to safeguard forests, biodiversity, and ecologically sensitive areas through community forest management committees responsible for the sustainable governance of Community Forest Resource (CFR) areas. This model enables communities to use traditional ecological knowledge alongside scientific management practices (Tatpati and Ajit 2017), marking an expected shift in India’s forest governance toward participatory and livelihood-secure approaches (Desor 2013).

Section 4(2) stipulates that modification or resettlement of forest rights in protected areas is permissible only when state agencies conclusively demonstrate that coexistence between humans and wildlife is impossible. Even then, resettlement requires comprehensive rehabilitation measures ensuring alternative livelihoods. The FRA’s unusually detailed preamble outlines the history of dispossession and the Act’s corrective purpose—an uncommon feature in post-independence legislation. The law recognizes and legitimizes pre-existing customary rights (Wani 2012), acknowledging that earlier development and conservation interventions often caused forced displacement and insecure tenure. Gupta (2021) argues that wildlife conservation projects should therefore be understood as ‘development projects’ whose socio-ecological impacts must be evaluated like any other initiative involving significant landscape modification.

Section 2(a) defines ‘community forest resource’ as customary forestlands within a village’s traditional boundaries, encompassing reserved, protected, and unclassed forests, as well as sanctuaries and national parks. Even displaced villages may claim ancestral forests if residents demonstrate occupation as of 13 December 2005 or prove illegal eviction prior to that date (Wani 2012). Rule 13(2) specifies the admissible evidence for CFR claims, including NTFP collection zones, sacred groves, irrigation systems, burial grounds, and archival documents predating forest classification. Rule 6(b) mandates that sub-division level committees ensure Gram Sabhas receive necessary documents and maps; district-level committees must provide additional support to vulnerable tribal groups.

To process and recognize forest rights, the FRA establishes a four-tier institutional mechanism. Gram Sabhas hold primary authority and constitute Forest Rights Committees (FRCs) under Rule 3(1) to initiate, verify, and approve claims before forwarding them to the sub-division level committee (SDLC). State-level monitoring committees, headed by the chief secretary and comprising senior officials and Scheduled Tribe representatives, oversee compliance across each state. SDLCs, comprising revenue, forest, and tribal welfare officials and three panchayat members from forest-dwelling communities, examine and forward claims to district-level committees (DLCs), which have final approval authority. Tribal welfare officers serve as member-secretaries to both SDLCs and DLCs. State-level monitoring committees, headed by the chief secretary and comprising senior officials and Scheduled Tribe representatives, oversee compliance across each state.

5.2 Ambiguity leading to misinterpretations in the FRA

Under the FRA Rules, SDLCs—through tribal welfare officers—must conduct awareness programs on community rights, while forest officials are required to assist Gram Sabhas by providing all necessary information on traditional forest use. Rule 13 specifies the historical and administrative evidence admissible in supporting claims. The process begins with Gram Sabhas, whose FRCs conduct verification jointly with forest and revenue staff. Verified claims with boundary maps are approved by the Gram Sabha and forwarded to SDLCs and then DLCs, which finalize maps, issue titles, and ensure their incorporation into official records. Even though the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA) has issued numerous clarifications, bureaucrats across states repeatedly describe the FRA as ‘ambiguous.’ These ambiguities, they argue, have resulted in varied interpretations (Das 2019), and recurring conflicts within decision-making committees (Kutty and Menon 2025). Scholars similarly note that interpretational clarity has been effectively delegated to implementing agencies (Das 2019, p. 7), enabling what Sarin (2010) warns is the Forest Department’s ‘extraconstitutional’ interpretational freedom.

While our aim is not to list every ambiguity in the Act, we highlight selected examples to illustrate how unclear legal provisions enable divergent interpretations, and how officials leverage authority to reinforce their interpretations through sensegiving. In our study site, these ambiguities correspond to distinct sensemaking or sensegiving behaviors. For example, although the FRA clearly recognizes cultivation by forest-dwelling communities, it does not specify whether such cultivation must be claimed individually or collectively. Some officials insist on rigid readings and demand that claimants accept their interpretation of the Act—what we describe as suppressive sensegiving. Others acknowledge the procedural gap and adopt flexible, solution-oriented interpretations—improvisational sensemaking.

6.1 Sensemaking and sensegiving by the forest department

6.2 Sensemaking and sensegiving by the tribal welfare department

The tribal welfare department, originally created to promote tribal upliftment through schemes on employment, agriculture, health, and education, was never trained to address the fundamental cause of tribal marginalization—their alienation from forests (Basha 2017; Rupavath 2009; Rupavath 2019). A review by the Andhra Pradesh tribal welfare department in 1963 (Rao 1963), reveals an inability to grasp this core issue and a belief that ‘integration’ of tribals into mainstream society, rather than restoration of rights, as the solution. One of the radical shifts introduced by the FRA was its attempt to correct this, requiring tribal welfare officials to transition from a welfarist approach to an empowering, rights-based one (Kutty and Menon 2025).

Sensemaking within the tribal welfare department can be categorized as active or passive. Active sensemaking involves officials consciously developing new interpretations of the FRA and of their own institutional role, requiring significant shifts in departmental functioning. Passive sensemaking occurs when officials follow forest department interpretations due to structural disincentives, as described by Kutty and Menon (2025).

6.3 Response to sensegiving by the forest department

The tribal welfare and revenue departments respond to forest department sensegiving in three ways: (1) by accepting it unquestioningly; (2) by rejecting it and independently interpreting ambiguities (reflective sensemaking); or (3) by adopting a compromise, selecting cues that allow them to balance power dynamics (improvisational sensemaking). Their failure to challenge dominant interpretations often reinforces existing power structures. For instance, officials rarely question how Adivasis, who were historically denied access to forests and forced into wage labor or settled agriculture, can now be disqualified for not being ‘forest dependent,’ even though the FRA was specifically enacted to remedy this injustice. As one official noted, evicted communities ‘have been converted to peasants and labourers’ (District tribal welfare officer, March 2021). Improvisational sensemaking is evident when committees adopt middle-ground positions. In a SDLC meeting, after the ACF claimed CFRs in Reserve Forests and National Parks were impossible, the committee allowed Gram Sabhas access to minor forest produce but ignored governance rights and let ACFs issue identity cards (SDLC meeting minutes, 2 April 2011, Hunsur). This concession accommodated both sides but upheld forest department authority, sidestepping the FRA’s mandate that Gram Sabhas govern community forests through their committees [Rule 4(e)].

Reflective sensemaking requires time, legal capacity, and contextual knowledge—resources often lacking within state bureaucracies. Short tenures and workload pressures further incentivize reliance on forest department interpretations. Without systemic power or adequate training, tribal welfare officials struggle with legal ambiguities and local histories, limiting the transformative potential of the FRA.

6.4 Response of civil society to sensegiving by the forest department

In contrast, civil society⁴ actors draw upon lived experience—as evictees, laborers, or rights advocates—to engage in reflective sensemaking. Their interpretations challenge bureaucratic sensegiving, foregrounding historical injustices. A tribal rights leader from Hunsur (Interview, March 2021) argued that Jenu Kurubas’ habitat rights include forest areas used for food, social, and cultural needs, and criticized their denial based on relocation or lack of cultivation—criteria misaligned with their actual forest-based livelihoods.

Community sensemaking can be automatic (connecting present interpretations with past experiences of injustice), or algorithmic (involving deliberate use of legal and historical knowledge) to counter forest department narratives. When officials argue that forest-fringe hamlets are ineligible for CFRs, community representatives present evidence of long-term NTFP collection and sales to LAMPS, engaging in counter-authoritative sensegiving (SDLC meeting, 16 December 2015, Hunsur). Civil society members also challenge bureaucratic failures, such as committees not providing legally required information to claimants. These interventions constitute inspirational sensegiving, indicating an exercise of episodic power to expose systemic shortcomings. During an SDLC meeting on 20 October 2014 (Hunsur), a tribal leader emphasized that FRA allows claims in national parks and reserve forests and demanded that FRCs receive necessary information before joint surveys.

After receiving CFR titles, communities continue to challenge forest department authority over management. By citing legal provisions such as Rule 4(e) of the FRA, they advance alternative interpretations of governance roles. For instance, the LAMPS president argued that FRCs should issue minor forest produce permits (SDLC meeting minutes, 17 February 2014, Hunsur), demonstrating reflective sensemaking that connects legal knowledge to future collective action.

6.5 Forest Department’s resistance to decentralization

Resistance by the environment and forest ministry to devolve power is evident in its attempts to define ownership over forest resources merely as ‘the right to net revenue’ rather than control (Sarin 2010). Sarin further documents how the MoEF successfully diluted JPC recommendations that would have made Gram Sabhas the final authority in forest governance. The department’s reluctance is reflected in its preparation of relocation plans for protected areas even before guidelines for declaring critical wildlife habitats were issued. Such resistance stems from a training culture that emphasizes control rather than participatory governance (Fleischman 2014; Hannam 2000). Community governance of tiger habitats may also threaten informal revenue streams within the department (Fleischman 2012).

6.6 Influence of episodic and systemic power

When interpretive disagreements arise, forest officials deploy delaying tactics, such as repeatedly seeking clarifications on the FRA’s applicability in protected areas despite multiple MoTA clarifications, to reinforce their systemic power. This systemic power also emboldens officials to demand documentary proof of past evictions from claimants, even though the law requires the state to assist Gram Sabhas in accessing relevant records. Given that most eviction records are held by the forest department, the burden of proof lies with them, not with displaced Adivasis. Yet officials rely on historical narratives asserting that all rights were settled when colonial administrations notified forests as state property, and contemporary narratives categorizing forest residents as encroachers. Even after CFR titles are issued, forest officials introduce new requirements, such as department-issued identity cards for forest access, to maintain administrative control, contradicting the FRA’s recognition of Gram Sabha authority.

Over time, as the implications of the FRA became clearer, the forest department intensified authoritative sensegiving to preserve decision-making power. Regan (1984) observed similar tendencies in personnel information policy implementation in the US and UK (Matland 1995). Forest officials narrow the law’s scope by arguing that evicted Adivasis are no longer forest-dependent and that granting rights in tiger reserves will increase conflict—positions that contradict MoTA guidelines, which affirm that forest dependence applies collectively and does not require exclusive forest-based livelihoods. Such authoritative sensegiving is enabled by systemic power rooted in organizational identity, training, and monopolistic access to information (Schildt, Mantere and Cornelissen 2020).

Weaker departments’ expansive sensegiving is countered by forest officials’ algorithmic sensemaking, shaped by institutional training that positions them as guardians of forests. As the FRA is widely perceived as a ‘forest’ issue, the forest department’s interpretations are granted epistemic authority, especially by revenue officials heading committees. In contrast, tribal welfare officials, lacking comparable systemic power, struggle to assert alternative interpretations. Addressing this imbalance requires structural strengthening of the tribal welfare department (Kutty and Menon 2025).

Sensegiving is more successful when backed by structural power. While the forest department’s narratives on forest governance are widely accepted, their attempts to speak on tribal welfare are rejected by tribal welfare officials and community representatives. Conflicts in interpretation are common in policy implementation due to legal ambiguities; however, it is the way actors make sense and give meaning, not ambiguity itself, that generates conflict (Matland 1995). When actors perceive threats to their authority, they restrict policy implementation to maintain control.

6.7 Piecemeal policy making

Conflicts in interpretation are common in policy implementation due to legal ambiguities; however, it is the way actors make sense and give meaning, not ambiguity itself, that generates conflict (Matland 1995). When actors perceive threats to their authority, they restrict policy implementation to maintain control.

Policy reforms that introduce radical laws without aligning supporting legislation create confusion and undermine implementation. New policies are filtered through old bureaucratic structures, yielding outcomes inconsistent with their transformative intent. The FRA’s preamble acknowledges historical injustice inflicted during forest reservation processes. Decision-makers, therefore, should assess historical injustice relative to when forests were first notified as state forests, not when they were later declared national parks. This requires reflective sensemaking, which current bureaucratic structures inhibit.

6.8 Perceptions of history/historical injustice

Forest officials rely on colonial notifications to claim that all rights were settled before forests were notified as state property. Yet these notifications largely ignored the rights of Adivasis, labelled ‘primitive jungle tribes,’ likely because colonial interests centered on timber extraction, while Adivasis relied on forests for subsistence. This historical oversight has not informed contemporary governance, enabling forest officials to assert that new claims constitute encroachment.

6.9 Significance of training in sensemaking

Correcting entrenched top-down implementation requires retraining. Institutionalized algorithmic sensemaking can be reshaped through revised training that incorporates historical contexts of forest governance and the intent of the FRA. Evidence of such transformation emerged in Chamarajanagara district, where a forest officer described how revamped FRA training shifted his understanding of Adivasi rights.

‘A training session shifted our antagonism as a faculty member clarified why forest dwellers deserve rights. “How could tribals present their interests to British officials?” he asked. “Even educated people struggle with legal language, so illiterate tribals stood no chance. The government is correcting this exclusion now, and you must grant every valid claim”’ (DCF, BRT Tiger Reserve, Chamarajanagara, April 2022).

Similarly, reconstituting Karnataka’s tribal welfare department in 2013, along with specialized training, empowered officials to assertively support Gram Sabhas and challenge misinformation. Earlier, being subsumed under the social welfare department diluted their mandate and continuity. Dedicated training has fostered stronger ownership of the FRA’s objectives (Taluk Tribal Welfare officer, Mar 2022).

Sensemaking occurs at individual, collective, and discursive levels (Brown, Colville and Pye 2015). Forest officers’ algorithmic sensemaking is reinforced through institutional training, mandates, and implicit sanctions, strengthening systemic power. Sensegiving follows, shaping the interpretations of weaker actors. For collaborative governance to succeed, all departments must share a common understanding of the FRA, supported by standardized training.

Edelman (2020) shows that legal ambiguity enables actors to construct meanings aligned with institutional interests, paralleling how sensegiving shapes law implementation. Because policy implementation has the potential to reconstruct the policy itself (Kgwete 2021), sensemaking within institutions may either enhance or undermine policy intentions.