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Modelling Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Deus Ex Machina? Cover

Modelling Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Deus Ex Machina?

Studia Universitatis „Vasile Goldis” Arad – Economics Series
Volume 25 (2015): Issue 4 (November 2015)
By: ,  ,   and    
Open Access
|Nov 2015
References

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sues-2015-0027 | Journal eISSN: 2285-3065 (formerly 1584-2339) | Journal ISSN: 1584-2339
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Language: English
Page range: 56 - 69
Submitted on: Oct 1, 2015
Accepted on: Nov 1, 2015
Published on: Nov 26, 2015
Published by: Vasile Goldis Western University of Arad
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Keywords:
monetary policy,
central bank transparency,
central bank accountability,
inflation performances,
political influence,
central bank decision-making process,
bureaucratic institution
Related subjects:
Business and economics,
Political economics,
Economic policy,
Business management,
Financial reporting, group accounting, accounting and balancing,
Marketing, sales, customer relations,
Industries,
Banks, financial service provider, insurers

© 2015 Florin Dumiter, Petre Brezeanu, Claudia Radu, Florin Turcas, published by Vasile Goldis Western University of Arad
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

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