Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective
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Language: English
Page range: 63 - 90
Published on: Apr 10, 2015
Published by: University of Białystok, Department of Pedagogy and Psychology
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
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© 2015 Paweł Gładziejewski, published by University of Białystok, Department of Pedagogy and Psychology
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