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What Drives Politicians to Run for Office: Money, Fame or Public Service? Cover

What Drives Politicians to Run for Office: Money, Fame or Public Service?

Open Access
|Jul 2017

References

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Language: English
Page range: 9 - 38
Published on: Jul 8, 2017
Published by: NISPAcee
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 2 issues per year

© 2017 Arpie G. Balian, Arman Gasparyan, published by NISPAcee
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