[2] Military Balance 2015, The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, Chapter 1, Part III: Hybrid warfare: challenge and response, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.97, 2015.
[3] Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Information Space (2011), available at https://ccdcoe.org/strategies/Russian_Federation_unofficial_translation.pdf.
[4] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, p. 94, Mar., 2008.10.1177/0002716207311699
[5] Edward Lucas and Peter Pomeranzev, Winning the Information War Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe, Center for European Policy Analysis, 2016, https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2706.
[9] Katri Pynnöniemi & András Rácz (eds.), Fog of Falsehood Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine, Helsinki, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Grano Oy, p.33, 2016, http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIAReport45_FogOfFalsehood.pdf.
[11] Peter Pindják, Deterring hybrid warfare: a chance for NATO and the EU to work together? NATO Review, 2014, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/also-in-2014/Deterring-hybrid-warfare/EN/index.htm.