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A commonsense assessment of Arrow’s theorem Cover

A commonsense assessment of Arrow’s theorem

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Open Access
|Apr 2017

References

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Language: English
Page range: 54 - 62
Published on: Apr 18, 2017
Published by: West University of Timisoara
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 2 times per year

© 2017 Guido Ortona, published by West University of Timisoara
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.