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Corporate Governance and Financial Performance Nexus: Any Bidirectional Causality? Cover

Corporate Governance and Financial Performance Nexus: Any Bidirectional Causality?

Open Access
|Jul 2016

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ijme-2016-0013 | Journal eISSN: 2543-5361 (formerly 2299-9701) | Journal ISSN: 2299-9701
Language: English
Page range: 82 - 99
Published on: Jul 15, 2016
Published by: SGH Warsaw School of Economics
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
JEL:
C3,
D2,

© 2016 Ibrahim S. Alley, Abimbola L. Adebayo, Blessing O. Oligbi, published by SGH Warsaw School of Economics
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.