Have a personal or library account? Click to login

Modification of Shapley Value and its Implementation in Decision Making

Open Access
|Oct 2017

Abstract

The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/fman-2017-0020 | Journal eISSN: 2300-5661 | Journal ISSN: 2080-7279
Language: English
Page range: 257 - 272
Published on: Oct 28, 2017
Published by: Warsaw University of Technology
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 times per year

© 2017 Leszek Zaremba, Cezary S. Zaremba, Marek Suchenek, published by Warsaw University of Technology
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.