Ownership and Capital Structure of Pakistani Non Financial Firms
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/fiqf-2016-0136 | Journal eISSN: 2719-3454
Language: English
Page range: 57 - 67
Submitted on: Oct 3, 2015
Accepted on: Apr 26, 2016
Published on: Feb 9, 2017
Published by: University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
Keywords:
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© 2017 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi, published by University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.