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Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values Cover

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering
Volume 8 (2015): Issue 1 (July 2015)
By: Vadim Romanuke  
Open Access
|Jul 2015

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ecce-2015-0002 | Journal eISSN: 2255-9159
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Language: English
Page range: 13 - 19
Published on: Jul 24, 2015
Published by: Riga Technical University
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 2 issues per year
Keywords:
Systems, man, and cybernetics,
Decision theory,
Computational efficiency,
Mathematical model
Related subjects:
Engineering,
Introductions and overviews,
Engineering, other

© 2015 Vadim Romanuke, published by Riga Technical University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

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