Articulation and Liars
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Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 383 - 399
Submitted on: Oct 4, 2017
Accepted on: Jun 15, 2017
Published on: Mar 6, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
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© 2018 Sergi Oms, published by University of Lisbon
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