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Judicial Activism Contributing to the Understanding of Social State Principle(S) – Constitutional Court of Slovenia at the Crossroads Cover

Judicial Activism Contributing to the Understanding of Social State Principle(S) – Constitutional Court of Slovenia at the Crossroads

By: Nejc Brezovar  
Open Access
|Apr 2017

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/danb-2017-0002 | Journal eISSN: 1804-8285 | Journal ISSN: 1804-6746
Language: English
Page range: 19 - 30
Published on: Apr 12, 2017
Published by: European Association Comenius - EACO
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2017 Nejc Brezovar, published by European Association Comenius - EACO
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.