Figure 1.
Schematic representation of the hierarchical structure of personality pathology. Two superordinate factors, called Internalizing and Externalizing, emerge from a general personality factor. Below this level there are three intermediate factors, for Internalizing splits into two lower-order factors labeled Detachment and Negative Affectivity whereas Externalizing maintains its structure. This three factor solution can then be decomposed into the five factors of Negative Affectivity, Detachment, Antagonism, Disinhibition and Psychoticism, each containing the lower-order trait facets that load on their respective trait domains. Psychoticism has complex links to the superordinate factors and this relationship is currently under investigation. Figure based on Wright et al. (2012).
Table 1.
Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP) traits and domains
| Domain | Traits |
|---|---|
| Self | Self-centered |
| Self-aggrandizing | |
| Sense of uniqueness | |
| Sense of entitlement | |
| Sense of invulnerability | |
| Self-justifying | |
| Unstable self-concept | |
| Emotional | Lacks anxiety |
| Lacks pleasure | |
| Lacks emotional depth | |
| Lacks emotional stability | |
| Lacks remorse | |
| Dominance | Antagonistic |
| Domineering | |
| Deceitful | |
| Manipulative | |
| Insincere | |
| Garrulous | |
| Attachment | Detached |
| Uncommitted | |
| Unempathic | |
| Uncaring | |
| Behavioral | Lacks perseverance |
| Unreliable | |
| Reckless | |
| Restless | |
| Disruptive | |
| Aggressive | |
| Cognitive | Suspicious |
| Lacks concentration | |
| Intolerant | |
| Inflexible | |
| Lacks planfulness | |
Table 2.
Early maladaptive schemas and schema domains
| Basic emotional need | Schema domain | Early maladaptive schemas |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Secure attachments to others | Disconnection and rejection | 1. Abandonment/instability |
| 2. Mistrust/abuse | ||
| 3. Emotional deprivation | ||
| 4. Defectiveness/shame | ||
| 5. Social isolation/alienation | ||
| 2. Autonomy, competence and sense of identity | Impaired autonomy and performance | 6. Dependence/incompetence |
| 7. Vulnerability to harm or illness | ||
| 8. Enmeshment/undeveloped self | ||
| 9. Failure | ||
| 3. Realistic limits and self-control | Impaired limits | 10. Entitlement/grandiosity |
| 11. Insufficient self-control/self-discipline | ||
| 4. Freedom to express valid needs and emotions | Other-directedness | 12. Subjugation |
| 13. Self-sacrifice | ||
| 14. Approval-seeking/recognition seeking | ||
| 5. Spontaneity and play | Over-vigilance and inhibition | 15. Negativity/pessimism |
| 16. Emotional inhibition | ||
| 17. Unrelenting standards/hypercriticalness | ||
| 18. Punitiveness |
Table 3.
Schema modes
| Modes | Schemas |
|---|---|
| Child modes: Involve feeling, thinking, and acting in a “childlike” manner | 1. Vulnerable child (abandoned, abused, or humiliated child) |
| 2. Angry child | |
| 3. Impulsive, undisciplined child | |
| 4. Lonely child | |
| Dysfunctional coping modes: Involve attempts to protect the self from pain through maladaptive forms of coping | 5. Detached protector |
| 6. Detached self-soother/self-stimulator | |
| 7. Compliant surrenderer | |
| 8. Angry protector a | |
| Maladaptive parent modes: Involve internalized dysfunctional parent “voices” | 9. Punitive, critical parent |
| 10. Demanding parent | |
| Over-compensatory modes: Involve extreme attempts to compensate for feelings of shame, loneliness, or vulnerability | 11. Self-aggrandizer mode |
| 12. Bully and attack mode | |
| 13. Conning and manipulative mode a | |
| 14. Predator mode a | |
| 15. Over-controller mode (paranoid and obsessive-compulsive types) a | |
a New Schema Mode added by Bernstein et al. (2007).
Figure 2.
Schematic of a predictive coding network and the role of precision in Bayesian inference. See main text for details.
Figure 3.
Bayesian model of lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing. See main text for details.
Figure 4.
Schematic overview of the generative model used to simulate a simple reputation game. This model is shown in graphical form, where the circles correspond to different states (and outcomes) that a subject can be in (and observe). The red arrows correspond to the mapping between latent or hidden states and their observable consequences. This is the likelihood matrix (A) shown on the right. Transitions among these states are encoded by blue arrows (solid for donate and broken for keep). The corresponding probability transition (B) matrices are shown on the right. Finally, the preferences for outcomes are encoded in a (C) matrix. These preferences are specified in terms of log prior probabilities. In this model, α and β can be regarded as encoding the precision of sensory evidence and prior beliefs, respectively.
Figure 5.
This figure shows the effects of changing the likelihood precision (α) and transition precision (β) during a simulation of 16 choices starting from a prior expectation about being moneyless but nice. This has been performed for synthetic subjects with different combinations of α and β. These effects are shown in terms of the posterior expectation about being charitable (left image) and the overall amount of wealth retained (right image). Although self-worth is generally lower for parameters that lead to greater wealth accumulation, the synthetic agents with very low α and high β (upper left corner of each plot) appear to have a higher posterior expectation of self-worth despite uncharitable behaviors. The developmental trajectory of a hypothetical patient with psychopathic traits is shown in red. Starting in the (altruistic) lower right corner, α initially decreases, uncoupling external sources of approval from beliefs about self. This trajectory leads to behaviors that yield greater monetary profit, but a lower self-worth. By subsequently increasing β, the influence of decisions on self-worth is diminished, uncoupling decisions from beliefs and resulting in uncharitable behavior that does not unduly compromise self-worth.
