Institutionalized Corruption: Chaebol Resilience Despite Economic Democratization Attempts

South Korean society has seen decades of mass political and social democratic movements, which succeeded in achieving a baseline for democratic practices. It remains important to explore the remnants of its authoritarian past to ensure these do not conflict with South Korea’s contemporary democracy. One such remnant is the chaebol, or family-run conglomerates, which many have criticized for their close relations with the government and influence over policy. Both left-wing and right-wing politicians targeted chaebol during the 2012 presidential debates, equating chaebol reform with economic democratization. Despite being the center of intense political discourse, no significant reform was achieved, and recent presidential debates lacked the same vigor to reform chaebol. Chaebols’ ability to seemingly avoid legal consequences and major reform has sparked conversations about their resiliency throughout the decades. 

This paper explores this resiliency by using a historical approach to analyze chaebols’ key development and reforms, and past barriers to reform. These historical findings offer a baseline to interpret contemporary investigations of chaebol’s state relations and public image. Based on these findings, we argue that chaebols are a hangover from South Korea’s developmental state period. The lack of vigorous reforms to address both chaebols’ economic concentration and political influence contribute to their resiliency. Achieving reform is further complicated by polarized public opinion, within a society that remains conflicted over prioritizing either economic success or democratic practices.