Abstract
A standard is the mechanism through which a recurring problem is ab-stracted to an easily implemented common solution. Standards encourage inno-vation by reducing the cost of solving common problems, and benefit consumers by creating safer, more affordable products. To encourage proliferation of stand-ards, private consortiums require patents on standards technology to be licensed on reasonable terms. This requirement, known as the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) obligation, is vague and has been the subject of exten-sive litigation, particularly as standardized technologies enjoy increased adoption and create large profits. To allow society to continue harnessing the benefits of standardization, courts should refrain from using the anti-suit injunction in cases of concurrent jurisdiction over FRAND disputes. The courts’ increasing use of the anti-suit injunction encourages litigants to forum shop, harms international relations, and threatens the predictability that businesses need to invest in re-search and development. These consequences threaten to hamper standards de-velopment as well as the benefits to consumers and society. This Note argues against the use of the anti-suit injunction in FRAND suits. Additionally, this Note argues that standard-setting organizations should import choice of law and forum selection clauses into FRAND contracts to facilitate FRAND negotiations. These clauses can remove the incentives for courts to issue anti-suit injunctions, and for litigants to request them.
© 2022 Sam V. Wizon, published by Boston College Law School
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons License.
