
Danger as Deterrent
Abstract
This Article explores instances in which the law makes crime more dangerous in order to reduce its prevalence. Defining “strategic endangerment” as an intentional exacerbation of preexisting danger designed to deter crime, the Article explores this approach in the context of criminal markets, where the multiplicity of people involved increases the law’s opportunities to exert indirect pressure on the criminal environment. The Article then offers a broader framework for thinking about the relationship between danger, harm, and agency in illicit vice markets.
Journal eISSN: 1930-661X
Language: English
Page range: 113 - 160
Published on: Jan 30, 2024
Published by: Boston College Law School
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
© 2024 Alexandra Yelderman, published by Boston College Law School
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License.