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# RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA): TOWARDS A NEW STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT?

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**Abstract**
Has the high-profile public opposition to recent EU trade agreements supplanted the traditional socio-economic pattern of competition in European trade policy with a value-driven one? This article draws on new data analysing the outcome of the ratification process of a mixed free trade agreement (CETA) in the European Parliament and in all national parliaments that have so far completed ratification. With help of a logistic regression model analysing the vote-outcome, this article demonstrates that despite high social salience, economic considerations remain prominent. Values (TAN-GAL cleavage) were relevant but played a different role than expected. Against the expectation, green parties associated with the GAL-spectrum voted against CETA demonstrating that party preferences on specific values do not necessarily coincide or generate the same policy preference.

**Keywords:** CETA, ratification, national parliaments, the European Parliament, free trade

## Introduction

Has the high-profile public opposition to recent European trade agreements supplanted the traditional socio-economic pattern of competition in European trade policy? EU trade

policy is no longer as we knew it. Until recently, commercial policy numbered among the technocratic policies applied in the absence of public or legislative scrutiny (Zürn 2004). And yet, over the past few years, the politics of EU trade has changed. Both the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) have generated deeper social and political controversies than other contemporary trade agreements (Young 2017 and 2019). We therefore have good reasons to assume that the driving factors behind political party mobilization on trade have also changed.

The most recent free trade agreements have been negotiated in a new institutional environment since the Treaty of Lisbon reformed institutional competences regarding the EU trade policy. The social environment has also changed, facilitating transparency, but also politicising free trade agreements (Meunier and Czesana 2019; Puntscher Riekmann 2017; Duina 2019). As a result, political actors' positions on trade *in general* and, even more so, on *specific* free trade agreements have become very prone to change. (Jungherr, Mader, Schoen and Wuttke 2018). Yet, as Meunier and Czesana have observed (2019), we should not try to explain the new trend by referring exclusively to the Lisbon Treaty. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the EU negotiated a multitude of free trade agreements: while some became highly politicised (TTIP), others were not socially salient (the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement). What we therefore have today is a variation that has taken place over time, across free trade agreements and across states (Meunier and Czesana 2019).

This article analyses the structure of the political conflict over the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) at the national and supranational political party levels. The empirical inference of the article is based on a dataset analysing parliamentary ratification of the agreement (vote outcome) in the European Parliament and all national parliaments of the EU member states that have completed the ratification process so far

Regarding the research method, the analysis is conducted with a logistic regression model. The data employed in the study is new: so far, there has been no large-N comparative study to analyse the outcome of a ratification process of a *mixed* free trade agreement at the national and supranational levels.

Despite the quickly growing body of literature on international trade relations between the EU and the third parties (Meunier and Czesana 2019, Hübner; Deman and Balik 2017; Lauresen and Roederer-Rynning 2017a and 2017b; Dür, Eckhardt and Poletti 2019, Jungherr, Mader, Schoen and Wuttke 2018; Siles-Brügge 2017; Duina 2019; Leblond and Viju-Miljusevic 2019, Postnikov 2020), the literature discussing the roles of parliaments (national or the EP) regarding the scrutiny or ratification of the most recent free trade agreements, such as CETA or TTIP, began to emerge only very recently (Rosen 2019; Roederer-Rynning and Kallenstrup 2017; Jančić 2016, 2019; Meissner 2016, 2021; Loo and Wessel 2017). Beyond that, the literature discussing positions on trade *in general* is far richer than the literature focusing on *specific* free trade agreements. Regarding CETA, the most recent literature has focused predominantly on explaining the unusual level of social salience and politicisation (Buonanno 2017; Lauresen and Roederer-Rynning 2017; Leblond, Viju- Miljusevic 2019). Although CETA has not become equally politicised as TTIP, it remained far more contested than other free trade agreements negotiated and concluded during the same time period. Whether the increased social salience of CETA

has affected the pattern of political party mobilization has, however, not been investigated. This article addresses that gap.

Given the unusual salience and politicisation of CETA in many EU member states, the expectation was that the national and supranational ratification processes would also be significantly affected. Drawing on the literature (Kriesi 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2018), it was expected that the classical utility-driven socio-economic cleavage structuring the conflict over free trade would be supplanted by a new pattern, such as, libertarian–universalistic versus traditional–communitarian (Kriesi 2010) or the TAN-GAL[1] cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2018). Yet, the results of the large-N study presented in this article confirmed the expectation only to a limited extent. The supranational and national conflict regarding CETA has been structured along the socio-economic cleavage ('old' pattern). While values ('new pattern') were also relevant, they played a different role than expected. Contrary to the expectation raised in the literature (Hooghe and Marks 2018), the empirical analysis demonstrated that opposition towards CETA originated from GAL, not TAN parties. The findings of the study therefore demonstrate that despite high social salience, the utility-driven political conflict regarding CETA has not been supplanted by a new, value-driven pattern. By the same token, the finding demonstrates that in trade policy national and EP parties are not automatically responsive to social contestation. Economic considerations remain prominent regarding trade agreements.

After a brief introduction, the article provides information on the role of parliaments in the ratification of mixed agreements. It also briefly introduces the process of CETA ratification. The next section presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses of the study and is followed by a discussion on the methodology and empirical findings. The concluding section discusses the findings in a broader framework and suggests avenues for further research.

## Theoretical framework: The structure of the political conflicts regarding CETA

Why is international trade in general a source of a political conflict? And how is that conflict structured? In the light of David Ricardo's comparative advantage hypothesis, free trade is beneficial to all parties involved (1817). However, in a short- or mid-term perspective some people can be negatively affected by the exposure to free trade. International trade fosters growth of competitive sectors, but also accelerates the fall of uncompetitive ones. For individual citizens, exposure to international trade can therefore either imply great opportunities, or existential threats. As a result, exposure to international trade can become a source of a political conflict.

Since trade has a redistributive effect, most authors agree that political parties also compete on trade (Milner and Judkins 2004). Yet, we find different opinions as to which cleavages explain political party positions. This article takes the abovementioned assumption for granted with an aim to establish whether party competition is driven by economic, or rather value-based, cleavage.

The economic model assumes that political parties can position themselves on trade along the basic left–right cleavage. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that political

1 Traditional-authoritarian-nationalist versus green-alternative-libertarian.

parties compete on trade along the class-based cleavage (Hiscox 2000; Rogowski 1989). The model postulates that trade affects *all* owners of the same factor of production in the same way. For instance, it is expected that *all* capital owners in rich industrialized countries with abundant capital will profit from free trade.

While the left–right cleavage has had different meanings in different countries or has been conceptually over-stretched, a minimalist definition of the cleavage has been proposed (Laponce 1981). It concerns the attitudes towards welfare and equality within a society. The general question is whether profits to those benefiting from free trade should be redistributed to those who have been negatively affected. Some parties believe that there should be support (such as restructuring funds) for regions or industries negatively affected by the opening of markets, others believe that such intervention would distort competition. At the same time, parties committed to equality within a society are more likely to have a different position on free trade than parties which accept inequality as a "natural thing". The study therefore evaluates two minimalist hypotheses next to a general hypothesis regarding the left–right cleavage:

- *H1. MPs from left-wing parties are more likely to oppose CETA than MPs from right-wing parties*
- *H1.1: The weaker the party's commitment to welfare, the more likely are the MPs from that party to support CETA*
- *H1.2: The weaker the party's commitment to equality, the more likely are the MPs from that party to support CETA*

Over recent years, a growing number of authors began to study the impact of general predispositions or values on free trade policy. As Mayda and Rodrik observed (2005), values can play a stronger role than 'economic variables' in shaping people's, but also political parties' preferences on trade policy. In their view, attitudes on trade are rather rooted in general opinions towards 'the other' (Mayda, Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke, Sinnot 2001). More specifically, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) observed that these opinions are shaped in the process of education. In particular, during university education students are exposed to ideas that associate free trade with a general social and economic openness towards the other.

According to Kriesi (2010) the contemporary conflict regarding free trade can be predominantly explained with the *libertarian-universalistic* versus *traditionalist-communitarian* cleavage. The cleavage has its source in the conflict between those who find the broadly understood denationalization and opening of national borders as a threat, and those who perceive the process as a positive development. Yet, the driving factor of the conflict is values, not utility. The cleavage does not draw on economic benefits associated with the denationalization process, but rather values associated with openness and closure:

- *H2.1: MPs from parties representing libertarian–universalistic values are more likely to support CETA than MPs from parties representing traditionalist–communitarian values*

A similar argument has been put forward by Hooghe and Marks (2018) who observed that the contemporary political conflict over globalization is no longer structured by the socio-economic cleavage but rather along the traditional–authoritarian–nationalist versus green–alternative–liberal value-based cleavage (TAN-GAL) (Hooghe and Marks 2018). According to Hooghe and Marks, voter preferences on trade, immigration and Europe-

an integration have substantially changed. As a result, voters have turned to new parties which offer value-based, non-economic, positions on these issues:

- *H2.2 MPs from parties representing GAL-values are more likely to support CETA than MPs from parties representing TAN-values*

Some authors have observed that the value-based cleavage differentiates left-wing party positions on trade. In particular, while liberal and post-materialist left-wing parties (new left) are more likely to support trade, traditional left-wing parties (old left) tend to be against free trade (Atilguist *et al* 2014; Shock 2000):

- *H2.3 MPs from parties classified as old left are more likely to oppose CETA than MPs from parties classified as new left*

While this article draws on the assumption that political parties compete on trade, or, more specifically, on the interpretation of the benefits and socio-economic implications of trade, it has to be observed here that some authors do not share that opinion and argue that parties do not mobilize on trade at all. In particular, the Ricardo–Viner model implies that persons who are employed in export industries tend to support free trade whereas those who work in import-competing industries oppose it. As this conflict of interests cuts *across* all the cleavages, there can be no partisan effect (Hiscox 2001). Under these circumstances industrial interest groups are more likely to shape trade policy than political parties (Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Grossmann and Helpman 1994). Furthermore, according to the New Trade Theory, there can be differences even within the same industry. Whether firms benefit from free trade namely depends on their position in global value chains (Dür, Poletti and Eckhardt 2019). There is also literature stressing the role of states' interests in shaping trade policy (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Katzenstein 1985).

## National parliaments and the ratification of CETA

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) extended the EU's exclusive competence in trade (Laursen and Roederer-Rynning 2017b). Article 207 TFEU stipulates that all aspects of external trade including services, trade-related intellectual property rights or foreign direct investment shall fall under exclusive EU competences. The Treaty has also empowered the European Parliament to (dis)approve new trade agreements (Roederer-Rynning and Kallenstrup 2017). Yet, if an agreement in question is recognized as a *mixed agreement* (Loo and Wessel 2017), national parliaments are involved in the ratification process because the free trade agreement concerns shared or exclusively national competences. In that case, the entry into force of such an agreement requires ratification by the European Parliament and national parliaments of all signatory states. In some cases, as in Belgium, regional parliaments have to be consulted as well.

Such institutional complexity generates tensions, as was the case with the ratification of CETA. With a decision of the European Commission,[2] CETA was recognised as a *mixed* agreement in July 2016. By the same token, it became the first *mixed* free trade agreement to be ratified under the new provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.

CETA represents a new generation of free trade agreements that go beyond tariffs and quotas.[3] In particular, CETA concerns issues such as: investment facilitation, competition, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, copyrights, temporary entry for busi-

2 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm

3 CETA eliminates 98% of tariffs and quotas.

ness purposes and tourism as well as sharing of knowledge and technology.[4] Negotiations over CETA began in May 2009 during the EU–Canada summit. Although initially the Commission viewed CETA as an EU-only agreement, in July 2016 it put forward CETA as a mixed agreement due to pressure from many EU member states. It has been observed that the social contestation of the TTIP has also affected CETA (Young 2019). Eventually, CETA became highly politicized in some EU member states, one of the most problematic issues being the compatibility of the dispute resolution system (Investment Court System) with the EU law.

On 15 February 2018, the European Parliament approved the agreement paving the way to the ratification process at national levels. With the successful ratification in the EP, and in Canada, (May 2017), the agreement provisionally entered into force. The agreement will be fully binding when national parliaments complete the ratification process. The major provision not entering into force was the Investor Court System (ICS) because it directly affects the competences of national courts and will become operative only after CETA approval by all national parliaments of the EU member states.

## The data and the explanatory model

The article analyses the vote-outcome on CETA in the European Parliament as well as in those national parliaments having so far completed the ratification process. By doing so, the article analyses the structure of the political conflict at the national and supranational levels at both horizontal and vertical dimensions.

The empirical inference of the article is based on a dataset analysing parliamentary ratification of the agreement (vote outcome) in the European Parliament and all national parliaments of the EU member states that have completed the ratification process so far (Czechia, Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Cyprus)[5]. Two states were additionally included into the dataset even though they have not completed the ratification procedure. In particular, the analysis includes the vote outcome in the French Assemblée Nationale (the Sénat has not voted yet) but also the vote-outcome in the Polish lower chamber, the Sejm. The Sejm formally voted only on the mode of approval but in practice MPs saw the vote as an opportunity to signal their support or opposition to the agreement. So far, only one national parliament has rejected the agreement: Cyprus (August 2020). It is not clear at the time of writing how the EU and Cyprus will proceed.

While the goal of the empirical analysis was to cover all the cases, we should stress the specificity of the sample. In particular, ratification of international agreements usually takes place first in parliaments in which the agreement is less controversial. Although the sample covers a high share of EU member states, we have to bear that fact in mind.

For the sake of comparability, the analysis excludes the few regional parliaments which voted on CETA. The underlying database includes votes of single parliamentarians, but the model uses party- and country-level variables only. Therefore, the vote outcome within each party is used as the unit of analysis.

4 URL: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (consolidated version of CETA, retrieved on 02.04.2018).

5 The information has been verified in each state under study. The process of domestic ratification is country specific.

The dataset, comprising of the vote-outcome by party and by MEP/MP, has been compiled specifically for the purpose of this study. In particular, the minutes of the plenary debates containing the vote outcome have been downloaded from the internet pages of the EP and national parliaments.

The dependent variable (DV) of the study has been defined as a vote of one party on CETA, more specifically the share of parliamentarians who have voted in favour. Abstentions are implicitly counted together with no-votes, but their share was rather insignificant (compared to the usual parliamentary praxis).

The dataset is compiled of 3,657 parliamentarians' votes, 750 in the European parliament and the rest in national parliaments. The parliamentarians represent 253 different political parties across Europe. However, not all of these parties have been included in the Manifesto Project[6] which provides data on political parties' positions based on their electoral manifestos. The database allows comparing party positions but also to examine how specific parties' positions evolved over time. Yet, the dataset does not measure positions of very small parties or unaffiliated parliamentarians, which are nonetheless present in most parliaments (Volkens et al. 2017a).

The independent variables in the model are at the national party level. Party-level explanatory factors could be employed to predict the voting behaviour within each party. The largest set of independent variables was employed from the Manifesto Project (Volkens *et al*. 2017a) which codes political-party electoral programmes. For instance, the Manifesto Project provides us detailed information on how a specific political party positions itself on various issues, such as welfare state, or environmental protection. The data is publicly accessible.

The model also introduces a number of control variables. To compare populist with non-populist party positions, the analysis employed the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (TAP) 2017 to classify political parties included in the dataset as populist or non-populist. Contemporary literature has also focused on populist party involvement in free trade policy. While some authors found that populist parties hardly mobilize on trade (Young 2019), others observed that populism, as a thin ideology, could be combined with the socio-economic, or the value-based, cleavage (Kriesi 2014; Rodrik 2018; Manow 2018). According to Manow (2018), left-wing populists tend to position themselves against free trade whereas right-wing populists are in favour. This is due to right-wing populists being more concerned with protection of their welfare state than trade policy.

The analysis also controls for a political party's national government membership. The expectation is that governing parties are more likely to vote in favour of CETA than opposition parties. According to the literature, governing parties have a stronger international responsibility for their actions (Rose 2014). Opposition parties, to the contrary, are unconstrained in responding to the preferences of their voters. There are namely governing parties that are confronted with the pressure to ratify an international agreement negotiated and signed by their government.

In the case of CETA, country-level effects can be also attributed to different levels of social contestation of the agreement (Meunier and Czesana 2019; Puntscher Riekmann 2017; Young 2019). In some EU member states, such as France, or Germany, CETA became a very salient and politicized topic, whereas in other states it has not been debated

6 https://manifestoproject.wbz.eu

at all. Beyond that, parties in countries with strong exporting industries are likely to be in favour while countries fearing stronger competition to local production are likely to be against. For this reason, the empirical analysis conducted in this study controls for country-level fixed effects.

The empirical model is based on a regression in which the dependent variable is the share of parliamentarians in a party having voted in favour of CETA. A logistic regression is used in order to limit the value of the dependent variable between 0% and 100%. The independent variables employed in the model were of a binary or a continuous nature. Some of the independent variables require clarification. Regarding the H1 hypothesis, the indicator was the "left-right" code from the Manifesto database. Regarding the H1.1 hypothesis, the indicator was the code "welfare-diff" being the difference between "Welfare State Expansion" and "Welfare State Limitation". The indicator employed for the hypothesis H1.2 has been "equality_pos" (equality negative was not coded in the Manifesto database). The indicator for the hypothesis 2.1 was the code "traditional_moral_diff", the hypothesis H2.2 has been operationalised with the code "environmental protection_pos" and "multiculturalism_diff", finally, the hypothesis H2.3 has been measured with help of the code "labour_groups_diff" (see Volkens *et al*. 2017b). For the country-level fixed effects at the national level Canada was adopted as a reference case. At the EP level the reference has been Austria.

## Empirical findings

The empirical findings demonstrate that the structure of conflict regarding the ratification of CETA was multidimensional. The results are summarised in three models: one for all parliaments, one for the European Parliament and one concerning national parliaments (see table 1). In fact, the conflict has been driven both by the economic, as well as value-based, factors. Yet, values frequently played a different role than expected. Not surprisingly, the analysis demonstrates a stronger partisan effect at the national level.

The explanatory model for national parliaments analysed 71 parties for which the data from the Party Manifesto Database was available (see table 1). The EP model was based on 158 observations, and the overall model included 178 observations. The analysed parties demonstrated a rather high internal coherence regarding the vote outcome (see Appendix, Table 1). The general pattern was that right-wing parties tended to be internally more coherent than left-wing parties. In general, social-democratic parties across the whole EU faced major difficulties in arriving at a common position towards CETA.

The models analysing the ratification process included a control variable "government party". As expected, governing parties were more likely to vote in favour of CETA than the opposition parties, particularly in their national parliaments. The results confirm that the political conflict has been structured by the socio-economic cleavage. In particular, right-wing political parties were more likely to vote in favour of CETA than left-wing parties. Furthermore, parties which emphasised social equality in their electoral programmes were more likely to vote against CETA.

The models also demonstrated that values influenced political actor positions. Yet, the role that some values played was different than initially expected. While the openness versus closure hypothesis was not as relevant as expected (multiculturalism was not significant), the TAN-GAL cleavage was relevant, though not in the way that was initially

assumed. In particular, not all of the components of the value-based hypotheses were equally significant. The assumption raised in the literature was that GAL-parties would support international trade. Contrary to the TAN-GAL hypothesis, parties committed to environmental issues were, in fact, strongly *against* CETA. If environmental protection featured high in a given political party's programme, the party was very likely to vote against CETA. The old versus new left hypothesis could not be confirmed. (See Table 1).

In order to assess the relevance of cleavages between countries, country-fixed effects were included as control variables. The fixed effects of five countries turned out to be significant (all positive): Croatia, Czech Republic, Malta, Sweden, and Spain, all with a positive sign. This indicates that parliamentarians in these countries were more likely to vote in favour of CETA than parliamentarians with the same preferences in other states. The sign of the different variables' impact did not change between the different models, though partisan effects dominated votes at the national level, so the other variables lost significance.

The impact of populism was not conclusive. In the model for all parliaments, populist parties were more likely to vote against CETA. However, in the European Parliament populist parties[7] were more likely to vote in favour of CETA. Apparently, populism played more of a catalysing role.

## *Discussion*

The empirical results presented in this article have demonstrated that the conflict regarding CETA, both at the national and supranational levels, was predominantly structured by economic factors. Values have nonetheless played a somewhat different role than expected.

The empirical analysis demonstrated that despite high politicisation of free trade, the socio-economic cleavage is still extremely relevant for explaining the structure of conflict regarding specific free trade agreements. The conflict regarding free trade still has strong underpinnings in redistribution, less so in values. In particular, drawing on the Party Manifestos database, this article demonstrates that left-wing parties – but also parties stressing social equality – were more likely to reject CETA than parties advocating free markets in their electoral programmes. And yet, the political conflict could not be exclusively explained by socio-economic variables. The analysis demonstrated that political party positions on CETA are not exclusively informed by utility-driven, socio-economic factors, but also by values.

While values structured the political conflict over CETA, their impact was to some extent different from expectations. More specifically, it was not the case that traditional-communitarian or traditional, authoritarian, or nationalist (TAN) actors were, in general, more likely to reject CETA than libertarian–universalistic or green, alternative, and liberal (GAL) parties. Against expectations, parties committed to environmental protection positioned themselves strongly against CETA. Environmental protection was a very powerful factor fostering opposition to CETA both among liberal and populist actors. Although green parties are usually in favour of free trade *in general*, they positioned themselves against a *specific* free trade agreement. This finding clearly demonstrates how important it is to differentiate between political actor positions on free trade in general

7 According to the Timbro index

and specific free trade agreements. Green parties most likely rejected CETA because the agreement failed to live up to their standards of multilateralism.

While values play a key role in structuring the partisan conflict on specific free trade agreements, their impact is not as parsimonious as we expected. In particular, both traditional-communitarian/TAN and libertarian–universalistic/GAL values can stimulate support and opposition to free trade agreements. The strong opposition of Green parties towards the CETA demonstrates that the TAN-GAL cleavage is limited in explaining the structure of conflict regarding specific free trade agreements. The finding demonstrates that, against our expectations, party positions on specific values do not necessarily coincide or generate single policy preference.

As expected, governing parties voted in favour of CETA whereas opposition were more likely to oppose it. The role of populist parties was not conclusive. In particular, while within the whole sample populist parties were more likely to vote against CETA, in the EP they were more likely to vote in favour. The findings concerning populist parties confirmed to a significant extent the existing hypotheses. As the literature indicated, populism on its own does not explain preferences on multilateralism in general or specific free trade agreements (Manow 2018). Populist parties vary significantly regarding their preferences on trade, and they need socio-economic or value-based underpinnings in order to formulate their preferences (Kriesi 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2018).

The finding confirms that populists are a very heterogenous group that rejected or supported CETA for very different reasons.

Future studies should deliver better explanations as to why political parties support or contest *specific* free trade agreements. Qualitative discourse analysis of parliamentary debates accompanying the ratification process would shed more light on this question. Political party programmes, so far, the most popular source of empirical enquiry, are not particularly helpful in this respect because they only include parties' general positions on free trade. It also has to be noted that our knowledge regarding the effects of politicisation is highly unsystematic. In particular, this study has demonstrated that politicisation of CETA in the media is not automatically translated into national parliaments. That finding also raises further questions regarding the generalisability of this study. In particular, the pattern explaining the structure of conflict regarding specific free trade agreements is not generalizable on the conflict concerning free trade in general (but also vice versa). Rather, the findings concerning the conflict on a specific mixed agreement could be helpful in explaining another specific FTA. Finally, future research should acknowledge that contemporary political parties support different approaches towards free trade, ranging from regional cooperation to global governance beyond regionalism. As a result, our operationalisation of the dependent variable should become more sensitive towards that variety.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

**Table 1**. Vote for CETA – regression results

| Independent variables | Model 1: all parliaments coeff. | std. error | | Model 2: Eur. Parliament coeff. | std. error | | Model 3: nation. parliaments coeff. | std. error | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| constant | -8.82 | 6.72 | | 4.06 | 7.01 | | -8.99 | 7.69 | |
| left (-) / right (+) | 0.26 | 0.09 | *** | 0.29 | 0.10 | *** | 0.18 | 0.13 | |
| welfare | 0.01 | 0.28 | | -0.01 | 0.32 | | -0.05 | 0.37 | |
| equality | -0.56 | 0.28 | ** | -0.76 | 0.31 | ** | -0.48 | 0.37 | |
| traditional moral | -0.67 | 0.42 | | -0.62 | 0.48 | | -0.43 | 0.89 | |
| environment | -0.44 | 0.20 | ** | -0.56 | 0.22 | ** | -0.46 | 0.38 | |
| multicultural | 0.35 | 0.33 | | 0.43 | 0.37 | | 0.12 | 0.52 | |
| labour groups | 0.34 | 0.42 | | 0.05 | 0.50 | | 0.58 | 0.57 | |
| government | 8.21 | 2.95 | *** | -10.44 | 3.04 | *** | 10.77 | 2.90 | *** |
| populist | -8.12 | 2.61 | *** | 6.23 | 3.73 | * | -0.43 | 3.86 | |
| Austria | 8.06 | 7.95 | | | | | | | |
| Belgium | 2.07 | 7.43 | | -7.14 | 7.61 | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 14.53 | 8.84 | | 3.23 | 9.74 | | | | |
| Croatia | 21.04 | 10.08 | ** | 11.04 | 10.91 | | | | |
| Cyprus | 0.92 | 7.84 | | -5.18 | 8.68 | | -6.23 | 7.44 | |
| Czech Republic | 12.97 | 7.40 | * | 4.73 | 8.12 | | 9.10 | 7.22 | |
| Denmark | 4.82 | 7.13 | | 1.81 | 8.02 | | -0.94 | 7.12 | |
| Estonia | 11.94 | 7.29 | | 6.85 | 9.34 | | 8.57 | 7.10 | |
| Finland | 9.38 | 7.12 | | 4.67 | 7.84 | | 2.92 | 7.29 | |
| France | 1.33 | 6.87 | | -9.13 | 7.04 | | -3.02 | 7.81 | |
| Germany | 10.58 | 7.30 | | 2.40 | 7.30 | | | | |
| Greece | -0.90 | 9.08 | | -9.17 | 9.23 | | | | |
| Hungary | 6.53 | 7.40 | | -2.81 | 7.85 | | | | |
| Ireland | 4.12 | 8.80 | | -5.66 | 10.22 | | | | |
| Italy | 10.63 | 7.38 | | 1.19 | 7.97 | | | | |
| Latvia | 8.32 | 7.59 | | -4.02 | 9.51 | | 6.69 | 7.59 | |
| Lithuania | 11.45 | 7.26 | | 1.59 | 7.72 | | | | |
| Luxembourg | 7.72 | 7.41 | | 2.63 | 9.21 | | 2.59 | 7.03 | |
| Malta | 21.46 | 10.04 | ** | 11.50 | 11.18 | | | | |
| Netherlands | 2.03 | 7.05 | | -8.03 | 7.29 | | | | |
| Poland | -2.77 | 7.51 | | -11.70 | 8.65 | | 0.78 | 7.96 | |
| Portugal | 5.16 | 7.40 | | -3.44 | 8.76 | | 2.64 | 6.95 | |
| Romania | 13.84 | 9.18 | | 1.21 | 10.54 | | | | |
| Slovakia | 12.12 | 7.88 | | 1.29 | 8.32 | | | | |
| Slovenia | 11.60 | 8.02 | | 1.25 | 8.38 | | | | |
| Spain | 13.33 | 6.95 | * | 3.44 | 7.59 | | 9.00 | 7.11 | |
| Sweden | 19.12 | 7.86 | ** | 13.53 | 8.35 | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 10.83 | 6.71 | | 2.22 | 7.33 | | | | |
| | No. of cases: 178<br>Adjusted $R^2$: 0.28 | | | No. of cases: 158<br>Adjusted $R^2$: 0.30 | | | No. of cases: 71<br>Adjusted $R^2$: 0.29 | | |

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