

THE BELIEVED AS BELIEVED: THE NOEMATIC DIMENSIONS OF FAITH AND DOUBT IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Jodie McNeilly

The University of Sydney

jodie.mcneilly@sydney.edu.au



Reception date: 03-2015

Acceptance date: 09-2017

Abstract: Countless scholars have wrestled with the ambiguities and complexities in determining the role of the noema in Husserl's theory of intentionality since his transcendental turn, and consequently converted what was intended to be a structural solution to a problem into a contested problem itself.¹ Shifting emphasis from the 'whatness', or ontological concerns of the correlate noesis—noema to the 'howness', or methodological force of phenomenology, allows me to discuss two things. The first is theological. Before and since Janicaud's pronouncement of the 'theological turn' in phenomenology, the intentionality thesis has been rejected as a means to account for certain experiences given differently to object-phenomena (Janicaud, 2000). In accounting for religious experience as a complex movement between faith and doubt, my work reaches not for the 'essence of phenomenality' (Marion), or a givenness beyond intuition made invisible, nor does it seek to describe a transcendence beyond immanence, or proof in the existence of a god/gods, rather it concerns itself with the processes and underlying structures of belief. Arguably by focusing upon the noetic and noematic structure of intentional acts, intentional analysis is revitalised for delineating the belief modalities of faith and doubt in religious experiences.

Keywords: Husserl; belief; presentation; noesis-noema; religious experience.

It will be the purpose of this paper to demonstrate how In salvaging intentionality for the purposes of phenomenologically describing faith and doubt, my analysis engages directly with the eidetic laws of Husserl's series of belief modalities, and the various 'problems', 'events' and 'modifications' he delineates in relation to the structure of the

¹ Classically, the debate has been summarised into two opposing sides, which either see the noema (1) *ontologically identified* with the intended objectivity, or (2) *ontologically distinct* from its intended objectivity. Contemporary positions have developed strictly along one of these two lines—the first we identify as 'the Gurwitsch position', here the noema is best understood as perceptual, and in the relation between perceptual act and the object perceived, it is, in fact, the object as intended; see Drummond and Embree, 1992. The second is 'the Føllesdal position', which interprets the noema in a Fregean sense, as *Sinne*. The noema is an intentional, 'not real' content that is 'abstract', 'prescriptive', and 'symbolic'. To simplify, a 'real' object or thing can burn, but a 'noema' object or thing cannot; the noema and object intended are ontologically distinct. See Smith and McIntyre, 1989.

noesis-noema. Taking phenomenological method in the manner outlined within *Ideen I*, I extend those very moments where Husserl pauses with promise to deepen his investigation and examine the particular species faith and doubt of the genus type belief to elaborate upon his belief-modalities; this is the second thing. Consequently, my work is presupposed by not only the phenomenological reduction, but also any inherent problems of Husserl's transcendental turn. Furthermore, I only attend to belief from within the phenomenological attitude after certain beliefs are put 'out of play', and so do not focus on the transitions of belief between the natural and phenomenological attitudes.¹ Touching on these issues more or less abstractly, I demonstrate how an intentional analysis of faith and doubt can begin to work. But before this, I must provide an account of the correlation understood from *Ideen I*.

1. Understanding noesis-noema and its analytic richness

Beyond the contested territory of the role of the noema in Husserl's philosophy, we have within intentionality the act, the object and the content. The content ties the act to the object in every act of perception or 'intensive mental process' and characterises the ego's regard. This is the tripartite structure of intentionality in its aboutness of things that exist, are non-existent, or pertain to the mind. Husserl entreats that it is not a question of what the perceived is, but what the perceived *as* perceived is, in other words, the content, or the noema, as he introduces it in 1913. There is a sense, certainly as one reads through the fine-grained analysis of Sections 87-125 in the Kersten translation, that the object, or thing perceived, loses its ontological importance in the relation between perceptual act, object and the determining spheres of that relation. Indeed, the latter becomes paramount in his descriptive study. By focusing upon the noematic dimensions of any intentional act, the thing perceived—it being there and constant—is elaborated more adequately in terms of its perspectival adumbrations: we see and imagine it from all sides. Moreover, the perceptual acts in their regard towards these things become more eidetically nuanced through their corresponding noemas. By attending to the noema we acutely understand the modifications and transmutations that take place in any singular perceptual act over

¹ The study of Husserl's belief between the two attitudes has been undertaken by (Brainard, 2002).

time. The unity of an experience is characterised by the synthetic movements and changes in both the noetic (perceptual acts) and noematic moments (contents of the acts) that is our consciousness of the world. Both sides of the correlate relate differently to the thing of which it is about. The noetic and noematic changes are separated in the synthetic movement of perception and/memorial reproduction, and yet paradoxically tied together in the original constitution of the perceived. From the moment of simple perception, the perceived somewhat fades into the background, while the constitutive relation between the ‘perceiving’ and the ‘as perceived’ shifts, registering a variety of connections over the temporal unfolding of an experience. Husserl distinguishes these shifts into clear-cut distinctions, modalities, and modifications. He generates levels and layers of associations, sifting through the variances as com-possibilities to seek the universal eidetic structures of consciousness more generally, and those disclosed between the noesis and noemas.

It is clear that the ‘as perceived’, or ‘as x’ where x is any intended object (the object as it appears), facilitates the method that without it would lack the fine-grained characterisations that the noematic spheres fill out. The noema-thing is an “utterly non-self-sufficient” object. Why? Because “its *esse* consists exclusively of its *percipi*” (Husserl, 1983: 241). A further qualification to this dependency (and one that saves him from falling into a solipsist hole with the ‘to be is to be perceived’) is that the essence of the noema does not include the *percipi* as a really inherent component. Rather, the noetic and noema “belong together eidetically” (Husserl, 1983: 241). Not functioning as dependent component parts in intentional perception, the eidetic structures are what bind and separate these dimensions of perception. Whether this dependence on an eidetic realm pushes Husserl into an ornate and irrefutable idealism is not my immediate concern here. The noesis and noema are transcendently situated beyond the simple charge of a radical subjectivism, enabling a style of analysis that probes the experience of phenomena in both its unity and temporal modifications.

Believing—The Believed—The Believed as Believed

The three relatum: ‘believing’, ‘the believed’, and ‘the believed as believed’, enter into different relations depending on the kind of ‘belief modality’ we are dealing with. Husserl characterizes the noetic component of a belief-act into a “series of belief modalities” to include (non-exhaustively) “certainty”, “possible”, “probable”, “questionable”

and “doubtful” (Husserl, 1983: 252). The noematic is found in the correlate being-modalities: being-certain; being-possible; being-probable; being-questionable and being-doubtful. From here, Husserl begins to make some conceptual distinctions separating ‘belief-certainty’ (“PROTODOXIA”) from the other modified belief modalities termed ‘doxic modalities’. There is a founding structure here between protodoxic certainty and doxic modalities, whereby the latter become “intentional invariants grounded in the essence of” the former (Husserl, 1983: 252).

Husserl insists “we seize upon what is properly a matter of the correlate when we direct our regard directly and precisely to the correlate” (Husserl, 1983: 256). Following his advice beyond an exegetical assessment of the terms, I turn my “regard directly” and “precisely” toward the noetic moment and its corresponding noematic dimensions to explore how the correlate functions in a discussion of religious faith.

2. The givenness of faith: the problem of presentation

In the phenomenology of religion, presentation as the dominant mode of givenness is problematised by authors wishing to account for experiences that are not given in the same way as sensible and/intellectual objects. Such experiences include mystical, religious and other so-called ‘limit phenomena’ like other persons. On this account, having or apprehending these unique kinds of experiences becomes inaccessible to normal intentional perception. Emmanuel Levinas rejected the view that objective knowledge can account for experiences of the infinite: the ethical relation with other; the overflow; and transcendence itself (Levinas, 1969). The ‘Other’ as an external irreducible structure prior to interiority itself, along with other sensibilities not of the order of phenomenal experience but of enjoyment, cannot be reduced to intentional objects. Levinas says:

[t]o think the infinite, the transcendent, the Stranger, is hence not to think an object. But to think what does not have the lineaments of an object is in reality to do more or better than think (Levinas, 1969: 49).

Indeed, for Levinas, what we do better than to think in representational terms of the world is to ‘live from’ it, never reducing it to meanings, but permitting our corporeity to live in perpetual ‘contestatation’ (Levinas, 1969: 128-9). The reversal of the constituted and constituting in intentionality, where the world is conditionally nourishing its constitution, does not necessarily eliminate presentation as a mode of givenness. While Levinas inverts the logic and strains the relational structure in orientation and direction, a more nuanced account of presentation could reinforce the role of intentionality if not bring something else to his philosophy.

There are three different manoeuvres for addressing the problem of presentation as an accepted mode of givenness for understanding religious experience.

- 1) Acknowledge the limitations of presentation as the only mode of givenness by offering alternative modes. For example, Anthony J. Steinbock makes a radical break with presentation, asking: why should phenomenology “not open itself to all kinds of “givens” in the distinctive manner that they give themselves?” (Steinbock, 2007: 10). From this study he proposes *verticality* as a mode/dimension of mystical experiences.¹
- 2) Simply enlarge the field of presentation to include all aspects of experience, whereby all phenomena give themselves in experience as perceptible.
- 3) A third way (and my solution) does not entirely discount (1) and (2). It keeps with Husserl’s intentional analysis as proposed in *Ideen I* to provide a more nuanced account of presentation. This happens ‘if’ the correlate is given its due regard in the distinct manner suggested by Husserl for all descriptive accounts of phenomena. When our regard is directed to the ‘as believed’ in religious faith, we are dealing with “modes in which the object itself intended to and as intended to is given” (Husserl, 1983: 244). In so far as we are dealing with the givenness of the ‘as believed’, we come upon a *different* mode of givenness which, as Husserl clearly states: “var[ies] from one kind of intuition to another kind” (Husserl, 1983: 244).

¹ Steinbock uses the term verticality to evoke a “dynamic” upward “movement”. A vector of mystery and reverence, verticality elevates this experience from the more favored usage of the “horizontal”, which describes the “reachable”, “graspable”, “controllable” in human existence. By and large, “[v]erticality expresses a lived directedness—religiously, morally, and bodily” (Steinbock, 2007: 12-13).

In developing (3), Husserl gives an example of ‘probability’ or ‘deeming likely’ from his doxic modalities series: we can either “look at *what* is probable”, or “look at the probable itself as probable”, that is “at the noematic object as having the characteristic allotted to it by the believing noesis” (Husserl, 1983: 253). As his analysis develops, it is striking to note that the role of the noema becomes more significant, especially in relation to the intensive mental process of believing, while the thing believed (the object of belief) moves further and further away from the belief itself. I propose two reasons for this distance. The first is that it may be the result of being caught up in the concatenations of belief modifications as they are eidetically described, or the result of a supervening of belief within a community of believers. If we take an example of the latter, the monotheistic belief in a divine being for the average believer is the result of a ‘presentation of a belief’, rather than a first-hand, direct presentation of the being itself. Presentation here is removed, if not entirely remote, from an originary constitution of this divine being that was supposedly felt, seen, or heard. Beyond such claims of originary constitution by mystics, prophets, priests, visionaries, or shamans, most religious experiences are supervening, accumulating and modulating beliefs.

When the ‘thing believed’ (i.e., the divine being) is at an epistemic distance from one’s actual experience, the noetic moment, ‘the believing’, becomes itself the ‘object intended’ and the ‘object as intended’. However, in pure eidetic descriptions we in no way “[...] direct our regard back to the act” as one would in psychologistic reflections (Husserl, 1983: 257). Rather, the direction of our regard is toward the noematic determinations that are never produced by reflections. Husserl implores that taking them as reflections “is mere construction” (Husserl, 1983: 256) and the evidence for our non-psychologistic regard occurs in “natural language” when we describe (rather than interpret) “precisely” what we see, [as the phenomenon] presents itself: “[w]hat is appearing as appearing is obviously the subject of predication” (Husserl, 1983: 257).

This direction of regard toward the correlate is a *leitmotif* for an intentional analysis of so-called limit phenomena relating to religious experience. In studies of religious experience, the ‘act of belief’ and the ‘believed as believed’ become more prominent, and (quite frankly) more interesting to look at than the thing believed. Focusing upon the noematic correlation of acts of believing affords the sphere of presentation a distinctive richness that one’s turn of regard to the believed (i.e., God, the proof of his/her existence, etc.) does not.

As a final point, one who works with Husserlian phenomenology (at least since the transcendental turn) must accept some level of ideality and work accordingly with it. When we begin to deal with the eidetic structures of belief acts and their connections *infinitem*, structures that are removed from the believed *originaliter* through ‘concatenation’ or ‘supervening’ processes, we are not strictly dealing with the kinds of *evidenz* of a material object presenting in space and time—the type of object that critics of presentation in the religious debate readily default to. Rather, we are turned towards the “not really inherent” dimensions of phenomena: the ideal [“*ideel*”] characteristics of the *noemata* (Husserl, 1983: 244).

By articulating the nuances of the correlate in presentative acts, and more specifically in relation to the processes of belief, we are privy to the “ideally infinite chain of reiterated modifications” describable in the way that Husserl’s outlines (Husserl, 1983: 255). Thus, instances of experience we call religious or mystical are given in presentation, either originally or reproductively, as developed by him in *Ideen I*. It will be the remaining business of this article to examine closely what insights can be gained (and arguments made) by developing certain aspects of Husserl’s series of belief modalities in relation to faith and doubt within religious experience. The following section by no means provides an exhaustive analysis but lays open a possible field for future inquiry into religious phenomena that is based on the structure of an intentionality thesis.

3. Examining (a) doubt as a doxic modality of faith, and (b) faith as a neutrality modification of belief

(a) Doubt as a doxic modality of faith

For the proposed analysis, we presuppose that:

1. faith is a *specie* of the *genus* type belief;
2. faith possesses a series of belief-modalities and correlative being-modalities: certainty, possible, probable, questionable and doubtful; being-certainty; being possible; being-probable; being-questionable and being-doubtful.
3. faith undergoes both a belief modification and being modification

Doubt belongs to the specie-belief ‘faith’ as a doxic modality in its series. Here doubt can be seen as a ‘denial’ modification of faith. The belief and being certainties of faith are posited in a primal form. Denial refers us back to this primal source or belief modality of certainty and is a “modification of [this] something else” (Husserl, 1983: 254). Doubt, as denial, is not logically ruptured from its background, it is noetically and noematically bound through the modification process. Even though there is no disassociation between the modalities of certainty and doubt, a transmutation of the founding belief takes place. On the noetic side it is a *negation* of this position, while noematically it is a *cancellation* of the corresponding posited characteristic of this same position. “The regard of the Ego [can be] directed to that which undergoes the cancellation”, but it can also be directed toward “the cancelled as cancelled, to that which bears the stamp of cancellation”. The cancelled, in this respect, has transformed into a “new object” (Husserl, 1983: 254). And yet even in the creation of this new object Husserl insists that there holds an “interesting eidetic peculiarity” of the noeses and noemas “in their pointing back to something other, something unmodified in their own essence, without any consideration of origin” (Husserl, 1983: 255-6).

Religious doubt as a ‘doxic-modality of faith’ and ‘modification of denial’ can be understood in strong or weak terms. In instances of complete rupture from a ‘belief—certainty’ to complete denial, for example: “I believe with certainty there is a God” to “there is no God”, the transmutation of the negated act is a modification leading to the cancelled object: faith. Even in instances where there is an absence of faith (as ‘origin’) preceding the movement of doubt in the existence of God (as an always held belief), the doubt still points ‘back to something other, something unmodified’ in its essence, a structure always already shared eidetically with faith—the supposed diametrically opposed positive positing of God’s existence. My overall point here is that doubt, even at its strongest of no prior faith, is an eidetically ordained ‘cancelled-out’ faith in the belief process.

This interpretation supports the claim that atheism is indeed a radical version of faith, a view that opposes the idea that all atheism extinguishes faith along with its contents. Doubt as a doxic-modification of faith characterises the kinds of arguments that posit reason and science (progenitors of atheism) as mere ‘placeholders’ for a new theism. It is the kind of position that does not reduce contemporary atheism (‘death of God/s’) to being a mere destroyer of conceptual and linguistic idols (Marion, 2001: 6). The noematic

components in this movement of doubt generate new positions, and by virtue of their nature, eidetically connect to the original belief-certainty. Analysing these movements becomes a case sensitive activity. First, the constitution of faith as belief-certainty differs across cases. The motivations may be direct (aesthetic) or supervening where faith is constituted on a community of belief (belonging to a religion). As a result, the modification between the polar ends of certainty and doubt, against a background of other intentional activity (“nexus of intentionalities”)¹ can be elaborated in deeply nuanced ways—ways that provide an analytical richness to a personal theological turn. The regular presence of doubt in faith is a traversing movement between the two poles in the doxic series. Unlike a rupture in faith, the movement does not transition/transmute through a modification of denial. Therefore, it operates as a weaker version of doubt in the series. This expanded perspective challenges any absolutist view that faith is toppled by the least amount of doubt, as some onto-theologies might attempt to demonstrate in proofs entailing the inexistence of god.

(b) Faith as a Neutrality modification of normal perception

Working through Husserl’s eidetics of belief, we come to a special case that “occupies a completely isolated place” in its relation to the series: the ‘neutrality modification’ (Husserl, 1983: 257). Neutralization is a universal modification of consciousness that does not belong specifically to the sphere of belief (Husserl, 1983: 257). Neutralised modifications are all “consciously there although not in the manner of something actually thought of, but instead as something merely thought of as “mere thought” (Husserl, 1983: 258). Examples include the phenomenological reduction where a parenthesising process of “putting- something-out-of-action” takes place (Husserl, 1983: 258). Neutralised consciousness does not “play the role of a believing for what is intended to” because mere thoughts, on both sides of the correlate, are neither positable, nor predicable (Husserl, 1983: 259).

So what does this mean for faith if we take it to be a neutrality modification of perception?

Included in Husserl’s neutrality modifications are (1) ‘phantasy’ and (2) ‘neutral picture-object-consciousness’. Leaving phantasy aside for a later study, let us consider

¹ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 484)

the second in terms of Husserl's description of the "depicted realities" of an image.¹ When we apprehend an external picture (like a painting) we "advert" (turn our attentions) to a depicted reality of the image (Husserl, 1983: 261). The image presentation does not exist, and it does not, not exist; it is also not in any other positional modality of belief as previously explicated. Rather, there is a consciousness of it "quasi-existing" in the neutrality modification of being. What does this mean for religious faith if it is constituted through visual representations and/or images in the mind?

Hindu devotion "is the work of the body and the imagination, both held as sacred and both powerful avenues to the Divine" (Moore in Huyler, 1999: 12). Faith is constituted largely through pictorial images in this religion. If, for example, we apprehend a painting of the Hindu God Rama it is dually constituted as both a physical object (paint, canvas) and aesthetically as a 'depicted reality' (a type of man). Our regard is turned towards Rama, not as an object but "to the realities presented in the picture" (Husserl, 1983: 262). These depicted realities are mediated by a founding noesis of 'similarity' that brings "something else" to the perception. A Hindu brings to the picture ideas of Rama from descriptions in the *Ramayana* and attributes qualities and characteristics from other gods in the Hindi pantheon. These ideas and attributes are not fully posited in the sense that they present Rama as existing, but he does exist as a depicted reality in terms of what is brought to the representation—that 'something else'. Moreover, it can be said that Rama is similar to a man. His physical representation is (to some degree) analogous to that of a man: one head, two eyes, legs, feet, etc., thus the believer can attribute mortal emotions (love, hate, happiness, anger, etc.) amongst other aspects. The founding noeses mediate a depicted reality of Rama with a "quasi-existence"; faith on this account is therefore neutrally modified, rather than posited by doxic belief (Husserl, 1983: 262). Susanne Langer claims that

[r]eligious thought, whether savage or civilized, operates primarily with images... only an image can hold us to a conception of a totalphenomenon, against which we can measure the adequacy of the scientific terms wherewith we describe it (Langer, 1988: xviii).

¹ Phantasy is a neutrality modification only in relation to 'presentation' in memory consciousness.

Prior to any description, scientific, phenomenological, or otherwise, the structural modification of neutralization takes faith further from positional belief and closer to ‘mere thought’, inferring the quasi-existence of the thing merely thought.

As a further point to this analysis (and dealt only with brevity here), the similarity thesis in depicting the reality of Rama, or any god for that matter, presents a unique perspective on the role of ‘idols’ in discussions that narrate our relation to the divine. The distance, the space between us and God(s) that is readily filled by idols and acts of idolatry, can be described as a conceptual and/or imagistic resemblance to ourselves: we see “*God as we have created him*” (Benson, 2002: 22), or, in the reflection of our experiences, the idol retains this gap resembling “the divinity that we experience” (Marion in Benson, 2002: 22). Husserl’s ‘similarity thesis’ as it operates in neutralization offers a different characterisation of this distance between God(s) and us. Considering this in relation to visual representations and the example of Rama taken above, a believer attributes certain human aspects to him, but not in the sense of ‘creating an idol’ with this or that idea or image. Rather, they see and intuit something else, what Husserl calls, a “*plus ultra*” to that perception: “every perceptual givenness is a constant mixture of familiarity and unfamiliarity, a givenness that points to new possible perceptions” (Husserl, 2001: 48). On this account, Marion’s much needed distance between being and God is filtered with a conception of the idol that is not limited to the visible, nor reliant on the self-revelatory presence of the divine (Marion, 2002). Idols are the result of a complex intentional process for the believer, and when religious belief is constituted by images, they play an essential role, stimulating perceptual depth in acts of devotion. The noetic-noematic dimensions of a neutralized belief provide a nuanced account of the conceptual and image-based idol that continues to be “graven” within the philosophy and phenomenology of religion (Benson, 2002).

By and large, if we take certain constituted moments in religious faith as a neutralized modification of perception, rather than as a belief modality posited through simple perception, the role that images play in relation to belief in Husserl’s philosophy requires a deeper investigation of his phenomenological analyses conducted between 1898—1925 on phantasy, image consciousness, memory and time.¹ Whether inside the modification series (certainty to denial), or not belonging to but related to this series (neutralization: depicted realities), Husserl’s theory of belief supports a triangulated consti-

¹See Hua XXIII: *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung*.

tution of faith and doubt as 'epistemic', 'imagistic' and 'aesthetic' movements in religious experience.

4. Conclusion

This article points to the possibility of a Husserlian inspired intentional analysis of religious experience that does not discard presentation as a mode of givenness. I have shown that by paying attention to the noetic-noematic correlate with all its modifications in Husserl's theory of belief in *Ideen I*, we can begin to deepen existing, and generate distinctive eidetic structures. Further on this account, I have shown that doubt does not extinguish faith, nor motivate atheism, but is rather a distinctive modification of denial in Husserl's belief modalities. I have hinted at a supervening process in a community of belief making, where faith is eidetically generated from presentations of 'believing' and the 'believed as believed', and at an epistemic distance from the thing believed. On this basis it is possible to extend Husserl's analysis towards an intersubjective theory of belief, one that would prove to be a rich model for theological study.

In the depicted realities of an image, faith happens. Elaborating upon the relationship between images in the mind, imagination, the prefiguring aesthetic motivations and instances of religious faith, we will continue to refine and push the possibilities of the noesis-noema as methodological device. It was the purpose of this article to develop two threads of analysis in order to indicate the potency of Husserl's philosophy in critical discussions on such themes as faith, doubt, givenness and idols within the phenomenology of religion.

REFERENCES

Benson, B. E. (2002). *Graven Ideologies: Nietzsche, Derrida and Marion on Modern Idolatry*. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press.

Brainard, M. (2002). *Belief and its Neutralization: Husserl's System of Phenomenology in Ideas I*. New York: Suny Press.

Drummond, J. and L. Embree. (1992). *The Phenomenology of the Noema*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Husserl, E. (2001). *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Trans. A. J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic . Orig.: *Husserliana XI, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926*. Hg. Margot Fleischer. Den Haag: 1966.

Husserl, E. (1983). *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book*. Translated by F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Orig.: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. I Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Halle: 1913.

Huyler, S. (1999). *Meeting God: Elements of Hindu Devotion*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Janicaud, D. (2000). *Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: French Debate*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Langer, S. (1988). *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and Infinity: an essay on exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press..

Marion, J. (2001). *The Idol and Distance: five studies*. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. New York: Fordham University Press.

Marion, J. (2001). *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena*. Translated by Robyn Horner and Vincent Berrand. New York: Fordham University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by Colin Smith. London and New York: Routledge.

McIntyre, R. and D. W. Smith. (1989). "Theory of Intentionality." *Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook*. Edited by J. N. Mohanty and W. R. McKenna. Washington D.C.: Center for advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America: 47-79.

Steinbock, A. J, (2007). *Phenomenology and Mysticism: the verticality of religious experience*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.