The Structure of Ideas: Problems for Thinking about the Pure Ego

Javier San Martín
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)
Facultad de Filosofía
Departamento de Filosofía Moral y Política
jsan@fsof.uned.es

Reception date: 01-2016
Acceptance date: 09-2017

Abstract: In the first part of my paper, we will journey through the general structure of the first volume of Ideas, from which we will be able to deduce the position of Volume II. After carrying out a general analysis of the noesis/noema correlation structure in Section III and having provided, in Section IV, the basics of a phenomenology of reason, the second volume of Ideas should study the general fields in which the objects of transcendental experience appear: the world, the animal being, and the spiritual or cultural being. The third, unwritten volume should have been devoted to the study of the superior products of culture, and science. Thus, the second part of this paper will show the place of Ideas' second volume. The third part, the decisive one, will inquire into the position of the world and the place of the body and culture. Specifically, it will ask whether the experience of the body is understood to be an objective genitive or whether it is also understood, necessarily, as a subjective genitive. The same question will be asked about culture. An understanding of one as objective or subjective genitive radically alters the meaning of the pure ego.

Keywords: Pure Ego, Transcendental subjectivity, Body, Culture, Anthropology.

1. Introductory remarks

We are meeting to commemorate a decisive event in world philosophy, the publication in the spring of 1913 of *Ideas'* first volume. Phenomenology has been with us for a century now, and what might, thirty years ago, have seemed to be a waning movement, for several reasons, both in our two countries and in Germany, where phenomenology originated, is now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, revealing to be a vigorous movement that is receiving an increasing acknowledgment. In the decades of the seven-

ISSN: 0874-9493 (print) / ISSN-e: 2183-0142 (online)
DOI: 10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0004

ties and eighties, other movements dominated philosophical thinking, and phenomenology was a bit residual. This was certainly the case in Germany. It was the case in Spain, in Mexico, and at the heart of the Latin American Philosophy Society, where phenomenology was never even present. We phenomenologists are perhaps the only philosophers who have only exceptionally contributed to the immense catalog of the Iberian-American Encyclopedia of Philosophy. This Encyclopedia set its ground rules at the beginning of the 1990s. Phenomenology hardly even existed in our world at that point. Today, however, it is a prestigious movement, contemplated with a certain reluctance by many, it is true, but this is often only a confession of how difficult they find it to fully understand what phenomenology really is.

This difficulty really comes from the intricate staging of phenomenology, the issue on which my paper will focus: To clarify or simply present the difficulties that spring from the difficulty of understanding the fundamental notion of phenomenology, the pure ego, as presented in the publication of *Ideas* in 1913. In the famous dispute between Ortega y Gasset and Unamuno, before Ortega y Gasset embraced phenomenology, moving on a neo-Kantian horizon, Unamuno knew that Kant maintained a pure ego as the central point of his philosophy. Unamuno told Ortega that he could not accept this "purity"[1], that he could not stand so much purity, that he preferred, shall we say, to get his hands dirty and stop being pure.

The purity of the ego, or the pure ego, was Kant's great problem, and it is the great problem of Husserl's phenomenology too. So then, the main goal of my paper will be to try to sketch what this "purity" means, and when I refer to what it means, I also refer to what it does not mean. This will be the key element to trying to frame the philosophical usefulness of phenomenology and deactivate both spurious uses and the total neutralization that can result from a poor understanding of this purity – something that has, in fact, occurred, particularly in our intellectual world. For example, as I have mentioned, in the Latin American world, where phenomenology was nearly excluded, it is quite possible that this exclusion is intimately connected to the understanding of this "purity" of the ego. It is true that this "purity" makes it seem that the ego, being a pure being, has no interest in people's lives and, with the philosophy I have mentioned being mainly oriented by ethical interests, it is understandable that this phenomenology, which should describe the

[1]"And then I cannot, I cannot support the *purity*, pure concept, pure knowledge, pure will, pure reason… such a purity takes my breath away" (letter from Unamuno to Ortega y Gasset), Gasset, 1987: 111.

essences of the pure ego, would not leave much of a mark, especially when a phenomenologist defines himself by establishing himself as a "disinterested spectator"[1]. Even more so, when he establishes himself this way through methodological procedures oriented toward eliminating any worldly contamination and establishing a philosophy that is not contaminated by the world. Everything in the 1913 publication seems to condemn phenomenology to oblivion. This is why, when substantive philosophy (not the formal philosophy that analyzes scientific procedures – if this is possible without a substantial philosophy) turns almost exclusively into moral philosophy, phenomenology tends to appear as a residual philosophy, or something belonging to reactionary groups or even to those who maintain or embrace medieval philosophical currents. What I am trying to say can be seen quite well in a book that has had great resonance in Spain: a study of Spanish philosophy written by a professional according to Bourdieu's philosophical theories; in this book phenomenology hardly exists before 1990, the date at which the analysis ends.[2] Furthermore, the only well-known phenomenologist, Fernando Montero Moliner (1922-1995), was completely overlooked and is not even mentioned or identified as a phenomenologist. This current is more or less explicitly ascribed to the residual movements of philosophy imposed by the political dictatorship.

Similar events have taken place in many of our countries. If we follow the ups and downs of phenomenology in Mexico, the pattern does not differ much from the one I have just described. The same goes for Argentina, where phenomenology went from being the clear and preponderant positioning of the country's most relevant philosopher, Francisco Romero, in the 1950s, to being considered residual in the 1980s. In Argentina, too, the 1990s were the beginning of a decisive change, as phenomenology became a respected movement, present in nearly all universities; the same happened in Mexico, Colombia, Spain, and, of course, Portugal. Further, I can vouch for the increasing interest in phenomenology in Brazil. I believe all of these fluctuations have to do, to a large extent, with the difficulty of understanding the "purity" of the ego. I am going to approach the issue from the structure of *Ideas* because I believe this is the best way to understand the problem presented. This problem had to be a concern until the posthumous works were widely available because the "purity" of the ego set forth in the first volume of *Ideas* could do

[1] As it is known, Husserl speaks about an "*uninterressierter Zuschauer*," Husserl, 1965: 92; Husserl, 1973: 73; in the *Einleitung Vorlesung 1922/23* Husserl speaks of "*unbeteiligter Zuschauer*," Husserl, 2003: 35, 77 and 83.

[2] I refer to the book *La filosofía española, herederos y pretendientes. Una lectura sociológica (1963-1990*), (Vázquez García, 2009).

no less than provoke the rejection by some and efforts to escape from a dead end by others.

This subject is no different from what happened to Kant. The former instills the need for a transcendental apperception, the nucleus of the pure ego, that guarantees the objectivity of knowledge, just to contaminate it, right away, with elements that can only be related to the body, such as the form of external sensibility. For how can there be an "a priori form of external sensitivity" dissociated from corporality? The different syntheses of the imagination that Kant proposes in the first edition of *KrV* all deny the purity of the ego. If imagination is at the core of objectivity, no matter how much he wants to guarantee the objectivity of the pure ego, the impurity of the body has already sneaked in. Kant himself filters out some of these impurities in the second edition, eliminating the synthesis of the imagination. However, we must not deceive ourselves. What is behind this, and behind the problems of phenomenology, is the issue of who we are talking about when we talk about the pure ego. In other words, when we do transcendental philosophy because we talk about the pure ego, are we not doing anthropology? That is, are we not talking about human beings? This was the issue that Kant was struggling with and that caused him to eliminate any trace of imagination in the second edition because it ruined purity. Indeed, this was the only way to keep a philosophy that does not want to be anthropology coherent, because the latter is a science of experience while philosophy wants to be *a priori*. Notwithstanding, Kant was not too sure of his achievements because, as early as 1793, in a letter to Stäudlin, he announced the questions posed by philosophy refer to a fourth one, the question of what the human being is, a question that anthropology answers.[1] This is a highly uncomfortable situation for everyone who holds on to the pure ego, because anthropology will always be, it is said, a *parergon*, a secondary work in Kantian philosophy. What is behind the pure ego is not the human being. Yet, philosophy deals with the pure ego. Kant's conclusion should have made us reflect but let us get back to Husserl.

[1]About the problem of Kantian anthropology see San Martín, 2013: 184-199.

1. The structure of *Ideas I*

Husserl conceived his first great work for introducing phenomenology on a very ambitious scale but perfectly thought out. Once he had resolved the issue of the subject of formal objects that was necessary to refute psychologism and, starting from the *a priori* of correlation, that if all consciousness is consciousness-of, and every object an object of a consciousness-of,[1] the consciousness-of a formal object could not be a consciousness that depends on historical circumstances. This means that we have insurmountable limits to the use of reason and constrictions have consequences such as, for instance, pedagogical ones; we cannot teach mathematics with a different multiplication table telling us that, say, 2*2=8.

Husserl had been trying, for a long time, to describe this consciousness, whose maximum exponent is the ego, because we always, in the end, make descriptions from our consciousness. However, at the same time, the need to confirm this philosophy by trying to give it a certainty that philosophy does not seem to enjoy gets in the way. This certainty must refer to the sum of all life and it must begin with knowledge. To this end, he initiates two actions. First, he describes the structure of the world, a meaningful structure traversed by a typology, so that the world is not the world of scientific facts because it is traversed by a structure of facts that belong to certain types, the essences. When we study this, it becomes clear that it is possible to notice only the types, the essences, and so give an essential description. This is how he clears the way, in the first section of *Ideas I*, to

[1] There is an important note (Husserl, 1976; 169) about the discovery of this "*a priori* of correlation": "The first breakthrough of this universal *a priori* of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my *Logical Investigations,* around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent lifework has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this *a priori* of correlation. The further course of the reflections in this text will show how, when human subjectivity was brought into the problems of correlation, a radical transformation of the meaning of these problems became necessary, which finally led to the phenomenological reduction to absolute, transcendental subjectivity.

"The first, though still unclarified, emergence of the phenomenological reduction occurred several years after the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901); the first attempt at a systematic introduction to the new philosophy of the transcendental reduction appeared in 1913." (Husserl, 1977).

Contemporary philosophy of the decades since then — even that of the so-called phenomenological schools — preferred to persist in the old philosophical naïveté. To be sure, the first breakthroughs of such a radical change, a total transformation of the whole natural manner of life, was difficult to present adequately, especially since certain considerations, which will become understandable in the following, constantly give rise to misinterpretations resulting from relapses into the natural attitude." (Husserl, 1976: 169; 1970: 166).

indicate that phenomenology wants to be a science of essences, it wants to offer the typological characteristics of consciousness and its operations. I do not believe this first section has any further importance at this moment.[1] The second section is important because it is where Husserl guarantees the field of consciousness. This is where he attempts to rescue this field from its imbrication with the world. To this end, he designs a methodological procedure, which is what will really cause all the problems that I mentioned earlier.

Indeed, all the problems come from the immersion of consciousness in nature. Psychologism is nothing more than taking a *radical* stance in favor of this immersion. The human being is a natural being because he or she is in and appears in the world, thus everything in the human being is natural. So, in the second section, Husserl tries to show that this world in which consciousness is immersed can be subjected to a Cartesian-type criticism and, therefore, be bracketed in *epoché*. This world results from the harmonious way through which our lived experience unfolds, but I have no guarantees, so that the world becomes a hypothesis that the discourse of experience could discredit. This is why an *epoché* of the world is carried out, reducing us to the field of consciousness. This phenomenological reduction should affect all kinds of objects that can appear in my experience. Thus, the field of experience stands out as the field that is left, a field that has been purified of all imbrications with the world because the world has been bracketed. With the world bracketed, my own body and its animated part, that is, the soul, have also been bracketed, along with everything related to the body, such as the knowledge of others which can only occur through their bodies. Therefore, we are left only with our consciousness and its pure experience, an experience that places nothing in reality because reality is bracketed.

The third section analyzes the different structures of this consciousness, according to the open duplicity of intentionality, because there are different forms of consciousness and of the object given to consciousness. The ways of intending an object are the different *noesis*, and the ways of the object are the different *noemata* and forms of the *noema*.

[1] This statement should be completed by Pedro Alves' paper in this book. In the first section of *Ideas I* the so-called *eidetic reduction* by imaginative variation begins, a theme that runs through phenomenology, in which Husserl's relation to mathematics appears, but in my opinion Husserl hardly ever used the imaginative variation in *Ideas I*.

Thus, the third section is mainly devoted to an analysis of the noetic-noematic structure of consciousness.

In an effort to arrive at the most crucial results for philosophy, the fourth section presents the basics of a phenomenology of reason because intentionality involves a kind of teleology toward the fulfillment of the objects' donation. This is not at all metaphysical; it is simply the acknowledgment that knowledge, valuation, and action are adjusted to criteria of efficacy. That is, knowledge tends to give us things the best it can because if it does not, it is useless. Valuation tends to give us consistent values because if they are not consistent, the action based on these values will not be consistent. Finally, action tends to be coherent throughout the whole of life because otherwise life would lose its consistency and, in the end, would lose itself. There is no need to seek any other "foundationalist" background in this kind of world, such as the teleology of intentionality that Husserl uses. The fourth section, as a phenomenology of reason, seeks to determine which acts are the basis for reason in the structure of consciousness, or when we can speak of rational acts in each of the spheres of experience.

This is the only book of the three planned volumes *of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology* that Husserl published during his lifetime and, therefore, the only book from which phenomenology was disseminated. According to it, the most important issue is that consciousness, whose fundamental exponent is that it is my consciousness, is pure; it is a consciousness that has been purified of any involvement with the world because the world has been bracketed.

2. Position of *Ideas II*

The analyses of *Ideas I* are the only ones that were known publicly during Husserl's lifetime. It is known that the developments of this work led to the desertion of many of his students at Göttingen, who saw phenomenology as a way of doing philosophy that fit the natural tendency of knowledge to go to things themselves, following the very motto of phenomenology; in *Ideas*, Husserl postulated a method that moved us away from things, bracketing the world and everything belonging to it. The return to consciousness, to pure transcendental consciousness, was understood to be a relapse into idealism, even more so as the region of consciousness was given as an absolute, while the world appeared

as presumptive and therefore untrustworthy, in a procedure similar or identical to that used by Descartes.

The analyses of section III on the noetic-noematic structures were general, not reaching the specific spheres in which experience happens. They analyzed the different kinds of acts that occur in experience but without differentiating among the broad fields of experience, it being true that experience occurs in different forms: presence, memories, representations, and expectations; experiences are neutralized or modified, original or not. Besides, experience occurs in acts that present the object in acts that value and desire it in all of the previous forms as well as in practical acts that manipulate things. In all of this "primeval forest" – as Husserl calls all of these acts in his lessons from 1922/23 (Husserl, 2002: 93) – of the acts of consciousness, sensorial perception seems to prevail because it is through it that the things in the world appear to us in their corporeal nature. This is also where Husserl sees the source of reason and truth.[1] So what *Ideas II*, to which only a few privileged people had access in Husserl´s life, among them Heidegger, does is to focus on the broad fields in which this experience, analyzed in section III of *Ideas I*, is produced. In addition, Husserl discovers there are three broad fields: the field of the physical world, that of the animal or animated body, and that of the spirit, or the world of culture. It is necessary to, immediately, say that Husserl did not finish shaping this text; he finished it by letting his assistants, especially Edith Stein (Husserl, 1991: XVI f.) spell it out, something which was not, in fact, unusual for him, as this is what happened throughout his life with most of his texts. In fact, he only published three more books, *Formal and transcendental Logic*, *Méditations cartesiennes*, only in French, and then the first part of *Crisis*.

Ideas II was meant to be the immediate complement to *Ideas I* because, beginning the concrete analyses that further specify the ones of the third section, these analyses always occur in one of these broad fields, nature, the animate body, and the field of the spirit or culture. What is interesting about *Ideas II* is to wonder about its relationship to *Ideas I*. At first, they all seem to be noematic analyses in which the noetic-noematic analyses of *Ideas I* are specified. In the very structure of the book, it is clear that Husserl, right from the first paragraphs, is analyzing what experience is from the beginning: As can be

[1] For this preference of the perception see,: "Wir sehen, es sind hier weitere vernunfttheoretische Scheidungen und auf sie bezogene Forschungen nötig. Wesenszusammenhängeheben sich ab zwischen den verschiedenen Qualitaten mit denihnen eigentümlichen Vernunftcharakteren, und zwar wechselseitige; und schließlich laufen alle Linien zurück zumUrglauben und seiner Urvernunft, bzw. zur "Wahrheit". (Husserl, 1977: 322). See also San Martín, 2007: 13-27, and San Martín, 2010: 263-274.

seen in § 8, the original objects of our experience are those that can be sensed (Husserl, 1991: 17). It is true that, even though Husserl begins with the yearning to clarify nature as the object of natural science, we soon find out that the original objects are the ones of the senses. Why is this important? Because the objects of the senses are objects with animal predicates which, in the concept of nature belonging to natural science, are only the exponents of natural predicates. This is why, in the second chapter, § 12, this point is noted: the difference between material and animal nature. The result Husserl pursues is that our world, the world in which things occur, is not the nature of natural science but rather an animal nature that has this extension but goes beyond it. I do not want to pursue this extremely interesting subject because all I want is to show that the intention of *Ideas II* is to look at the objects that appear in the experience discovered and purified in *Ideas I* and the first object that phenomenology encounters is the given things in animal nature.

The second object is even more interesting because it is the one that will cause us the most problems. These problems were already in *Ideas I* for anyone who wanted to see them, because it is true that the objective body, as part of nature, was disconnected by the *epoché*. It seems to have disappeared from our consideration, but this does not mean that we do not have it within our field of experience, and that is why Husserl studies it here, in *Ideas II*. However, there was a problem in *Ideas I*: the body had disappeared. It does not necessarily appear, but an analysis of the perception of things through the senses in their own self does appear. How can consciousness work with senses without a body? Evidently, the body is something latent in *Ideas I*, making its full appearance in *Ideas II*. However, it materializes as part of the human being who appears in the world. The human being is a composition of body and soul that is, above all, part of this animal world, even more so than an animal or, in other words, an animated body, which is the case of all animals.

We will see how Husserl carries out the analysis of this body, and how he gives contents to this assumed latency in the analyses of perception in *Ideas I*. The perception gives us things – *leibhaftig* – because the perceptual subject has a *Leib*; the senses that make up the means of perception are organs of the *Leib*. Therefore, it is assumed that the so-called pure ego has *Leib* in the third section of *Ideas I* and, insofar as there is a connection between the third and fourth parts, in the fourth part also.

The third section of *Ideas II* deals with the spirit. This word, however, has different meanings in German than in other Romance languages, in which it is closer to "soul" than to what is understood as a soul in German. The best way to understand this word is to

notice two things. First, the spirit refers to the action of a human being in a personalistic attitude, that is, the attitude in which we are always in the world, acting as a person, an attitude in which things make sense. Speaking like this, we are in the world of culture. The second indication is the way that what is, in other countries, called "human sciences" is *Geisteswissenschaften* in German. This is a sphere to which the sphere of the spirit refers, the sphere of culture. In effect, the third section of *Ideas II* is the study of the sphere of culture because culture is simply the sense with which we, as people, act in the world. It has taken us a long time to formulate a philosophy of culture based on Husserl. Not even Derrida, who studied *The Origin of Geometry* in-depth, discovered an entire philosophy of culture there. On the other hand, the late publication of *Ideas II* (first published in 1952) did not help much. Later, what we could call technical culture appears in *Ideas II* while in *The Origin of Geometry* (1939) ideal culture appears. However, it is only in the articles on *Renovation* and *Ethics*, both published very late, the *Kaizo* articles in 1988, and the *Ethics* in the year 2004, that practical culture appear, making it problematic to unite Husserl's complete theory of culture which, in fact, permeates his entire work. Anyway, the third section of *Ideas II* is the study of the person as a cultural being. I cannot now go into the study of this rich third section, but I am interested in making it very clear that the point of *Ideas II* is to analyze the three broad fields in which the experience of transcendental subjectivity, achieved or discovered in *Ideas I,* unfolds. Secondly, I want to make it clear that the three fields are latent in *Ideas I*. The field of nature is latent because, in the end, everything that there is, exists in it, even though it is necessary to specify that this is not physical nature but nature full of colors, scents, and sounds. The field of the body is latent because perception is only feasible through the sense organs, which are part of *Leib*. The way phenomenology proceeds is none other than through language, which informs this world of animal nature because the essential-typological classification in which all the things of the world are, which is the meaning of the first section of *Ideas I*, is an indubitable effect of culture. Culture, the spirit, is, above all, language. That is why language is always there when Husserl presents the issue of the *noema*. Therefore, the three fields analyzed in *Ideas II* were already there, as empty molds, in *Ideas I*.

3. Position of the world, body and culture

However, now we will move ahead, because in both *Ideas I* and *Ideas II*, the three fields agglutinate the objects of experience. Every object of experience is either part of nature, part of the human being, or part of the culture. These are the three broad fields in which experience happens. It is not by chance, in this sense, that the first chapter of the second section entitled "Constitution of animal nature", which mainly deals with human beings, is about the "pure ego". According to the results of the second section of *Ideas I*, the ego is pure because it has been purified of all contamination of the world, including the human being. The pure ego, therefore, has been separated from the human being. This is the clear message that Husserl conveys in *Ideas I*, which is ratified and strengthened in the first chapter of the second section of *Ideas II*. Let us take a brief look at this chapter which, with only eight paragraphs (§§ 22-29) is not very long; of these eight paragraphs, the first seven only take up thirteen pages (Husserl, 1991: 97-111) while the last one takes up eleven (Husserl, 1991: 111-120), almost as many as all the others combined. This indicates the importance of § 29.

The pure ego is achieved through the abstraction of the body, by paying attention only to the ego that thinks, an ego that is not based on corporality, thus giving us the pure ego that is "precisely that of which we have spoken extensively in the first book" (Husserl, 1991: 97). The rest of the paragraph defines this ego that is given as the *sum cogitans* (*ib*.), so when, for example, I make a judgment, it is this ego that, when perceiving, directs itself toward that which is perceived; it is not mythical in any way. The direction that I capture in the reflection process exists: It is the origin of this directional ray, or it is what receives the rays that reach it from the object (*Gegenstrahlen*), that is, for example, desired (Husserl, 1991: 98) and in action.

The ego functions in acts and can only be distinguished from them abstractly, but it is individual (*absolut Individuelles*) (Husserl, 1991: 98, line 15) and undivided (*ungeteilt*) (Husserl, 1991: 98, line 3). It cannot be thought about as something separate from its experiences, as something separate from its life (line 29), but it can become inactive as soon as a *cogito*, a concrete act is gone; then "the pure ego sinks, in a way, into inactivity" (*in Inaktualität*[1]) so if the ego is present in many moments, there are many periods in which it is inactive, whole periods of the flow of consciousness "devoid of any activity-

[1] For the translation, see Cairns, 1973: 72.

of-the-ego" (Husserl, 1991: 100, lines 29 f.). Paragraph § 24 refers to the difference between this ego and the human being, which is very important for changes in acts do not change the ego, as it is immutable (Husserl, 1991: 104, line 8). This is why it must not be confused with the ego as the ego of the *real* person, with the real subject of the *real* person. Husserl gives a whole series of eminently reasonable reasons: it has no predispositions, either original or acquired, or skills or dispositions. It does not have a reference to *real* changing circumstances; therefore, "It is not changeably related, in real properties and states, to changing real circumstances, and thus it is not given in appearance with reference to appearing circumstances" (*ib*., line 15 f.). He then alludes to the conditions for knowing a person in the sense Kant had already explained in his pragmatic anthropology: "To know what a person is or what I myself am as a human personality, I must enter into the infinitude of experience, in which I know myself from ever-new sides, better and better" (*ib*., line 18 f.), that I can verify or deny. I can even think that this ego, this personality, does not exist, that my body does not exist, "even though it is given in experience" (*trotz seiner Erfahrungsgegenbenheit*), (*ib.,* line 25 f). This is exactly the reasoning of the *epoché* and, referring to the future as well, this can happen if experiences do not develop in a harmonious way. This is the same criticism on which the *epoché* is based. The pure ego is absolutely simple, all richness resides in the *cogito*.

Paragraph 27 pursues the issue of the difference between the human being and the pure ego, after having once again clarified the relationship between the ego, consciousness, and the *cogito* in Paragraph 26. Thus, one thing is consciousness, a unit of flux, another is the ego that executes acts and which, as such, is a *cogito*. The ego is something like a watchful consciousness, being the one that can accompany any representation as long as that representation means any dark consciousness that can be illuminated by the ego-function. The paragraph is characterized by translating very precisely the results of the structure of *Ideas I*. The ego refers to the objective side of the *cogitationes*, the objective that is experienced, the entire world with all the things that are in it and among them, the person that I am, the person that I designate as myself: "I as a person am an integral fragment of the real world that surrounds the pure ego which, as the center of all intentionality, also executes precisely that of which ego, the person and the personality, is made" (Husserl, 1991: 109). A bit further on, this person is the empirical ego, which functions as a real-phenomenal central member (*Zentralglied*) (Husserl, 1991: 110, line 1) for the apparitional constitution (*erscheinungsmäßig*) of the temporal-spatial world in its totality. Thus, "every pure ego that executes the apperception 'I, the human being,'"

has in itself, the human Ego, the personality, as an object of its environment (*Umgebungsobjekt*) (*ib.,* line 30) and, on the other hand, "the pure Ego encounters itself again as pure Ego in the human being and in the personality", insofar as these objects are posited with a "meaning according to which the real Ego contains the pure ego as an apperceptive nuclear content" (*ib*., line 28 f.).

With this, Husserl has presented the classical theses that can be gleaned from the structure of *Ideas I.* The apparent clarity is superb, though difficulties soon appear. The summary of all of this is that the body, as an integral part of the human being, and the soul which, as the animation of the body, is no less integral, are objects of the ego. This is a subjective genitive: the ego holds the human being, its body, to be objects for which it is the subject. The same goes for cultural products that are special objects which the ego intends to use to execute some action. The field of culture foreseen in *Ideas II* is mainly one of what I have called elsewhere technical culture,[1] the culture that, in contrast to ideal culture, is repeated in each technical model. Therefore, the genitive in the sentence "the body and the culture of the ego" is a subjective genitive.

In my opinion, then, this clear outline is the result of the structure of *Ideas I*, presented quite clearly in these paragraphs and complemented by paragraph 28, in which the ego and the data of consciousness cannot appear through a multiplicity of perspectives and, therefore, appear in themselves. The opposite happens with the real ego and with all realities. This is the reason why man, as a reality, is an intentional unit. The real egos, myself included, are mere "constituted unities". (Husserl, 1991: 111, line 8.).

As I have said, in addition to being the longest one in the chapter, § 29 is tremendously important because it sets forth some of the decisive changes for fully assessing the clarity of the previous outline. It is true that Husserl does not take it as the starting point of a subject that can change the considerations regarding the previous outline's clarity. The subject of this chapter is that any act of the ego remains in the field of consciousness, finally generating a habit that belongs to it. If it makes a decision, the latter, as a decision that has been made, continues to be my property, my customariness, until there is a reason to revise it. It speaks explicitly as habits which, in addition, are not part of the empirical ego, as real dispositions, but properties of the pure ego.

With this, Husserl moves on to analyze the reality of the body, to study the body of the ego, whose place we have already seen, as an intentional object constituted through

[1] See San Martín, 1999: 199 f.

experience. The multiplicity of this experience ends up presenting its object, and precisely because in the future things might not go as expected, it could cease to exist. According to the Cartesian presentation of the *epoché*, this is the case. However, when Husserl gets down to an actual and precise analysis of this body, he finds an important duplicity: that of the hand that touches the hand, the body that touches the body. It is on this point that there is a duplicity that in no way submits to the foreseen general outline because, in the hand that touches and is touched, there is a double sensation, an internal sensation, and a sensation of something outside. The touched hand is external, and the hand that touches has, itself, a sensation that is the flesh, the *Leib*. These sensations are, for Husserl, the first layer of the consciousness upon which the ego builds the rest of the intentionalities. The *Leib* is nothing more than the set of our sensations of all kinds, the "*Empfindnisse*", localized sensations, the movement sensations (*Kinästhesen*) and those "sensations belonging to totally different groups, e.g., the 'sensuous' feelings, the sensations of pleasure and pain, the sense of well-being that permeates and fills the whole body, the general malaise of 'corporeal indisposition'" (Husserl, 1991:152). All those sensations make up the basic material of consciousness for the ego. They are, therefore, *noetic* experiences, or real parts of *noetic* experiences as an indispensable substance of the field of consciousness in which the ego rules, as Husserl says. These sensations belong to the ego, but not to the physical body, constituted through multiplicities that can happen in other ways. They are absolute, they are indubitable; my sensation of being seated now is indubitable because there is no margin for an alternative interpretation, as happens with doubt. On the other hand, as Husserl excellently explains, at least localized sensations (the *Empfindnisse*), and no fewer movement sensations, have an extension: the localized sensations directly constitute the flesh as something extensive. If I touch an edge, the localized sensations of my hand become something extensive that directly presents the hand. The same thing happens with other parts of the body. This is the first layer of consciousness upon which the ego acts. As a result, we have a fundamental conclusion: the body of the ego is a very broad concept that can only be conceived through careful analysis. After clarifying that the body is no longer an object of the ego, the *genitive* being in that moment *subjective*, but it is rather part of the ego because it is the first layer of transcendental consciousness. Thus, by the subjective genitive, the ego that was the subject of the body, becomes a corporeal ego, given that the body is part of the subject. This leads to the displacement of the previous subjective genitive, according to the following table:

The body		of the	ego
object		Subjective genitive	subject
Physical body	flesh	of the	ego
object	Sensitive subject	of the	ego

It is not that the subjective genitive has turned into an objective genitive, but rather that what was before only a subject has moved, absorbing into itself part of what was before only an object, thereby breaking the initial clarity, because now the pure ego includes impure things. Things as impure as those sensations of pain or of pleasure, the main example of which is all that is sexual. That which is sexual cannot be excluded from the field of transcendental ego that Husserl calls "pure," as its purity comes only from the fact that nothing that does not derive from real or possible experience must enter into it.

The third section deals with culture. We could use the same table as before because culture is made up of objects that are spiritualized or animated by apperceptions that tell us what these objects are for. Due to space constrictions, I will not use this kind of culture any further, which is the most important one here. When I speak of the culture of the ego, alluding to the cultural object the ego manages, this object is doubly constituted in the ego, first as a physical object, a material thing extended in space, and then as an object that responds to a valuation concerning an action that the subject wants to carry out; this is why it is a given object within a theoretical apprehension that perceives it as a physical object and later with a valuation that considers it adequate for carrying out an action. This valuation, of course, has a different nature when compared to the previous apprehension, because we could say that the latter is passive, while the other is active. Yet, at any rate, the cultural object belongs to the ego and, therefore, the genitive continues to be subjective. The ego is the subject of culture and culture is its object.

However, in the case of culture, things are more complex because it interferes not only with the apprehension of the objects' value [*Wertnehmung*] with reference to exercising action, but also fundamentally through language in the constitution of these units we talked about and whose establishment ends up being a property of the ego. The culture of the ego is the culture that establishes the units the ego will constitute; moreover, it is the set of these units that are given to me socially because they already exist in society.

Knowing is learning to know.[1] Once knowledge is acquired, it becomes the subsequent framework of any knowledge of this thing. The question, then, is whether the unit constituted by the ego's action can be seen as a pure object, or better yet, if it does not become part of the subject, as a habit of recognition through which the subject approaches any encounter from that moment onward. In reality, culture is nothing more than the set of customary units of recognition, valuation, and action that the ego initially had to institute; once created, however, they become a substantial part of its own flesh, in the form of habits. Culture, seen from the subject's perspective, is the creation of units and accustomedness, which especially at this moment also means that culture becomes the subject of the ego because the ego works within these habits. Cultural habits are the true subject, so that, in this case, we can say that in the sentence "the culture of the ego" the genitive is more an objective than a subjective genitive because culture is what ends up *shaping* the subject. Also because of the place of habits, the subject has stopped being the pure ego that had everything else except its lived experiences as objects. If culture was initially an object, it easily becomes part of the subject, like the body. That is why the subject is historical and cultural, but we must also now reconsider the very notion of man, whether it is this object that might not exist or not. I will end with a question: Should all of this not force us to reconsider the relationship between phenomenology and anthropology, given that it is based on the clarity of the inherited outline of the structure of *Ideas I*, in the third section of which, on the other hand, the *Leib* is implicitly considered to belong to the transcendental subject?

[1] "Alles Bekannte verweist auf ein ursprungliches Kennenlernen" (Husserl, 1973: 113).

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