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Philosophical generations in contemporary Russia

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Abstract

The generational approach aims to reconstruct the existential context of the development of philosophy, to study the personal ties within the philosophical community. Russia's invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a split in the Russian philosophical network. The years of war practically destroyed professional solidarity in the Russian academic community, which is divided into three camps. In the first one, there are researchers opposed to Putin's regime who have left Russia and found new work in universities and research centres around the world. These colleagues have united in a number of new structures aimed at critically analysing the origins and consequences of the military catastrophe unfolding before our eyes. Some academics who have not found a use for their professional skills abroad have been forced to either change their occupation or return to Russia. In the second camp, there are colleagues working in Russia who see their mission in passive resistance and escapism. Most of them are intimidated and depressed. By the end of 2024, they began to remark that the Kremlin and the Duma were increasingly turning to academics for expert opinion and assistance in developing a new ideology. In the third camp, there are philosophers who share the values of the Russian far right and support the war and repression in Russia, and who are developing a Russian military philosophy. The article examines the transformation of values over two years of war in four generations of Russian philosophers active today (the so-called generations of "stagnation", "glasnost", "market reforms" and "relocalisation").

Keywords: philosophical community, war in Ukraine, Russian military philosophy, academia in exile, philosophical generations

The generational approach in philosophy

The generational approach aims to reconstruct the existential context of the development of philosophy, to study the personal (horizontal and vertical) ties within the philosophical community, which determine the birth and development of philosophical ideas. It is not just about the age of those who "make philosophy", but about the emergence of new issues and a new attitude to philosophy itself, the creation of a new social and cultural role for philosophy, about a new understanding of the world and human beings, and about the changes of what could be called the "philosophical way of life".

My first occasion for reflection on the specificity of philosophical generations and their role in the formation of the philosophical tradition was the 100th anniversary of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which was celebrated in 2021. The establishment of the Institute of Philosophy in 1921 marked the beginning of the institutionalisation of philosophical studies in Russia.

There was a number of publications in Russian that have proposed the new concept of 'philosophical generations'. First of all, the recently published *Philosophy in the Plural* (Smirnov & Sineokaya, 2020) presents original philosophical concepts of prominent Russian thinkers who worked at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the last hundred years. Another example is the popular two-volume book *Generations of the Higher School of Economics*, in one volume of which students of the university discuss their professors, and in the other volume professors talk about their teachers (Ivanova & Yudkevich et al., 2013; Yudkevich & Ivanova et al., 2013). Here it is also important to recall the two-volume book edited by Vladislav Lektorsky, *Filosofiia ne konchaetsia . . . Iz istoriia otechestvennoi filosofii. XX vek* [*Philosophy does not end... From the history of Russian philosophy. 20th century*]

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(Lektorsky, 1998a; Lektorsky, 1998b). This edition gave impulse to the publication of the famous series of 22 volumes *Philosophy of Russia in the second half of the 20th Century*.

A philosophical generation is defined, in my view, by the existential contribution to philosophy made by people who are close to each other during their integration into both official and unofficial philosophical institutions. The mutual understanding of those who belong to the same philosophical generation, despite all their stylistic and ideological diversity, is based on the sharing of a bibliography, for example. It can mean the intellectual foundations established during youth through literature, films, blogs, performances, exhibitions, poetry, music, journalism, folklore, social experiences and travel.

In the case of a philosophical generation, it is not simply a question of the age or the same values of those who "do philosophy". A philosophical generation is a group of people whose life does not just fall in the same period of time, but who are creators of philosophical meanings and the philosophical discourse of their epoch. In the case of philosophical generations, there can be no indicative timeframes of the main stages of the generational path, which are multiples of fifteen or twenty years, as established in sociology. Thus, the epoch of the seventies-eighties could be seen to stretch for almost three decades, while the time of the nineties lasted at most five or six years (1987–1992).

The notion of 'philosophical generation' is not identical to the biological, genealogical, or socio-psychological understanding of generation as it is with the understanding of generation in the archaic biblical sense. The classical metaphors of 'caravan' or 'waves' do not work for the concept of philosophical generations. However, Ortega y Gasset's concept based on the thesis that 'contemporaries' are not 'peers' (Ortega y Gasset, 2000, pp. 260–261) and the classical sociological approach of William Strauss and Neil Howe (Strauss & Howe, 1991) are partly applicable. To a certain extent, the modern generation theory is also useful, using the sociological interpretation of generation, which unites individuals depending on their age, specific consumption patterns and media preferences. In this sense, one could talk about the 'boomer' generation, 'generation X', 'millennials' or 'zoomers' (Radaev, 2019).

My approach to the history of modern philosophy is presented in the collective work *Philosophical generations*, published on the eve of the war (Sineokaya, 2022). This is a vivid (first-person) history of philosophy in Soviet and post-Soviet times. This book is the last pre-war collective self-portrait of Russian philosophers. Today, this chronicle of philosophical generations provides a key to understanding the transformations of the philosophical community that are taking place before our eyes.

Philosophy and war

Russia's invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a split of the Russian philosophical network (Faure, 2024; Sineokaya, 2024a; Sineokaya, 2023). Two years of war practically destroyed professional solidarity in the Russian academic community, which has been divided into three camps.

In the first camp, there are scholars who have left Russia to work in universities and research centres around the world.[2] In the second, there are employees of universities and research centres working in Russia (Sineokaya, 2024b). Most of them are intimidated and depressed. They remain silent about the war. Most of them have concentrated on archival work, dealing with 'just' the history of philosophy, schools of Eastern philosophies, problems of animal consciousness, formal and modal logic, etc. Among these researchers, there are some who are trying to advance in their academic careers regardless of the political regime. In the third camp, there are philosophers who share the values of the Russian far right, who support war and

[2] Independent Institute of Philosophy, for more information see https://independentphilosophers.com/en.

repression in Russia, and who are developing a Russian military philosophy (Sineokaya, 2024c).

The processes taking place in the Russian academic community today can be viewed in different systems of coordinates and from different perspectives. If we take as a dividing line the open expression of one's position on the Kremlin's policy, the largest group will be the silent opponents of war and repression. A minority will be supporters of a sacred war with the 'collective West' and adherents of the new Russian military philosophy. Even fewer are those who openly criticise the Russian authorities.

If we take a generational perspective, we see that there are four philosophical generations most active today: 1) the 1970s–1980s generation (the long generation that began its journey into philosophy in the late sixties and up to the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika); 2) the 1990s generation (those who studied during the 'perestroika' years from the second half of the 1980s to the early 1990s); 3) the generation of the 2000s (those who are forty and over today, who entered the profession from the second half of the 1990s onwards); 4) the generation of the 2010s (known as the 'grandchildren of perestroika' and who are now around thirty years old).

1) The generation of the 1970s–1980s is a long one, beginning its philosophical journey at the end of the 1960s and taking shape before Gorbachev's perestroika. It was a generation of solitary, autonomous and self-sufficient individuals. Each cultivated their own direction, without feeling involved in their own generation. They did not like having generational standards applied to them, or being compared to the generation of the 1960s. They had no illusions, were pragmatic and were opposed to the generation of the "thaw," which did not accept them into their circle. Seeking academic positions in the stifling atmosphere of Brezhnevism, the 1970s generation generally sought spiritual sustenance in the absolute, beyond history and time. Their professional advancement was difficult and slow. Without the opportunity for self-fulfillment, their professional careers and sometimes even their lives came to an early end. While the 1960s generation gravitated towards large-scale projects, the generation of the 1970s–1980s appreciated the depth of immersion in a specific subject. They gathered in circles, but did not create their own generational reviews.

2) The 1990s philosophical generation is the one that studied philosophy at the dawn of perestroika, from the second half of the 1980s to the early 1990s. I belong to this generation. My generation's entry into philosophy took place during a short period of history, "perestroika," in an atmosphere of freedom and open discussion. Ground-breaking books were published, and archives were opened and became more accessible. The tradition of the "Silver Age" (a phrase referring to the rich artistic and intellectual developments in late 19th and early 20th century Russia) was revived, with open debates between people of different generations, professions and beliefs, converging in the pursuit of lively dialogue and mutual understanding. During these years, a new generation of intensely bookish idealists emerged, who were fortunate enough to enter the profession at the beginning of the peak of "glasnost", when it seemed that history in Russia was taking a new turn, defining a special role for the philosophical generation of the 1990s. This generation was strongly marked by this feeling of freedom and openness. The centre of gravity of my philosophical generation was the magazine *Logos* (founded in 1991).

3) The 2000s generation is made up of those now just over forty, who entered the professional field in the second half of the 1990s. They continued the model of the 1970s and 1980s, broken down into solitary individuals and small groups of people. They experienced the collapse of the illusion that Russia could quickly and easily reproduce the European model and integrate the Western way of life. What is more, after the new valorisation of intellectual life at the end of the 1980s, it was very difficult to survive economically as a philosopher in the 1990s, a decade marked by the difficulties of Russia's transition to a market economy. This generation accepted the logic of events, obeying their objective course. Many representatives of this

generation shut themselves away in philosophy, in ivory towers, devoting their lives to the multiplication of knowledge, but forgetting wisdom, which is to say the existential understanding of this knowledge. Others, on the contrary, abandoned knowledge for knowledge's sake, which had become a mortal barrier between them and their lives. A dividing line between the partisans of the analytic tradition and those of continental philosophy runs through this generation. It is a collection of dissimilar units. This generation is less attached to the idea of a journal as a means of bringing different voices together.

4) The generation of the 2010s is that of the "grandchildren of perestroika", who are around thirty years old. It has inherited from its teachers of the 1990s generation an interest in the identity of culture and life, tradition and freedom, European history and the concrete character of Russia. A distinctive feature of this generation is its openness to interaction. This was a generation that felt at home in the Russian philosophical space and beyond. A generation that received a brilliant education, that was motivated, professional and also felt free. Sadly, this promising generation has been shattered by the war. Many members of this generation left Russia after February 24, 2022. Those who remained are now facing a crisis. Time will tell what awaits this generation, and how and where its members will be able to find professional fulfilment. The spirit of this generation, which gravitates towards various forms of collaborative work and sees philosophy as a collective affair, can be found, for example, in the magazine *Fig Juice* [*Finikovyy kompot*] founded in 2012.

In short, these four generations can be designated as follows: 1) stagnation; 2) glasnost; 3) market reforms and 4) relocalisation. Or 1) the generation of reformed Marxism, Kant and Derrida; 2) the generation of Nietzsche, Foucault, Berdyaev and Solovyov; 3) the generation of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Ivan Ilyin; 4) the generation of Deleuze, Arendt, Dennett and Chalmers... Or in another way: 1) a silent generation, 2) a generation of translators into Russian, 3) a generation of interpreters, 4) a generation that speaks the languages of the world... We can label them in numerous ways.

Today, after two and half years of Russia's war in Ukraine, during which I have been analysing articles, books, speeches at conferences and in the media, I conclude that the active conformist majority, which openly declares its anti-Western and anti-liberal positions, consists mainly of those who classify themselves as members of the philosophical generations of the 1970s–1980s and 2000s. The most radically anti-war and anti-Putin generation is the generation of the 2010s. Of course, each generation has its bright exceptions.

To talk about the way each of the four modern philosophical generations manifests itself today in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine in detail, I will focus on the most active academic and research groups in the mass media, which have been playing a significant role during the war.

The generation of stagnation

The generation of the 1970s–1980s are now in charge of the majority of Russian pro-imperialist institutions that have actively engaged in the process of transforming the Russian education system of values from universal liberal ('Eurocentric') to conservative, isolationist 'Russian traditional values'. The most influential proponents of the war and developers of "Russian military philosophy" of this generation are Alexander Dugin, Fyodor Girenok, Igor Evlampiev, Leonid Polyakov, and Olga Zinovieva. They are very active as propagandists in the *Izborsk Club*, the newspaper *Zavtra*, the media holding *Tsargrad*, and the *Zinoviev Club*. These groups became visible in Russian public life after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Some of them managed to break through from the ideological backdrop into a respectable scientific community after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This camp lobbies for the de-Europeanisation of Russia, the destruction of Russia's institutional and cultural ties with Europe, welcomes Russia's geopolitical and civilizational "Eastern turn", and outlaws anything

that tries to resist the forces of disintegration. They are in favor of continuing the war at any cost until Russia's complete and final victory, of escalating Russia's war with Ukraine into Russia's war with the EU and the US, and approve of Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The goal of the 'legionaries of Russian philosophy' (as they call themselves) of this generation is to build the Russian world as a state-civilisation, to develop an appropriate ideology for this goal, and a new educational canon, through which the new generations of Russians will be formative in the paradigm of Neo-Eurasianism. The most influential authorities of the conservative part of the 1970s–1980s generation today are Nikolay Danilevsky, Nikolay Trubetskoy, Konstantin Leontiev, René Guénon, Lev Gumilev, Alexander Zinoviev, Julius Evola, and Karl Haushofer. The whole diversity of modern Neo-Eurasianism can be divided into two groups. In the first group are ultra-nationalism and isolationism with elements of the fascism of Alexander Dugin, and in the second is the symphonic pan-Eurasian internationalism of Andrei Smirnov.

The pro-Kremlin neo-Eurasian camp faces philosophers openly against the regime and from the same philosophical generation, such as Alexander Dobrokhotov, Sergei Zenkin, Ruben Apresyan, Elena Petrovskaya, Marina Bykova, and Nikolay Plotnikov. In addition to their research and teaching, these scholars focus on analyzing the anthropological catastrophe which is taking place before our eyes. Most of them live outside of Russia, which guarantees their personal safety and access to free media. However, the majority of free-thinking professional philosophers of this generation (including Russians who have been living and working in the West for a long time) have not created new academic structures aimed at bringing together and supporting researchers who left Russia because of the war (with a few exceptions, for example Nikolay Plotnikov, who helps new emigrants through the Fedor Stepun Fellowship Program).

This philosophical generation was the first to take practical steps to criticise Russia's full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. I am referring to the initiative of Nikolay Plotnikov, who acted as an editor-in-chief of the collective volume *In the face of catastrophe* (Plotnikov, 2023). The book brings together representatives of different philosophical generations, as does another collective volume, edited by Marina Bykova, *At the vanishing point of history* (Bykova, 2024). The authors of these volumes belong to the same philosophical generation, and this work can be seen as an anti-war manifesto of the liberal wing of the 1970s–1980s generation.

The majority of this philosophical generation are university professors and researchers who have remained in Russia and who are silent about the war and repression, but do not take part in the patriotic propaganda and development of military philosophy. Some of them, since their Soviet youth, have been ready to reconcile with any currently legitimate government, regardless of their personal political preferences. Many of the intellectuals of the 1970s–1980s generation are in 'internal exile'. These colleagues see their mission in preserving their institutions and their own academic positions in order to carry on the philosophical tradition in Russia, to pass on their values and knowledge to students, and to continue their professional research in Russian. The contribution of these scholars to the resistance consists in not allowing the system to convince them and others of what official propaganda says.

An example of the wartime activities of this philosophical generation is the opening of the Ivan Ilyin Higher School of Political Studies under the leadership of Alexander Dugin at the Russian State University for the Humanities in August 2023. This structure aimed to bring Russian education "in line with traditional Russian spiritual and moral values" in accordance with famous Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 809 of November 9. 2022 *On approval of the fundamentals of state policy for preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values* (2022). The opening of this center led to the largest university protests since the beginning of war. Students protested against naming the university centre after the conservative religious philosopher Ivan Ilyin (1883–1954), Putin's most cited philosopher, a leader of the White Russian emigration, who in the 1930s sympathised with

National Socialism and sought in it an ally in the fight against bolshevism. Students also called Dugin, the director of this centre, a fascist and demanded his resignation. Alexander Dugin is an extreme right-wing ideologue and traditionalist, who became famous for his initiatives to militarise the country in general and education in particular. He advocates for a ban of any criticism of the state, the government, the church and the president, as well as for the introduction of "extraordinary" measures to increase the birth rate, restrictions on migrant labour, etc. (Dugin, 2024). While earlier all of these initiatives were expressed by Dugin on the marginal websites of the *Izborsky Club, Tsargrad* and *Zinoviev-info*, since 2023 his ideas have been appearing in the mainstream media: *RIA-news, Vedomosti* and *TASS*.

The Ivan Ilyin Higher School of Political Studies turned out to be a stillborn research structure. None of Dugin's intentions, namely to create a new programme in the humanities and rewrite the history of Russian philosophy, were accomplished. However, his new academic position (Director of the Higher Political School at the Russian State University of Humanities) is emphasised during every Dugin intervention on Channel One of Russian television (for example, he regularly appears in the show 'The Big Game'), in order to give legitimacy to his propaganda speeches.

The scandal around the Higher Political School exposed the state of Russian society, which in the third year of the war with Ukraine has found itself in a situation of 'war of all against all'. Playing the 'Nazi card', the Communists are settling old scores with the 'Whites' and at the same time with the ethatist Ivan Ilyin; the Dugins are using this occasion to once again demand the repression of liberals; liberal-minded students and intellectuals call 'Putin's favorite philosopher' a fascist, attacking President Putin himself; imperials of all stripes are busy squabbling in their own camp.

I think that the main purpose of all this noise is to divert public attention from another new and effective structure of the Russian State University of Humanities, the Institute for Heritage and Contemporary Society, which successfully competes with the Dugin Higher Political School. The Institute is headed by another representative of this generation, Valery Fadeyev, Putin's advisor and head of the Presidential Council for Human Rights and Civil Society. Fadeyev's Institute is currently engaged with "bringing Russian education in line with traditional Russian spiritual and moral values". As for Valery Fadeyev himself, he presented his image of the future in September 2024: "There will be no guns – there will be no oil" (Fadeyev, 2024). The new socio-cultural model proposed by Fadeev is based on the following statement: "the world is in a state of prolonged war" (Fadeyev, 2024). This implies universal military conscription, increased spending on military purposes and patriotic education, and an expansion in the number of military personnel.

The generation of glasnost

The generation of the 1990s began its journey in philosophy during the freest years of Russia's modern history and took an active part in the democratic transformation of the country in the 1990s. This is the first generation of professionals, neither Soviet nor anti-Soviet, integrated into the global scientific community. With the outbreak of war, this generation split into two antagonistic camps. The first camp is represented by supporters of the growing isolationism of Russia from the rest of the world. The second camp consists of researchers who see Russia as an integral part of the Western oikoumene. At the same time, both camps are united in the belief that the bloodshed must be stopped by all possible means and as soon as possible.

The most radical isolationists and ideologues of the new Russian military philosophy of this generation are Vladimir Varava, Alexander Sekatsky, Alexei Chadaev, Oleg Matveychev, and Yurii Pushaev. All of them are adherents of Kremlin policy. Unlike Dugin and Prokhanov, they neither criticise the government in general nor personally Vladimir Putin, nor his possible successor Vladislav Surkov. Some of these intellectuals were at the origin of the right-wing

nationalist association, the United Russian Philosophical Movement. This generation leans towards corporatism but does not create its own media, preferring to actively use social media to promote its views and form virtual alliances.

The wing of academic conformists is represented by Alexei Kozyrev, Vasily Vanchugov, Igor Chubarov, Valery Anashvili, and Boris Mezhuev. These philosophers are the most professional and successful part of the philosophical academic community today. Their public speeches are remarkable in that they present key thinkers of the Russian philosophical tradition (such as Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolay Berdyaev, Ivan Ilyin, Konstantin Leontiev, Nikolay Danilevsky, Nikolay Trubetskoy and others) as defenders of modern "Russian traditional values", far-right conservatives, opponents of pacifism, and spiritual supporters of Russia's war with "the collective West" and Russia's new political identity as a State-civilisation.

The theorists of isolationism, Vadim Tsymbursky (author of the concept 'Island Russia') and Mikhail Yuriev (author of the concept 'Fortress Russia'), became the philosophical reference point for the conformists of this generation. The core of this group is made up of new Russian conservatives who believe that Russia's mission is to preserve classical Europe, which has been lost to the modern European Union.

A revealing example of the activity of this generation during the war years is the story of the ending of a longstanding international philosophical project. Valery Anashvili, creator and editor-in-chief of *Logos,* the most influential philosophical journal in Russia, which has been popularizing contemporary Western philosophy in Russian for more than 30 years, decided to remove from the journal's website the names and texts of authors who have taken an anti-war and anti-Putin stance or are currently working outside Russia. Valery Anashvili explained this action by saying that it was done to save the journal.

Many members of the philosophical generation of the 1990s, who work in Russia and belong to the silent protest group, continue to do their academic research, working mainly on the 'pure' history of philosophy, archival work, and teaching. Some of them openly say that in their communication with colleagues and students, they are more and more often forced to use Aesopian language.

This generation is the most active group in academic emigration, which has launched a significant number of new research and educational projects. The most successful educational initiatives in philosophy are FLAS (Montenegro), the Free University (Latvia), the MA Nemtsov Programme in Russian Studies (Prague) and Smolny beyond the borders (Berlin). The most important research philosophical institution created by Russian academic emigration is the association 'Independent Institute of Philosophy', registered in Paris in 2023. The association was founded by former colleagues of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where I use to work as the deputy director for research and the head of the Department of the History of Western philosophy before moving in France in February 2022.

In addition to philosophers, the association brings together political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, philologists, historians and psychologists. Until 2022, most of the colleagues united in the Independent Institute of Philosophy held academic positions at leading universities and research institutes in Russia (Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg European University, St. Petersburg State University, Herzen University, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Higher School of Economics, Institute of World Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Tyumen State University, etc.). The association has Ukrainian colleagues, who work or have worked at the Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, as well as European, American researchers and colleagues from other countries. The Association conducts critical research in philosophy, humanities and social sciences, and organises collective research projects with colleagues from all over the world. The goal is to analyse the

historical and socio-political logic of current events and to search for solutions to the current crisis. Several collective research projects are being undertaken at the Association. For example, "Observatory for comparative bioethics", which brings together specialists in bioethics, anthropology and medical humanities to analyse Russian and Belarusian ethical and legal norms in the field of health care, biotechnology and nature management. The project "Dictionary of political language of Putin's Russia" is aimed at studying the genealogy and practical use of key concepts of modern Russian official political discourse (such concepts as 'Russian world', 'collective West', 'DNA of the nation', 'pentabasis', 'traditional values', 'conservatism', 'state-civilisation', etc.). The focus is on an interdisciplinary approach to the study of these concepts, explaining their place in Russian political rhetoric and their use in national and international perspectives, as well as their influence on anti-democratic (predominantly far-right) movements in Europe and the United States.

The In/Visible Ink project aims to give a voice to academics at risk (in Russia or abroad) by giving them access to an anonymous, certified and secure platform for publication. The Association organises a series of monthly seminars on 'Philosophical methods for the analysis of contemporary problems' at the University Paris 1 Sorbonne Panthéon. Weekly online seminars have been on Plato, Leibniz, Thomas Mann, Winfried Georg Sebald, normative ethics, the history of Soviet literature of the Stalinist period, mega sciences, the concept of universal good, etc.... The projects and seminars of the Independent Institute of Philosophy aim to analyse various contemporary interdisciplinary problems, taking into account current developments in the social and political spheres, as well as scientific discoveries and cultural trends. These activities are a response to the growing criticism that contemporary philosophy is unable to co-operate with the social sciences, dealing mainly with abstract problems disconnected from the real life.

The generation of market reforms

The generation of the 2000s, united by the focus on individual professional growth, is now entering a period of professional acme and is actively trying to take its place in the social and professional hierarchy. The most severe and vulnerable ideological split in intragenerational ties is experienced today by this generation - the students of the 1970s–1980s generation who have adopted the paradigm of philosophising from their teachers. The generation of the 2000s came to philosophy in the difficult era of the fall of the repressive Soviet regime. Today they clearly and radically define their worldview choice.

In the wartime, the protesting part of this generation within Russia became a new generation of catacomb philosophy. But many philosophers of this generation, such as Maxim Medovarov, Andrei Korobov-Latintsev, Nikolay Arutyunov, Anatoly Chernyaev and the late Daria Dugina, have sided with aggressive militarist state propaganda and devoted themselves to creating a new Russian military philosophy. They themselves and their like-minded colleagues are active in the far-right institutions created by their older colleagues. But there are also networks created by representatives of this philosophical generation. In 2022, Nikolay Arutyunov, under the guidance and with the participation of Alexander Dugin, founded his own philosophical association titled 'Cultural Space "Sun of the North"'. They are authored by the same extreme right-wing authors as the generation of the 1970s–1980s, but their main ideological guru is probably Alexander Dugin.

An example of the activities of this generation during the war years is the case of Anatoly Chernyaev, who became famous because he was dismissed from the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences three times in the last three years around Christmas. On the tercentenary of Kant's birth, Chernyaev published an article in Vedomosti entitled 'Aufviderzeyn, Kant [Goodbye, Kant]', in which he called Kant's legacy 'an ideological weapon of the West against Russia':

> The ideas of Kant's political philosophy are used to discredit the decisions of the Russian government, and his name is used to stimulate separatism in the Kaliningrad region and to revise the results of the Great Patriotic War. The Fifth Column has made one of its banners the philosophy of Kant, especially the ideas of his work *Toward perpetual peace*, which presents the concept of a European federation that limits the rights of sovereign states, including the right to wage war. Kant's doctrine is declared 'philosophy of peace'. Kant's ideas are used as a tool to weaken Russia (Chernyaev, 2024).

The generation of the war

The generation of the 2000s is also represented by well-known names of critics of Putin's regime, such as philosopher Kirill Martynov (editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Europe), philosophers Artemiy Magun, Oksana Timofeeva, sociologist Grigory Yudin, anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova, historian Dmitry Dubrovsky, and others. Many academics recognised by Putin's regime as foreign agents belong to this generation.

The generation of the first decade of the 21st century, which entered the profession in the years before the war, was prepared and open to interaction with the international scientific community. This is a bright generation, who felt equally at home in the Russian philosophical space and abroad, a generation which is brilliantly educated, freedom-loving, professional and aiming for success. A substantial part of this philosophical generation left Russia during the war years and began the difficult path of integration into world university structures. Those members of this generation who remained in their homeland either immersed themselves in academic activity, escaping the depression and improving their professional level, or are actively trying to make a career using the wartime opportunities for social and career growth. It is too early to draw conclusions about what this generation's contribution to philosophy will be.

I do not know how long it will take, but the community of Russian philosophers, divided and scattered around the world, will eventually begin to work together again. This won't happen because there will be general agreement, unanimity, or because we will all begin to share the same values. It will happen because only together we will be able to put together all of the facets of the catastrophe in which we are all complicit, only by doing so we will have a chance for a future. But first, we will have to learn to talk to each other about the dead and the tortured, about retribution, about betrayal, about fear, about guilt, about duty, about action as action and action as the absence of action. Together, we will have to find anew the grounds for co-operation with each other.

I hope to be able, sometime after the end of the war, to publish a second collective work, *Philosophical generations*, in which colleagues could present reflections on their generation in the context of the war. This will be a new portrayal of philosophers' experience of this period and the generations with which they might identify with.

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