

From home to the unhome: An architectural model of a phenomenological inquiry

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Abstract: Amidst and against the many challenges and disturbances facing the meaning of home, the “unhome” emerges from the phenomenological dialectic between Heidegger’s existentialism and Levinas’s ethics, addressing the challenges and disturbances to the meaning of home. Heidegger argues that home is located topologically, within the bounds of a homely sphere, governed by an apophantic and exclusive binary: home versus its opposite—the world or not-home. Conversely, Levinas offers a less assertive and more dynamic perspective, critiquing Heidegger’s views as uncritical and excessively topological. Levinas defies this binary opposition, framing home as an ethical question rather than a purely spatial construct. In this context, the unhome arises as a Levinasian ethical inquiry into what opposes home. This paper explores the architectural connotation of this phenomenological dialectic and extrapolates from Levinas’s broader phenomenology of the Other to propose an architectural conceptual model of the unhome. This model critiques and complements Heideggerian perspectives and introduces a novel approach, framing the unhome as a hybrid plane of existence where architectural experience becomes chiral. Furthermore, the paper elucidates key architectural concepts—scale, place, materiality, and porosity—through which the unhome can be architecturally experienced. This exploration positions the unhome as profoundly architectural, communicating the dilemma of choosing freedom over security through tectonic elements. It redefines the meaning of home, shifting it from a primarily existential construct to a profoundly ethical one.

Keywords: home, unhome, architecture, phenomenology, Heidegger, Levinas

INTRODUCTION

Home is a notion that crosses with the human experience on many levels: psychological, anthropological, historical, social, economic, cultural, and architectural. Agnes Heller (1929-2019), argues that home can have different meanings for different people. However, as a notion, home is one of the few constants of the human condition (Heller, 1995, p. 2). Blunt and Dowling (2006) summarise, in a cross-disciplinary literature review, the meanings of home as a pluralist, multi-scalar, and multi-faceted notion. Architecturally, home is primarily associated with the house, an established and privileged connection. Moreover, architectural space is linked to security, privacy, identity, and familiarity. Metaphysically, architecture is also perceived as a haven, refuge, journey, and memory. Against their exploration of a rich spectrum of meanings, however, Blunt and Dowling highlight that home is constantly challenged and disrupted. They state repeatedly that home can be experienced positively or negatively, or as a complex mixture of both, which make the definition of home a hard task.

Such challenges to the meaning of home are starkly evident in large-scale destruction of houses, whether due to manmade or

natural disasters. Recent examples include California’s relentless wildfires, which have indiscriminately consumed vast parts of Los Angeles, and the widespread devastation of cityscapes across the Middle East, Ukraine, and other regions. Beyond the physical destruction of houses, the meaning of home is further unsettled by wars, mass (forced) migrations, and an escalating housing crisis. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with economic recessions and inflation, has intensified these challenges.

Porteous and Smith (2001) formalise the discussion on the destruction of the house and its impact on the meaning of home. They define this phenomenon as *Domicide* or “the murder of home” (Porteous and Smith, 2001, p. 3). Their work suggests that home is deeply tied to its architectural embodiment, the house, and that its destruction or abandonment leads to a profound erasure of home’s positive values, such as comfort, security, and belonging. They argue for a strong correlation, if not causation, between the physical destruction of the house and the dismantling of home’s meaning. Consequently, they conclude that the loss of a house—whether through destruction, abandonment, or even unwanted confinement—profoundly affects the experience and understanding of home.

Domicide and the possibility of a negative experience of home confront the colloquial, overwhelmingly positive, romantic, poetic, deeply optimistic, and somewhat naïve expectations of home—a view perpetuated by representations of home in various art forms, such as literature, painting, music, architecture, and cinema (Blunt and Dowling, 2006, pp. 67–69). Another contributing factor is the commodification of home, particularly within the real estate sector, which reduces the complex notion of home to picturesque architectural images and deceptive promises—“If a *home* is something you can buy, then that appears to be all there is to it” (Hollander, 1991, p. 42).

In the modern architectural discourse, disturbances of home could be clearly seen in the vehement antagonism to the homely sentiment in architectural practice, brought by modern movements of the 20th century (see: Reed, 1996). The avant-garde, progressive, anti-traditional, and radical ideas of Adolf Loos’s “Ornament is a Crime”, Mies van der Rohe’s “Less is More”, and Le Corbusier’s “A House is a Machine for Living in” reflect strife against “the sentimental hysteria” that surrounds “the cult of home” (Le Corbusier, 1986, pp. 13–14; first published 1931).

The adoption of avant-garde modernism in intellectual circles and among the upper-middle and upper classes led to profound ethical and aesthetic crises concerning the modern meaning of home, which find their roots in the evolving socio-ethical landscape of modernity and the re-emergence of the mythical “Godman” master builder (Joyner, 2023). Indeed, this discourse put architecture at a crossroad of contradictions, where the antagonism of home in the name of design hollowed the potentiality of home in the house with rather Unhomely experiences of alienation and confiscation of agency.

These challenges are evident not only in architectural design and the dominance of the architect, but also in the broader shift in housing paradigms, exemplified by the increasing prevalence of house rental over ownership. This socio-economic shift recalls a modern dilemma of homemaking “within someone else’s house” (Vidler, 1992, p. 5) or, more broadly, “on someone else’s terms” (Avery, 2014, p. 3). Furthermore, contemporary houses and house-building practices are still plagued with inhospitality to unconventional types of families, imposition of style over lifestyle, downsizing, and obsession with quantity over quality as a response to the housing crisis (see: Maak, 2015).

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Enlightened by these arguments, this paper focuses on philosophical and architectural exploration by calling a phenomenological discussion, or rather, dialectic, between Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) existential phenomenology of Being, as explored primarily in *Being and Time* (Heidegger, 1927) and Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) ethical phenomenology of the Other, postulated in *Totality and Infinity* (Levinas, 1961) and *Otherwise than Being* (Levinas, 1974). Through this dialectic, the architectural dimension is explored, resulting in an interdisciplinary journey of an epistemological nature, departing from the perceived positivity and desirability of home toward its particular counterpart: *the unhome*.

Conceptualising the unhome begins by contextualising the meaning of home within the phenomenological dialectic and examining the interplay between architectural experience and meaning. Accordingly, the unhome presents itself as a neologistic extrapolation of Levinas, corresponding to and critiquing Heidegger’s shortcomings. The unhome further denotes an experience that arises from within the home as it confronts and overcomes its inherent vulnerabilities and contradictions. The

discussion results in a synthesised conceptual model that visualises the architectural relationship between home and unhome.

The dialectic of opposition between these two philosophers is established in the literature and allows for a serious and exhaustive discussion. Unfortunately, this approach necessitates the full or partial exclusion of insights from other established authors such as Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Yi-Fu Tuan (1930-2022), and others. The arguments from these aforementioned authors were not included in this paper for one of two reasons: either because similar arguments could be found in the writings of Heidegger or Levinas, or because they raise other important and interesting points that cannot be exhausted within this paper. Furthermore, to make these arguments, this paper explores the writings of Heidegger and Levinas, and attempts to distil an architectural lexicon that composes home and unhome. This approach allows for the conceptualisation of architectural models and the re-definitions of the elements of the architectural compositions.

CONCEPTION OF THE UNHOME

Home and Not-home in Heidegger’s Phenomenology

The meaning of home for Heidegger begins with Mircea Eliade’s (1907-1986) theological phenomenology of the Sacred and the Profane (Eliade, 1987; first published 1957), suggesting that home is, ontologically, an ancient religious practice; a designation of a sacred place and a defiance of the “homogeneity of space” (Eliade, 1987, first published 1957, p. 20). Accordingly, Heidegger’s phenomenology of home is deeply intertwined with topological existence, or existence in the place (Heidegger, 1962; first published 1927). The question of existence does not only relate to the question of *Sein* (German for “Being”), but more profoundly to *Dasein* (German for “Being Here” or “the site of Being”) (Malpas 2006, p. 6)—home is the enrootedness or placefulness of Being.

Heidegger’s take on *Gelassenheit* (Heidegger, 1966; first published 1959), which translates from German as release, serenity, calmness, composure, or letting-be, contends that home is intrinsically existential and naturally positive, familiar, measurable, and known. This is an echo of Bachelard’s image of home as the poetic house. The Bachelardian house emerges from metaphoric poetry, not an object but a subject of significance for the self—Home is the house in which the self finds intimacy, security, release, and daydream (Bachelard, 1994; first published 1958). Furthermore, the notion of Dwelling (Heidegger, 1971; first published 1951) argues that home has nothing to do with building for the sake of building—architecture or house as an end of itself. Rather, home is building as dwelling. To dwell is not only to shelter or to reside, and it is not attained merely by the means of building. Rather, to dwell is to exist—“to be on earth as a mortal” (Heidegger, 1971, first published 1951, p. 145).

Heidegger alludes to an intrinsic and exclusive relationship between home and the world; between the sacred and the profane. Thus, the architectural reading of Heidegger’s home refers to the house—or any extent of the homely notion to larger scales—as a topological threshold or boundary. This presents the metaphor of what Peter Sloterdijk would describe as a bubble or a *sphere* (Sloterdijk, 2011; first published 1998), in this case a *homely sphere*, in which architecture encapsulates and protects the interior with a demarcation between the inside and outside with tectonic, visible, definable and defendable boundaries (Fig. 1).

Home for Heidegger is seen to be made in a set of binary opposites; while the interiority, enrootedness, and exclusivity deem home existential, the Heideggerian opposite of home, that which is not-home, comprises the experiences of exteriority, uprootedness, and vulnerability. Such experiences could be attributed to categorically negative experiences, such as domestic violence or forced displacement, or challenging experiences, such as migration, critical racial, gender, or feminist perspectives, as well as issues of unfavourable housing conditions, including homelessness.




Fig. 1. Conceptual model of the Heideggerian homely sphere. (Source: Author, 2024)

These social, economic, geographic, and architectural experiences of home depict exiting the homely sphere as it cannot intellectually account for or include these experiences in the Heideggerian definition. Thus, the epistemological and ontological integrity of the home remains intact within the sphere, while absent outside of it. Heidegger's involvement with the Social Nationalist party in Germany further complicates the correspondence between his idea of home and place as enrootedness in the homeland and the larger, more sinister, Nazi ideology (Malpas, 2006, p. 18). As a result of this alignment with Nazism, in principle, if not in practice, arises a mythology of home as rooted in blood, place, and tradition. Therefore, this view does not consider the radical shift of meaning in geographical uncertainty, placelessness, and uprootedness. Furthermore, enrootedness and belonging could be viewed as dogmatic, privileged, and exclusive to blood and land (see: Harvey, 1991; Saldukaityte, 2019). Hence, at its extreme, enforcing and reinforcing such notions, in propagandistic narratives, gives rise to nationalism, fascism, and xenophobia.

Home and Unhome in Levinas's Phenomenology

Contrasting Heidegger's enrootedness and exclusivity, Emmanuel Levinas makes an argument for home in uprootedness and inclusivity of the Other. Levinas rejects the Heideggerian construction of home, and with it, the premise of the Sloterdijkian homely sphere altogether. He views Heidegger's insistence on Dasein and the ontology of Being as topological existence, as "too earthy, as pagan, a source of creating idols" (Levinas, 1987, pp. 52–53; first published 1957). This description of home as pagan is a direct response against Heidegger's designation of home as sacred. Levinas further accuses Heidegger's view on home of being ethically questionable, as it "splits humanity into natives and strangers" (Levinas, 1990, p. 232; first published 1961). Furthermore, Levinas argues that the absence of enroot-

edness "does not destroy or demolish the meaning of home" (Levinas, 1998, p. 117); rather, home is "the very opposite of a root as it indicates a disengagement, [and] a wandering which has made it possible" (Levinas, 1979, first published 1961, p. 172).

In this sense, Levinas's radical view on home does not negate its existential dimension, but rather redefines it as an a-topological existence. He argues that house may persist or desist, but in either case, it may cease to embody the Heideggerian or sacred place. Instead, something else is uncovered that does not simply substitute home but consort with it in an interplay that creates "a paradoxical coexistence between contrasting stances: ongoing attachment to the home (and the household in it) and a sense of uncanniness — the *unheimlich* [...] within the home" (Boccagni and Miranda Nieto, 2022, p. 520)—Hence, the *un-home*.

While Levinas never uses the term uncanny per se, his larger understanding of the meaning of home and how it is related to the ethical encounter with the Other find their roots in the interpretation of Sigmund Freud's (1856-1939) *Der Unheimliche* (Freud, 2003; first published 1919), translated from German to the Uncanny or the *Unhomely*. The Freudian unhomely speaks of the eeriness or anxiety that arises from the recognition of something foreign, strange, unsettling, and unfamiliar within the familiar. This leads to a sense of alienation, disorientation, and estrangement (Freud, 2003, first published 1919; Vidler, 1992).

The unhome is the emergence of that which is not familiar within the bounds of the home, even if in the shape of a thought. However, this unfamiliar presence does not seem to invade the home from the outside; Freud alludes to the presence of another, or *an Other*, hidden within the proper, and whose emergence disturbs the familiar and known by the invading force of the unfamiliar. Thus, the unhomely entails a crisis and disturbance of the proper, meaning "it has to do with a sense of ourselves as double, split, at odds with ourselves" (Royle, 2003, p. 6).

Against Freud's conception of the Other as menacing and hostile, Levinas's larger ethical framework calls to look kindly at the Other, to encounter it within the home, and to assume responsibility towards it. Similarly, Bernhard Waldenfels argues that the encounter with the Alien or the Other oscillates in the meanings of *hostis*, the Latin root of both hostility and hospitality (Waldenfels, 2007, p. 119). This indeterministic stance towards the Other and the optimism of kindness challenges the simplicity of fear from the unknown, revealing the anxiety within the self as it confronts, or encounters, the incomprehensibility and inaccessibility of the romantic and idealised home.

The unhome exposes the existential and ethical crises of home, redefining its meaning. It emerges to overcome the dogmatic sacredness and liberate the meaning of home from the uncritical and assertive placefulness of the house. Nonetheless, while this wager is an invitation to recapture the beauty in freedom and to re-approach home as a permanent, inalienable notion, not a transient place, the (false) security of the sphere is denied. Thus one has to be, as Sartre cautions, condemned to be free—the encounter with the Other and the responsibility towards alterity is the costly freedom to see beauty in the ugliness that penetrates every home, to reject the safety of dogma, and to understand the home in the unhome.

A MODEL OF THE UNHOME

In correspondence with and complementing the suggested model of Heidegger's home (Fig. 1), the unhome is explored in a conceptual model. This model amends the arguments of Levinas

with further theoretical connections and allows for a visual representation of the architectural experience of the unhome (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Diagram: Conceptual model of the Levinasian Unhome. (Source: Author, 2024)

A Sphereless Home

Unlike the home/not-home duality, the unhome cannot be problematised as a mere crisis of the interior or as a “bourgeois kind of fear” (Vidler, 1992, p. 4). The unhome does not awaken as a crisis of interiority invaded by the Other, friend or foe—in fact, this exchange is the definition of home for Levinas—but rather from “something familiar unexpectedly arising in a strange and unfamiliar context, or of something strange and unfamiliar unexpectedly arising in a familiar context [...] the revelation of something unhomey at the heart of hearth and home” (Royle, 2003, p. 1).

The unhome, then, comes as “a crisis of spatial boundaries” (Avery, 2014, p. 5) and the dissolution of such boundaries around the home—The inability to distinguish between the inside and outside, the private and the public, the self and the Other. The image of an encapsulated or circumscribable home as a sphere can no longer apply, instead its complete opposite arises: the unhome is sphereless and alludes to a spatial rupture in the perceived demarcations of home. This spatial liminality prevents the house from straightforwardly distinguishing between the interior and the exterior. Moreover, the bleeding of the external into the internal, the unfamiliar with the familiar, the unknown with the repressed, negates the apparent binary oppositions that govern the Heideggerian homely sphere—The unhome is neither on the inside nor on the outside.

The Otherside

The inability to locate home within either an inside or an outside, and the perplexity in navigating this boundless sphereless home is examined as a state of spatial in-betweenness or *Hybridity*. Homi Bhabha’s (1909-1966) concept of hybridity, viewed as an “ambivalent scene, a productive space that does not rest on fixity, but creates something new out of the merger of conflicting ideas, experiences and places” (Bhabha, 1994; Avery, 2014, p. 129) presents an approach towards the unhome as existing within a third kind of space or a third spatial dimension which questions and undermines “binary constitution of self/other, public/private and inside/outside” (Bhabha, 1994; Avery, 2014, p. 16).

This proposed third dimension cannot logically exist within the dualistic dimensions of the sphere. Yet, all these dimensions share common ground in the architecture of the house. This suggests that the unhome might be imagined as situated in a chiral or parallel spatial dimension—an Otherside, an upside down, a passage through the looking glass. In this sense, the unhome alludes to an experience that runs parallel to the homely plane of existence, where being-at-home and being-in-the-world are experienced uncannily and simultaneously within the house.

Architecture, thus, becomes a conduit for the experience of both home and unhome, serving as the looking glass through which one goes—or transcends—to the Otherside. Levinas views this transcendental unhome on the Otherside as being more homely, or rather, more ethically responsible, than the home within the sphere or on the hither side. This is not merely because of the absence of boundaries, which allows for an unobstructed encounter with the Other, nor because it resists the dogma and paganism of enrootedness. It is also because this dimension offers access to a deeper understanding of the truth about the essence of Being.

Architectural Nexus

The unhome is architecturally conjoined with home, albeit on the Otherside. Levinas’s text, *Reality and its Shadow* (Levinas, 1987, first published 1948), argues that such a relationship is that of the reality of Being and its substitution by its image (Levinas, 1987, p. 3). Levinas argues that uncritical examination takes this image independently from its reality, and thus presents itself as unreal. Instead, Levinas argues that reality exists in its duality: both as what it is and what its image resembles—its double, its shadow (Levinas, 1987, p. 6). Thus, when seen from the hither side, the house appears as the image of home, while from the Otherside, the house is the shadow cast by the unhome. The house imprints itself on this Otherside as a shadow cast by the homely house. Thus, it no longer serves to represent or extend the self, nor does it protect from the outside. Instead, the house provokes a sense of existential presence of an Other and compels an ethical response. The unhome embodies the duality of heteronomous architectural experiences and autonomous architectural space.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNHOME

It is, thus, seen that the meaning of home copes with its challenges in two philosophically distinct ways; Heidegger explores the meaning of home in its fixity, stability, connection—or rather, embedment—in the soil of the homeland in such concepts as *Dasein*, *Dwelling*, and *Gelassenheit*. This view presents home in an apophantic and assertive judgment, which harshly divides the existential notion of Being into two folds: at-home and in-the-world, or home and not-home. Subsequently, the meaning of home and not-home are presented by the homely sphere, which both protects the home and demarcates a boundary against the outside or the not-home realm.

Conversely, Levinas challenges Heidegger’s binary dichotomy of home versus not-home and liberates home from its traditional, dogmatic, and uncritical association with a fixed place or architecture. His theoretical and paradigmatic perspective reframes the meaning of home within its ethical implications. Levinas critiques the uncritical glorification of home, suggesting that such a view is a trace of paganism and inhibits the openness necessary for the encounter with the Other. This reconceptualisation shifts the crisis of meaning in home towards an ethical question, where the self is continually challenged and transformed through its relationship with alterity.

Historical and ideological perspectives on the unhome in modern and contemporary architectural practices, alongside interdisciplinary discourse in architectural theory, reveal a recurring focus on concepts that connect the architectural question of the house to the unhome. These concepts address and examine the architecture of the unhome through its spatial relationships across different scales, as well as its associations with place and questions of placelessness or uprootedness. Additionally, architectural elements such as materiality and porosity engage directly with the relationship between the interior and exterior of the house.

Scale

A primary architectural outlook on the unhome uncovers it in two scales; the domestic and the house, and the urban and the city. This duality allows unhome to be understood at different levels and within different social dynamics, reflecting varied relationships people have with their immediate and extended environments, which contributes to the complexity of defining home versus unhome. Home, on the domestic scale, is largely centred around the question of interiority and security, while on the city scale, it has to do with the social dynamics and the spatial relationship with anonymous others (Vidler, 1992; 2000).

However, this question of scale presents itself differently in the phenomenological discourse. The phenomenology of home situates scale within the sacred meanings attributed to domos, or the scale of intimate, minute, and explicit location of one's house or home; topos, or the scale of the place which has a distinct character and emotion; and cosmos, or the scale of a broader, universal context in which humans locate themselves, each defined by thresholds that demarcate transitions from one to the other. In contrast, the phenomenology of the unhome emerges as a radical shift from scale to that which is devoid of scale, where clear boundaries and thresholds dissolve. In this sense, the architecture of unhome opposes its inherent purpose as a demarcation of boundaries, revealing a paradoxical, scale-less architectural phenomenon.

Place

Domicide and topocide show that the destruction of the physical and architectural space disrupts and severs the emotional or psychological connection to the house or place. This, in turn, provokes an existential crisis for those who are forced to alter their meaning of home, where the physical destruction and uprootedness are mirrored by a psychological and emotional uprootedness, compelling a redefinition of the meaning and location of home across new scales and spaces.

In the phenomenological discussion, uprootedness emerges as a counterpoint to Heidegger's enrootedness, a notion that ties home closely and solely to topology: the place of permanence, belonging, soil, tradition, and unchanging essence. This Heideggerian outlook risks propagating divisive ideologies such as nationalism or xenophobia. Conversely, uprootedness, as distilled from the writings of Levinas, defies the paganism of home and considers unhome as liberation from geographical determinism. Velim Flusser (1920-1991) further describes uprootedness as the painful tearing of unconscious ties to home but also as an opportunity to cultivate connections through free will (Flusser, 2002; first published 1987).

Unhome in uprootedness, counter to the architectural view, does not necessitate physical departure—leaving, fleeing, or abandoning of home. Unhome emerges irrespectively to topology, and the diverse forms of leaving or losing home reveal unhome as an existential and ethical response to the crisis of up-

rootedness, challenging the idealised notion of home by exposing its complexities and ambiguities.

Materiality

Physical and material aspects of architecture manifest in dialectics such as darkness and transparency. This perspective on the bodily constitution of the house and its relationship to the meaning of home significantly impacts the sense of unhomeliness. Darkness may evoke feelings of entrapment, while transparency exposes privacy to the public. Materiality, as the foundation of interaction with the outside, can feel unhomey on either end of the spectrum. Furthermore, materiality connects to domicile, where the destruction of a home's physical structure disrupts both its form and the emotional security it offers. The term suggests anthropomorphism, with materiality symbolising bodily flesh, mortality, and grief (Vidler, 1992).

In the phenomenological conception of unhome, the material body of architecture seems to convey two dilemmas: the first is the question of boundaries. That is, whereas architecture, materially and physically, delineates the boundary and protects home from the intrusion of the outside world, the same architecture seems to fail in the unhome. The materiality of unhome is the realisation of architecture's inability to repel the Other, thus forcing the encounter and response. The second dilemma is the question of the physical representation of enrootedness. The material aspects of home are widely questioned and undermined by Levinas. For Levinas, the attachment to the body of home, the place or the house, is ascribed to vestigial paganism that lingers in the human psyche and prevents humans from expanding the meaning of home elsewhere.

Porosity

Architectural porosity relates to visual permeability, often enabled by glass and transparent architectural elements. However, material porosity is central to the concept of the unhome, extending beyond incidental contact with the outside, such as in cases of partial or total destruction, to include the mundane and functionally essential openings—windows, doors, and chimneys. This porosity speaks to the extent a home remains open to external forces, potentially leading to sensations of invasion or instability. Thus, porosity, by either welcoming or averting the outside, plays a key role in fostering or dismantling the sense of home, emphasising how external influences can transform a home into an unhome.

CONCLUSION

The concept of the unhome is explored in this paper through the juxtaposition of phenomenological and architectural perspectives, where Levinas's views on the meaning of home and unhome are contrasted with those of Heidegger. The unhome, therefore, emerges as an ethical and spatial phenomenon, framing its arguments around the dilemma of freedom and security. The conceptual model of the unhome captures this dialectic through the incorporation of new and abstract architectural concepts such as *spherelessness*, *hybridity*, *chirality*, and *architectural nexus experience*.

Moreover, the architecture of the unhome is further explored in its scale, placefulness or placelessness, materiality, and porosity. The paper elucidates how the unhome is an architectural phenomenon, one deeply connected to the experience of the house or architectural space. It further demonstrates how architecture conditions the meaning of home and unhome through its various ways of regulating the dialogue between interiority and exteriority.

Finally, the unhome is an ethical stance against the burdensome toll of home, its vulnerability and fragility, which are specially experienced in domicile. It might seem aligned with Modern, Le Corbusian ideals against home; however, the Levinasian unhome profoundly differs from modern architectural calls by confronting and overcoming home, not by denial, deformation, or deprivation. It is an open-ended and unassertive invitation to revisit and revise the inherited meanings of home in today's complicated world, full of loss and scares in hope.

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