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Review of Javier Fernández Sebastián (ed.), *Political Concepts and Time. New Approaches to Conceptual History*. Cantabria University Press and McGraw-Hill Interamericana de España, Santander 2011, ISBN 9788481026092

Editor Javier Fernández Sebastián informs the readers of *Political Concepts and Time* that it is "the outcome of the more or less continuous contact between a group of scholars from different professional backgrounds and of various nationalities" (p. 5) The authors share, despite the diversity of backgrounds, "a common interest in language as a social phenomenon which evolves over time, in the symbolic and cultural aspects of politics, and in the changing horizons of self-understanding of historical actors" (p. 6). The volume is dedicated to Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006) for his outstanding contribution to conceptual history. The contributors have been urged to see this homage "to the master's work" as an obligation to develop conceptual history further, to consider "the most important theoretical challenges faced by conceptual history today" (p. 6). On the other hand, although Koselleck's work serves as "a major source of inspiration" (p. 4) for the authors, it is indeed clearly visible that the authors belong "to quite different academic traditions and research styles" (pp.5-6). The diversity of disciplines is at times discernible in their distance from Koselleck's work; it is difficult to see barely any point of contact. Nevertheless, at other times, it is also evident that the different disciplines may indeed have something in common. The general impression is, however, that the editor has had some difficulty in finding an appropriate grouping principle for the diverse contributions, and, consequently, in compiling a single and coherent volume where the contributions serve the attainment of a common goal.

Besides the introduction and appendices – comprising the commemorative speech by the professor of ancient history Christian Meier, Koselleck's fellow historian and friend, and a mission statement on the European Conceptual History Project – the book is divided into three parts. The first part (*Conceptual History and Neighbouring Disciplines*) includes four articles which consider the relations of conceptual history to disciplines closely related to it. The first essay, by Hans Erich Bödeker, argues that conceptual history is closely related to both social history and intellectual history. The essay serves as an instructive introduction to Koselleckian *Begriffsgeschichte*, including the problems and challenges entailed in its practice. The second essay, by Elías Palti, addresses the reasons for the changes in the intellectual instruments employed to com-

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prehend the world, from the history of ideas to metaphorology. The third essay, by Michael Freeden, suggests that the study of ideology might be of considerable value to conceptual history. In the final essay of the first part, Peter Burke proposes viewing the "cultural history of intellectual practices" as a useful neighbouring discipline to both intellectual and conceptual history. In his "brief survey" (p. 119), Burke presents, or rather, lists, numerous contributions to cultural history of intellectual practices. In order to acquire a more in-depth understanding of these contributions, the reader should consult the works listed in the chapter's extensive bibliography.

The second part (*Temporalizing Experiences and Concepts*) also comprises four articles. Firstly, Alexandre Escudier pays particular attention to the epistemological problems of temporality for historical semantics, sketching a "general theory of historical experience", a theory which Escudier finds implicit in Koselleck's work. In the second article, Kari Palonen treats Koselleck as a political theorist, concentrating especially on considering Koselleck's interpretation of how the growing gap between past experience and future expectations aids in understanding his conception of the contingency of the future. According to Palonen, speaking of politics as an activity presumes "that action itself could be or could have been different." Palonen's thesis is "that it is precisely in terms of the contingency of activity that we might perhaps better understand the contribution of Koselleck's conceptual history to political theorising" (pp.180-181). In the third article, Pim den Boer urges conceptual historians to go beyond "conceptual nationalism." Many political and social concepts are also transnational (e.g. *middle class/bourgeoisie/Bürgertum* or *civil society/ société civil/bürgerliche Gesellschaft*). Because these concepts are not identical, a comparative study of the national versions or understandings of transnational concepts helps to discern the national peculiarities of the concepts and their understandings, and at the same time might free researchers from traditional national tunnel vision. At least one result of transnational comparative study is clear: "The idea of one predestined saddle-time has to be replaced by flexible periodization and a plurality of conceptual ridges" (p. 211). *Sattelzeiten*, the periods of semantic change when new concepts were created and old concepts received new meanings, have ranged from the sixteenth century (Netherlands) to the nineteenth century (Finland). Pim den Boer's article can be read as a kind of introduction to the essay of Jörn Leonhard, who substantiates comparative conceptual history by the case study of the semantics of *liberal/liberalism* in early nineteenth century Europe. The study of this concept helps to discern different expressions of condensed political and social experiences in France, Germany and Britain. Leonhard convincingly shows how experience, as expressed in the use of concepts, can function as a "key concept of historical research" (p. 247). Earlier, in 1998, Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink succeeded in demonstrating the merits of comparative conceptual history with the analysis

of the concept of *nation*. In the case of *nation*, the cultural transfer from revolutionary France to Germany created, via productive reception of the French model, a peculiarly German language of nationalism (Lüsebrink 1998). With his case study, Lüsebrink has illustrated how the reception of ideas, as well as concepts, is always not only productive but also selective; it depends on how people envisage their situation and problems, and on that basis, on their aims and intentions.

Part two also includes a chapter by João Feres Júnior, who deliberates on "the question of how political science and the social sciences in general can benefit from the fundamental theories of conceptual history" (p. 223). This is a worthwhile question, it is not quite clear how this task can be accomplished by trying to answer the question of whether Koselleck should be classified as Kantian or Hegelian, i.e. by whom he has most been influenced (pp. 226-232). Adopting an influence, or being influenced, is in itself human and normal. Identifying influence does not, however, in itself provide an explanation for thought. In other words, although the influence may be a fact, it remains a fact in need of explanation. If we find Hegelian or Kantian ideas in Koselleck's texts, explanation proceeds by searching for an answer to the question of why he should have adopted these ideas. Adopting an influence entails reflecting on alternatives, which is a process of weighing up, more or less consciously, the available influences. In other words, adopting an influence presupposes thought. Invoking influence as an explanation for thought ignores thought, the fact that choices are made. We can safely expect that Koselleck, a skilled conceptual historian, meticulously reflected on his own conceptions, and weighed reasons for adopting the ideas of others, or tried to make his argumentation as reasonable as possible.

The final part (*On the Historical Semantics of Modern Times*) includes the contribution by Guiseppe Duso, who proposes a reconstruction of the genesis of the notion of power as a fundamental political concept. The second chapter by Faustino Oncina Coves probes the linkage between semantics and iconography in conceptual history, a linkage worthy of study not least because of Koselleck's interest in war memorials and his participation in debates on memory and history in his latter years. In this respect, Koselleck's colleagues look back on him with camera and notebook on *Denkmaljagd* (Steinmetz 2011, 80), "tirelessly searching for an as yet unpublished snapshot of a monument" (p. 306). In the third chapter, Jacques Guilhaumou argues that the history of the modern subject and its representations is closely related to the history of concepts. The final part is concluded by the chapter entitled "'Riding the Devil's Steed'. Politics and Historical Acceleration in an Age of Revolutions", where the editor himself revives "the old metaphor of the runaway horse" (p. 14) in order to demonstrate some of the fears and reactions of people who experienced the age of revolution first-hand, particularly in the Iberian Atlantic

during the early nineteenth century, showing how historical agents tried "to comprehend a disrupted time which appeared to have entered into a period of unusual acceleration" (p. 373). The contribution bears a fascinating resemblance to Koselleck's articles on the history of the concept of history, conveying convincingly the enthusiasm induced by the interesting findings. The chapter is an "intellectual homage" (p. 374) to the master that does justice to Koselleck and shows merit to the chapter's author. A surprising finding in Fernández Sebastián's article is how the contemporaries reacted to the acceleration of change. The change occasioned an experience of a gulf between experience and expectation, with the result that the past "ceased to throw its light upon the future" (quoting Tocqueville, p. 388), but at the same time an idea gradually spread that it was contemporary history, rather than ancient history, which provided useful lessons for the future. For instance, in 1835 Martínez de la Rosa concluded that "the history of the last fifty years contains more lessons in politics than the long series of many centuries" (p. 390). The question arises of how it was still possible to hope that useful lessons could be drawn from recent history during an era of exceptionally rapid changes, changes which caused an apparently ever-widening gulf between experiences and expectations. How could the recent past throw its light upon the future? Usually, in earlier times at least, drawing lessons from history was based on the view that changes in circumstances were very slow, almost non-existent, i.e. that the experiences of the grandparents and grandchildren remained the same, or at least very similar.

The import of conceptual history to neighbouring historical disciplines, especially to intellectual history, forms the perspective from which I assess the value of conceptual history, and will consequently evaluate the book under review. My remarks can be interpreted as my interpretation of the utility of conceptual history for intellectual historians. The interpretation is based on my conception of conceptual history; I do not maintain that this interpretation is a valid description of Koselleckian conceptual history, or a valid description of conceptual history of any sort. I shall use this review as an occasion for contemplation of my conception of both conceptual and intellectual history, perhaps even for improving my understanding of these subdisciplines of history.[1] It follows from my restricted perspective that I will comment in detail only those contributions where the relation of conceptual history to intellectual history is more or less directly addressed.

Bödeker's conception of conceptual history as closely related both to intellectual and social history is well-grounded. This conception allows only relative independence for conceptual history as a discipline, but this is enough; no more is allowed to any other discipline. *Begriffsgeschichte* has been mistakenly interpreted as being close to the history of ideas (cf. the formal affinity of the expressions *history of ideas* and *history of concepts*). As Bödeker rightly maintains, by critically reflecting on its early theoretical premises, *Begriffsgeschichte*

"has opened up possibilities move beyond the criticized positions and develop into a history of knowledge and consciousness, capable of laying bare the representations of an era's social knowledge in its genesis, constituting conditions, cultural-historical lines of tradition and epistemic structures" (p. 21). Clearly, conceptual history cannot manage this alone. It can, however, be a fruitful way to contribute to the attainment of this goal by concentrating on improving the accomplishment of its own tasks. For instance, "all too frequently the practice of conceptual history has assigned the concepts it studies an internal dynamics of their own that is not inherent in them, but arises only in their use by the historical actors" (p. 25). Another point worthy of note is that even if there can be no "historical social reality without the achievements of language", this historical reality should not be reduced to its linguistic form: "Concrete linguistic action should be understood not just as a reaction to extra-linguistic conditions, but also as a consequence of the respective interpretations of extra-linguistic conditions by the participating historical actors. What can and must be understood lies outside the concepts" (p. 27-28), or as emphasized by Leonhard: "Experience as an analytical key concept puts special focus upon the subjective perception of realities as means of historical orientation and recognition" (p. 248).

Bödeker emphasizes that to be able to understand a concept, or rather its use, "as a concentration of experiences and expectations, opinions and patterns of explaining historical reality", the concept should always be seen as a "part of a network of other concepts". In other words, the object of analysis in conceptual history is not an individual concept but "an interdependent terminology" constituted by the use of concepts, or, to put it briefly, thinking (pp. 31-33). This also seems to be the opinion shared by Michael Freeden in his essay "Ideology and Conceptual History":

> The emphasis on any given concept needs to explore its multiple interactions with concepts that sustain it, colour it, attack it and intersect with it. Concepts do not exist in an ideational vacuum. They are part of broader, if constantly fluctuating, networks: in order to appreciate the complex structure and 'conduct' of a concept, the focus of conceptual historians needs to shift so as to weave in and out and around the chosen concept (p. 74).

As Bödeker rightly reminds us, *Begriffsgeschichte*, even in its lexical form, as practiced in the lexicon *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, "analyses concepts as elements of a semantic and linguistic field." Hence many articles in the lexicon are in fact not constructed "around a headword" or the lexical headword title. Articles "often contain several synonymous or antonymous headwords or groups of headwords" (p. 32). In human communication, "the use of conceptual frameworks" structure knowledge (p. 37). That conceptual history should

transcend singular treatments of concepts and instead analyse them as related to each other is a conception Koselleck shared from the start of his career as a conceptual historian (see Koselleck 1967, 88-89 and 2006, 101, cf. Steinmetz 2011, 72-73).

Analogically, at least in a formal or methodological sense, when Koselleck urges conceptual historians to reconstruct "the webs of concepts" (*Begriffsnetze*), intellectual historians Quentin Skinner and Mark Bevir have stressed that to grasp the specific rationality of the thought and culture under study, historians must consider the specific beliefs of that culture. Understanding beliefs in turn presupposes understanding the conceptual or 'logical' relations of the beliefs, or considering the specific networks of beliefs of the people under study. Understanding a belief presupposes seeing it 'holistically as part of a network of beliefs' (Skinner 2002, 43, see also Bevir 2000, esp. Ch. 5). Thus, Skinner advises intellectual historians to conceive their basic task "as that of trying so far as possible to think as our ancestors thought and to see things their way. What this requires is that we should recover the concepts they possessed, the distinctions they drew and the chains of reasoning they followed in their attempts to make sense of their world" (Skinner 2002, 47).

According to Skinner, the basic task can be accomplished by using "the ordinary techniques of historical enquiry" (Skinner 2002, p. 3). Here it is worth emphasizing that the ordinary technique of historical enquiry applied in understanding the thinking of historical agents should not be understood as a Cartesian pure perception or "as a direct meeting of minds that is independent of, and unaided by, these minds." In "re-thinking" the minds of other people, "we see them essentially as responding to demands of the external world. We thus put ourselves in their minds by putting ourselves in their situation and not vice versa." We are thus "trying to understand agents as being engaged with, and responding to, the demands of an environment-as-they-conceive it" (Stueber 2004, 200-201, 204).

Analogically, and this time perhaps in both a methodological and ontological or substantial sense, both Koselleck and Skinner stress that language is not "an epiphenomenon" of reality or social world but one of the determinants of human action (Koselleck 2006, 99 and Skinner 2002, 174). The image of language as a mirror of social reality implies that the process of social change is the primary cause of developments in vocabulary. The metaphor is, however, misleading in that it "encourages us to assume that we are dealing with two distinct and contingently related domains: that of the social world itself, and that of the language we then apply in our attempts to delineate its character" (Skinner 2002, 172). Koselleck has repeatedly conveyed the common ground in this respect by stating that language should be seen as both a factor and an indicator of historical change (starting in Koselleck 1972, XIV). Skinner, for his part, affirms that there is "a genealogy of all our evaluative concepts to be

traced and in tracing their changing applications we shall find ourselves looking not merely at the *reflections* but at one of the *engines* of social change" (Skinner 2002, 178, my italics).

A comparison of the approaches should not, however, strive for their fusion. Nor should the comparison aim to settle which of them is better history, and accordingly determine which approach should be abandoned, as in the manner of Alexandre Escudier ("studied ignorance and the empty clichés cultivated by Quentin Skinner and John Pocock", p. 138). The fusion of approaches would result in confusion, and their confrontation is not only inappropriate but also sheer waste of time. To avoid both the (con)fusion and confrontation of the approaches we have to adopt, in this case, a solid inverse Marxist attitude: it is not our task to change the approaches but to interpret them, and to exploit them for our specific purposes while at the same time remembering that we ourselves are responsible for the results. In this connection, Peter Burke makes an apposite proposal in his essay, recommending an attitude worthy of adoption in historical and associated disciplines. In determining the cultural history of intellectual practices, Burke suggests that it "may be located on the frontier of between intellectual and cultural history, understanding the term 'frontier' in this context as a 'contact zone' rather than a line of separation" (p. 104). An alternative metaphor in this context might be to conceive of the frontier as a "stitch" rather than a "crevasse." Disciplines should be seen as each other's *Hilfswissenchaften* and scholars within each discipline have the right, indeed duty, to interpret the import or value of the viewpoints and methods represented by neighbouring disciplines for their own purposes – at their own risk.

Koselleck's and Skinner's projects have been compared and interpreted in various, sometimes even contradictory ways (at present, the most detailed comparison is Palonen 2004). Different, even conflicting views can be interpreted as a manifestation of dialectics of strife. The strife is made possible by the consensus that there is a conceptual or intellectual dimension in all history, i.e. that understanding history is based on understanding the internal (or conceptual or logical) relationship between thought and action. The participants of the quarrel disagree only on the way this dimension should be understood, on the underlying presuppositions of questions posed or how an approach should be philosophically or theoretically grounded and justified. Conflicting views are held not by the "head representatives" of the approaches but among some of their followers. According to Skinner, the approaches are neither incompatible nor convergent, and therefore he hopes that "both of them will continue to flourish as they deserve" (Skinner 2002, 187), a view which Koselleck also shared (Koselleck 1996, 62-65).

In 1998, Martin van Gelderen made the reasonable proposal that conceptual history and intellectual history (or history of political language) "may meet each other at a methodological middle-ground, conveniently described as the

semantic field", or more exactly "in a hermeneutical circle around semantic fields" (Gelderen 1998, 234). In this semantic field, both approaches have enough to do; the students of both approaches can concentrate on the problems they are interested in. The possibility of co-operation is based on intertwined problems and tasks, succinctly described by van Gelderen:

> To grasp the historical meaning of concepts, it is necessary to study their usage in the sentences and passages of texts, to study how words, phrases, metaphors and rhetorical topoi denoting the concept are used in argument, to study aligned and contrasting concepts and to study structures or argumentation (ibid).

In interpreting thought and action, both language and the social world, with their constraining and resourceful dimensions, have to be considered. How things proceed, or what happens in history, at present or in the future, is always dependent on thought. In thinking and acting, people themselves decide how they react to these constraints and use the available resources, i.e. they decide how they make history. Thus, it follows that understanding history presupposes the consideration of more than just the conceptual relations between concepts, intentions, motives and beliefs. In addition to the concepts, intentions, beliefs and motives of historical agents, the "total" network of the dimensions of thought must include their conceptions of both their social world and of the ideas and ideologies of their age or culture. In this sense, all history must be the history of thought.

We can say that concepts, ideas and circumstances constitute a mind-independent world, but the understanding of how historical agents are moved by concepts, ideas and circumstances is determined by the way they happen to conceive of them. Thus, it is both necessary and justifiable to see the mind-independent world as mind-dependent, in R. G. Collingwood's words:

> All history is the history of thought; and when an historian says that man is in a certain situation this is the same as saying that he thinks he is in this situation. The hard facts of the situation, which it is so important for him to face, are the hard facts of the way in which he conceives the situation (Collingwood 1973, 317).

For example, when people

> speak of the influence of geography or climate on history, they are mistaking the effect of a certain person's conception of nature on their actions for an effect of nature itself. The fact that certain people live, for example, on an island has in itself no effect on their history; what has an effect is the way they conceive that insular position; whether for example they regard the sea as a barrier or as a highway to traffic (Collingwood 1973, 200).

Intellectual history is an approach that concentrates on the conceptual dimension of human activity, or on the thoughts expressed in human actions. Following Collingwood, we could define the task as that of envisaging the situation in the way historical agents envisaged it, or as Skinner puts it, as that of trying as far as possible to think as our ancestors thought and to see things their way, or in Bevir's words: "Historians of ideas want to make intelligible the way someone else has made the world intelligible; they want to understand how someone else has understood things; they want to explain the way someone else has explained things" (Bevir 2000, 178). These analogical notions might be summarized and generalized by saying that intellectual historians try to conceive of how things have been conceived of; things here meaning everything that can be conceived of, ranging from "material" circumstances to ideas and ideologies, and, of course, to concepts as well. (For a more detailed justification of this view, see Hyrkkänen 2009)

Intellectual history is not the social history of ideas, because ideas (ideas embraced by historical agents) are not a mere reflection of a social world. The social or mind-independent world is not a context that automatically 'causes' ideas. We are tempted to regard contexts as something external from which something can be deduced or to which something can be reduced. The problem, in other words, is that we are inclined to understand context as a very independent thing operating behind the texts and their authors. It is useful to remember at this point that the etymological root of *context* is the Latin *contextus*, the past participle of the verb *contexere*, meaning to weave or join together. Contexts only determine the meanings of texts in that understanding a text depends on how the historian weaves it together with something else. Because the intellectual historian is concerned with the dimensions of thought, s/he should proceed conceptually, or in contextual language, aim to 'weave together' not only historical agents' concepts, intentions, beliefs and motives, but also the connection between their thoughts and actions and their conceptions of their social world.

The Koselleckian *Begriffsgeschichte* deals with concepts in the sense that experiences and expectations are stored in concepts, or more specifically, in the sense that experiences and expectations themselves are constituted by conceptions, which in turn become evident in how concepts are used in argumentation. For this reason, the history of concepts can be appropriately named conceptual history, i.e. a discipline contributing to understanding how people have perceived and conceived of concepts and ideas as well as their social world. At this wide semantic field, intellectual and conceptual historians might share the view that the subject matter of their approaches is not the social history of thought, because thoughts or ideas are not merely reflections of the social world. Nor can their subject matter be called the history of autonomous concepts, because concepts, or more generally, ideas, do not make history. The

true historical agents are human beings, who conceive of concepts, ideas and circumstances in their own peculiar way. Therefore, the dichotomous question of whether concepts, or more generally, thoughts are indicators or factors of reality and social change deserves to be answered only in the affirmative.

Endnote

1 It is worth mentioning that Cesare Cuttica has also used the review of the book as an opportunity to weigh his own conception of the merits of conceptual and intellectual history (Cuttica 2012). Here I shall not comment on his views, worthy of comment as they indeed may be.

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Markku Peltonen 2013. *Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 278 pp. ISBN: 9781107028296.

The adversariality of Westminster politics is the defining characteristic of the British parliamentary culture. In contemporary political discourse, it is mainly described in pejorative terms and, for the general public in Britain, the Nordic model of consensus seems more appealing form of politics. It seems strange that in a country that would otherwise prize and be eager to conserve its historical heritage has not more extensively explored the roots of its signature political style and found a way to reappraise it. Markku Peltonen's recent volume *Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England* is an important contribution to the study of the English political culture and its connection to the humanist education of classical rhetoric. The book offers an interpretation of the intellectual, political and educational context of the causes of the English Civil War and Revolution. At the same time, it brings light to the discussion of the adversarial character of the British parliament.

Peltonen starts (and ends) his narrative with a reference to Hobbes and his argument that schoolmasters and rhetoricians were largely to blame for the start of the civil war and revolution. He contributes to Quentin Skinner's work by directing the attention to the political and historical context of Hobbes's anti-rhetorical arguments. But he more decisively sets out to contradict some of the prevalent accounts of pre-revolutionary political culture. Peltonen also criticises Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy for its simplistic way of understanding politics. He argues that in order to understand pre-revolutionary popular politics we cannot apply the current ideal of politics aiming at consensus but, instead, we should focus on what the prevailing intellectual ideas of the time were. In the book the notion of the omnipotency of eloquence is raised as a key element of the pre-revolutionary English political culture. The idea is so central that the author has even decided to emphasise it in the chapter titles of the book which all contain the word 'rhetoric'. This repetitiousness can be interpreted as an intention to strengthen the view of the omnipresence of eloquence in the pre-revolutionary context.

The book is divided in two parts. The first part deals with the education of *ars rhetorica* in early-Stuart England. It is shown that the basis of the pre-revolutionary rhetorical training was the speaking of *pro et contra* on a variety of topics. It is explained to whom the rhetorical training was directed, for what audiences eloquence was meant, what kind of topics the training involved and how the schoolmasters envisioned the political uses of the training. Peltonen describes how the English humanists used their classical authorities to advocate the centrality of political speech in active citizenship. He also points out that there were many aristocratic writers who were so convinced of the powers of eloquence that they warned of the disastrous effects if they were left to the hands of the masses. The idea was that active citizenship, including the education of rhetoric, would only enhance the *ethos* of a gentleman. However, there were a number of humanists who were eager to teach eloquence in grammar schools. The book discusses the extent to which the English school system was instrumental in providing humanist training. Schoolmasters who advocated the politics of active citizenship spread the humanist ideals to anyone irrespective of the accident of their birth. So, in fact, "everyone who received a grammar-school education received … a training in political speech-making and hence in political action" (p. 32).

Peltonen is able to provide an impressive amount of historical evidence to argue that the most commonly held view that political debate was not aimed at conquering, but convincing in pre-revolutionary England, simply is not correct. He turns the attention to the rhetorical education provided by pre-revolutionary schoolmasters and how their teaching affected the political culture in more general terms. The training encouraged looking for the contrary side of an argument and ways to put forward counterarguments in any debate. The schoolboys were expected to speak and write about a variety of political topics, such as liberty, taxation and tyranny, and consider the people as an important audience. Furthermore, they were instructed to use words as weapons and seek victory of their opponent.

As Peltonen describes, the notion of popular politics was a key feature of the training, and its centrality derives directly from classical rhetorical manuals. Addressing the people, or the multitude, affected the way arguments were put together. Peltonen argues that there are two main ways to see how the English rhetoricians focused on a popular audience. The first one is to look for the 'utility' argument. Instead of following Cicero's division of using arguments of *honestas* (honesty) and *utilitas* (utility) for aristocratic and plebeian audiences respectively, several English rhetoricians named *utilitas* as the most potent argument in deliberative rhetoric. The other way is to see how the rhetoricians instructed to speak in a language best suited to gain popular benevolence. The English manuals encouraged appeals to commonly held views and notions, and "if eloquence was above all about speaking to the people in a style which

suited them, it followed that it could be described as popular or populist" (p. 39). English rhetoricians also gave advice on what kind of topics an orator should cover which were based on classical predecessors. Peltonen argues that training of this kind was done through the practice of newsletter and theme writing. What is particularly striking in his account is the affirmation that early-Stuart rhetoric manuals were dominated by the setting of agenda for contemporary political debates.

In the second part of the book the attention turns to the political uses of the rhetorical training. This is an important section because it shows how the grammar school education affected the political culture more generally. With a detailed analysis of parliamentary debates Peltonen shows the extent to which *ars rhetorica* was used in contemporary popular politics. The analysis portrays frequent employment of rhetorical figures and tropes in parliamentary speeches, pamphlets and other writings. What is interesting is the way he argues the persuasiveness of the various uses of these weapons of *ars rhetorica*. A selection of political debates are presented and analysed from the point of view of *ars rhetorica* but it also becomes clear that the contemporaries did not use tropes and figures merely for the sake of following the classical authorities. The political debate on the role of eloquence played a part as well. It is here that Peltonen's book provides a number of interesting historical findings. Although it has been known that the use of *ars rhetorica* was common in Elizabethan parliaments, Peltonen is able to show that it did not only continue in the early Stuart period but it became entangled in the political controversies. He shows, for example, that the members of the privy council of Elizabeth I advocated a policy to undermine the use of rhetoric in the House of Commons. They were able to make political use of the fact that most of the aristocratic rhetorical treatises emphasised that the duties of active citizenship, of which eloquence was a part, were reserved only for aristocracy and gentry. But the schoolmasters of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century had a different agenda. They were largely responsible for the preservation and distribution of the civic humanism in England.

The training and practice of rhetoric became widespread and the pre-revolutionary politics is difficult to understand without it: "It is surely significant for our understanding of the political culture of pre-revolutionary England that schoolboys seem to have been routinely told that their deliberative speeches treated such topics as law-making and foreign policy" (p. 59). One of the most significant reasons why it is so hard to understand the culture is because the contemporaries took it for granted that their audience would be well aware of the use of rhetorical strategies. Peltonen provides a sense of international background to his analysis of rhetorical manuals and treatises of the period. He points out that the humanist educational programme coincided with the invention of printing and a series of events that were connected with the po-

litical and religious turbulence of the sixteenth-century Europe. In a country that was ruled by a monarch with extensive authority a widespread education of active citizenship emphasising omnipotency of oratory was bound to cause trouble and second thoughts.

Peltonen's book highlights how deeply political the use of *ars rhetorica* was in pre-revolutionary England and the humanist writers were not just blindly following their classical authorities. In fact, they were very critical of the differences between the uses of rhetoric in republican and in monarchical forms of government. Rhetorical education was an important part of the power struggle between the monarch and the parliament. As it is shown, Elizabeth I and James I actually tried to take benefit from aristocratic writings against popular rhetoric. In this manner they both used *ars rhetorica* to their own political ends. By censuring popular rhetoric their intention was to draw the attention away from their own rhetorical undertakings. But it also shows how far even the monarchs believed in the powers of *ars rhetorica*. Although there were those who were not in favour of eloquence, its popular benefits were generally recognised.

For further research on the English political culture Peltonen's analysis opens up new possibilities. Given that the humanist rhetorical training was so widespread it provides interesting points of comparison with more modern British parliamentary practices. For example, a major difference with the nineteenth-century political culture is that the kind of systematic training of active citizenship did not exist anymore. However, the debates *pro et contra* remained relevant in politics. The grammar school teaching itself changed but its cultural effects could still be seen, for example, in the proceedings of Parliament and even in debating societies. The humanist rhetorical ideals continued to pass on through the practical knowledge of parliamentary work. In an essay dating from 1838, William Gladstone wrote that the most opportune way to self-educate oneself in public speaking was to follow the example of the British House of Commons. He wrote that not enough chances to practice rhetoric was available for those who aspired to a public career. In the light of Peltonen's book, Gladstone's solution to learning rhetoric by observing the actual practices of parliamentary oratory was not new at all. In 1622, Henry Peacham Jr. suggested that one should take note of parliamentary speeches in order to learn about rhetoric.

It is also interesting to compare the Elizabethan aristocratic interpretations of the dangers of popular rhetoric with the nineteenth-century Whig interpretation of parliamentary government. The role of the political press had changed radically, and greater contingency of politics due to outside demands of reform required adjustments. Although the times and methods are different, the argument that the aristocrats and gentry should educate the people remained similar. It was a Whig invention to incorporate the idea of popular sovereignty into

the parliamentary system in order to protect the aristocracy's traditional role as 'leaders of the people'. As the constitutional role of the House of Commons grew, the parliamentarians and especially the government ministers were given the high position of agenda-setters. Although the Crown still had the prerogative of naming the prime minister, the rest of the cabinet had to enjoy, first and foremost, the confidence of the majority of the House of Commons. The pre-revolutionary House of Commons debates had been between the opposition and the Crown, while the adversariality of the nineteenth-century Parliament was formed between the minority and the majority of the House. Whereas the humanist rhetorical training had provided themes and topics for political debate, the unpredictability and quicker pace of nineteenth-century parliamentary work changed the setting in which debates were conducted. Peltonen reminds us that the chief aim of humanist eloquence was the comparison of argumentative strength, not truth or efficiency, that is attested by the military metaphors used in training following the classical tradition. In the nineteenth-century political debate the idea of efficiency started to become a commonplace which put the aims of humanist training and ancient parliamentary procedure under strain. In other words, it was Parliament that now provided most of the training in political eloquence, not the school system.

Peltonen's volume is significant precisely because it deals with the formation of the English political culture by taking into account the wider influence of European political crises as well as the omnipresence of rhetoric in the pre-revolutionary context. Peltonen not only places the formed culture to a political setting but also discusses the extent to which the rhetoric manuals were used in grammar schools and what it entailed culturally. He presents Hobbes's anti-rhetorical arguments as a part and parcel of the humanist discourse of the time. In this light, Hobbes's account of the causes of the civil war becomes more commonplace since criticism of the rhetorical training was not unusual. Peltonen's book helps to better understand also the current debate about the adversariality so often associated with British politics. It makes us understand that the authority of the monarch has shaped (and it still does) the way the use of eloquence is perceived. It has created a certain reservation against adversarial politics that seems to continue running deep in the national discourse that idealises consensus and efficiency. It is important to take into account that the aversion is connected to the historical formation of the modern British parliament debating culture. But it also has to be understood as an argument in a debate, not as the absolute truth of the matter.

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Judith Butler, *Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism*, Columbia University Press, 2012, 256 pp., ISBN 9780231146104

As a response to the refugee flow caused by South Sudan's breakdown into a near civil war in December 2013, the Israeli political leadership pushed through a notorious "infiltrator law" that allows for the indefinite detention of refugees and illegal immigrants, - without fair trial or asylum review. In addition to constructing a steel fence to close off the Sinai desert, Israel is now also building the world's largest detention camp, capable of holding more than 10.000 people. Benjamin Netanyahu and former interior minister Eli Yishai motivate these procedures by stating publicly that the refugees and illegal immigrants of African descent threaten the security, demography and identity of the Jewish state as well as the Zionist dream.[1] The law has caused mass protests and strikes, backed up by human rights organizations and the UN. While the conservative, right wing government appeals to Jewish identity in order to justify its actions, others press for a revaluation of precisely Jewish values and call for solidarity towards the Sudanese refugees. Judith Butler's *Parting Ways – Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012) speaks precisely to this dilemma. How is it possible that a State is established on the identity and collective memory of a certain group of refugees (the Jews), while simultaneously legitimizing the production of millions of other refugees (i.e. the Palestinians)?

Parting Ways continues Butler's theorization of the relationship between law and violence, discussed earlier in books such as *Precarious Life* (2004), *Who Sings the Nation State?* (2007) and *Frames of War* (2010). The focus is now on the question of whether it is not in fact a Jewish obligation to resist State violence, and if Zionism as a political ideology is used to justify Israeli State violence, then is it not an ethical obligation to resist Zionism? Butler works with writings from Jewish and Palestinian thinkers, such as Edward Said, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Mahmoud Darwish, Primo Levi and Emmanuel Levinas, in order to articulate an ethics of non-violence as a critique and response to Israel's State violence and its self-declaration as a Jewish State. Instead of simply disclosing the state-sanctioned violence and war crimes carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces for instance, Butler engages in a critical conversation with political Zionist ideologies in order to expose how Jewishness has been politicized and manipulated to sanction Israel's authoritarian and xenophobic politics.

A crucial element in Butler's project is the political significance of speaking up against injustice. Like Primo Levi and Hannah Arendt before her, Butler has been labeled a self-hating Jew and an anti-Semite for criticizing and speaking up against the Israeli military occupation of Palestine. Thus, *Parting Ways* builds on an ethical

motivation expressed beautifully already in her 2004 essay "The Charge of Anti-Semitism: Jews, Israel, and the Risks of Public Critique":

> "[…] for most progressive Jews who carry the legacy of the Shoah in their psychic and political formation, the ethical framework within which we operate takes the form of the following question: will we be silent (and be a collaborator with illegitimately violent power) or will we make our voices heard? (and be counted among those who did what they could to stop illegitimate violence), even if speaking poses a risk to ourselves." (Butler 2006, 103)

This making of the voice heard constitutes part of the narrative strategy of *Parting Ways*. Butler is not only performing close, original and at times controversial readings of the thinkers she engages with, but she also lets her own, personal experience and motivation shine through the text. The introduction of the book establishes Butler as an author with a specific kind of Jewish education that constitutes the ethical motivation for her resistance to Zionism (*PW*, 20-21), - and any other monolithic, exclusivist and identitarian ideology for that matter. "In the case of Jewishness...*displacement* characterizes a certain *diasporic* train of thought. It also confirms a set of ethical values that bind us to those who exhibit no readily available, national, cultural, religious, racial similitude to the norms that govern our cultural self-definitions" (ibid. 23,my emphasis).

These ethical values are centered on Butler's idea of "cohabitation" - the fact that we are all born into a world in which we live among people that we did not chose to live with and with whom we may feel no belonging - and her belief that all lives are meaningful and grievable, and that all lives must be protected from destruction. Following Edward Said, Butler makes the intriguing claim that this "diasporic train of thought" and "ethics of dispersion" is something that characterizes the writings of both Palestinian and Jewish writers. Thus her articulation of a Jewish ethics of non-violence is not something that she intends to be understood as exclusively Jewish. Through a reading of Said's interpretation of Freud's engagement with the figure of Moses, Butler makes room for a narration according to which Moses as an Egyptian was a figure who was both an Arab and a Jew. "...Said's text is something of a petition, an incitement to consider that 'displacement' characterizes the histories of both the Palestinian and the Jewish peoples and so, in his view, constitutes the basis of a possible, even desirable alliance" (29). This idea forms Butler's conception of binationalism, which does not merely mean political binationalism as in two peoples living in one state, but more importantly signifies an ethical binationalism through which "...two peoples, diasporic, living together, where the diasporic, understood as a way of attaining identity only with and through the other, becomes the basis for a certain binationalism" (31).

Butler reads Said through Emanuel Levinas' ethics of alterity in which "the face of the Other" constitutes an ethical demand not to kill. Moreover, Levinas' entire

philosophical project aims to establish ethics as the foundation for philosophy. Thus his philosophy challenges traditional sovereign conceptions of the subject, by placing relationality as the heart of subjectivity. So we have here a complex layer of interpretations underlying Butler's thesis of the interrelatedness between ethical binationalism and cohabitation. Butler is reading Said through Levinas, and Said is deciphering the legacy of Moses through Freud. Said's work assists Butler in deciphering the highly problematic relation between ethics and politics in the work of Levinas. This happens through a critical engagement with Levinas' political and ontological Zionism. Butler notes importantly, that according to Levinas, Palestinians cannot be recognizes as intelligible Others with a face. They do not form a "neighbor" for Levinas, but on the contrary, a threat and an enemy. It is thus Said, through his emphasis of Moses as an Arab Jew, who becomes for Butler the thinker of a non-Eurocentric conception of Jewishness.

Moreover, Butler's ethical project is in important ways related to her inquiry into the relationship between law and violence. The ethical condition of "cohabitation" is vulnerable and "precarious" and needs to be preserved and protected from destructive forces, such as military occupation and state-sanctioned violence. Making one's voice heard and enabling others' voices to be heard is one element of her project. Another important aspect, interlinked to the previous, is the articulation of the history of the oppressed. Thus in order to "…think with Levinas against Levinas and to pursue a possible direction for his ethics and politics that he did not pursue…" (61), Walter Benjamin's essay "Critique of Violence" becomes an important ally for Butler.

Butler shows how Benjamin, inspired by Georges Sorel, attempts to understand revolutionary violence as a type of violence that aims to overthrow legal violence, which for him is exemplified by State power. This task opens up the question between violence and morality, or violence and justice. Benjamin's essay is at the same time a critique of the kind of European, progressive history in which violence and law have become fundamentally interlinked, making it impossible to envision a politics that is not based on coercion. Benjamin reflects on "law-making violence" and "law-preserving violence", by which violent ends become coded in law, which then violently polices this law through coercive institutions. Benjamin's essay is complex, sketchy and moves in circles. What is significant for Butler in this essay is that according to her interpretation, Benjamin formulates a conception of liberating violence that is paradoxically non-violent (71).

Drawing from the Hebrew story of the Korah and from the Greek myth of Niobe, Benjamin states that "Divine violence" interrupts the violent cycle of "law-making" and "law-preserving" violence, without establishing a new, equally coercive order to replace the former. In Butler's reading, this idea in Benjamin has to do with his Messianism and his urge to articulate a new conception of history that gives voice to the oppressed (99-103). Central to this task is the role of memory in the telling of history. "Perhaps the messianic takes aim precisely at redemption

and this way is the 'Antichrist'. Somebody's memory is interrupting someone else's march forward, and perhaps this happens precisely because something of that suffering over there resonates with the one over here, and everything stops. Remembrance may be nothing more than struggling against amnesia in order to find those forms of coexistence opened up by convergent and resonant histories [i.e. the histories of Jews *and* Palestinians]" (113).

Butler examines the questions raised by Benjamin's essay by reading it parallel to Hannah Arendt's critique of violence, as well as Arendt's critique of Zionism and the formation of the Israeli State in particular. Arendt's specific terminology, such as "plurality" (the fact that men, not man inhabit the earth), is important for Butler's formulation of *cohabitation*. What Butler notes, is that unlike Benjamin, Arendt does not theorize law as simply coercive, but also as world-building and contractual (77).

Although Butler does not theorize the violence of lying as it is understood by both Benjamin and Arendt, her own ethical motivation and political commitment to the task of speaking up, and breaking the silence of Primo Levi for instance (204), could be theorized in the context of Arendt's insistence that under authoritarian and despotic law, truth-telling is political action *par excellence*. In essays such as "Lying in Politics" and "Truth and Politics" Arendt – much like George Orwell in his "Politics and the English Language" - makes the point that to a certain degree, lying is an unavoidable part of politics. However, in the context of organized lying and systematic manipulation of facts, the entire context according to which we normally compare various statements is altered. The example of anti-Semitic accusations against anyone who criticizes Israel can be understood as a form of lying that is violent and destructive. Hence:

> "Only where a community has embarked upon organized lying on principle, and not only with respect to particulars, can truthfulness as such, unsupported by the distorting forces of power and interest, become a political factor of the first order. Where everybody lies about everything of importance, the truth teller, whether he knows it or not, has begun to act; he too, has engaged himself in political business, for, in the unlikely event that he survives, he has made a start towards changing the world." (Arendt 2006, 247)

In this sense, *Parting Ways* is a kind of a "start towards changing the world". And as such, it is a bold and honest expression of a deep ethical concern. Although the book at times suffers from lack of references[2] a normative tone and lack of depth when dealing with highly complicated questions in global politics, it nevertheless offers very important questions for anyone interested in questions such as sovereignty, nationalism, human rights, statelessness, state violence, diasporas and of course the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For instance, as Butler emphasizes, the notion of Palestinian nationality and national belonging raises important political

questions regarding the concept of "sovereignty" and "the nation-state". Palestinians in exile are living in a diaspora and are thus located in numerous different countries. "Historically considered, them the nation of Palestine is not bound by any existing or negotiated borders, which means not only that rights and obligations extend beyond existing boundaries, but that existing boundaries are the effect of illegal land appropriations." (Butler 2013, 206) Accepting a Palestinian state within the current borders is thus the same as accepting the illegal settler-occupation of Palestine by Israel. This being the case, serious consideration has to be given to the thought of a binational, Arab-Jewish, federated state as an alternative to the two-state solution. The several complex problems addressed by Butler in *Parting Ways* thus boil down to the question of how we should understand nationality, national belonging and human rights outside the model of the European invention of the sovereign nation-state? This is the most important contribution of the book as well as a question that must be taken seriously by everyone witnessing Israel's treatment of the Sudanese refugees fleeing civil war.

Endnotes

1 "African Migrants protest Israel detention law" *Al Jazeera*, 7.10.2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/cloneofafrican-migrants-protest-israel-detention-201417195210919142.html Accessed 7.10.2014. "Netanyahu: African refugees threaten Israel's identity, security" *Mail & Guardian* 31.5.2012. http://mg.co.za/article/2012-05-21-israel-on-african-immigrants Accessed 10.1.2014.

2 "One controversial claim of the book that is beyond the scope of this review is Herman Cohen's supposedly profound influence on Arendt (p. 153). Seyla Benhabib for instance claims that Butler "…places Arendt all too easily in the company of thinkers such as Herman Cohen" and that "…there is very little historical and textual support" for this affinity (Benhabib 2013, 157). Benhabib further notes that "Cohen shows up [only] twice in Arendt's Jewish writings" in passing and with a sense of irony (ibid. n36). To add to Benhabib's concern, upon closer examination Cohen is actually not mentioned anywhere in the Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress and not once in her Denketagebuch. Yet, Butler claims that "…these two thinkers remain cognate" (p.141; cf. p. 153) and that Arendt's at times racist Eurocentrism is a result of her indebtedness to Cohen. Upon two short conversations that I had at The New School for Social Research regarding this matter, one with Jerry Kohn (1/30/14) and the other with Judith Butler (2/20/14) it became evident that Kohn thinks that Arendt was not influenced by Cohen in any ways, whereas Butler clarified her point by stating that Arendt took up Cohen's ideas indirectly through thinkers such as Gershom Scholem and Walter Benjamin as well as the Neo-Kantian environment she studied at. Nevertheless, the claim that Arendt ended up developing an at times racist form of Eurocentrism through her absorption of Cohen's ideas is a strong claim to make and thus in need of further investigation.

References

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Hearing Foucault

Lauri Siisiäinen 2013. *Foucault and the Politics of Hearing*. London: Routledge. 156 pp. ISBN 978-0-415-51926-7

During the past few decades, political theory has been relaxing its reigning tradition of denigrating the sensual. That tradition quarantined the senses to preserve the fantasy of the abstract individual whose political tenure involves rational deliberation in a pristine public space. In the contemporary affective-aesthetic-materialist turn, scholarship has instead been tracking the sensual. It holds that the senses play a role in the organization of political subjectivities, movements, institutions, and events – so much so that political analyses that shy away from the sensual seem to be missing something essential.

Lauri Siisiäinen's *Foucault and the Politics of Hearing* appears within this context. It has two primary aims: to display Foucault as a thinker of the sensual, the "auditory-sonorous" in particular; and to elaborate the political import of Foucault's fledgling, fleeting remarks on the aural. These aims shape the author's self-described hermeneutic and critical method. Siisiäinen's method is hermeneutic in its close reading of the auditory-sonorous throughout Foucault's career; it is critical in that articulating a Foucaultian politics of hearing demands detouring from Foucault, elaborating what he did not. To do so, Siisiäinen interleaves Foucault's *oeuvre* with figures such as Rousseau, Derrida, Kafka, Calvino, and Boulez. Altogether, the book is a much-needed work on Foucault and a fruitful exploration of Foucaultian auditory politics.

Each of the book's chapters tracks the auditory-sonorous across a given decade of Foucault's intellectual career. Siisiäinen's preference for a chronological rather than thematic organization valuably brings into focus the twists and turns taken by the auditory-sonorous throughout Foucault's thought.

Chapter one, "The Archaeology of Our Ears," thematizes the auditory-sonorous in Foucault's 1960s texts regarding discourse and empirical knowledge. It begins by demonstrating that Foucault, from *Madness and Civilization* to

The Archaeology of Knowledge, invokes tropes of noise and murmur to denote the anonymous, presubjective character of discourse. Siisiäinen then navigates Foucault's writings on clinical knowledge to show that the ocularcentric Foucault of *The Birth of the Clinic* later revises his position. In a minor essay, Foucault observes that medical auscultation indicates that sound and the ear do not only supplement the clinical gaze. "Modern power needs ears," Siisiäinen concludes, "not only eyes" (33). After examining the aural implications of the confession in Foucault's introduction to Rousseau's *Dialogues*, Siisiäinen closes the chapter by showing the importance of the auditory-sonorous in *The Order of Things.* Audition enabled vision to secure the Classical age's empiricism, and phonics came to define language in modernity.

The next chapter, "The Genealogy of Auditory-Sonorous Power and Resistance," will deeply interest readers who turn to Foucault mainly for his 1970s genealogies of disciplinary power and governmentality. Siisiäinen criticizes Foucault's omission of the auditory-sonorous when thematizing panopticism. He notes that Bentham's plans for the panopticon included tubing that would enable an inspector to surveil the sounds emanating from each prison cell. Disciplinary power might be "panauditory" as well as panoptic. Siisiäinen then elaborates the auditory-sonorous in Foucault's writings on the confession, pastoral power, and crowds before concluding with an examination of noise in regard to neoliberal governmentality. Siisiäinen illuminates the politics of hearing around *homo œconomicus*, cast "not only as a formally rational/calculating subject, but also as the sensitive and sensory subject" (79).

"Voices of Care, Friendship, and *Parrēsia*," the final chapter, covers Foucault's 1980s work on ethics and aesthetics. Siisiäinen explores the care of the self through the "interior voice," Foucault's term for the locus of subjectivation where "possessing the discourse and being possessed by it" become indistinguishable (92). Siisiäinen then discusses the "musical event" which approximates friendship as a way of life: both involve the cultivation of "the movement of sharing, which suspends the order of identity and distinction" (114). This "methexis" finds further expression in Siisiäinen's explication of *parrēsia* as an anonymous voice that cries from "in between the members of the multitude" (117). *Parrēsia* becomes political insofar as its dissonance disrupts the auto-affective univocality of sovereignty.

I recount this cacophony of points to sound the broad scope of Siisiäinen's account of the auditory-sonorous in Foucault's œ*uvre*. Such a work is needed given the customary attention to Foucault as a theorist of discursive practices and the gaze without their inflections by and conjunctions with the auditory-sonorous (3-4). Siisiäinen's style may slightly obscure the specific points that might be drawn from the book. The chapters are, however, flanked by an introduction and a conclusion that helpfully summarize and thematize.

Here are a few valuable themes that can be gleaned from the book:

1. The auditory-sonorous has undergone transformation, both historically and in Foucault's œ*uvre*. For Foucault, the auditory-sonorous, and the senses more generally, are not phenomenological but genealogical; the subject whose body emerges through the vicissitudes of power-knowledge does not come pre-equipped with static sense organs. Foucault's thinking about the auditory-sonorous has also shifted over time. This is an important response to those who reduce the auditory-sonorous in Foucault to his comments in *The Birth of the Clinic* which, as noted above, were not Foucault's final utterances on the matter.

2. Aurality is a site of political struggle. Siisiäinen shows us a Foucault who tracks the recalibration of aurality across a variety of venues. From the clinic to the confession, power has been interested in our voices and ears, generating an economy of sounds and filtering what we can hear. In this manner, Siisiäinen articulates disciplinary power as sensualized, interested in the proximity and contact between bodies. Governmentality also appears sensualized, concerned with managing the noise that undoes the individualizing imperatives of liberty, property, and privacy—the anchoring conditions of liberalism and neoliberalism (87-8). These endeavors of power, however, are too porous to ever fully capture the potentialities of the auditory-sonorous. Crowds, music, and *parrēsia* all point to the possibilities of sonic resistance. Siisiäinen thus presents a Foucault who opens sites of power and politics that often receive short shrift in analyses of both Foucault and the senses.

3. Nothing in listening and hearing secures a politics of surefire resistance. Although he details the wild, undisciplined effects of noise, Siisiäinen emphasizes that we should not presume that aurality gifts us "the mysterious origin of transgression, resistance, and subversion" (131). The intensive affectivity of noise might be a resource of resistance in specific engagements with sovereignty and disciplinary technologies, whose persistence relies on the individualizing processes that they furnish and feed. But if power were to intensify rather than individualize, it might deploy rather than dampen the affectivity of noise, thus problematizing the clamor of crowds as the ground for resistance. An elaboration of power's mobilization, militarization, and capitalization of sound's intensive capacities unfortunately lies beyond the book's pages.[1] Siisiäinen nonetheless notes that regiments of the care of the self call for the subject to be on high alert for discursive events that reshape its creative potentialities; ascesis compels a sensitive attunement to whatever arrives. Resistance is situated, immanent. It does not adopt a twelve-step program.

These virtues of the book aside, I have a few questions and points of criticism.

Although the book's excellent coverage of the auditory-sonorous undeniably enriches Foucault scholarship, what Foucault might *add* to current literature on aurality and the politics of hearing remains underelaborated. Siisiäinen criticizes scholars of the senses who genealogize auditory power without addressing Foucault's specific comments on the auditory-sonorous. How might attention to

and engagement with those comments revise and rearticulate the points made by those scholars? What new insights does Siisiäinen's archaeology of Foucault bring to established scholarship on the auditory-sonorous in fields such as political theory, cultural studies, and ethnomusicology? Detailed responses escape this book, as though Siisiäinen opens many doors but only offers a peep into what lies beyond.

Next, the book seems to sometimes overstate its claims regarding the politics of hearing. This occurs when Siisiäinen elects to elaborate undeveloped areas of Foucault by turning to other authors. Take Siisiäinen's discussion of *homo œconomicus* as a sensory subject, whose entrepreneurial roleplay requires a mapping of and thus sensitivity to dangers in its milieu. Because Foucault does not detail the sensorium of *homo œconomicus* and the implications of neoliberal demands to sense danger, Siisiäinen turns to Kafka's "The Burrow." In that story, a tunneling creature is unable to pinpoint danger since the noise from which it emanates seems to saturate the burrow. The renewed drive to grasp an ever-fugitive locus of danger spins a spiral of failure, dooming the creature's emplotting endeavor. Siisiäinen suggests that the same happens to *homo œconomicus*:

> "the more it listens, the more sensitive it becomes, the more carefully it attempts to take care of its property, the more it ends up loosing its mastery over its property and over itself. The sensitivity, required and encouraged by the very constitution of *homo œconomicus*, leads to the dissolution of *homo œconomicus*, and this happens 'with the help' of the ear" (86).

Several issues dog this claim. First, the self-dissolution of *homo œconomicus* is Siisiäinen's conclusion, not Foucault's. That is, there is little reason to believe that Foucault would make this argument. This is because, second, Siisiäinen's dialogic method imports Kafka's story into Foucault's historical archive. Here, a literary engagement substitutes a genealogical investigation into neoliberal demands for *homo œconomicus* to be on guard for dangers seeping into its milieu. While this method certainly has merit in its opening of a theoretical investigation and political imagination, it may obscure the precise operations of the auditory-sonorous in neoliberal subjectivities of the historical present. Siisiäinen's non-genealogical claims hazard the framing of *homo œconomicus* as predesigned by neoliberalism for self-dissolution. Only a genealogical investigation can account for the emergence and resilience of the neoliberal subject in a culture of risk, as well as its possibilities for aural resistance. I do, nonetheless, appreciate Siisiäinen's theoretical rather than genealogical endeavor, which points to the political promise of pushing neoliberal power to its potentially self-destructive limits.

My final criticism concerns Siisiäinen's hermeneutic method. It seems that Siisiäinen approaches Foucault more with the eye of a thinker than the ear of a listener. The auditory-sonorous elaborated by Siisiäinen is found in the idioms

and metaphors deployed in Foucault's texts. It is encased in meanings of words rather than expressed through the sounds of words, phrases, and sentences. In other words, the sonority of Foucault's captivating writerly style receives no comment in the book. We readers receive a Foucault who had something to say *about* voices, ears, noise, sounds, and cries, but whose *own* voice, murmurs, and lyricism unfortunately remain unheard. What about the Foucault who sought to work on his audience affectively, to open their senses to the subtle, insidious, joyful workings of power? *That* side of Foucault enriches the critical one; it ignites the senses with urgency over the historical present, sparking a sense of need and desire to grasp and refigure the horizons our lives. It makes politics into a dire, happy affair. What might be said about Foucault's aesthetic? How did that aesthetic inform Foucault's writings? And could that aesthetic inform one's own?

Siisiäinen's method undeniably brings fresh insights into Foucaultian thought, so why be picky? In a work on the politics of hearing, I want to hear more – insights and criticisms, yes, but also the buzz of thought, the cries of crowds, the hum of power. I want the genre of political theory to be enriched, for critical argument to sound with sensual tones. I want the senses tingling. My request is that texts plot their reason partly in rhyme and in sublime cuts so that their very words vibrate with the tremors of anonymous voices. I may be urging political treatises to be penned with a tinge of modern literature, at least in Foucault's sense. For Foucault, all writing bubbles up from hubbub, but what distinguishes modern writing is that it crackles with that noise. "Writing no longer repeats words, sentences, or stories," recounts Siisiäinen. "Instead, it now repeats the noise and murmur itself... By starting to follow as closely as possible its every movement, writing actually takes part in this noise, and its own enunciating voice becomes mixed with the noise it is listening to, so that writing is, in the end, an echo of the labyrinthine murmur of representations" (14). The ambition for such a well-wrought writerly style compels experiment.

Take this essay, a modest attempt to be an advocate for noise *and* an expression of it. The use (or overuse, really) of rhyme, consonance, and a little alliteration was intended to generate an ambience. It may have been cute at times, jarring at others. It may have charmed or annoyed. Whatever affects were induced, I hope that some noise, whose dynamics Siisiäinen has described so well, could be heard – noise that reverberates through the readerly body, spreading it laterally and tuning its senses to something murmuring, in thought, in politics, in the everyday, and in writing.

Endnotes

1 For example, see Goodman, Steve 2010. *Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear*. Cambridge, USA: The MIT Press.