

A Critical Study of the Term ‘Weixin’: Is It a Mistranslation of ‘Vijñaptimātra’ in Chinese Yogācāra Texts?

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Abstract

The teaching of vijñāna is one of the main fundamentals of Mahayana Buddhism, originally put forward by the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in Sanskrit. Later, teachers like Asanga, Vasubandhu developed this teaching writing commentaries (Kārikā) on it. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and these commentaries in Sanskrit were translated into the Chinese language at the beginning of Chinese Buddhism, and the term Vijñaptimātra (weiliao) was used as Vijñānamātra (weixin). Later, even the great Chinese scholar, Xuan

Zang, used this term in his Chinese translations of Yāgācara Sanskrit texts. Modern scholars, such as Kalupahana, Zhou Guihua, and Lai Yonghai, have pointed out that this Chinese term has caused a misunderstanding of the teaching of vijñāna in the Yogacara as ‘the mind only philosophy,’ and the tradition was also wrongly named as ‘the Mind only school’ (Yogacara vijñānvāda). Hence, this article discusses and critically examines these modern scholars’ view point and tries to point out that Chinese translators did not misunderstand the teaching of Yogācāra vijñāna using the term “weixin”.

Keywords: weixin, weiliao, Yogācāra, faxin zong

Introduction

Yogācāra school was originated in India during the 4th century A.D., and subsequently spread to China, Korea and Japan. This school was introduced to China in three times, and it was recognized as Fa Xing Zong in China. Its main philosophical teaching,

the function of Consciousness is based on the teachings put forward in the text named *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, which was originally written in Sanskrit. Hence, this article explains the function of the consciousness which was revealed in the text. Indian scholars: Maitreanatha, Asanga, and Vasubandhu immensely contributed for the development of its main philosophy by writing many commentaries. One such valuable commentary is the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu. Many modern scholars are of the view that a Chinese great scholar monk, Xuan Zang, who went to India and studied under Ven. Dharmapala in Nalanda, has misintranslated the Vasubandhu's view point of 'ideation only' (*Vijñaptimātramidaṃ*). as 'consciousness only' (*Vjñanamātramidaṃ*) in his Chinese translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. The article will critically look into this view point and try to examine whether the Chinese scholars have really misunderstood and mistranslated the teaching of 'ideation only'.

Literature Review

There are many sources for the study of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. These can be divided into two main groups. The first includes certain sutras that Yogācāra philosophy draws its inspiration from which began to appear in the third century A.D. Among them are: the *Śāṅghinirmocanasūtra*, the *Māhāyāna-abhidharmasūtra*, and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* etc. The second includes the commentaries and the compendiums, written by Asanga and Vasubandhu who were the founders of the Yogācāra school. Asanga wrote among other things, the *Mahāyāna Saṅgraha* the *Abhidharma Samuccaya* and a Commentary on the *Śāṅghinirmocanasūtra*. The important works of Vasubandhu include the *Twenty-Verse Treatise*, (*Vimśatikā*) the *Thirty-Verse Treatise* (*Trimśatikā*) and the *Commentary to the Twenty-Verse Treatise*, (*Vimśatikākārikā*).

Today, there are many secondary books dealing with Yogācāra School and its philosophy. Among them Prof. D. J. Kalupahana's book *Bauddha Darsana Itihāśaya* written in Sinhala is important because he puts forward new views on Yogācāra philosophy and some of its sources. Similar views can be found in his English book *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*. According to him the *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu has been mistranslated into Chinese and Tibetan languages. He says: it is rather ironical to see that the term vijñaptimātra of Vasubandhu's *Viñaptimātratāsiddhi*, has been translated wrongly as 'vijñāna-mātra'. The term 'vijñaptimātra' means 'ideation only' and 'vijñāna-mātra' means 'mind only'. According to him this is a grave mistake done by Chinese and Tibetan translators, and also it contributed to the misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's philosophical concept of 'ideation only' as 'mind only'. This also resulted in the misunderstanding of the Yogācāra tradition as idealism (Vijñānavāda).

Prof. Kalupahana further says that this situation became more confused because some part of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* has been changed by Sylvan Levi when he edited the text again in Sanskrit. The text has two parts: one is *Twenty-Verse Treatise* (*Vimśatikā*) and the second *Thirty- Verse- Treatise* (*Trimśatikā*). As Prof. Kalupahana pointed out the first chapter of the original Sanskrit text of the commentary on the *Twenty-Verse-Treatise* by Vasubandhu has disappeared and it was recast into Sanskrit by Sylvan Levi basing on Chinese and Tibetan translations. Sylvan Levi's edition has injected more idealistic sense to Vasubandhu and Yogācāra School. This led to the misunderstanding of the whole Yogācāra philosophy as idealism or 'mind only' (*vijñānavāda*). Prof. Kalupahana quoted first few sentences of the Sylvan Levi's Sanskrit edition of Vasubandhi's commentary on *Twenty-Two-Verse- Treatise* as follows:

“mahāyāne tridhātuka vijñaptimātram
vyavasthāpyate, cittamātram bho jina putrā yadūta

tridhātukamiti sūtrāt, cittam mano vijñānam
vijñaptisceti paryāyāḥ cittamātra sasamprayogamiti,
mātramityartham pratiṣedhartham” (Kalupahana,
2003, pp. 189–190).

Prof. Kalupahana pointed out that the same misinterpretations can be seen in Vasubandhu's pupil, Sthiramati's commentary on the *Thirty - Verses -Treatise* (*Triṃśatikākārikā*). This commentary too has explained Vasunbandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* in a more idealistic manner.

Research Problem

So, the aim of this article is to examine whether Yogācāra philosophy has been mistranslated by the Chinese scholars or not? At the same time, an effort will be made to examine the Yogācāra philosophy and attempt to see whether it focuses on “mind only” or “ideation only”.

Research Methodology

This is completely a literature base study. Both Sanskrit and Chinese primary sources will be utilized. The relevant secondary sources will also be taken into consideration, wherever they are needed.

Results and Discussion

This article will help readers to examine the gradual development of Yogācāra philosophy in China with the Chinese translations of Sanskrit Yogācāra texts. They will be able to critically understand whether renounced modern scholars, such as D. J. Kaluphana, Lai Yonghai, Zhou Guihua etc., are correct or wrong in blaming that Yogācāra philosophy misinterpreted by the hands of Chinese translators of the Sanskrit Yogācāra texts.

Philosophic Background of the Yogācāra

The main factor that caused the origin of Buddhist traditions is the effort made by various Buddhist monk-scholars to reinterpret early Buddhism. They

explained early Buddhist teachings according to their understanding. They faced the problem that if all conditioned phenomena in the world are impermanent and if there is no soul how could things exist and migrate from this life to next life. It was necessary for them to answer this question according to early Buddhist point of view. So, various Buddhist monks came up with their own interpretations and this led to the mushrooming of different groups or traditions. They adopted logic and reasoning answer these issues and this gave rise to many views that were mutually opposing. In this process of philosophic interpretations these groups influenced one another. Yogācāra philosophy was influenced by Madhyamaka philosophy of 'emptiness' (śūnyatā). Though, Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamika philosophy, explained and strongly emphasized that the 'emptiness' is not nihilism or annihilationism, but meant no-*thingness*. However, ācārya Nāgārjuna's concept of 'emptiness' was taken as meaning nothingness. This

situation was seen by another group of monks as a misinterpretation of Buddhism. These monks wanted to rescue Buddhism from this nihilistic point of view and they tried to explain early Buddhist teachings in a more positive perspective. These monks later came to be labeled as Yogācārins. So, it is in response to the concept of emptiness put forward by the Mādhyamika tradition, the Yogācāra School originated (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 134).

Yogācāra Philosophy and its Two Emphases

The philosophers of the Abhidharma schools taught that consciousness arises when the senses are in contact with objects. Yogācāra turns this commonsense Abhidharma position upside down. What Yogācāra claims is that consciousness actually produces the experience of sensations and their objects. It is not that a subject and an object come together to produce conscious experience, as in the Abhidharma model. Rather, for Yogācāra, there is a fundamental process of consciousness that produces

one's experience of subjective selfhood on the one hand and the objective world on the other. One's experience of both oneself and the world arise dependently from a more fundamental process of consciousness. Traditionally, scholars of Buddhism have accepted this view as a form of Idealism, the theory that the world is a product of the mind. Today, this interpretation is being debated.

Another interpretation claims that the world as we know it is produced by the mind; what the world is in itself we have no way of knowing. Related to this view is an interpretation that approaches the matter from a non-dualistic point of view, where the subject and the objects of experience arise together. In any case, for Yogācāra, one's experience of self and world is certainly generated by the mind. Given this position, the philosophical task for Yogācāra was to explain how consciousness can be the basis for both these subjective and objective aspects of experience.

To begin with, they claim that all the mental and physical elements (dharmas) in experience are arising dependently within a more fundamental process of consciousness. While Mādhyamikas emphasized the emptiness of this dependent arising, Yogācāra goes a step further and claims that consciousness is the causal force behind such dependent arising. Consciousness forms itself into the six senses (including the mental faculty that "senses" thought objects) and the objects of these senses. As the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* says, consciousness is like water forming itself into waves (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, sloka 100).¹ These six senses and their objects arise dependently from consciousness, accounting for the mental and physical elements of one's experience through a process that Yogācāra calls "ideation only" (vijñaptimātra).

Behind this ideation process of the six sense-consciousnesses is, according to Yogācāra, a seventh form of consciousness that they call "mind" (manas) (*Lakṣṇavatārasūtra*, sloka, 102). They claim that this

more unitary faculty of consciousness is the basis of both inner reflection and self-awareness. Self-awareness arises in the mind as it reflects on, or "follows", the dependent arising of the six senses and their objects. Because of this self-awareness, the mind concludes that it exists as an independent self, apart from the objects it experiences. But in fact, both one's self and the world are two dependently arisen aspects of an experiential process that is being produced by consciousness-by ideation only.

Yogācārins also claim that behind the mind of self-awareness and reflection is the ultimate source of this whole ideation process. They call this eighth and final level of consciousness the "storehouse consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*). In the storehouse consciousness is the fundamental unity of consciousness that is prior to all its forms. In its use of the above water and waves metaphor, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* also says² that storehouse consciousness generates from itself all forms of experience like the ocean whose water takes form as

waves. In other words, out of its "storehouse", consciousness constructs the subjective experience of one's mind and senses, as well as the objective world of their experience. While one's self and the world seem to be so distinct from each other in experience, they are really just dependently arisen formations from the storehouse consciousness.

Yogācāra claims that the storehouse consciousness contains the karmic "seeds" deposited in it form the process of conscious experience. (*Triṃśatikā*, sloka 18)³. These seeds influence the storehouse's ongoing construction of experience and account for its continuity. The seeds are influenced or "perfumed" (*vāsanā*) by one's positive and negative attitudes. For example, one's negative dispositions, such as the Three Root of Evil (hatred, greed, and delusion), condition the seeds of future experience within the storehouse consciousness in ways that often lead to unwholesome thoughts, words, and actions. These unhealthy thoughts, words, and actions then produce new negative karmic seeds in the storehouse

consciousness that, in turn, will affect one's future experience. Therefore, the storehouse consciousness accounts not only for one's experience of oneself and the world but also for the moral and spiritual qualities of that experience. This being the case, Yogācāra taught that one must change the karmic condition of the storehouse consciousness by the practice of the Six Perfections. These perfections cultivate "pure seeds" within the depths of the storehouse consciousness itself.

On the bodhisattva's Great Journey, mental defilements and afflictions are gradually eliminated, pure qualities are cultivated, and the mind is stilled by mediation. Then, when the inner conditions are right, at the very foundation of consciousness there is a sudden "conversion of the basis" (*āśrata-parvṛtti*). One's ordinary processes of consciousness stop, and one gains an intuitive insight into the storehouse consciousness at its basis. Thereby, one attains freedom from all conditioned states of consciousness, Awakening, and Nirvāṇa.

Yogācāra's presentation of this radical and sudden turning over of the basis of consciousness greatly influenced East Asian Buddhism. Some East Asian Buddhist writers read Yogācāra as agreeing with the Tathāgata-garbha Literature. These writers believed that both traditions taught that the purity of spiritual life comes from the inherent luminous Buddha-qualities found within one's deepest center. The sudden turning over of the basis of consciousness was thought to reveal a non-dual nirvāṇic nature of luminous and pure consciousness, the unlimited Dharma-body, which is the essence of Awakening and Nirvāṇa. As we shall see, other Buddhist writers disagreed with this interpretation of Yogācāra, and this issue became important to the development of East Asian Buddhism.

Returning now to early Indian Yogācāra, besides its theory of consciousness, the school also presented what are called the Three Natures (*tri-sva-bhāva*) of experience (*Triṃśatikā*, sloka 23). First is the "imagined" (*parikalpita*) nature of experience. That

is, in one's ordinary experience, oneself and the objects of that experience seen to be independent entities, when, in fact, this independent nature of things in one's experience is made by *prapañca*. For Yogācāra, the imagined nature of experience is generated by the karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness, along with the ego awareness of the mind.

Second is the "interdependent" (*paratantra*) nature of experience. Here, we find the Madhyamaka "ultimate truth" that all entities are arising dependently or interdependently and are, therefore empty of "own-being". Yogācāra points out that this interdependent nature of the self and entities of experience is produced by consciousness. That is, while people "imagine" that themselves and the objects of their experience are independent, in fact, they arise in experience interdependently from the processes of consciousness. However, since ignorance leads people to imagine that oneself and the objects of the world are independent, one

develops attachments, defilements, and dukkha. Thereby, unwholesome seeds are planted in the storehouse consciousness, which, in turn, play a part in this dependent arising of experience. Therefore, the "interdependent" nature of experience is pure and impure; good and evil.

Because of attachment to the imagined independent things of ordinary experience and the resulting impurity of the interdependent nature of experience, Yogācāra posits a third nature. It does so to stress the need to purify oneself from the ignorance that is superimposing the imagined fabrication of independence onto the interdependent nature of things. By this purification, one can cease making this superimposition, see the truth about the dependent arising of experience, and become free from attachment and the defiling of experience. One does so by following the Bodhisattva Path. The result of this purification is the third nature, which is called the "perfected" (pariṇiṣpanna) nature of experience. This perfected nature of experience is

ultimately attained by the realization of Awakening, wherein one sees that all ordinary experience is a product of "ideation only" (*vijñaptimātra*). With enlightened wisdom, one realizes Nirvāṇa.

According to the above explanation it is clear that Yogācāra philosophy has several facets. The one is that the outside world is only ideation which is created by the inner mind. This interpretation also has two sides, one is the outside world is really non-existent but only the mind does exist. The other is both mind and outside world are really existent, but without functioning and contacting of the mind there is no way to experience the outside world, and in that sense outside world does not exist; what only exist, is the mind.

The first idea is closer to the idealism in Brahmanism and western philosophy. These philosophies posit metaphysical and transcendental idealism which negates the existence of the outside world. This Buddhist '*vijñānavāda*' should not be categorized

into that group because it is more psychological than metaphysical and transcendental. Prof. Kalupahana very accurately expresses this idea as: *'...then vijñānavāda needs not necessarily mean 'idealism' in a metaphysical sense. It could be psychology ('vijñāna'=psyche, vāda =logos) as well'* (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 127).

The second view lays more emphasis on the existence and the functioning of the mind. Perhaps, it may be close to early Buddhist explanation of mind (“*mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā*” *The Dhammapada*, *gāthā* 1). As this tradition highly emphasizes the existence of '*vijñāna*' even today many scholars are of the view that this tradition should be named as '*Vijñānavāda*'. For instance, Prof: Kapila Abhayawansa says: “*so, outside experiential thing is only an ideation (cittāmātramidaṃ) which is created by the mind (vijñanamātra), so that mind becomes more prominent. In that way the outside experiential world is confined into an ideation but because of the mind is playing a big role in this function. And this*

philosophy is known as an ideation only (vijñaptimātra) (Abhayawansa, 1999, pp. 74–86).

Chinese Term ‘Weixin’ and Yogācāra Philosophy

With the translation of Buddhist texts into the Chinese language, Chinese scholasticism started to discuss Buddhist philosophy. Yogācāra tradition and books were translated into the Chinese language on three occasions by three famous teachers: they are Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, and Xuan Zhuang. The first is Bodhiruci's translation of Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Wei Shi Er Shi Lun*) into Chinese language and named as '*Wei shi Lun*' 《唯识论》. Though the original text has twenty-two verses, in his translation there are twenty-three verses. The second is Paramārtha's translation of the same text, but its name changed to *Mahāyāna Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (*Da Cheng Wei Shi Lun*) 《大乘唯识论》 and it has twenty-four verses. The third

is Xuan Zang's translation of the same text, but it has only twenty-one verses. He named it as '*Weishi Ershi Lun*'. 《唯识二十论》.

All these three translators used the term 'wei shi' (唯识) which means 'mind only' (*viññānamātra*) for 'Vasubandhu's term '*viññaptimātra*' which means 'ideation only' (Wei liao bie - 唯了别). Xuan Zhuang's (596-664 A.D.) translation records it as follows: 《成唯識論》卷 1: 「我法迷唯識者，令達二空，於唯識理如實知故。復有迷謬唯識理者，或執外境如識非無、或執內識如境非有、或執諸識用別體同、或執離心無別心所，為遮此等種種異執，令於唯識深妙理中得如實解，故作 [3] 斯論。」 (CBETA, 2021, T31, No. 1585, p. 1a13–18)

Explaining this quotation of ancient text of Xuan Zang, Prof: Lai Yong Hai says that this interpretation puts forward the view that the real truth of 'wei shi' (mind only) means 'outside world is non-existent,

only exist is the mind' (“外境”之 “无”，“内识”之 “有”). “又为开示谬执我法，迷唯识者，令达二空，于唯识论如实知故。复有迷谬唯识理者，或执外境如识非无，或执内识如境非有，或执诸识用别体同，或执离心无别心所：为遮此等种种异执，令于唯识深妙理中得如实解，故作斯论”。（*Cheng Wei Shi Lun*, 卷一）（赖永海, 2000, p. 183).

Xuan Zhuang's disciple Kui Ji (632-682 A. D) in his commentary (*成唯识论述记* - *Cheng Wei Shi Lun Shu ji*) on *Cheng Wei Shi Lun* also explains Yogācāra philosophy in a meaning to similar his teacher, Xuan Zang as follows: “唯谓简别，遮无外境。识谓能了，诠有内心。识体即唯，持业释也。识性识相，皆不离心。心所心王，以识为主。归心泯相，总言唯识。唯遮境有，执有者其真；识简心空，滞空者乖其实”（卷一）。

Explaining this Prof Lai Yong Hai says that mind only teaching (wei shi) has been analyzed by Kui Ji

in two ways: one is denial of the outside world and the second is affirmation of the inside '*vijñāna*'. Inside world and its all the empirical things are not out of '*vijñāna*'. In this way, Kui Ji emphasized 'outside world is non-existent, what exists is only the mind'. “唯识”的根本意义有两个方面，一是否定外境，二是肯定内识。一切性相离不开心识。这样，他就强调“无境有识。”(赖永海, 2000, p. 184)

In this regard, Chinese scholar Zhou Gui Hua has written a very important article: “Difference between 'Mind only and Ideation only': Reannotation of the Fundamental Question of Yogācāra Studies” 《唯识与唯了别——“唯识学”的一个基本问题的再诠释》《哲学研究》, 2004 年第 3 期). In this article, he pointed out that this mistranslation and misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's standpoint of Yogācāra philosophy (*vijñaptimātratā*) was done by Chinese translators found by Chinese scholar, Cheng (吕), about one thousand years later to Xuan Zang. It

is said that being influenced by Japanese and Western scholars' views, he started to examine the original Sanskrit texts and found this mistake. But, he was reluctant to popularize it because he thought that it goes against the great teachers who translated the original texts into Chinese. So, he kept silent. Later on, in the 70th and 80th decades two Chinese scholars: one from Beijing 'Han Jing Qing', and one from Hong Kong 'Huo Tao Hui' raised this issue again and discussed the difference between 'wei shi' (唯识- '*vijñāna-mātra*') and 'wei liao bie ' (唯了别- '*vijñaptimātrata*')

So, the important question is why great teachers like Xuan Zang and other translators understood and used '*vijñaptimātrata*' ('wei liao bie'- 唯了别). as '*vijñāna-mātrata*' ('wei shi' - 唯识)? is it really a mistake or not? So, it is also necessary to understand why Chinese scholars emphasize the non-existence of the outside world.

In this regard, I wish to draw your attention to important facts. One is that in China, four terms 'xin' 心(citta), 'yi' 意(manasa), 'shi' 识 (vijñāna), 'liao' 了(vijñapti), are considered as basically same in meaning. More or less, a similar interpretation can be seen in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, sloka 104).⁴ So, Chinese translator Xuan Zang and others may have thought that these four terms are interchangeable. Hence, the problematic issue is not in the terms but the interpretation given by them. They explained Vasubandhu's Yogācāra philosophy as which negates the existence of the outside world and emphasizes the existence of mind or *vijñāna* only. In this regard, Chinese researcher Zhou Gui Hua has pointed out very important facts about why ancient Chinese scholars translated the Sanskrit term ' *vijñaptimātratā* ' as 'wei shi'?. He says that as Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy is totally against the concept of substance in both mind and matter (dharmanairātmyatā) put forward by sectarian Buddhism, so, there is no way to understand

'vijñāna' in an eternalistic perspective as idealism understood in the west. Another fact, he pointed out is that the terms 'xin' 心(citta), 'yi' 意(manasa), 'shi' 识 (vijñāna), 'liao' 了 (vijñapti), are different as designation but same in meaning. As evidence he pointed out the three Chinese translations of early Sanskrit Yogācāra books namely *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* 《瑜伽师地论》、*Madhyantavibhaṅga* 《辨中边论》, *Māhāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* 《大乘庄严经论》 have used two terms 'citta' and 'vijñāna', to discuss 'vijñāna-mātra'. They did not use the term 'vijñaptimātratā' to discuss 'vijñāna-mātra' because they understood that 'vijñāna-mātra' represents the same meaning as 'vijñaptimātra'.⁵

Conclusion

As mentioned above, the Yogācāra philosophy has two facets; one is the emphasis on the continual process of 'vijñāna', second is the emphasis on the non-existence of the outside world since it is

understood through the '*viññāna*' it is only an ideation (*viññaptimātra*). Vasunabdhhu emphasizes this second view of Yogācāra philosophy. Chinese scholars prefer the first emphasis of Yogācāra philosophy, and so they used the term '*viññāna-mātra*' ('wei shi' - 唯识) instead of '*viññaptimātra*' (wei liao bie'-唯了别) of Vasubandhu.

It is clear that Chinese scholars deny the existence of the outside world and emphasize the process of '*viññāna*' without resorting to eternalism. This view is similar to the early Yogācārins. Though Chinese scholars used the term '*viññāna-mātra*' (mind only), they did not misinterpret Yogācāra philosophy as idealism (*viññānavāda*) in the West. They prefer to use the term '*viññāna-mātra*' (mind only), as perhaps they have thought that it is the most important explanation of Yogācāra philosophy. Therefore, it is not reasonable to accuse Chinese scholars of misinterpreting or mistranslating early Yogācāra philosophy.

Notes

¹ “Taraṅgāhi udadher yadvat pavana pratya āritāḥ, nṣtyamānāḥ pravartante vyucchedaś ca na vidyate, ālayaughas tathā nityam viṣayapavanaritaḥ citristaraṅga vijñānair nrtyamānāḥ pravartate”.

² “Na ca anniyena ca ananyena taraṅgāhi udadher matāḥ Vijñānāni tathā sapta cittena saha samyutāḥ”.

³ *Trimśatikā*, sloka, 18.

“Sarva-bājaṃ hi vijñānaṃ-pariḍāms tahtā tathā Yāty anyonya-vasād yena-vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate”.

⁴ “Trividhasya svabhāvasya-trividhāṃ niḥsvabhāvatāṃ Samdhāya sarva-dharmānāṃ-deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā”.

⁵ 在原始、部派佛教那里，识有其自体性，而了别是识相，是识对境的认识功能，显然，了别与识二者有体、相之别。但大乘佛教否定诸法的自性，诸法由缘起而生的相（功能）就成为法之体性，即体、相二者可同义使用。在此意义上，则不能说识有自性，此时，识别或了别亦即识的体性，识与识别、了别同义。所以，《唯识二十论》说：“心、意、识、了（即了别），名之差别”。（《大正藏》三十一册）即认为识与了别义一，只是名异而已。而且在瑜伽行派的早期文献如《瑜伽师地论》、《辨中边论》、《大乘庄严经论》等中，基本还是从心、识而非从“了别”角度谈“唯识”义。因此，用“唯识”代表“唯了别”甚至全体唯识学，也不是没有依据的。

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