THE MUSICAL EXPRESSION OF EMOTION: METAPHORICAL-AS VERSUS IMAGINATIVE-AS PERCEPTION

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The paper begins with an overview of various well-known accounts of the musical expression of emotion that have been proposed in recent years. But rather than proceeding to assess the merits and faults of these accounts the paper examines whether a radically new theory by Christopher Peacocke is superior to all of them. The theory, which certainly has a number of attractive features, is based on the idea of metaphorical-as perception. The notion of metaphorical-as perception needs to be elucidated and the examination of Peacocke's theory takes place by playing it off against a rival theory that is based on a different kind of perception, imaginative-as perception. The paper argues that, as the basis of an account of the musical expression of emotion, imaginative-as perception has all the advantages and none of the apparent defects of metaphorical-as perception.

I

There are at least two things that aestheticians have meant by the musical expression of emotion. The first is what might more perspicuously be called the possession by music of emotional qualities: a passage of music M possesses an emotional quality of kind E if and only if M can rightly be said to possess E. So M possesses the emotional quality of sadness if and only if it can properly be said to be sad. The second is what more nearly answers to the term 'musical expression' since it is defined in closely related terms, in terms of music's being expressive of emotion: a passage of music M expresses an emotion of kind E if and only if it can properly be said to be expressive of E. So M expresses sadness if and only if it is expressive of sadness.[1] Now for this distinction to be pertinent it requires that a passage of music could fall under one of these conceptions without necessarily falling under the other. Although in principle a distinction of this kind might be symmetrical, allowing a piece of music, no matter which conception it falls under, not also to fall under the other, in fact when this distinction is drawn by aestheticians, it is usually because a certain asymmetry between the two ideas is recognized as requiring it. The asymmetry is that whereas a passage that is expressive of E must possess E, a passage might possess E but not be expressive of E.[2] The acceptance of

[1] Sometimes the definition is reversed, elucidating music's being expressive of an emotion in terms of its expressing the emotion. Not everyone recognizes the distinction between possession and expression.

[2] See, for example, Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), who holds that (i) music that possesses E may well not be expressive of E (p. 155), (ii) if music is expressive of E it possesses E (p. 155), and (iii) unlike music that merely possesses E, if music is expressive of E, it is thereby an aesthetic success (pp. 344–45, p. 157).

this asymmetry would imply that one idea (the possession of an emotional quality) is more basic than the other (being an expression of emotion). But I shall leave this matter aside.

The most crucial issue is the nature of the canonical basis of a judgement that M possesses emotional quality E or that M is expressive of E. This canonical basis is the experience of hearing M as possessing E (hearing M as E or hearing E in M) or hearing it as being expressive of E, and the question is what this experience consists in. Is it possible to analyse this experience or in some other way to elucidate it?

II

The musical expression of emotion has often been modelled on the human expression of emotion. By this is meant the (perceptible) manifestation of an emotional state of mind in the subject's body – in its appearance (facial expression and posture), overt activities (manner of action or movement), and what emerges from it (tears, cries). In brief, it is the (external) bodily manifestation of emotion. But two distinctions must here be borne in mind. The first is the distinction between **an E expression** and **an expression of E** – for example, a cruel (or amused) expression and an expression of cruelty (or amusement) – the second, but not the first, implying an instance of E underlying the expression (so that it is an expression of **the person's** E). (You can have an amused expression on your face without your being amused and your amusement being displayed in your facial expression – in which case your facial expression, although an amused expression, is not an expression of your amusement.) So an E expression is, roughly, just a characteristic appearance of the expression of E in persons, whereas an expression of E is not (merely) an E expression but an expression of some person's E. The second distinction is one within the class of expressions of E and it is the distinction between bodily manifestations that are things the subject **does** (intentionally or unintentionally) and those that **merely happen** to him. If a bodily manifestation of a psychological state is something that the person does, the person can be said to have expressed his or her state in that manifestation; if it is not something the person does, although the state is expressed in the manifestation, the person has not expressed it in the manifestation – the manifestation is not the person's expression of the state. You express your affection for a child with a caress; your shame is expressed in your blush, your anxiety in the trembling of your fingers, your sadness in the tears that spring to your eyes, although in each case you have thereby expressed nothing. For you to express your shame, anxiety or sadness you must **do** something – make a gesture or articulate your attitude in words: it is not enough for your state to be expressed in your body or in what emerges from it. And it is only

an expression of E that not merely happens to the subject but the subject does that can be *expressive of* the subject's E.

There are two ways in which an account of the musical expression of emotion might be modelled on the human expression of emotion (where this includes both an E expression and an expression of E): directly or indirectly. The first seeks to exploit an analogy between the music itself and the human expression of emotion itself, aligning the musical expression of emotion with the human expression of emotion by providing an account that defines the musical expression of emotion in terms of the human expression of emotion. In this sense it 'likens' the musical expression of emotion to the human expression of emotion. The second focuses, not on the music itself but on an affective reaction to the music, and similarly not on the human expression of emotion itself but on a human emotional reaction to it, and represents the canonical basis of a judgement that a piece of music is expressive of an emotion as including some element of the emotional reaction. In this sense it 'likens' the reaction to emotionally expressive music to the reaction to the human expression of emotion. The first way has been followed, variously, by, for example, (i) Peter Kivy, who for many years held that when we experience music as being expressive of a certain emotion, the music sounds to us as being like the way someone who is undergoing the emotion sounds when the emotion is expressed in the person's voice: the music is heard as audibly resembling a vocal expression of the emotion;[3] (ii) Stephen Davies, for whom the canonical basis is a perceived resemblance between the music and the nonvocal expression of the emotion in human behaviour: the temporally unfolding dynamic structure of music is heard as being like the appearance of bodily movements displaying or expressive of the emotion;[4] and (iii) Jerrold Levinson, who, closely following the pioneering footsteps of R. K. Elliott, represents the canonical basis as being the experience of hearing the music as the expression of a certain emotion by an indefinite agent in a *sui generis*, 'musical' or 'purely musical' manner.[5] Followers of the second way

[3] This has always seemed to me more nearly an account of an experience of the musical representation of the vocal expression of emotion than an account of an experience of the musical expression of emotion. See, for example, my 'Music and the Expression of Emotion', *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 23 (1989): 26–27.

[4] Stephen Davies, *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

[5] Jerrold Levinson, 'Musical Expressiveness', in *The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 90–125, and 'Sound, Gesture, Space, and the Expression of Emotion in Music', in *Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 77–90; R. K. Elliott, 'Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 67 (1966–67): 111–26. Elliott's theory is analysed in my *Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 127–34.

include, notably, (i) Roger Scruton, who, in a way nobody has found easy to grasp precisely, has sought to elucidate the nature of the canonical basis in terms of the idea of a sympathetic emotional response to the 'abstract, indeterminate, unowned' human life a sensitive listener imagines in the music;[6] and (ii) Derek Matravers, for whom the canonical basis of a judgement that a passage of music expresses emotion E is (roughly) an experience of listening to the passage in which the music arouses a (non-cognitive) feeling that would constitute an aspect of a sympathetic or empathic emotional response to the expression of E by a person.[7] But it is possible to have a foot in each camp, as does Aaron Ridley, for whom the canonical basis is (roughly) an experience of the music in which the resemblance of the music to human vocal or physical behaviour expressive of a certain emotion arouses an emotional response that mirrors that of the emotion.[8]

It will be seen that these accounts can be divided in another way, into those that represent the canonical basis as being purely perceptual and those that deny this, adding in one way or another an imaginative or affective element (or both) to the perception of the music. Accounts of these various kinds have not always been restricted to the musical expression, as opposed to the possession, of emotion. But, taking at face value its surface appearance, the musical possession of an emotional quality, unlike the musical expression of emotion, does not need to be modelled on the human expression of emotion. For although it could be so modelled, there is an obvious alternative, which is to model it on the experience of emotion itself, likening the experience of the music to the experience of emotion, or in some other way founding the concept of the musical possession of emotion on that of the experience of emotion itself, not the human expression of emotion.

Now it is clear that certain of these accounts, none of which commands widespread allegiance, are best thought of not as representations of what constitutes the canonical basis but as accounts either of what gives rise to the experience of music as being expressive of emotion or what might result from that experience or both. But it is not my purpose here to assess the relative merits of the various accounts. Rather, my main concern is to evaluate an entirely different conception of expressive music from anything I have already outlined: Christopher Peacocke's radically new view of musical expression. This is a purely perceptual account, and the question is whether it is superior to its many competitors, whatever their respective merits might be. If it is superior, there is no need to return to these competitors.

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6 Scruton, *Aesthetics of Music*, chap. 11.

7 Derek Matravers, *Art and Emotion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), chap. 8.

8 Aaron Ridley, 'Musical Sympathies: The Experience of Expressive Music', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53 (1995): 49–57, and *Music, Value and the Passions* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

III

Peacocke's conception of musical expression is not restricted to the expression of emotion but includes also the expression of states and processes of various other kinds; and it defines both the nature of the experience of hearing music as expressing properties that it could possess only metaphorically and the correctness condition of such an experience.[9] The experience is, he claims, an experience of metaphorical-as perception in which a metaphor enters the intentional content of the experience: the notion of the thing heard in or as expressed by the music enters the conscious content of the experience (in a metaphor).[10] The correctness condition is, crudely, that the particular nature of the metaphorical-as perception provoked by a piece of music must be the most illuminating way of hearing the music. Peacocke appears not to claim that metaphorical-as perception is the core of every instance of an experience of the musical expression of emotion. He appears to allow that, when a listener hears a piece of music as resembling in some audible respect (pitch contour, timing, and the like) a human vocal expression of a certain emotion, this also is an experience of the expression of emotion in music. But perhaps he just recognizes this form of perceptual resemblance as another source of musical significance, not as a form of the musical expression of emotion. Whatever the truth of this may be, he deems this kind of experience of the musical expression of emotion, I believe rightly, to have little application to purely instrumental music.[11]

It is a strength of Peacocke's view that it accommodates so easily the distinction between a piece of music's possessing an emotional quality and its being expressive of that kind of emotion.[12] It has sometimes been thought that, since the difference between the two concepts entails a lack of implication from the first to the second (and perhaps from the second to the first), radically different accounts must be given of them. But, however the distinction between the two ideas might be articulated, this is not so – as is neatly demonstrated by Peacocke's proposal, which can be applied to each by a simple change in the metaphor that forms part of the intentional content of the perception. Another advantage of Peacocke's proposal is that, as I have indicated, it is not restricted to the musical

9 Christopher Peacocke, 'The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 49 (2009): 257–75. Peacocke does not restrict metaphorical-as perception to music and other art forms. And he does not provide a correctness condition for the perception of things that are not artefacts, presumably because there isn't one.

10 Ibid., 262.

11 See Malcolm Budd, 'Music and the Communication of Emotion', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 47 (1989): 129–38.

12 Peacocke slips freely between the two ideas.

expression of emotion, or even to the expression of psychological states, but extends much more widely. However, as will soon become clear, metaphorical-as perception is not alone in accommodating so easily both the musical possession and the musical expression of emotion, and also the expression of states other than emotions. What I propose to argue is that another form of perception has all the advantages of metaphorical-as perception as an account of expressive perception; it has advantages that metaphorical-as perception does not; and it lacks the obscurity or the blankness that, at present, stands in the way of a clear understanding of metaphorical-as perception.

IV

What must be true of a person for his current perception to have a metaphorical-as content? It has often been recognized that metaphor is reliant upon a set of correspondences or a mapping between domains,[13] wherein things, properties, relations, and structures are mapped from a source domain onto a target domain; and, accordingly, Peacocke regards it as integral to metaphorical-as perception that it exploits such an isomorphism. The purpose for which it exploits an isomorphism between domains is, of course, to fashion a metaphorical-as component of perception, and Peacocke cites three features necessary at a subpersonal level for such an exploitation.[14] Now if there is such a thing as metaphorical-as perception, the features Peacocke postulates are perhaps necessary (although, as he acknowledges, not sufficient).[15] But what reason is there to believe in such a form of perception and what exactly would it be like at the personal level to undergo an experience of metaphorical-as perception? Is it possible at the personal level to recognize whether one is undergoing an experience of metaphorical-as perception, and, if so, how?

Given that, as yet, there is no evidence for the underlying features that Peacocke specifies being at work in the generation of perceptual experiences of works of art, and that even if there were such evidence this would not be sufficient to establish that metaphorical-as perception is taking place, conviction rests on the plausibility of the examples he provides (which run across both seeing and hearing). But there is a difficulty in assessing their plausibility and helpfulness. For if an alternative account is presented of the examples – one that does not make use of the idea of metaphorical-as perception – it is open to Peacocke to concede that indeed there are perceptual experiences that conform to the

[13] For example, George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 4.

[14] Peacocke, 'Perception of Music', 267–68.

[15] Christopher Peacocke, 'Experiencing Metaphorically-As in Music Perception: Clarifications and Commitments', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 49 (2009): 300.

proposed alternative, but these are not the experiences he has in mind: his experiences have a distinctive phenomenology captured by the conception of metaphorical-as perception. And this is not an idle possibility, for Peacocke scouts some alternative accounts and deems them inadequate to the phenomenology of the experiences he himself has had in his engagement with music, pictures, and architecture.

V

It is, I believe, instructive to focus at first on the presence of metaphorical-as perception in visual perception, more specifically in the perception of pictures. Peacocke offers two examples of pictures that he believes engage or sustain metaphorical-as perception, Zurbarán's *Metalware and Pottery* and Friedrich's *Solitary Tree*.[16] But here I am hampered, for my own reaction to these supposed instances of metaphorical-as perception is to confess that – leaving aside perceptions of resemblance – the only kind of perceptual experience with a content other than simply what is depicted which I have been able to have in front of these pictures is one of imagining of my experience of seeing what is depicted that it is an experience with a different depicted content: I can imagine of my seeing the depicted metalware and pots that it is seeing depicted people; I can imagine of my seeing the depicted oak tree that it is seeing an isolated, unhappy person depicted. Call this kind of seeing pictorial imaginative-as perception.[17] Now Peacocke insists that perceptual experience must 'be sharply distinguished from imagination':

> Imagining something in the music is not in itself hearing something in the music. Equally, imagining something in a depiction is not the same as seeing something in a depiction. A child does not win a competition for finding the hidden snowman in the line drawing

[16] Wrongly (and misleadingly) so-called, according to the leading Friedrich expert Helmut Börsch-Supan. (See his *Caspar David Friedrich* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), 130, where the correct and better title is said to be *Village Landscape in the Morning Light*, which accurately reflects the underlying idea of the picture. I am sure that this is right. Accordingly, Peacocke's correctness condition renders his metaphorical-as perception incorrect.) In fact, it is not quite true, as I go on to claim, that I can imagine of my seeing the depicted oak tree that it is seeing an isolated, unhappy person – without collateral damage to another prominent item in the picture. For to do this I would have to do something rather difficult – blank out my awareness of the shepherd standing next to the tree tranquilly watching his herd of sheep!

[17] You don't need to be imaginative to engage in imaginative-as perception: you just need to be able to imagine of something that it is something you know it is not. There are, of course, other forms of imaginative-as perception than the pictorial, both within and outside the visual. Outside there is (most pertinently) the musical. Inside there is the visual perception of things lacking a depictive or representational content, as with Peacocke's example of modern windmills in a wind farm: I can imagine of my experience of seeing them that it is an experience of seeing an army of warriors.

> by imagining a snowman somewhere in the pattern of lines. The child has to see the depiction of the snowman there, and he has to see it as a depiction of a snowman.[18]

In fact, however, these remarks are not sufficient to rule out the possibility of elucidating the experience of, for example, hearing sadness in music or seeing a depiction as depicting a snowman, in terms of imagining something. For there are more sophisticated ways of introducing the imagination into the hearing of music or the seeing of a depiction, in particular by representing the hearing of sadness in music (or music as being expressive of sadness) as the imagining of the experience of hearing the music that it is an experience of sadness (or an experience of an expression of sadness), as, in rather different ways, both Kendall Walton and I have done,[19] and by representing (as Walton has done)[20] the seeing of a picture as depicting a snowman as the imagining of the experience of seeing the depiction that it is an experience of seeing a snowman. But Peacocke does rule the possibility out when he denies that metaphorical-as perception is a combination of some non-metaphorical-as perception with an element of imagining that something is the case.[21] Furthermore, he would insist that there is no good reason to expect that, just because he and I have the same perceptual system, a metaphorical-as perception that he has before an object is one that I also should have before that object.

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18 Peacocke, 'Perception of Music', 267. See also his 'Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 50 (2010): 190.

19 Kendall Walton, 'What is Abstract about the Art of Music?', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46 (1988): 351–64; Budd, 'Music and the Communication of Emotion'; Budd, 'Music and the Expression of Emotion', 27–29; Malcolm Budd, *Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music* (London: Allen Lane, 1995), 147–49. In fact, as will be seen, I have presented more than one imaginative-as account of experiences of hearing music as an expression of emotion.

20 Kendall Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (London: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 8.

21 Peacocke, 'Perception of Music', 259. It is this aspect of Peacocke's view that clearly distinguishes it from what would otherwise be its very close relative, namely Roger Scruton's view in *The Aesthetics of Music* (although the situation is complicated by Scruton's preoccupation with the musical expression of emotion, of which he presents an unusual and rather opaque account (see § II), rather than the mere possession by music of emotional qualities). In my 'Aesthetic Realism and Aesthetic Qualities of Music' (reprinted in my *Aesthetic Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), I have explained that

> The application of [Scruton's] theory of metaphor, while it does not deliver a full description of the canonical basis for the attribution of an emotional quality to music, yields this outline account: the concept expressed by the non-aesthetic use of the emotion term is a constituent of the intentional content of the experience of perceiving an item as possessing the aesthetic emotional property […]. (p. 183)

Whereas this outline account is amenable to an interpretation as a combination of (non-metaphorical-as) perception and an element of imagining-that, Peacocke's is not. (I am grateful to Rafael de Clercq's always trenchant comments for forcing me to emphasize this point of difference between Peacocke's and Scruton's views.)

However, my inability appears to go further than I have as yet revealed. For I am unaware of ever having had a metaphorical-as perception and appear not to know what it would be like to undergo one. But, of course, the reason I am unaware of ever having had a metaphorical-as perception might be that I have failed to grasp what it would be like to have one, and that if I were to grasp this I would come to realize that I am familiar with experiences of this kind, in particular in my experience of music and painting.[22]

There is, however, a difficulty here. For both in pictorial imaginative-as perception and pictorial metaphorical-as perception the notion of the thing seen in or expressed by a picture enters the conscious content of the experience in the same propositional form, and if the things seen in or expressed by a picture are the same in the imaginative-as and the metaphorical-as perceptions, the imaginative-as and metaphorical-as contributions to the intentional contents of the perceptions will be identical in conceptual content. So consider the metaphorical-as component of the intentional content of Peacocke's perception of Friedrich's tree as a solitary person and the pictorial imaginative-as component of the intentional content of my perception of the tree as a solitary person. In each case the depicted tree is experienced as a solitary person, in one case imaginatively-as, in the other metaphorically-as, a solitary person. Accordingly, the two components of the intentional content are of just the same propositional form: *That is a solitary person*. Likewise for any other example where, crudely, what is imagined of a depicted item in a perception of something is the same as what is perceived metaphorically-as in a perception of that thing. It follows that I will not be able to grasp what it is like to undergo a metaphorical-as perception by attending to the distinctive conceptual nature of its intentional content: consciousness of the propositional content of the contribution to the perception's intentional content made by the metaphorical-as aspect of the perception will not thereby endow me with the knowledge that my perception has a metaphorical-as aspect. So unless metaphorical-as perception manifests itself in perceptual experience in some other way, attention to my perceptual experience – to its intentional content – will not enable me to gain the understanding I lack.[23] Of course, there is a difference in the intentional contents, for in the metaphorical-as case *That's a solitary person* is a metaphor, but in the

[22] I dismiss the possibility that I might be mistaken about the nature of my experiences in looking at the Zurbarán and Friedrich pictures, and that rather than their being imaginative-as perceptions they are metaphorical-as perceptions. For in looking at these pictures I set myself to engage in the imaginative project, which I can disengage from at will. In any case, pictorial imaginative-as perception is certainly a possibility, and so it is an alternative to pictorial metaphorical-as perception.

[23] Although imaginative-as perception can, as I have indicated, occur through an act of will, of course this is not necessary.

imaginative case it is not. But since metaphorical-as perception is not a matter of the notion of metaphor itself[24] (or some special type of content that is metaphorical)[25] entering the conscious content of the perceptual experience, how does the fact that a propositional component of the intentional content of a perception is a metaphor declare itself to the subject of the experience?[26] In virtue of what does a perceiver know that their perception has a metaphorical-as aspect?

VI

This question might well be met by another question: In virtue of what does a perceiver know that their perception has an imaginative-as aspect? And if the answer to this second question is said to be that the perceiver knows immediately that they are engaged in imagining, no objection could fairly be lodged against a similar response to the first question: a person knows immediately that they are entertaining the intentional content as a metaphor – they are immediately aware that, to coin a word, they are engaged in metaphoring. Furthermore, if it is said that a perceiver whose perception has an imaginative-as aspect knows immediately not just that they are engaged in imagining but what the aspect is under which they are imagining, what could stand properly in the way of attributing the comparable knowledge to a metaphorical-as perceiver? But what is it to entertain an intentional content of a perception as a metaphor, and, more specifically, as the metaphor it is? Peacocke's view is that metaphorical-as perception exploits an isomorphism, but he offers no account of the upshot in perception of the exploitation except as being a metaphor – a particular metaphor the content of which is determined by the character of the linkage of corresponding items established in the underlying subpersonal state.[27] Given that there is no intrinsic distinguishing mark of the metaphorical-as propositional component of the intentional content, entertaining this propositional content as a metaphor must, it seems, be a matter of the perceiver's attitude to that content – more specifically, the way in which the perceiver understands it.

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24 Peacocke, 'Experiencing Metaphorically-As', 299.

25 Peacocke, 'Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As', 189.

26 It is important to realize that Peacocke's idea is not that when M is perceived metaphorically-as F, the contribution made by the metaphorical-as component to the intentional content of the perception is *M is metaphorically F*. This would be a falsification of the phenomenology. The contribution is, rather, the metaphor *M is F*. It is the metaphor itself that enters perception, not a representation that something possesses a property metaphorically (which is not itself a metaphor). A metaphorical-as perception has a metaphorical content – namely, the metaphor that permeates the perception.

27 Peacocke, 'Perception of Music', 267.

VII

The foundation of metaphor on an isomorphism of some kind or other might give rise to the idea that it is integral to metaphoring that a perceiver, in undergoing metaphorical-as perception, experiences or is in some other way consciously aware of a likeness or correspondence or isomorphism of properties or relations between the object of perception and what is predicated of it in the metaphor. Now in fact there is another form of perception – one that might perhaps be thought to be a close relative of metaphorical-as perception – which is a rival candidate for the role of the perception of music as possessing emotion and which does have built into it the idea of likeness. This is a species of what I have called cross-categorial likeness perception, wherein the sensitive listener hears the music as sounding like what it is like to be in a conscious emotional state.[28] This form of perception requires the listener to perceive a likeness between a passage of music and a kind of feeling: the experience of the sound of the music seems to the perceiver to be like an experience of a feeling of sadness, depression, elation, anguish, loneliness, nostalgia, awe, yearning, calm, restlessness, tenderness, love, or whatever. Of course, there is a distinction between a simile and a metaphor, the first, but not the second, explicitly likening one thing to another; and just as you can perceive one thing as being like another without being able to identify the respect in which they are alike, so understanding something as a simile – understanding it as the (open) simile it is – is simply a matter of understanding that it likens one thing to another, which does not entail understanding the respect in which the one thing resembles, or is thought to resemble, the other (although failure to grasp the supposed basis of the resemblance is likely to provoke puzzlement, thought, or questioning). It is clear that just as an open simile is not the same as a metaphor (and a metaphor is not just an elliptical open simile), so cross-categorial likeness perception is not the same as metaphorical-as perception: the contribution to the intentional content of an experience involving cross-categorial likeness perception is of the simile form *This is like that*, whereas the contribution to the intentional content of an experience involving metaphorical-as perception is of the metaphor form *This is that*. But although this distinguishes the two kinds of perception, it does not rule out the possibility that metaphorical-as perception is like cross-categorial likeness perception in involving the awareness of a likeness, or correspondence or isomorphism of some kind. However, if it does involve such a recognition, this will come about, not in the same immediate manner as with any form of likeness perception, made

[28] I have both advocated and firmly rejected such a view of at least some experiences of music as possessing an emotional quality! See my *Values of Art*, 136–42, and my 'Music and the Communication of Emotion', 27.

explicit by the character of the propositional form, but through what is involved in understanding the metaphor that figures in the intentional content of a perception.

VIII

Here we must distinguish understanding an intentional content of a perception as a metaphor and understanding that metaphor – understanding that content as the metaphor it is. This distinction is most easily drawn if we consider the entry of a metaphor not into perception but into thought. For it is clear that a metaphor can, at least in one sense, enter thought without being understood, as when one encounters, perhaps in a poem, what must be a metaphor but a metaphor one does not understand. Whatever might be thought about this case, there are two possibilities: either metaphoring essentially involves understanding the metaphor present in perception or it does not. Now it seems that, for Peacocke, to engage in metaphoring is, as such, only a matter of understanding an intentional content of a perception as a metaphor, not a matter of understanding the metaphor. For his view is that in metaphorical thought, imagination, or perception, a correspondence of some kind between two domains is exploited, but not necessarily thought about, imagined, or experienced: metaphorical-as perception, like metaphorical thought or imagination, is a matter of exploiting a correspondence, rather than representing it. Accordingly:

> When you think of life as a journey, various features of your representation of a journey are mapped onto your representation of a life. The mapping is exploited, rather than thought about or represented. This is why, when you think or imagine or experience metaphorically, you appreciate the metaphor first. In more complex cases you may have to think hard about, and work out, what exactly the correspondence in question is if someone raises the issue.[29]

So the view is that when you undergo metaphorical-as perception, 'you appreciate the metaphor first', that is, before representing what the correspondence between domains is (which you may or may not do later).

Now I take this as being tantamount to the view that in metaphorical-as perception the metaphor that enters the intentional content of perception is understood as a metaphor but the metaphor itself need not be understood. For what is it to understand a metaphor? Perhaps there is no simple answer to this question, for what exactly must be grasped by one who understands a metaphor depends on the point or function of the metaphor, and there are metaphors of very different

[29] Peacocke, 'Perception of Music', 260.

kinds.[30] The general point or function of an interesting,[31] complex metaphor in which something is predicated of an individual thing is often to present the subject referred to in a certain light by intimating (or being the expression of the idea) that there is a set of likenesses or correspondences between the subject and the character attributed metaphorically to that subject by the predicate. This is true of the metaphor that Peacocke mentions in the passage quoted above, *Life is a journey*. It is also true of Romeo's utterance 'Juliet is the sun'. *Juliet is the sun*, as understood by Romeo, indicates that, for him, Juliet stands to him in some similar ways to those in which the sun stands to his life (or human life in general). What these ways are nobody is in a position to know, and the set of ways Romeo intended will surely have been indefinite. But if Romeo's intention had been entirely empty, then the so-called metaphor he uttered would be null, and nobody, not even Romeo, could understand it. Of course, it would be easy to offer an interpretation, which perhaps an empty-headed Romeo would eagerly have accepted, thereby stamping a meaning upon the metaphor. But unless it has a meaning, it can't be understood; the metaphor will be understood properly only if reflection on the character of the sun's relation to Romeo's life (or human life in general) brings to consciousness some of the ways in which Romeo sees Juliet as standing to him; and it will be understood perfectly if it brings to mind all of the intended ways (and perhaps no others). Many metaphors, however, are much simpler than this, merely reflecting a single likeness or correspondence, or a correlation between members of a set of properties of one domain (or items of one kind) and members of a set of properties of a different domain (or items of another kind), the relations between members of the first set (or kind) being thought of as resembling the relations between the correlated members of the second domain (or kind) – as with the correlation between tones of different pitch or the whole numbers and relative spatial height and depth (which once gave rise to metaphors).[32]

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30 It should not be forgotten that the point of a metaphor is not something uniquely determined by the linguistic representation (or propositional content) of a metaphor, for the same linguistic (or propositional) form can be used to make different points on different occasions of use, and so be used to express different metaphors.

31 Not all metaphors are interesting: metaphors can be farfetched, feeble, or moribund, for example, as Nelson Goodman emphasized in *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 79.

32 I believe that the characterization of music by affective terms is often in the first way simple, giving expression to a felt inclination to regard the character of various pieces of music as corresponding or being analogous to the character of how various affective states feel. (A different experience of hearing music as being expressive of emotion might be one in which in listening to the music it feels to you as though you are in the presence of sadness, nostalgia, excitement, or loneliness, for example – an experience that might, but need not, infect you with that emotion or cause you to feel a sympathetic emotional response as if to the expression of that emotion by a person. Compare Kendall Walton's pioneering account of musical tension, of which this is essentially an extension, a weakening, and a reordering, in his 'Projectivism, Empathy, and Musical Tension', *Philosophical Topics* 26 (1999): 407–40.)

And then, as I have indicated elsewhere, there is the possibility that a metaphor has the function of expressing an experience of imagining the subject as having the property signified by the predicate used literally.[33] Leaving this possibility aside – it would be inconsistent with Peacocke's understanding of metaphorical-as perception – it seems that you do not understand something as a metaphor unless you understand that it is likening one thing to another (or the relations between things of one kind to those between things of another kind). And you do not understand the metaphor itself unless you grasp the respect or respects in which the likeness is thought or intended to hold.[34] Now a perceiver who undergoes a metaphorical-as perception and understands the metaphor must, it seems, be oriented towards the metaphorical-as intentional content of the perception as one who understands it is so oriented when the metaphor arises outside perception and is understood as the metaphor it is. Accordingly, it would seem that if in metaphorical-as perception you understand the metaphor as it figures in your perception, that is, understand it in undergoing the experience, you must in some sense be aware of the way or ways in which the object perceived corresponds to what is attributed to it by the metaphor. Hence, if it is not intrinsic to metaphorical-as perception that the perceiver is so aware, it is not necessary that the metaphor that enters the intentional content of the perception is understood. And if this is so, what would be the point or value of metaphorical-as perception in those cases where it is not understood?

It seems as if Peacocke operates with a notion of appreciating a metaphor that is not the same as and does not presuppose understanding the metaphor (at least in the sense I have gestured towards). Perhaps this is a misunderstanding of Peacocke's view that when you undergo metaphorical-as perception, 'you appreciate the

[33] Malcolm Budd, 'The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements', in *Aesthetic Essays*, 80–81. This function might well lead some to deny the proposition the status of metaphor, even though it conforms more or less perfectly with the dictionary definition ('the application of a name or descriptive term or phrase to an object or action to which it is imaginatively but not literally applicable', *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*). I would be happy to concede the point. But to deny the proposition the status of metaphor would in itself achieve nothing. For the question would then be whether the predication of music of an emotion, or expression of an emotion, is indeed a metaphor (in the restricted sense conceded), or instead a predication amenable to an imaginative-as interpretation, that is, a predication not intended to be taken at face value but understood as intimating an experience of imagining one thing to be another.

[34] I put it in this way ('thought or intended to hold') because, firstly, more or less any proposition that might be used as a metaphor could, as I have previously indicated, on different occasions of use be understood in different ways (and should be so understood in relevantly different contexts) and, accordingly, does not identify any specific metaphor, and, secondly, a metaphor can be coined on the basis of misunderstanding. The best discussion of what is communicated by a metaphor is the opening chapter of James Grant's unpublished doctoral thesis 'Criticism and Imagination' (D.Phil. diss., University of Oxford, 2010), a revised version of which will appear in his *The Critical Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

metaphor first'. And perhaps there is an important sense in which one can appreciate a metaphor without understanding it (in the sense at issue), although I have no idea what this might be. But it seems clear that without an elucidation of what I have called metaphoring (which may or may not be the same as Peacocke's idea of appreciating a metaphor), metaphorical-as perception remains shrouded in darkness.

IX

Now the uncertainty about what metaphoring consists in goes hand in hand with an uncertainty about what its value might be in the experience of art, and especially in the appreciative perception of music. Although there are relatively few adherents of an arousal theory of the musical expression or possession of emotion, and it is generally conceded that it is not, or may well not be, integral to hearing emotion in music that the music produces a related affective reaction in the listener, it is clear that music perceived as being expressive or possessive of emotion has the power to affect a listener emotionally, and is liable to do so, at least with a certain kind of listener, if the music is experienced both as possessing an emotional quality (or as being expressive of an emotion) and as being impressive.[35] Accordingly, expressive music might well arouse the same affect as that which the music is perceived to have (or perhaps a sympathetic affective response to that affect). Here there appears to be a striking difference between metaphorical-as and imaginative-as accounts of the experience of the musical expression of emotion. Accounts of the musical possession or expression of emotion that are of the imaginative-as form are in an excellent position to explain this power and liability. For we are all familiar with the power of the imagination to induce emotional responses to what is imagined, both inside and outside art: inside, as in the experience of the novel and the drama when we are emotionally affected by the imagined events; outside, as when my starting to imagine a tarantula walking towards my bare foot, or my imagining of my seeing a tangle of black wires in my hand that it is my seeing a tarantula, is liable to induce in me a feeling of dread so strong that it forces me to stop the imagining. It is therefore no surprise if, in listening to music in the imaginative-as manner, the imagining of a certain affect or the imagining of an expression of a certain emotion should be accompanied by an emotional reaction to what is imagined. But – whether or not it involves recognition of a likeness or correspondence – why should metaphoring sadness or its expression in the perception of music be liable to have any effect on a listener's emotions? If it does not involve recognizing an

[35] Of the six conceptions of the expressive perception of music that I list in § II, those of Roger Scruton, Derek Matravers, and Aaron Ridley have an affective reaction built into them, and both Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson are not only well aware of emotionally expressive music's liability to induce emotion but have proposed accounts of how such a reaction might come about.

isomorphism, there seems nothing in it that might explain such an effect. But even if it does involve such a recognition, the mere recognition of a correspondence would seem markedly insufficient to facilitate an emotional effect. Without an account of what it is to entertain the metaphorical-as element of the intentional content of a perception as a metaphor, there can, it seems, be no answer to the question why the perception of music in the metaphorical-as manner in listening to music might well elicit an emotional reaction to what is metaphorized.

X

So at present there is, I believe, a gap in our understanding of the idea of metaphorical-as perception, and this gap disables us from determining whether metaphorical-as perception has the right character to explain a widely-held power of emotionally expressive music (it appears not to have such a character). Imaginative-as perception both lacks this gap – there is no problem analogous to that of how understanding figures in the experience of metaphorical-as perception – and has the required character. Moreover, imaginative-as perception copes just as easily as metaphorical-as perception with both the perception of music as possessing an emotional quality and the perception of music as being expressive of an emotion. For example, you can imagine of your experience of the music that it is an experience of sadness, and you can imagine of your experience of the music that it is an experience of the expression of sadness.[36] Furthermore, imaginative-as perception, which, unlike metaphorical-as perception, is a familiar, widely recognized phenomenon, has as large a field of possible application within (and outside) music as does metaphorical-as perception: whatever music (or anything else) can be perceived metaphorically-as it can be perceived imaginatively-as. In consequence, insofar as one of these kinds of perception is to be identified as forming the core of the expressive perception of music, imaginative-as perception has the better credentials. Furthermore, not only is imaginative-as perception the superior candidate for the role, I believe that instances of imaginative-as perception are in fact, at least in part, constitutive of certain sorts of experiences of hearing music as possessing or being expressive of emotion.

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[36] An imagined expression of emotion E might be an expression in either of the senses I distinguished – an E expression or an expression of E. Indeed, some music gives the impression of being only the appearance of emotion (as with an E expression) rather than heartfelt emotion (as with an expression of E).

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