OTAKAR ZICH: AESTHETIC AND ARTISTIC EVALUATION, PARTS 2 & 3

II

1. If, then, we wish to investigate what *artistic evaluation* consists in, we have to depart from what is given by experience.[1] The evaluation whose nature we wish to determine arises in us in connection with *works of art*. Thinking about these works of art in their completeness reveals their extraordinary richness and diversity. They all appear as *composed* formations (though not in a unified way), and the evaluation relating to them is of the same nature. We observe that we are evaluating individual parts or aspects of each work, and that these partial evaluations (of which there are a greater or lesser number, depending on the nature of the work and of the person perceiving) merge into a summary evaluation, which although not their mechanical aggregate, is nevertheless a resultant. The subject of partial evaluations is, as we say, various 'artistic qualities', as are dealt with systematically by theories of the individual arts and, in practical terms, by technical textbooks. Each artistic discipline has *its own specific* qualities, which cannot be reduced to others. It may be the silvery colour in a Hals painting, or the free polyphony of a Beethoven quartet, or the melodiousness of [Karel Hynek] Mácha's verse. Even if according to a shared term it seems that it concerns the quality of two forms of art together, as in the third of the examples given here, we must not be misled. It is only a verbal aid, an illustrative idiom, a vague analogy: the melodiousness of verse is something entirely unlike the melody of music. We speak similarly of a melodic line with regard to music, or of a shade of colour with regard to painting; when it comes to the immense quantity of artistic qualities or even to the types of these qualities our language is too impoverished and requires assistance. For the majority of cases it has no words whatsoever and one can imagine these nameless qualities only optically (for example, in the visual arts) or acoustically (for example, in music). Each

[1] [This is the translation of Parts II and III of Zich's 'Hodnocení estetické a umělecké' (1916), Part 1 of which is published in English translation with an Editor's Introduction in the previous issue of *Estetika* XLVI/II (2009), 179–201. Any of the mistakes in the names of artists, authors, or works mentioned by Zich in the original Czech have been quietly corrected here.]

artist of a certain field lives within such specific ideas about his art; he not only imagines them, but thinks within them, and as a rule – with the exception of poetry of course – without words. And these qualities of a certain artistic discipline – to return to objects of art – are like a great crowd of certain individuals of the same race, or a certain class of monads, amalgamating themselves into organisms of concrete works of art.

This specificity based on the field of art is not the whole story. Even the totality of these qualities in all their immense diversity and richness is specific to it – these and no other are the *artistic* qualities. In this we define 'art' for the meantime only by its extent, leaving aside contentious marginal categories, such as the industrial arts. All these qualities have been created, and continue to be created, by people, artists. They are artefacts. This differentiates them, for example, from related qualities of natural beauty. There are fields of art which have such close relationships to nature that we could easily confuse the two qualities. This would be absolutely wrong, and indicates, if it so occurs, only a superficial view of works of art. Even the most realistic work of *art* contains mostly artistic qualities, that is, ones that are man-made, not natural; otherwise it would not be a work of art and its creator would be merely an instrument for reproduction. Zola's Naturalist principle defines art as a 'a bit of nature, *seen through temperament*', which indicates that although the qualities of nature penetrate to the core of the artist, here they undergo a metamorphosis, so that what results is the artist's creation, and its 'truthfulness' is only a possibility of reality, and so a probability, not reality itself.

After this brief characterization let us turn to the phenomenon of evaluating artistic qualities. A term very much in vogue, particularly today, is 'artistic values'. Why values? Probably because, we reply, they are capable of enchanting us and of moving, exciting, awakening powerful feelings within us – aesthetic feelings. In brief, they are (affectively) appealing. But this answer leads us into the same blind alley from which we escaped in Part I. How can their value be based on their affective appeal when many of them produce such an effect without being artistically valuable, whilst others fail to produce this effect despite their artistic value? Undoubtedly each of us has at some time, at least with regard to new art – for example, the paintings of Gauguin, the compositions of Schönberg – experienced this condition: we are aware that this is something of great value, but the feeling of pleasure simply does not arise! It is as if we were powerless with regard to the work. In such cases people often pretend to feel pleasure only because the value of the work has been confirmed for them by an authoritative source. Obviously, I do not wish to deny the affective appeal of artistic qualities in general; on the contrary, as soon as we comprehend

works of art this feeling of pleasure always arises, often powerfully. But the feeling cannot grant these qualities anything more than an *aesthetic value*, that is, a relative value, like the aesthetic value of the beauties of nature and life. If, however, we restrict ourselves solely to the objective material of artistic qualities, we will not have answered our questions regarding absolute value; the material is in itself incapable of answering the question for us, even though it *is the environment* in which the value asserts itself. That is also why we considered this material first, and shall not let it entirely out of our sight for the rest of our analysis. It is so far clear that this material, like the qualities of nature and life, is subject to psychological laws concerning aesthetic appeal, except that these laws, due to the emphasized specificity of such material, are even more particular than the general laws of the aesthetic processes of the mind.

2. It is therefore necessary to move from art to artists. If we bear in mind that 'works of art *are created by an artist*', we shall seek a solution to our question in an analysis of this artist's activity. *To create* means chiefly to produce something new, something that did not previously exist. In our case this would be a requirement for *novelty* of works of art or artistic qualities. This requirement is clearly non-aesthetic, and from experience we know that we do in fact place this demand on works of art. It is therefore probable that in this we shall find the key for general evaluation. This *novelty* must first be defined, at least in brief, from two sides.

First of all, it is evident that the requirement for novelty which is placed on a work of art relates to its *artistic* aspects. Other aspects of the work may, but need not necessarily, meet this demand. So, for example, the 'subject matter' of a painting, a poem, or drama considered in itself, taken as abstract so to speak, need not be new; if a particular artistic expression is new, the requirement is fully met. Let us recall, for example, how many times the subject of the Judgement of Paris has been treated of independently in painting; how many various poems contain, for example, the theme of belated love, or how Shakespeare selected the subject matter for his dramas from tales and chronicles, where they have already, in another manner, been treated of. It is utterly unfair to criticize a work of art for its 'old subject matter' or, by contrast, to praise the novelty of the subject; such an aspect is *in itself* insignificant. If old subject matter is treated using new artistic qualities it is a valuable work. The significance of new subject matter for art resides only in the fact that such subject matter easily leads to new artistic qualities. These therefore contain the immediate value of the work of art – 'new' subject matter has only a mediating value.

Second, it follows from a close analysis of a wide range of artworks of the same genre that even with regard to the artistic aspects of the works this cannot be

a matter of a requirement for *complete* novelty, but only of a requirement for *partial* novelty. No work of art can be absolutely new; its novelty is always only relative. Overall, the 'most new' are the *wholes* formed by individual works of art. The individual aspects, that is, the parts or what we called 'artistic qualities', are transferred from one work to another only modified to a greater or lesser extent. Only through a gradual variation in a longer chain of works of art do qualities emerge which are entirely new in comparison with the original qualities. If a quality is too new, or if even a variant is too sudden, the work will be incomprehensible to the public, and we become accustomed to it only in time. Time, then, reduces these great subjective differences between older and newer works. For example, Mozart appears to us to be akin to Haydn but the contemporaneous public that worshipped Haydn considered Mozart's work 'not music at all'. Similarly, Manet at the outset was not understood, even though in so many respects he was following on from previous painters such as Velázquez, Hals, and Goya. From these brief comments there ensues a sense of what we should see the '*development of art*' residing in – namely, *the variation of artistic quality*, which, however, need not occur successively. Each artistic quality contains a possibility of greater or lesser variation (and some artistic motifs are particularly fertile), and necessarily dies out when this possibility is exhausted. Development often returns to a quality from the past, which was not at the time fully taken advantage of because it was too rich in this 'potential energy' of variation (for example, classical sculpture or Bach).

Turning now to the question of evaluation, we observe that this factor of novelty, as we have just defined it, may be highly important, but is not in itself *sufficient* for evaluation. Even this 'novelty' is no more than mere *relative value*; no more than what we have called 'appealing'. An analysis of an impression resulting from novelty, however, shows us how this impression depends not only on the perceiving subject, but also on *repetition* of the impression. The reason for the appeal of the 'new' (curiosity, increased interest, surprise) is a double-edged sword: it is also why it quickly loses its appeal. What is new becomes old as soon as one encounters the work a second time, not to mention even later. We become accustomed to it. Rather than become old, a true work of art usually rises in value in the immediate future. Though I have said that one must become accustomed to works of art, particularly new ones, the progression is the opposite here. Only if I become accustomed to it, thoroughly acquainted with it, does a work affect me with its full intensity, whereas with familiarity the appeal of a 'new' work is reduced until it expires. This is evident also in opposite cases. A work of art that aims only to be new, surprising, sensational, has a bleak future. Its novelty fades, and the appeal of the work is gone. We see this best in

the great field of the beauty of life, relating primarily to costume, that is, in the field of '*fashion*'. This is primarily based on the principle of novelty, so its appeal stands and falls with its novelty. Only in times when fashion has managed to emancipate itself from the confines of this position, for example, in the Rococo style, has it raised itself from the aesthetic realm to the artistic sphere.

The principle of novelty has thus disappointed us beyond all expectation. This is because we have not yet moved on from art to artists. We have considered novelty as a sign of 'creating', but we have thus characterized the result of the activity. We have again indicated only an objective characteristic of one work of art as against other works. In the sentence 'The work is created by the artist' the emphasis must therefore be on the word *artist*. *The work is the creation of the artist* and the reason for general and necessary evaluation follows from the relationship of the *artist* to the work. Like everyone, an artist is an *individual*. That means that in all spiritual and physical aspects he differs from other people (and other artists). If we study one of these numerous aspects in various people, for example, motor skills, a memory for certain things, a tendency towards certain emotions, and so forth, we find ourselves forever confronted with individual differences that are often so great that we at times have the impression we have met with an entirely new feature in someone we have never before encountered in ourselves or anyone else. Obviously these individual differences appear in people's behaviour as well. The result of such human activity – though a special activity of course, reserved for a certain class of people, that is, artists – is works of art. It is, then, entirely natural that we attribute different features of various works of art to the differences of the people who created them. This means that we understand the novelty or distinctiveness of works of art not merely as their characteristic with regard to other works of art (as we discussed novelty earlier), but instinctively or consciously relate this novelty to the artists who made these works. The distinctiveness of a work for us is a *manifestation* (since the work is the result of a certain activity) *of the distinctiveness of the artist*; for us it is evidence (a document) of the artist's *character*. Hence both the predicate *characteristic*, which we attribute not only to artists but also to their works, and the word *originality*, as opposed to mere novelty, capture this relationship between the work and its author. If, for example, we familiarize ourselves with the flora and fauna of a foreign land, we term some of them 'new' or even 'distinctive' for us (for example, Australian fauna), but never 'original', since this is always with reference to an artist. From this it is evident that the concept of the 'originality' or the 'uniqueness' of a thing is narrower in scope than the concept of novelty, and is richer in content, possessing an additional attribute (the relationship to the author or artist).

3. In stating the conclusion 'The artist, like every man, is an individual, and also his activity and its result – the work of art – are individual', I have for the moment expressed a judgement of narrower validity in a general form. The premise is a fact, but the conclusion is only a possibility – after all, clearly not every artist creates individually *distinctive* works. For this conclusion to be necessary, one must limit this premise. It was immediately clear that I meant a *great artist*, and that the result of his activity, a distinctive work, is also a valuable work of art. By limiting the term 'individuality' we also come to the sought-after artistic *evaluation*.

Each person, and so each artist, is an individual in the sense I have outlined above, with reference to various aspects and traits of his physical and mental nature. This primarily concerns *innate* properties and dispositions. Nature has been truly bounteous to us in this respect, and each of us has our individuality guaranteed. If, however, we compare this with what we gain during our lives, we find there are not so many differences. Socialization results in many of the same things for a certain group of people, whether from the influence of teachers, environment, or the times, and it is very difficult for a whole society to emancipate itself from this. Innate individualities thus to a considerable degree become equal, and differences are diminished. Despite everything, *each* person remains an individual in terms of his physical and spiritual nature, that is, an individual that I would term *static*, since it determines how a person will be at a certain point in his life. In our case, however, this concerns human *activity*, so we must ask whether each person appears as an individual in his conduct and in the results of that conduct, in his actions (especially works of art), that is, whether each person is a *dynamic* individual. It then appears that this dynamic individuality cannot be attributed to everyone without reservation. Let us bear in mind, for example, the ethical dimension of man. It is evident that, in this respect, with upbringing the innate individuality of each of us becomes largely uniform, yet is preserved. As soon it becomes a matter of ethical conduct, however, we see that within this realm even this diminished human individuality does not always apply. Many people, given numerous opportunities, do not act according to their own inclinations, let alone their convictions, and submit to the influence, example, wishes, or commands of others. The man who not only judges, but also acts in his own way, appears to be a *strong* ethical *individual* (and it is irrelevant here whether this is in the good or the bad sense). Only this sort of strong ethical individual will perform individual actions and, conversely, if we observe any individual actions in the face of all possible influences, of which there are always plenty, we judge them to be those of an ethically strong individual, a strong personality.

The same applies to art as a form of human conduct and to its actions, works of art. An innate artistic disposition is certainly that of individuality; nevertheless, these differences of individuality are noticeably levelled out, at least for certain groups of artists (for example, pupils of the same master, followers of the same school, artists living in the same period). As soon as it is a matter of artistic activity, many artists do not act 'in their own way', for they are under the influence of the advice, example, or suggestion of other artists or works of art. Only strong artist-individuals act, in spite of these influences, 'in their own way' (and thus genuinely 'create'). Consequently, we encounter few artists who made distinctive works in their youth, even amongst those whose later work is entirely original: their individuality only gains in strength with lengthier development to the extent that it becomes manifested also in their actions. So, if I find a work of art to be distinctive, I attribute this to a strong individuality, a strong creative personality. I *evaluate* this *strong individuality* of the artist (a fact that we shall analyse later), and together with this I evaluate the work that is a document of this individuality.

Negative terms of artistic evaluation – imitation, eclecticism, mannerism – also comport with this interpretation of artistic value: In their work *eclectics*, usually unconsciously, employ artistic qualities of other works, aiming of course to select aesthetically appealing influences, and frequently doing so with success. This is most evident from the fact that in their day eclectic works usually enjoy enormous success with the public. If a great artist creates new qualities in his works – which we can now refer to as 'new values' – these values are not always initially comprehensible to the general public precisely because of their novelty, and are therefore not appealing. Only with time do they acquire general appeal – and are then embraced by eclectics. We thus see a continuously repeating phenomenon – namely, it is just when great artists 'breakthrough' that their works share their success with works that seem to be of equal value, closely related in nature, that is, containing similar qualities. Why are these qualities not 'artistic values' when they appear in *epigonic* works though they are when they appear in original works? They cannot be criticized for not being new, since they are no longer new even in the originals. If I go to a Wagner opera today, everything I hear will be familiar and old, just as if I go to a [Carl] Goldmark opera and hear something of Wagner in this. But Wagner created these values, whereas Goldmark merely adopted them. In Wagner they are therefore a document of his personality, which manifest themselves in distinctive activities, and he appears to me to be a strong individual. Goldmark, by contrast will appear to be a weak individual – his copying of the qualities of another is evidence of that. *From this* springs my positive evaluation of Wagner and my negative evaluation of Goldmark, which

I impart also to the qualities of their works of art, though these qualities may be very similar. These qualities are, however, never exactly the same, since the artist who borrows them always changes them to a greater or lesser extent in a way that is to *their detriment*, precisely because this artist, not being a strong individual somehow deforms, weakens, or flattens them. The epigone, attributing these qualities closely to a master, reproduces them relatively best, at first hand, so to say. They therefore retain signs of individuality, though the individuality of another. On passing through a whole range of further works, however, these qualities increasingly get worn down, till they become entirely *banal*. What is decisive here is not that they are 'old', but that these qualities have been used by many artists.[2] Such material is then used by the true eclectics, in whose works these qualities possess virtually no individuality whatsoever, and are now mere templates. Yet even here they do not entirely lose their aesthetic appeal, particularly if their originals produced an exceptional effect. They at least please the lower orders sufficiently, as is shown by popular poetry, musical compositions, and paintings. Only with time do all these works (from the epigonic down to the last eclectic works), thoroughly parasitical on the original qualities of others, fall inexorably into oblivion.

The phenomenon of artistic *mannerism*, when an artist draws mechanically on his own qualities which he previously created and used successfully in the past, is of another kind. For example, Perugino brought certain new qualities to painting, but repeated them throughout his life *ad nauseum*. Though we cannot say that we entirely reject works in which the artist repeats himself, our evaluation is perceptibly less positive. This is, I believe, because of the requirement for *development*. Human individuality is a temporal concept, and is therefore subject to the laws of evolution. I therefore see evidence of the power of the artist's individuality also in the fact that this individuality is capable of development, and that it actually develops during the artist's life (the years in which the artist is active). Just as, from this perspective, I excuse great artists who in their youth, that is, at the beginning of their development, used also the qualities of others in their works (for example, under the influence of their teachers), and I do not dismiss them as eclectics, so I do not excuse an artist who in some of his works appeared to possess exceptional individuality, when he was merely repeating himself in his subsequent work. Although I would not call such an artist an eclectic – he would be so only in relation to himself – clearly his individuality is not sufficiently strong; it sufficed only at the beginning, but was not strong enough to continue. And from here it follows that my appreciation

[2] Concerning the uniqueness of a work of art, see Section 6, below.

is diminished. With regard to both eclecticism and mannerism, however, one must note that these are quantitative and relative concepts. It depends on the degree to which an artist in his work borrows from another or repeats his own work, and whether the artist creates small new variations at least in this.

If an artist intentionally repeats himself for non-artistic reasons, for example, endeavouring to gain further success or profit from his earlier works, he will undoubtedly cause me to evaluate his works negatively, though not directly (because he is motivated by fame or profit), but indirectly. That these motivations are decisive for the given artist is further evidence of the weakness of his *artistic* personality.

4. For our formulation to be complete I must add that I evaluate a work of art as a manifestation of strong *artistic* individuality. That is to say, this individuality appears to me in this material, in this world of qualities that I outlined at the beginning of Part II. This material in its totality is given to me through experience, and I know it more or less incompletely, mainly because I cannot know all art and also because it is constantly increasing and developing. For this reason I sometimes stand baffled before the work of a new, strong artistic spirit, at least at first, and instinctively seek a connection with older qualities, which are familiar to me; I then process these in order to comprehend the new qualities. Only when these *artistic qualities* are *comprehensible* am I able to comprehend this new personality. For it is on this that the emphasis lies; this is what is decisive, and surely not an understanding of other aspects of this personality, for example, ethical or philosophical aspects, though it cannot be denied that these are also revealed to me together in the majority of works of art. But they are revealed to me also in works that are not artistic – actually in life generally. And, conversely, in many works of art (in those, for example, which I classified as 'l'art pour l'art') they remain concealed from me. This supremely important matter must be borne constantly in mind. Thus, for example, I can comprehend the artist's emotional aspect only mediately, that is, in these artistic qualities, and only conditionally, that is, if it appears in these qualities. I mention this because it is common aesthetic theory, particularly of art lovers, who see in a work of art only an 'expression of the artist's feelings', and thus see the basis of artistic perception as being in empathy with these feelings. In comprehending the artist's personality from his work I am not always or solely concerned with these feelings. Only a small part of art for example, most lyric verse (but not all), sets the expression of feelings as its main task. For many disciplines, however, this task does not exist at all, or is entirely subordinate, as, for example, in ornamentation or epic poetry. With all works, however, there are many other concerns apart from comprehending the feelings that the artist

invested them with. It has to do, for example, with the fertility of the artist's imagination, the subtlety of his perception, the penetration of his intellect, and last but not least the artist's physical power, since, with the exception of poetry and music, which make use of writing, artistic creation is inextricably linked with physical activity (for example, painting or acting). It is evident that by demanding only that one empathize with the work diminishes the richness of the pleasure derived from art. On the other hand, the 'expression of feelings' is a phenomenon that we encounter outside art as well, in life, and it does not necessarily lead to a work of art even for artists; indeed, the more powerful it is, the less a feeling is capable of leading to a work of art. Let us imagine, for example, that I visit an artist friend, who has suffered a great tragedy. I enter, and find him sitting immobile, deep in troubling thoughts. From this breakdown, from his eyes, gestures, and reticence, I sense great pain; all this is an eloquent, indeed shocking, document of pain. In terrible depression this man will be unlikely to create art. After some time I visit him again; he has now recovered and I see a poem on his table. Let us assume the best-case scenario for the theory – namely, that this is a lyric poem, expressing the feelings the artist has experienced. I read it and fully empathize with the pain it expresses – just as *intensely* as the first time. But what I experience this time is so much more *rewarding*! I am enraptured by the melody of the verse; I admire the power of the imagery; I am stirred by its magical rhythm. Let us substitute a musician for the poet and a musical composition expressing this mood for the poem. This time my experience of the artist's feelings will be entirely different from before. It will be a remarkable melody, a special harmony, the likes of which I have never heard before, a masterful, bold polyphonic interweaving. So, both the first and the second time, it is an expression of feelings. But the first time it is only this expression; the second time it is something more – namely, artistic qualities, which are in both cases entirely different. And let us imagine further that my friend is that rare person who experiences his pain deeply, but is merely a mediocre artist. Even in this case his poem or musical composition will be an expression of his feelings and most certainly heartfelt; nevertheless, I shall not evaluate it as a great work of *art*, even though it will *affect* me as a *human* document. If we object that his work is not of value since the artist did not succeed in fully expressing his feelings, let us recall that in the first case he succeeded by means outside the realm of art! He did not succeed in the second case because he was unable *to create good artistic qualities*. It is in those good artistic qualities that the justification for the existence of any work of art resides, even one whose aim is not to express feelings, but, for example, to solve a purely 'technical' problem of art.

One must therefore say a few words about *technique* as well. It is customary to use the term to indicate something inferior. This, however, evidently stems from the technique one reads about in textbooks, and that can, presuming a certain talent, be learned. Such technique, however, is abstracted from works of art which already exist. It is only an imitation of these works and can therefore be learned. Every artist learns this technique at the beginning of his development, to be able to express himself in art at all. But, as soon as it is learned, the artist's constant and tireless endeavour becomes to unlearn it, in order to be able to create his own technique. The first to use a certain technique is the artist who *created* it; this is a genuine artistic value in *his works*, and we are fully justified in deriving pleasure from *it*. This is how all artists understand works of art, at least within their own field. It is only because many aestheticians are no more than amateurs in art, and because these technical concepts are *for them* a system of abstract concepts, that such a technical understanding of works of art is considered entirely special, reflexive, theoretical, and even non-aesthetic.[3] But this is actually not the case, at least for true art connoisseurs. Recall, for example, how [Eugène] Fromentin waxes lyrical about Rubens's *painting technique*: it was not theoretical reflection which helped to understand this 'technique' while he was standing in front of the paintings of the master; he reflected upon the matter only later when he made his notes and eventually wrote *Les Maîtres d'autrefois*.

It is thus a *feature specific* to the perception of art, that we familiarize ourselves with the *artistic* aspect of a certain personality. This is only one of many facets that the artist has as a person, but for the creative artist, as opposed to the people perceiving the art, this facet is paramount. When considering 'artistic qualities' at the beginning of Part II, I touched on the fact that this is an entirely special world, an entirely artificial world, in which these artists live and think. But this is not entirely so; these artists stand in the real world which demands their attention. There are ethical, religious, scientific, social, and, at the very least, practical problems here, for example, existential problems, which artists are forced to respond to. It is also well known, however, that a good many artists live in their artificial world to such an extent that they neglect or overlook everything else. The consequence is usually an existential catastrophe: 'They did not fit in here'. This sentence, however, does not mean that we should not understand artists also with regard to aspects of theirs which are other than artistic, so long of course as these aspects appear in their works of art. If these other aspects also appear in the work – if they are not

[3] That is, in the usual sense of the word 'aesthetic', in which 'artistic' is included as a separate case.

merely figments of our imagination or someone else's – and the artist's personality appears also in these aspects as strongly individual, then, such a work is – all things being equal – richer for us, though not more valuable than one from which we learn nothing about them or in which these aspects do not seem original to us. Only the artist's strong artistic aspect is the *sine qua non*. If we find this aspect, the value of the work is always guaranteed; if not, then the work – despite all else – is of no value.

5. The fact that we can also understand other aspects of a strong personality in works of art suggests that we can become acquainted with such non-artistic characteristics of strong individuality (the individuality that I have termed 'dynamic', that is, manifesting itself in actions, in creating, in *genius*) also in creations other than works of art, indeed in life in general. So, the case characteristic of art, of understanding *artistic* individuality, is merely a particular case of a general fact. Each of us knows the unusual and powerful impression made by 'strong personality', which we experience, for example, upon reading a work of philosophy (say, by Spinoza), of science (for example, Abel's mathematical works), religion (for example, the Gospels), and, lastly, in direct contact with such a person. All memoirs contain interesting passages in which the author depicts the irresistible and, for him, unforgettable impression of having been in touch with 'great individuals' of artistic, scientific, or political genius, and so forth. There is a vast amount of such literature, for example, that describes Napoleon. In *our encounters with genius* there resides a remarkable *value*, and the causes of that value must, at least briefly, be analysed.

This much can be said in advance: the sources of this evaluation are surely manifold, and cannot be converted into a single formula. Here one can observe both altruistic and selfish factors. The social instinct plays a powerful role. It is a mixture of love, admiration, respect, and even fear, which binds us to such people. This 'sympathy with the strong' takes priority within us over pity for the weak; it is so strong, in fact, that it appears even when other feelings resist it. We are unable to deny our sympathies even to those strong personalities who have caused a great deal of horror and evil – recall Napoleon again. And if such great people are also fiercely detested, this is only a reaction to an instinctive sympathy for them, and this deadly rancour may, for example, under the influence of personal contact, become transformed into boundless love. *Irresistibility* is thus a sign of an impression that we have from encountering genius; in art I know of no surer sign that we are standing before a genuinely *great* work than the absolutely overpowering nature of the impression it makes. Here I am not referring to a great emotional effect, since this varies from situation to situation, even for the same person perceiving the work. But the power with

which such a majestic work enraptures one, not only one's emotions but also one's imagination and thought, and the power with which it binds one's will, as soon as it appears, that is, as soon as the artistic qualities of the work are comprehensible, forever the same, and appear to be something necessary. The perception of such works is thus not the 'freies Spiel', as considered by the famous 'Spieltheorie'; it is, instead, akin to hypnosis, since it entirely overpowers one, that is, the entirety of one's Self, even though it does not seem like violence. I shall stop my commentary at this point; the effect of 'soul on soul' belongs to the field of psychology, which so far remains obscure in many respects, so it easily tempts one towards 'supernatural', unscientific interpretations.

There are, however, selfish factors at work here as well. Let us recall chiefly how fascinating it is not only to meet a great personality for the first time but also to absorb him, even to transform oneself into that personality. This does not necessarily mean transmuting oneself into a strong personality, merely into one that is *different* from oneself. As children we played out our fantasies – we were bandits, princes, great commanders, we were 'baddies' or 'goodies', and so forth. Poets, dramatists, and actors preserve into adulthood this capability of reversed metempsychosis. (I would call it transmigration of souls rather than transfiguration.) The characters of their novels and plays are created by a process in which the Self takes on a mask and plays behind it. Only in this way can they create unified characters. The poets, dramatists, and actors who, relying on experience and observation of life like the others, do not live through or 'play through' the characters of their novels and plays. Instead, they only compose them, creating mere conglomerates of qualities, not people. But even the rest of us who are not poets or actors cannot forget the allure of these childhood games; we no longer play them ourselves; we only experience the rare delight provided by this transformation of our Selves into others by the characters that poets and actors create, whether we are at home reading a novel or in the theatre watching a play. This delight springs from the fact that one's mental life is *enriched* by this in all its aspects, with new traits that one's personality does not possess, or at least has not developed. Moving on from this to our subject, it is evident that it is especially by understanding great, strong individuals that one's Self is immensely enriched, in breadth and depth. Perceiving a part of their personalities, which they have immortalized in works of art, one augments one's own Self with new, unsuspected, or only now surmised sensations, and one learns the subtlest differentiation of states of mind, that were before only approximately known to one. One's colour perception is enriched and differentiated, for example, by being in contact with paintings and one's emotional life is enriched and differentiated by reading poetry. The instinctive desire for

the all-round development of one's Self is therefore a motivating force, which drives one to find contact with genius through the medium of that genius's works; it is natural that according to one's inclinations one then seeks certain fields, and amongst these the field of art in particular excels in its *all-round* efficacy on one's own mind. Moreover, great geniuses are ahead of their time: through the power of their personalities they move the development of a certain field of culture considerably forward; they anticipate the future. The desire to penetrate into this future, at least a bit further is, however, present in everyone; by this I do not mean the desire to know one's fate but the desire to see the future state of culture. So many times while contemplating a scientific or technological mystery one is possessed by a vivid desire to be able to leap forward a number of years into the future to a time when the problem will be solved. And one day one may receive a book or stand in front of an invention (recall, for example, the problem of aviation) which suddenly, unexpectedly, quickly makes this a reality. A similar situation applies in each field of art as well.

Having indicated at least some of the main factors that give value to our contact with genius (my aim was not to mention all the factors) it remains for me to touch upon the character of this evaluation as opposed to a relative evaluation, the 'aesthetic value' mentioned in Part I. On first impression it would seem that this artistic value is of the same nature as aesthetic value, since it is also based upon emotional effect. When I spoke of the charm of the strong personality and the delight in the transformation of one's Self, I was, it is true, also using words indicating emotions. But these emotions are entirely different from aesthetic feelings, that is, from those feelings with which a work of art affects me directly. They spring from the personality that is concealed behind the work or within it. This is most evident where both kinds of feelings do not mix and thus do not merge into one, that is, in non-artistic works. If I read a scientific work, which unexpectedly addresses a difficult problem, I am enraptured; if I find myself before an almost miraculous invention, I am overcome with admiration. But these feelings apply to the creative personality who has made these works; the work itself does not have *an affective impact* in the same way that, for example, a Beethoven symphony or a Shakespeare play does. It is therefore evident that in works of art *two effects* come together: the direct emotional effect of the object and the effect that its creative individuality has on us. Because this second effect may also manifest itself independently in various non-artistic works, and the first effect may also do so within natural beauty, it is evident that an evaluation of art originates in the *intersection* of these two processes, the occurrence of 'aesthetic value' together with the occurrence of what we may call the 'value of personality'.

Second, it needs to be demonstrated that this value, which is different from aesthetic value, is not relative, that is to say, it is not dependent on the variable aspects of the human mind, but, in the sense of Section 5 of Part I of this essay, it is 'absolute', and therefore universal and necessary. I have emphasized the necessity of this evaluation, analysing the factors from which it springs. These factors were the general and constant qualities of the human mind, being essentially instinctive. To judge from experience, however, it would seem that this evaluation is not general and necessary; many people do not evaluate all kinds of great works of art, and are unable to do so. This contradiction is only apparent; if we wish to determine the nature of an evaluation, we must presume that the *conditions* of the possibility of this evaluation have been met. Simply because many people are unable to understand the equation, I do not deny, for example, that the truth of $log\ ab = log\ a + log\ b$ is a universal scientific value. Whoever understands it must also acknowledge it. So a person who comprehand's the qualities of a work of a genius must necessarily evaluate this genius and thus also his work. As we have seen, this was not the case with regard to aesthetic value. Even someone capable of this aesthetic feeling may fail to experience such a feeling towards an aesthetic object that can otherwise evoke such feelings in others or at other times.

6. We have seen that an evaluation of a personality occurs upon perceiving not only works of art, but also other works. In this respect therefore art has aspects in common with other products of human culture. Despite this similarity, however, there is a fundamental difference between works of art and all other works. Since in all other cases a further value occurs as well, for example, a scientific, a philosophical, or an ethical value, which we adopt *independently* of the value of personality. Only this second value is fundamental to such works, since it is decisive for the value of the work, whereas the value of personality is secondary, merely accessory. We can leave this out, and our understanding of the work or evaluation of it will not suffer as a result. Indeed, it is the *ideal* of science, ethics, and so forth, to *liberate* themselves from this value of personality, which lends the work individuality, random traits. All these works are, however, human works, and must therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, contain traits of the personality that created them. This depends also on the nature of the field concerned. In a work of philosophy, for example, there is – generally speaking – far more of the individual element than in a work of science. And, there is more of the individual element in a work of historiography than in a work of mathematics. Traits of personality and therefore also values – since I mean only works of great minds – therefore exist here and will exist in future, and nothing prevents us from understanding and evaluating them, for

example, in the mechanics of Newton or the philosophy of Schopenhauer. But the understanding of scientific, moral, and other values contained here and elsewhere involves a tendency to remove these individual traits. This *depersonalizing tendency*, to put it briefly, distinguishes all fields of culture *from that of art*. As soon as [Leonhard] Euler found a universal solution to indeterminate equations, the significance of Diophantus' mathematics became merely historical, and the same applies also to the original aids used by Greek mathematicians to calculate surfaces when differential calculus was discovered. These works were also once of great scientific value. I have intentionally chosen mathematics in order to show that even in this field there are traits of individuality – not errors or inaccuracies – and that the development of science removes them. Such cases surely occur also in contemporary mathematics. With regard to the endeavour of science, for example, not to take account of individuals, it is fair to speak of *abstract science*, that is, one stripped of all the traits of the individuality of its creators, as being the *ideal* towards which we aim. We may never achieve this aim, but that is why it is an ideal.[4]

None of this applies to art. On the contrary, in art there is a tendency to preserve the traits of individuality of artworks, not to eradicate them. Even *faults* in art may rank amongst these traits. Anyone who, as a critic, corrected Goethe's *Farbenlehre* would improve this *scientific* work. Yet anyone who corrected the 'inaccuracies' in Goethe's autobiographical novel, *Dichtung und Wahrheit* would debase this work of *art*. Anyone who made a useful correction to some inventor's machine (for example, an aeroplane) would improve it. Yet anyone who 'corrected' the distortions in El Greco's or Böcklin's paintings would be destroying these works. We have several accounts of the French Revolution (for example, Carlyle's and Taine's), and with continuing historical research new interpretations will keep emerging, which on the basis of documents will correct previous ones, that is to say, will get closer to the truth. In a matter so immensely complex, it is perhaps impossible ever to attain the goal of interpreting everything as it in fact actually was (not only events but also motivations, many of which were surely unconscious). The traits of the individuality of the interpreters will thus always remain; yet their works form an increasingly valuable array, coming closer to their goal. A particular problem of art, for example, an equestrian statue, may also be considered by a range of works of art and here too we may

[4] The expression 'abstract science' is, however, ambiguous. It may, for example, refer to a science that takes no account of life, distances itself from life, and is speculative, dead, priding itself only on a formally logical 'truthfulness'. Such a purely academic 'abstract science' is, however, not an ideal and we must not confuse it with 'abstract science' in our sense, which seeks to leave its authors, not reality, out of the account.

observe technical development. If, however, this concerns artworks by strong artistic individuals, all are of equal value. And many 'technically impeccable' sculptures, the latest of their kind, making use of everything that was previously achieved, will be but eclectic works of average value. If I say that a work of art has only *historical value*, I do not mean that it lacks artistic value only now; I mean that it never had any artistic value, even when it was made. In science, a number of works tinged with traits of individuality can be combined into one manifestation that will be free from these differences, and will be of greater value – for example, a basic work on a certain question and a whole range of critical books which this work has led to and in certain respects supplements and corrects this work. In art, such combinations of a number of artworks into one that lacks traits of individuality suggests an eclectic work, and therefore a reduction of artistic value. If, however, we consider that works not of art can also possess values of individuality, and can therefore be viewed 'artistically', we see that here too one may speak of eclectic works, though with greater or lesser justification depending on the nature of the field from which the works originate. For, to be precise, their eclecticism is closely bound to the adoption of traits of individuality. Consequently, it is easy to talk about eclectic philosophy or religion, but scarcely so about eclectic mathematics. But if these individuality traits are not inaccuracies – in which case they diminish the scientific (or other) value of the work itself – these traits does not detract from the work's value. We want the philosopher to present us with a *true* view of the world, not a *new* view.

To sum up, we may say that 'the value of personality' plays a distinctive, decisive role in art, unlike in other fields of culture. It is therefore fair to call this for the most part an *artistic value*. After all, only in art is it essential, and elsewhere only accidental, just as all the other values discussed here are essential in their fields, but merely accidental in art.

Individuality in art, as we have emphasized, is a temporal concept, which changes and develops. The old Goethe is not the same great personality of art as the young Goethe. A work of art created by an artist *at a certain moment* in his personal development is therefore a manifestation of this momentary individuality, for which it is *unique*. This is a derived trait of a work of art and it certainly also contributes to the evaluation of each work itself in the sense of its *irreplaceability*. It appears, for example, in the industrial arts, where the hand-made is distinguished from the machine-made by its uniqueness. In the visual arts it distinguishes one work from its most faithful copy imaginable (for example, a machine-made copy); only a copy produced by a great artist has artistic value, since the personality of the copyist appears within it; this is precisely because it is not a faithful copy (for example, copies made by Manet). In fields in which

works of art have been captured in writing (music, poetry, drama), a work is only a 'work' when it is performed and its uniqueness has been consummated by the performance of the artists (the reciter, the musician or conductor, and to a certain extent an actor or director, though these people partly create independently). The uniqueness and therefore the irreplaceability of great works of art also explain their immortality, despite the development of art, that is to say, the constant development of the means of making art. No later work, even if able to compete directly with an earlier work and of equal greatness, could render the earlier work superfluous.

7. Since we have defined the concept of personality value, that is, artistic value, we must now look also at its scope. Here we find that this theory, which strictly distinguishes between aesthetic value and artistic value, is apparently insufficient for certain fields of art. This is true of works of art in which we do not encounter personality at all, and which bear no trait of individuality. Here I omit everything that from the perspective of development suggests only a preliminary step or the beginnings of art, for example, prehistoric art, tribal art, or children's art. I am concerned here with the fields where we find great, valuable works of art, which can be placed on the same level as great works of art by individuals. We find such works in the art of ancient cultures (for example, in Egyptian art), in guild art (for example, Gothic masonry and, in our age, arts and crafts), or in folk art. As regards artistic *value*, an Egyptian temple can be compared with a building by Bramante, a sculpture from a Gothic portal with a sculpture by Rodin, and a folk ballad with a ballad by Goethe. The comprehending and evaluation of these works are certainly of the same nature as the comprehending of the works of great individual artists. What shall we do now, however, with the theory of the 'strong artist-individual'?

What is chiefly evident is that many of these cases are different from works by artist-individuals only in a formal sense. An Egyptian temple undoubtedly had one chief architect (or several) who designed it and was certainly a great artist. The only difference between the architect of an Egyptian temple and a cathedral (like St Peter's in Rome) is that we do not know the former's name. The work, like many others from these fields, is anonymous. But our theory does not require the artist's name to be known; we do not want to understand his personality from what we read in some guidebook, for example, his date of birth; rather, we want to understand it from the work itself – and this need not reveal even his name. Ultimately, the result is the same whether we are standing before a painting by [Stefan] Lochner or one which was created by the 'Master of the Death of the Virgin'. The artist's name and all information about the artists are therefore a welcome aid, but are not essential.

We are not, however, concerned with this. We are concerned with the fact that these works, even if valuable (for they also include less valuable works, as in art by individuals), are not a document of *one* particular artist-personality. We always find a range of works similar to one another, even though they are by various artists. They are not, however, without distinctiveness (as is in eclectic works). We discover their distinctiveness if we observe a *group*, large or small, of such works; we then find that they have a uniform distinctiveness, even though they have been made by several people. It therefore seems as if only a whole *group* of artists were what one single personality is in art by great individual artists, that is to say, the individual personality in art is substituted for here by the *collective* individuality of the guild, the tribe, or the race. And each of these works must be evaluated as a manifestation of individuality, of collective (mass) 'personality'. This does not mean of course that this entire group of people constituting a collective personality created a particular work together – for example, that a particular folk song was composed by the 'folk'. The work was obviously created by an individual, but an entire group had worked on the conditions that formed the character of the work, which is the same as all other works of this kind. The system of these conditions is the artistic *tradition* of a specific time and place; the individual artist, placing himself at the service of the tradition, creates a work which is ultimately only a work of the entire group. The traits of his personality as an individual are veiled or even suppressed by the tradition.

It is evident that the extent to which an individual of genius is a member of such a group, profession, tribe, or race, determines the extent to which each of his works *necessarily* bears the traits of collective individuality, for example, traits of nationality. In addition, however, the work also bears the unique traits of its maker, which are not part of the tradition, and indeed are frequently in opposition to it. These 'collective traits', with regard to their time and place (for example, the groups of artists who formed the Italian Renaissance) were analysed by Taine. With such an analysis one can capture, and explain, with great efficacy, the spirit of such works as I have spoken of here, and which we may call 'collective'. It is clear therefore that anonymity is not a necessary characteristic of these works. If Taine, however, conceived individuals of genius as the *zenith* of this tradition (for example, the English dramatists before Shakespeare, then culminating in him), it is evident that his method is insufficient here. Such genius need not bear all the traits of the tradition of its time and country, and if it does possess them, it also possesses traits of that genius's own personality, which cannot be explained by this method, but are of the greatest importance for *this artist's* work. Nevertheless, one must admit that there are

great artists of this kind, who represent only the culmination of a tradition or an amalgamation of a number of traditions; I would term them *synthetic* as opposed to *analytical* geniuses, who, being revolutionaries in the field of art, demolish traditions by means of their traits of individuality, at least in part. Such synthetic genius would be represented, for example, by Raphael, and I see others similarly, for example, Homer. Taine's method, when used in this case, fully corresponds to the works of such artists.

If we consider the history of art of individual nations or tribes, we see that art at the beginning is a manifestation only of this general national individuality. It is of course not created by everyone, but only by those who, being equal in all other matters, are distinguished by their artistic capabilities and certain mental and physical dispositions. At this level, art is a manifestation of a simple and naïve personality, and its artistic qualities are entirely simple and primitive in terms of technique. The greater the differentiation within a society, the more a certain class of artists stands out, the range of artistic media increases, technique becomes more artistic, and with the emerging culture artist-personalities also become more complex. Further progress eventually leads to artist-individuals. But together with this growth of civilized art, which is developing ever more abundantly and diversely, indigenous art maintains itself at the lower orders of the nation, which are penetrated by culture only gradually, and it develops very slowly. This is the 'folk art' of civilized nations; its distance from contemporary civilized art naturally increases constantly, its production gradually dies out when these folk strata attain such a standard of culture that their own art no longer satisfies them, so they prefer coarser forms of 'artificial' art, which is not at all to the benefit of these strata.

III

1. Simply because it has a tendency to realize itself, each value contains a norm. This norm can also be formulated for our case, where we have determined 'artistic value'. It may be applied, however, only to those who perceive art, not to those who create it. We should seek the value of a work of art not in its aesthetic value, that is to say, not in its affective appeal (its ability to awaken aesthetic feelings), but in the comprehending and experience of the strong artist-personality that manifests itself through the work. There is only one way to achieve this: to learn it *from works* that can provide this comprehension and experience, that is, from the works of *great artists*, and to learn it as well as possible. So, for example, to comprehend a certain genius one should at least know the majority of that genius's works. Although knowledge of his life

outside art is undoubtedly interesting, and may be of benefit here and there, it is unnecessary. The man as a citizen and the man as an artist do not overlap at all and we are interested in an artistic evaluation purely with regard to the artistic aspect of a certain personality, since it is that which is fundamental. Only if a work points to a non-artistic aspect of that genius, and requires knowledge of that aspect, then one must know that aspect as well. The comprehensibility of a work, however, always resides in the comprehensibility of its *artistic* qualities, and one must make these one's own. 'Comprehending a work of art' can never mean merely experiencing its emotional effect, no matter how intensive this may be. Such a condition, largely passive, leads not to an evaluation of the work, but merely to an appreciation of its aesthetic value, which, as we demonstrated in Part I, is often in opposition to artistic value. Such perception, mediated by mood, is suitable only to the enjoyment of the beauties of nature and life, but not to the beauty of art; unlike the comprehension of art, it represents a lower level, and can be *permitted* at most for those works that manifest not a sharply defined individuality, but a loosely defined, broad, collective individuality, for example, folk art or the industrial arts.

In this way we gradually acquire two capabilities. First of all, we learn to comprehend the individuality of a work's maker from its artistic qualities. Second, we learn to respond *instinctively* to all works, primarily to works that are new to us, with a feeling of pleasure – and thus to ascribe aesthetic value to them – only if they have *artistic* value. This ability is *good taste*. It is clear that the excellence of this taste, for example, its versatility, will depend on the efforts that we devote to obtaining it, as well as on our innate capabilities to comprehend artistic qualities, which vary from one branch of art to the next. But this one true path will always yield results.

This norm can also be reached by another route, one I would term the teleological route, which is also a test of the accuracy of our theory. If we observe the great diversity of individuality amongst people who are lovers of artistic pleasures, we understand the actual diversity of standpoints that can be occupied with regard to a specific work of art. The *ideal*, or *norm*, will, however, be the kind of standpoint that the work's *maker* occupied with regard to the work, since it was created from *this* standpoint and therefore it is *this* standpoint that it *demands*. We postulate the maker's standpoint also for other spectators and listeners – though naturally as an ideal to which they should aspire – but not because it is the standpoint of the *artist* in general. After all, the artist does not always occupy the correct standpoint with regard to works of art by other artists even in the same branch of art; indeed the artist may be less capable of doing so than one who is not an artist, since the artist's strong individuality may

prevent him from empathizing with the other standpoint. The artist naturally always occupies the correct standpoint, however, with regard to his own works, and any aesthetician or critic who wished to deny such a thing would be presumptuous indeed. Of course, by the correct standpoint I mean only the correct *manner* of comprehending the work, whereas in the *evaluation itself* the artist may be mistaken – the artist frequently overestimates and sometimes underestimates his work, particularly just after he has made it. This ideal artist's standpoint towards his own work, however, as experience has shown, never remains at the level of examining its affective appeal, but applies primarily to the *artistic qualities themselves*, and relates also to aspects other than those related to mood. We also see that an artist understands his work always as a *component of his Self*, which he has infused into a lasting object. The artist feels this in particular with regard to his older works; here he is acutely aware that this is a piece of his former personality, that it contains a piece of his former life, for example, his youth. And the artist almost always correctly evaluates his older works.

The chief task of *art criticism* for the public is to determine which artworks are of value and which are not, and then to facilitate the comprehending of artistic qualities of valuable works for the public and to interpret their relationship to the personality of the artist. The first task is certainly not an enviable one, since many works must be rejected; consequently, we expect the critic not to respond merely instinctively to valuable works with pleasure or displeasure, but to think about them, that is, we expect the critic to justify his evaluation, and to do so objectively, not subjectively with a mere statement of his own aesthetic pleasure or displeasure. This task, however, is necessary and will continue to be necessary as long as insignificant, weak, and poor works appear next to good and great ones. The existence of the former kind – which, as we all know, is abundant in every age – is the reason for this 'critical' aspect of criticism. Since, as is evident from the aforementioned path to acquiring good taste, these poor works spread *bad taste* amongst the public, that is, a taste for works of low artistic value, which is even less able to comprehend great works of art than uncultivated and innate taste. Poor or even *average* artworks are thus the enemy of good artworks, and should never be presented to anyone (and it is a task for 'art education' to ensure that they never are), even, for example, children or the masses, as is often the case.

2. For creative artists, however, it is also possible to derive a norm from 'artistic value' as we have determined it, though only indirectly. An artist who wants his work to be the subject of artistic evaluation (and not merely to gain popularity or profit), which is the wish of every serious artist, must infuse the work

with the artistic qualities of his individuality. This appears to mean the norm that the artist should demonstrate his personality through his work. This watchword of *individualism* in art has been particularly emphasized in our times. Simply formulated, the watchword has, however, mostly disappointed, and it is clear from our earlier interpretations why this so. For a work to become valuable, it is not enough merely for the artist to have expressed his Self. The artistic facet of his personality must also appear in the work, and, in this respect, the personality of the artist must be strong and original. I have demonstrated that not every human individual in his actions – in our case, in artistic creation – is truly an individual. So, it happens that although many works may be a manifestation of a personality, their artistic qualities are unconsciously taken from elsewhere, or are generally of poor quality and ordinary. The artistic aspect of the personality on which the work fundamentally depends thus appears to be weak, lacking in originality, even non-existent. To reproach the previous watchword for 'hyper-individualism' is therefore imprecise; this is a matter not of an overestimation of individuality in general, but of neglect of its artistic aspect, a naïve faith that a manifestation of personality is *eo ipso* a manifestation of an artistic personality. Quite often this has to do with self-deception, since, instead of presenting his own artistic Self (as he is convinced he has done), the artist has in his work unconsciously presented the assimilated Self of someone else (again of course artistic). The requirement that has been set against the watchword 'individualism', in order for the objective qualities of the work of art to be valuable, is therefore correct, but in itself is insufficient, since it would also admit an eclectic work of art, at least of 'refined eclecticism'. In fact it is also asserted, in opposition to 'individualism', that such refined eclectic works should not be condemned – and we also see that they enjoyed genuinely great popularity in their day, and in fact, with regard to the wider public, the greatest popularity. If, however, we look further into the more distant past, we see that these works have mercilessly fallen into oblivion – which is the best evidence that they *lack* artistic value. One must therefore combine the two diverse terms – the first subjective, the second objective. Our way of formulating 'artistic value' has given us a homogenous synthesis; we pointed out that the objective qualities of the work originally dwelled in the soul of the artist and are thus part of his Self, specifically his *artistic* Self. Our term is thus formulated subjectively, that is, psychologically, but nevertheless satisfies the requirement of objective values as well.

It is impossible, however, to express this norm positively. 'Create individual, original artistic qualities' as a command makes no sense, since it demands something that is independent of human will. This is a universally known

phenomenon; after all, 'originality at all costs' (that is, artistic originality), a deliberate creation *in opposition to* existing artistic conventions, is by this very fact dependent on these conventions. The norm can, however, be expressed *negatively*, that is, *Reject* everything that resists the concept of 'the creation of artistic value'! If we consider 'aesthetic value' as well, that is to say, the affective appeal of works of art, as I discussed in Part I, one can formulate the negative norm in three ways.

(a) The artist should not create works that *merely* aim to achieve aesthetic value, affective appeal, or use any artistic qualities to this end, solely with the aim of being highly appealing. Such are the vast number of *pseudo-artistic* works, which assume the name of art only because they use qualities taken from art in order to evoke affective sensations – the same effect could be achieved by other means, which are in fact being increasingly employed. This includes, for example, all works of a sensational, spectacular, horrifying, sentimental, bombastic, and pornographic nature. Such 'art' is bad not because of its achieving affective appeal *in this way*, but because it lacks artistic qualities. After all, Shelley's *The Cenci* evokes horror, and Chopin's nocturnes strike us as moving, Schiller's poems as having pathos. But in these cases high artistic qualities are the vehicles for these effects, and are the main thing, whereas in the previous works the vehicle could be anything, which is why we consider them low, *trivial*.

(b) Particularly in the arts that are in contact with nature and life, thus in sculpture, painting, acting, and writing, the terms 'realism' and 'naturalism' periodically appear. They appear regularly, when the existing artistic qualities in some of those arts have become stale, faded, a mere formula incapable of further development. These qualities' remoteness from the corresponding qualities of nature and life, a remoteness that artistic qualities must always possess, is then felt especially strongly. The watchword 'realism' thus actually means a turning away from formulas, but is formulated as a return to nature, to truth. After all, artists are able to return again and again to the inexhaustible resources of nature and life in order to draw inspiration for new artistic qualities. But this formulation, known also by the watchword 'imitation of nature', seduces weaker artists in particular simply to adopt and copy qualities of nature and life. This is of course, merely mechanical reproduction, not the act of creating as a manifestation of an artist-personality, but is and the artist should therefore not remain only at this stage. By this, we are expressing a *corrective* to the watchword 'naturalism', not its *rejection*. For, if the artist draws inspiration for his creative work from nature and life, even to the greatest extent, and processes them by his personality into new artistic qualities, his naturalistic works are of value (for example, those of Dostoyevsky and Courbet).

(c) In addition to this source, there is another, external source. It is almost

exclusive to certain branches of art, for example, architecture and music, with the exception of course to the artist's own inner Self, which is an internal source, though largely dependent on external sources. These include older and contemporary works and the qualities contained in them. At the beginning of Part II, we stated that a new artist presents the kinds of artistic qualities with which he has become acquainted, and has *transformed* them by means of his individuality. The mental mechanism in the creation of a particular work, even in an original artist, recalls, however, those qualities derived from other influences, which are unchanged or only veiled. We must not think that a great artist has nothing but original ideas; this is far from the case. But, a great artist in his work rejects all ideas that he feels are unoriginal; he is *self-critical*. But surely it is not a matter of the artist's determining their origin by reflection; it is usually by instinctively recognizing that they are somehow 'familiar', if not commonplace, banal qualities. None the less, the requirement to reject out of hand ideas that suggest a derivative origin is extraordinarily difficult to comply with (and to expunge them from a finished work is very difficult, if not impossible). This is particularly true if it is a matter of the influences of a contemporary creative work, whose character has not yet appeared sufficiently clearly to the artist for him to recognize it with certainty in his thoughts.

It is, however, a necessary requirement, since, although indirect, it is also an immensely important condition of the originality of the artist's finished work. If the artist does not meet the requirement of self-criticism, either because he does not wish to or because he cannot, he is in danger of producing an eclectic work, which may find favour in its time – even amongst critics, since even in these circles identifying an artist's originality in his own day is also difficult – but time, the greatest critic, will judge his work harshly. In all histories of art we find few names from earlier periods, whereas in their contemporary sections we find a plethora of 'altogether' good artists. The future will decimate these ranks as well, and in the process it is frequently more stringent than the most stringent critic of the present day, but it is also more just, since it also rehabilitates many an artist who was oppressed in his own time (for example, Rembrandt).