REVIEWS

Gary Kemp and Gabriele M. Mras, eds. *Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-As and Seeing-In*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, 307 + xv pp. ISBN 978-1-138-12346-5

As its editors report, the idea for this interesting collection of twelve essays (plus an introduction by the editors) originated at a 2013 conference at Vienna University entitled 'Wittgenstein and Wollheim: Seeing-As and Seeing-In' (p. xii). The volume is in five parts, with Part One, 'Wittgenstein and Seeing-As', comprising solely Charles Travis's paper 'The Room in a View'. Part Two, 'Difficulties with Wollheim's Borrowing from Wittgenstein', is composed of Joachim Schulte's 'Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It', Avner Baz's 'Aspects of Perception', Hans-Johann Glock's 'Aspect Perception, Perception and Animals', and 'Wittgenstein's Seeing-As: A Survey of Contexts', by Volker A. Munz. Part Three, 'Benefits from Wollheim's Borrowing from Wittgenstein', on offering supposed advantages of understanding Richard Wollheim's project in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein's, draws on our supposed understanding of both Wittgenstein's project here and his insight, although, as we shall see, any 'benefits' will depend on the accuracy, or consistency, of that account of Wittgenstein. This section consists of Garry Hagberg's 'Leonardo's Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection', together with '"Surface" as an Expression of Intention: On Richard Wollheim's Conception of Art as a Form of Life', by Gabriele M. Mras, and 'Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination', by Richard Heinrich. Part Four, 'Rescuing Wollheim's Account without the Support of Wittgenstein', comprises Gary Kemp's 'A Measure of Kant Seen in Wollheim' and Fabian Dorsch's 'Seeing-In as Aspect-Perception'. The volume concludes with Part Five, 'Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim's Account of Pictorial Experience', comprising Michael Levine's 'Wollheim's Ekphrastic Aesthetics: Emotion and Its Relation to Art', and David Hills's 'Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures'. Such part-headings suggest thinking of this book, first, as laying out Wittgenstein's position on aspect perception, understood perhaps (although this is contentious,[1] as we shall see) on the model of the duck-rabbit design *seen-as* a picture of a duck or *seen-as* a picture of a rabbit, then confronting both the difficulties and the benefits of such a use in the hands of Wollheim, and considering whether Wollheim's insights

[1] Since some key questions are exegetical, issues of transparency in the interests of full disclosure require my recognizing having written on this topic and that my account is explicitly rejected by Kemp (p. 202n10). See Graham McFee, 'Wittgenstein on Art and Aspects', *Philosophical Investigations* 22 (1999): 262–84.

were available without the Wittgensteinian pedigree, before turning to Wollheim's account of pictorial experience, although not then dealing centrally with the seeing-in question(s). But the volume is not so straightforward in either its topics or its structure.

To grasp the structure of the volume, we should cast our minds back to the situation in philosophy in the early 1960s. The publication of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, with its discussion of aspect perception (or 'seeing-as') in Part II, stimulated a line of thinking on perception which, in the hands of some aestheticians,[2] seemed to offer a productive way to characterize the perception of art. In this context, Wollheim's long essay *Art and Its Objects* (1968) suggested treating pictorial representation in terms of 'seeing-as'. But, first, the importance of Wollheim's text may make us forget how brief a discussion it is – a fact obscured if (as sometimes in the book under review, p. 172) its numbered *sections* are referred to as 'chapters'. Second, Wollheim's concern with aspect perception owes something to the consideration of related ideas in Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*, where discussion focuses on representational seeing as it relates to art – Gombrich is explicitly considered here (pp. 269–75; pp. 101–2; also p. 169). And, third, Wollheim was not centrally concerned with a scholarly consideration of Wittgenstein's writing, despite using various ideas from Wittgenstein in *Art and Its Objects* – including a discussion of Wittgenstein's transitive/intransitive contrast;[3] instead, his project was to make what he could of ideas he found in Wittgenstein. Indeed, Wollheim comments that, in *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, 'whatever structure the book possesses elsewhere is more or less abandoned' – not a conception that provokes close attention to its argumentative structures![4] Fourth, (as above) previous deployments within aesthetics of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception had not focused specifically on pictorial representation – apart from Gombrich and those he inspired. So, it is quite appropriate that the inclusion of 'pictorial representation' in the title of the volume under review is matched by a change in the order of the key thinkers. For, coming to address again the question of pictorial representation directly, Wollheim recognized what he regarded as a set of problems for the notion of 'seeing-as' as it might be applied in this context:

1. Pictorial representation in art is characterized by its *two-foldness*, so that we are aware of both the surface of the picture and of the 'absent object' – what

[2] Such as Virgil Aldrich, *Philosophy of Art* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Roger Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (London: Methuen, 1974).

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 158–61.

[4] Richard Wollheim, 'On Drawing an Object', in *On Art and the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 3.

the picture is a picture *of* – here, contrasted with the 'flip-flop' of, say, the duck-rabbit.

2. Pictorial representation imports a 'standard of correctness',[5] unlike those 'natural objects', such as faces or figures in clouds or plaster on walls – a 'standard' provided by the intentions of the artist (although how these are to be understood is of course another problem; and there is certainly no implication of a single outcome).[6]

To accommodate these ideas, Wollheim introduced the notion of *seeing-in* (in an essay attached to the second edition of *Art and Its Objects*), subsequently modifying it in his *Painting as an Art* and elsewhere.

This recollected history – especially vivid for a student of Wollheim, as I was in some of this period – highlights three primary questions, even if they overlap with one another. First, what exactly takes place in Wittgenstein's discussion? Given the status of almost all of his later work as *Nachlass* (his unpublished literary remains), one may need help in unravelling Wittgenstein's specific thought as it relates to the many topics in the volume from those expressions of it with which we were left. For, clearly, his expositions were inflected by his target-topics; and these might not be the ones central here. Further, these unpolished expressions may leave something to be desired. If this is less true of *Philosophical Investigations*, especially Part I, than it is of the other posthumously published texts, it nevertheless generates a scholarly controversy not reflected directly in the volume under consideration. Charles Travis ('The Room in a View') does consider what might be made of Wittgenstein's discussion in Part II of *Investigations*, although these concerns are both too distinctive and too far from central concerns with art and depiction to generalize far. Further, a number of the discussions of Wollheim's use of the expression 'seeing-as' in addressing pictorial representation comment on the accuracy, as the authors see it, of his employment of Wittgenstein. But, again, no consensus emerges. Thus, while Glock (p. 79) is clear that 'Wittgenstein starts using the label "seeing-as" in the 1930s', Schulte claims that it appears only late in his work.

Hence, if a first question would be, in effect, 'What did Wittgenstein mean?', a second concerns the use Wollheim made of him. Then, third, could Wollheim's conception be defended independently of any Wittgensteinian pedigree?

Given the diversity of responses even to central questions reflecting the views taken both of Wittgenstein and Wollheim and of their importance, especially in

5 Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 205.

6 See ibid., 119, 206.

respect of pictorial representation, many interesting answers are offered here, but little consensus. Thus, consider:

> Is all perception (really) aspect-perception?
> Is all perception concept-mediated – either because it is aspectual or for some other reason?

To each question, what is Wittgenstein's answer and what is Wollheim's? (How are these related, if at all?) Then, what has any of this to do with depiction in art? More specifically, is there profit in discussing aspect-perception, *seeing-as*, or *seeing-in*? Might these be different, or are they really the same? Further, how do the answers to such questions relate to 'what we ordinarily say'? And how are any of these notions (Wittgenstein's or Wollheim's) *technical*? And, if so, what does that mean when applied to the previous questions?

There is too much, and too much of interest, with too much variety, in this rich volume to consider in detail all its papers. Thus, what follows focuses on key themes suggested by the title of the text, discussing a small number of selected papers, mentioning others only in passing. As a result, many valuable essays remain undiscussed here, of which I would mention in particular Garry Hagberg's 'Leonardo's Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection'. The trade-off is that some are treated in greater detail, and perhaps more critically (in expounding my view), than would be typical in a review. That focus concerns two related kinds of issue: some substantive, scholarly or exegetical questions (what views on the topics of the volume should be ascribed to Wollheim, what to Wittgenstein?) and some methodological ones: how does one criticize or comment on these views? In particular, how might one arbitrate between differing claims as to their views?

However, a prior question for the prospective reader of the text under consideration, a question already alluded to, concerns what texts — especially of Wittgenstein — are germane, a topic on which the contributors differ. Thus, as Travis ('The Room in a View') comments: 'Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein produced a number of manuscripts which included discussion of seeing-as and what he called "seeing aspects"' (p. 3). He is here making three points crucial to the understanding of that material. First, as he rightly says of *seeing-as* and aspectual seeing, '[n]either is remotely the main topic' (p. 3) since these are introduced as 'objects of comparison'; second, 'no view, or account of seeing-as, is offered or endorsed' (p. 3); and, third, these manuscripts are 'more like daybooks than monographs; daily jottings, over an extended period, of daily […] occurrences of ideas and worries' (p. 3). He continues, 'I will refer to these texts

simply as "the daybooks'" (p. 3). Importantly, then, this view does not prioritize the remarks included in *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, as most other contributors do. And, at the least, developing such prioritization remains problematic even if this material (originating in MS 144) is taken as Wittgenstein's summary of that material, not least the difficulty in referring to it accurately. One such difficulty simply concerns its presentation. The 2009 translation of *Philosophical Investigations* treats what had been Part II as a separate text, *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*;[7] and some, but not all, of the contributors here use that designation, others preferring to continue to refer to the material in part of *Philosophical Investigations*. Further, the different page numbers of the 2001 edition render potentially problematic even references to '*Philosophical Investigations*, Part II'.[8] So, here, I shall at times augment reference to *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II (*PI*) with the corresponding references to *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* (*PPF*). Further, the fact that Wittgenstein had this material typed (as TS 234) does not settle the question as to its priority since, as we know, Wittgenstein preferred typescripts to work on, even when they were 'mostly *bad*' (as he said in two places of the material published as volume 1 of *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*).[9]

Equally, the attitude Travis endorses is not without its problems, in part reflecting difficulties the volume identifies. First, we do not know to what extent Wittgenstein's dismissive attitude to *Remarks I* generalized to other sources of now-published 'daybooks'; second, any interpretive strategy that looks across Wittgenstein's later writings is hindered by our failure to know how (if at all) these writings connect with others, and especially with the original Part I of *PI*. Moreover, if our concern includes making sense of Wollheim's writings, we do not know what of Wittgenstein's writings was generally available when, say, Wollheim wrote initially. But Travis is explicitly not concerned with the suggested connection through depiction in art.

To connect the discussion in Wittgenstein to questions about art, our first stop might *appear* to be Joachim Schulte's 'Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It', where he claims that he wants 'to find out whether Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing, or seeing *x* as *y*, can prove useful in discussing certain questions

7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, in *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 182–243. Hereafter: *PPF*.

8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 50th anniversary ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). Hereafter: *PI*.

9 To von Wight in *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Documents and Letters, 1911–1951*, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012), 418; and to Malcolm in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 104. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

in the philosophy of art' (p. 37). Yet, in fact, as we will see, the questions of philosophical aesthetics occur only briefly and tangentially in Schulte.

He remarks: 'I find the present scholarly situation surprising' (p. 37) – as I do, although perhaps for different reasons. For Schulte (p. 38), 'it was plain that there was next to nothing in Wittgenstein's text that had any direct bearing on questions in the philosophy of art'. So, what is Wittgenstein's topic in these passages? And what was his methodology? These are questions Schulte undertakes to address.

At least three factors must make us hesitate when faced with a description of Wittgenstein's project in the terms Schulte (p. 39) offers: say, 'a desire not to overlook certain diversities in our ways of using words', nor as being either 'extremely interested in what we say in situations that appear to warrant being described in terms of seeing-as or related locutions', or as concerned with 'detectable conformity or non-conformity of linguistic behaviour' (p. 39). For Wittgenstein's concerns are not obviously with language as such. Thus, first, even when two terms are distinguishable in German, Wittgenstein (in his writings) did not standardly always distinguish the use of one term (say, *Erfahrung*, one translation for 'experience') from that of another (say, *Erlebnis*, also translatable as 'experience': see Schulte, p. 42). Second, Wittgenstein did not conduct the sorts of empirical survey required to determine what, as a matter of fact, people do say in some context. Then, third, Wittgenstein employed both 'finding *and inventing* intermediate cases' (*PI*, § 122, my emphasis): for example, cases involving measuring wood in ways we currently do not[10] or making sense of utterances where there is no *one* thing we *do* (or anyone does) say – since nobody presently encounters this situation, to the point where there 'is not enough regularity for us to call it "language"' (*PI*, § 207). Of course, to discuss Wittgenstein's attitude to specific linguistic usage is to enter deep waters: we know he felt that, under certain circumstances, one could 'say what one liked' (*PI*, § 79), as long as one respected distinctions thereby drawn. At the least, Wittgenstein was not seeking to police a limited conception of 'what we say'. Rather, one must recognize the specific contexts within which questions arise (when they do), and not read 'at the foot of the letter'. But if Wittgenstein's claims are not rooted in this kind of semi-empirical semantic investigation, at what exactly is Schulte's criticism of Wollheim (below) at this point being directed?

As Schulte (p. 38) accurately records, Wollheim[11] had defended the view that 'there is a kind of seeing appropriate to representations': there, Wollheim

[10] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 93–94, §§ 147–50.

[11] In the 1968 edition of *Art and Its Objects*.

designated that kind of seeing 'seeing-as' – although one must remember that Wollheim can scarcely have taken this as a contribution to Wittgenstein scholarship since, as above, Wollheim preferred to find in the remarks in Part II of *PI* something to be taken 'as a hint, as a suggestion', since, by then, for him, 'whatever structure the book possesses elsewhere is more or less abandoned' – I do not say he was right, but this thought clarifies his procedure.[12] Moreover, Wollheim there took this to be 'well known'.

Careful reading makes clear that Wollheim does not wish to discuss particular linguistic idioms either, and certainly not just *any* combination of the words 'see-[something]-as-[something]'. Instead, he attempts to clarify the context that he *is* addressing in two ways, one of which gets Schulte's specific attention – namely, his claim that, in developing his distinction between seeing-in and seeing-as, he has 'not drawn heavily upon linguistic intuitions', regarding his usage as 'quasi-technical' (p. 39).[13]

Schulte concedes that Wollheim's expressed concern is with 'the use of given types of phrase *in certain contexts of utterance*' (my emphasis), rather than 'the use of these phrases in all conceivable contexts' (p. 40). But even this concession to contextualism does not go far enough: as we have seen, Wollheim regards the usage he addresses as technical. Schulte urges that 'the standard use of seeing *x* as *y* requires that y refer to a thing or type of thing different from what is signified by *x*' (p. 40). Does he think Wollheim would disagree? Schulte here recognizes Wittgenstein's point that 'in describing what another person sees I may say, in respect of what is a picture of a duck, that he sees it as a picture of a duck – *provided* it is clear to me and to my intended hearer that the picture is an ambiguous one' (p. 40; see *PPF*, § 121; *PI*, pp. 194–95): very roughly, it is satisfactory to talk of seeing the duck-rabbit design as a picture of a duck, since one thereby grants it could have been seen as a picture of a rabbit. Is this 'the standard use' too? That is unclear to me.

But, of course, Wollheim's discussion of the perception of depictions does not remain within the ambit of 'seeing-as'. Instead, as Schulte quotes from Wollheim, a contrasting situation is introduced, such that 'seeing-in is a special perceptual capacity, which presupposes, but is something over and above, straightforward perception' (p. 41),[14] a difference recognized when one notes the different ways each might fail. Schulte seems unhappy with such a reference to 'straightforward

12 Richard Wollheim, 'On Drawing an Object', in *On Art and the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 3.

13 Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 209.

14 Ibid., 217.

perception'; but his own talk of 'standard case' seems equally impossible to completely elaborate without some similar appeal.

Still, for Schulte, something of the 'flip-flop' between seeing a duck-picture and seeing a rabbit-picture remains crucial. Thus, my saying, 'Now it's a rabbit', 'Now it's a duck''serves to communicate to other people that I have caught on to the particular switching capacity of the figure' (pp. 42–43). Of course, an outsider, hearing me say both, might with justice describe this as my seeing first one of the aspects, *then* the other – although notice that then the focus still appears to be on words! Nevertheless, Schulte's point is that the *as* construction must have some function here. Hence, as Schulte grants, this claim about seeing a duck 'would be completely out of place' for what Wollheim calls 'straightforward perception' (p. 43) – as though otherwise my perceptions were inexplicably temporary! As Schulte notes, 'it would be foolish and possibly misleading – or an elaborate kind of philosophical joke – to say that I am seeing [the unmistakable rabbit in the backyard] *as* a rabbit' (p. 43). It would be a philosophical joke just because Wollheim's expression is self-avowedly technical; but it might be satisfactory to explain in this way my coming to see the creature: 'I was not sure a few minutes ago, but now I see the blurred shape in the fog as a rabbit' – perhaps I had better say, 'I see that it is a rabbit (after all)'. (Kemp, below, returns roughly to this.) Indeed, it is because of such differences that aspect-perception offers a potential 'object of comparison' for such cases. Further, Schulte explicitly notes that, in 'noticing an aspect', the duck-rabbit is a potential 'object of comparison' (p. 44).

However, Schulte also addresses critically Wollheim's writing of 'seeing photographs as photographs' (p. 40): he seems to regard Wollheim's concession that talk of 'seeing a photograph as a photograph' can be good English as contradicting the above claim about always seeing X *as* Y. But, while it seems to do so, in fact it does not, since that example of a use of 'seeing-as' in English is introduced precisely to set it aside. For Wollheim is careful to elaborate the alternatives to seizing on the photographic properties of the photograph: 'To concentrate on *this* not *that*.'

Despite Schulte's difficulties with this way of putting the matter, the contrast is fairly plain. And Wollheim carefully explains this idea in terms of 'the seeing *appropriate* to photographs, or to seeing photographs as photographs'.[15] But what is it to see a photograph *as* a photograph? An example may highlight what Wollheim aims to deny here. Suppose that, given our interest in Elvis Presley, we regard a photograph of Elvis for its photographic interest – we take it to look like

[15] Ibid., 208, quoted by Schulte, p. 39.

Elvis, and can learn something from it about how he looks. But, if we cannot get a photograph of Elvis, we might make do with a painting of Elvis where the painter used the smarter brother, Enis, as his model. Because they look 'alike', the painter can use Enis (or even the photograph of Enis) as a model for his painting of Elvis. As a result, someone might treat this second photograph as being one of Elvis. But that would be to set aside some of its key photographic features, as contrasted with the painting. For, while the photograph was of Enis, the painting would be of Elvis.

Wollheim's point is that such a concern fails to treat the photograph *as* a photograph. Here, no doubt the expression 'see-[something]-as-[something]' is correctly used in English when one sees the photograph of Elvis *as* of Elvis. But that is precisely why Wollheim, in clarifying *his* topic, sets this one aside. For here the appropriate contrast is with mis-seeing (and not 'seeing as' at all). One sees the photographic properties. The implicit injunction is to focus on what the photograph is a photograph of – and hence what is in the photograph (for example, the hairy wart on Enis's cheek, not shared by his more handsome brother, just the sort of thing the painter omitted).

Schulte comments, 'I do not want to suggest that the perception or contemplation of works of art is highly similar or almost identical to that of figures like the double-cross or the Rubin vase' (p. 46). And neither does Wollheim. Rather, the original thought that there was an advantage in modelling the seeing of representations in this way – where representational seeing is at best only one element of concern to philosophical aesthetics. No doubt there are those who are content with this element alone: perhaps they would do better with the likenesses the camera affords.

Later Wollheim came to see that this 'kind of seeing appropriate to representations' had distinctive characteristics that made it better treated in a different way, via 'the new notion of seeing-in'. Wollheim draws the distinction in terms of 'two distinct perceptual projects' (quoted by Schulte, p. 38), although for Schulte, 'paying attention to the words we are inclined to use in situations of seeing aspects may help us to arrive at a place Wollheim wants us to reach with his notion of seeing-in' (p. 47). Such a methodological injunction too runs counter to Wollheim's preference for the introduction of a technical term.

Hans-Johann Glock ('Aspect Perception, Perception and Animals') offers a contrasting set of concerns as well as a contrasting set of 'conclusions', while aiming at 'sketching the historical background of the idea of aspect perception […] making a case for a particular interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of the topic; and […] addressing some central philosophical questions raised by his discussion' (p. 77). Nothing in this initial characterization concerns directly either

pictorial representation ('In the present context, we can leave aside the presented object', p. 83) or Wollheim.[16] Further, both substantively and in exegesis, Glock rejects the idea that 'all cases of perception involve aspect-perception' as well as 'the view that aspect-perception holds the key to a proper explanation of other forms of perception'. His strategy involves responding to Mulhall, in part by 'placing the passages […] in their proper context' (p. 77).[17]

Thus, to answer some of our initial questions, Glock argues for 'two claims: that not all perception is aspect-perception; and that not all aspect-perception involves interpretation' (p. 77). But to make this out, we must have a clearer view of what 'interpretation' involves (see p. 87), in particular, with what it is contrasted. (Wittgenstein certainly thinks some things are just *seen* – as Glock shows: p. 89.)

At the least, 'the role of aspect-perception in Wittgenstein's later thought derives from its being a kind of perception' (Glock, p. 82); and hence a suitable 'object of comparison' since cases it both resembles and differs from can be brought to bear. That is why Wittgenstein emphasizes 'the difference of category between the two "objects" of sight', while granting that both are objects of *sight* (*PI*, pp. 203–5; *PPF* §§ 181–93; quoted by Glock, p. 83). Thus, 'when looking at a picture object we can come to *see* it differently, although we also *see* that the object itself remains *unchanged*' (Glock, p. 85). In part, no doubt this reflects the influence of Wittgenstein's reading of Köhler's gestalt psychology (pp. 78–79). And so, it is here that 'problems about the concept of seeing come to a head'.[18] For, as Glock remarks, 'the concept of *seeing* an aspect lies between that of *seeing*, which is a passive state or process that the subject is in, and that of *interpreting*, which is an action, something the agent does' (p. 87).

Further, 'the characteristic of aspect-dawning is precisely that no specific feature of the visual field changes, whether it be the components or their arrangement' (p. 84). Notice also that '[a]spect-dawning is not simply a matter of intellectually recognizing that visual appearances are delusive' (p. 87).

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16 Although see p. 79 for the view that 'Wollheim's ambition to put his ideas in the service of an account of pictorial representation are more congenial' than some other attempts to invoke Wittgenstein for one's own purposes; and discussed on pp. 92–94.

17 Throughout, Glock is partly responding to Mulhall, who had urged that Wittgenstein was not denying that ordinary perception involved continuous aspect-perception: rather, the key passage in which he seemed to do so (*PPF*, §§ 122–23) actually concerned the dawning of aspects. See Stephen Mulhall, 'Seeing Aspects', in *Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader*, ed. Hans-Johann Glock (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 246–67. Against this conception, Glock urges in particular that such a reading does not, after all, cohere with *PPF*, § 123, which is 'not necessarily episodic' (p. 89); and, for ordinary perception, 'it is even less plausible to regard it as constantly recognizing something […]' (p. 90) than it is for aspect-dawning.

18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), § 172, quoted by Glock, p. 86.

Wittgenstein's central diagnosis of aspect-blindness (a 'lack of a certain kind of (visual) imagination', p. 88) should be familiar to all who use multiple-figures, such as the duck-rabbit, in their teaching: there are always some students who, despite the best efforts of explanation or characterization, cannot see one aspect. Hence aspect-perception offers a suitable 'object of comparison' here because of the 'close connection between two phenomena: "meaning blindness" and "aspect blindness"' (p. 81).

In developing this account, Glock builds on an exegetical claim (*PI*, pp. 195; *PPF*, §§ 122–24): 'It would have made as little sense for me to say [of the picture rabbit] "Now I am seeing it as …" as to say at the sight of a knife and fork "Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork". This expression would not be understood […]. One does not take what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery […]' (p. 89). On this basis, he concludes (and surely rightly) that for Wittgenstein at least 'seeing-as requires a contrast between two different ways of perceiving an object, but under normal circumstances it makes no sense to say that one sees cutlery *as* a knife and fork' (p. 89). Contra Schulte, this is not *seeing-as*. And that has nothing to do with whether such a sentence, if uttered, would be correct English.[19]

A range of 'objects of perception' (that is, of things *seen*) is only open to those with certain conceptual masteries. Glock addresses this theme by considering the philosophy of animal minds (pp. 94–97): consider the responses of cats to mirrors (I am a disgruntled pet owner: see p. 95). Yet does the cat see its own reflection? Clearly, the cat sees *something* – and not merely 'as-if' sees it – not least because the connections Glock mentions to flight, and so on, are present in such a case. We might grant, on the basis of behaviour, that some cats discriminate one case from another.

But now consider, say, a dance critic dismissing the range of dance available to the ordinary resident of Southern California ('the Southlands'), a case I quote to show that it is not mere invention: 'My parrot, Steve, lives in a cage near the TV set and so has seen more dance than many Southlands balletomanes – although he much prefers car chases, parades, game shows, hurricanes.'[20] In effect, this passage embodies two claims: (a) that the author's parrot, Steve, sees more dances and hence sees *dances*; and (b) that his parrot prefers something else. But Glock has shown why these should both be rejected. Merely squawking at the TV set should not count as expressing a preference here, and merely seeing patterns of light and shade (even granting that ability to Steve the parrot) is no guarantee of seeing danceworks.

19 Glock sets aside Mulhall's specific objections (pp. 89–90); see note 17.

20 Lewis Segal, 'An Art of Stolen Glances', *Los Angeles Times*, 6 January 2008.

These points are reflected in Wollheim's discussion of the 'interlock between perception and conceptions',[21] since the key question is *what* do we see? And, as Wollheim notes there, seeing (say) elm trees surely involves at least some contrast with seeing oak trees, and so on: that is, it builds on a conceptual mastery. Further, we recognize that the question is a perceptual one, about what I see, not about inference from it. And hence there is a connection to the fallen-over triangle (*PI*, p. 207; *PPF*, § 217) where more than 'seeing-as' is required. If this is correct, Wittgenstein and Wollheim are presented as 'working the street', in this respect at least.

So, Glock has made clear why one might, with justice, stress the flip-flop dimension of aspect-perception (typified by the duck-rabbit), contrasting it with perception in general. Further, he ties this discussion to specific remarks in Wittgenstein. Moreover, he has recognized differences in concern between such remarks and Wollheim's (later) project.

By contrast, for Gary Kemp ('A Measure of Kant Seen in Wollheim'), the most illuminating comparison for Wollheim's views may not be Wittgenstein at all. Instead, Kemp urges, 'Wollheim […], despite his occasional remarks to the contrary, is best seen as borrowing not from Wittgenstein in formulating his theory of pictorial depiction, but, at least implicitly and loosely, from Kant' (p. 193). Not that implicitly; but not that explicitly in a scholarly way – Wollheim does not, say, typically quote Kant. And here one might also recall Peter Hacker's early attempts to use Kantian ideas to characterize Wittgenstein's project.[22] Thus, it is slightly puzzling that Kemp begins by referring to 'Wittgenstein's remarks about aspect-perception – *seeing-as* and *seeing-in*' (p. 183). For surely 'seeing-in' in this context is Wollheim's coining. And, even if we found something in Wittgenstein's German best translated as 'seeing-in', it would not be this idea of Wollheim's: as with the term 'paradigm' once Thomas Kuhn had employed it successfully in philosophy, one cannot infer that previous uses of that term were *really* talking about Kuhnian paradigms.

Kemp stresses that Wittgenstein rejects the psychologism inherent in the search for 'a conceptual underpinning of perception which operates beneath the threshold of awareness'. But he thinks 'Wollheim's preference of [the notion] *seeing-in* over [the notion] *seeing-as* in his account of pictorial seeing […] was indeed a mistake', in part because the notion of two-foldness 'does not provide anything like a decisive reason for the preference' (p. 183). But what would count as a 'decisive reason' here?

[21] Richard Wollheim, *The Mind and Its Depths* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 134.

[22] Peter Hacker, *Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), vii.

Kemp treats 'seeing-as' as though its investigation required plotting the uses of a linguistic expression, when (for both Wittgenstein and Wollheim) it was recognizably technical. This is even worse for 'seeing-in': one example offered is '[s]eeing a camel in the clouds' (p. 184) – but is it *there*? I doubt it. And, if our concern is with pictorial representation, we are unlikely to begin profitably from '[s]eeing gloominess in a landscape'. For Kemp, Wollheim 'infers' that seeing-in, rather than seeing-as, is 'at the heart of pictorial representation' (p. 185). But, as Wollheim explains, he came to *seeing-in* through self-criticism of (his version of) *seeing-as*.[23] Kemp urges that, to maintain his position:

> Wollheim will have either to deny that the skill of the boy who says of a cloud that it is a camel is exercising the same skill as when he identifies a camel as the subject of a drawing, or, say, somewhat idiosyncratically, that what is really going on in the cloud case is not seeing-as, or not merely seeing-as, but that the boy sees a camel in the clouds. (p. 185)

But how could this dilemma be foisted onto Wollheim? There is no *depiction* of a camel in the cloud: moreover, the cloud is not the sort of ambiguous figure where the boy might with justice see it now as depicting this, now as that (contrast Hamlet!).

To see the object in the picture is to see the marked surface in a certain way. Thus, to see the duck picture in the duck-rabbit design treats that design as depicting a duck: indeed, it is to see the duck picture when looking at the design. But such a suggestion, suitable for a design like the duck-rabbit (which may be seen two ways), will not typically be appropriate for a depiction *intended* to be seen this or that way: only when there *is* such an aspect can one legitimately see the design as such-and-such; or see such-and-such *in* the design. The wall stains described by Leonardo (contrast Kemp, p. 195; see also Hagberg, pp. 117–19) differ revealingly in this respect. There, the invitation is for intending-*painters* to make what they could of a marked surface when *nothing* is actually depicted: in fact, this is an invitation for these aspiring painters to 'read into' those stains a design they necessarily lack (as stains); and hence to import a 'standard of correctness'[24] necessarily lacking.

Kemp augments his comments with verbal remarks: faced with a picture of a soldier, one can say, 'I see it as a soldier's being angry' – although (with Glock, quoted previously) I cannot grasp why, apart from the verbal point, this should be thought 'seeing-as', if the picture *depicts* the soldier's anger. Drawing together related cases, Kemp comments: 'I am not sure the grammar of English is

[23] Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 209.

[24] Ibid., 208.

determinate on the issue' (p. 186). But, of course, technical coinings might be determinate, or anyway more determinate than anything provided by 'the grammar of English': with Wittgenstein, I am inclined to urge that one can say what one likes (*PI*, § 79). Thus, as Kemp notes, 'an opponent of Wollheim could point out that for at least *many* statements of seeing-in, there is an equivalent statement of seeing-as and vice versa' (p. 187). This might, at best, show us something about English usage. Further, to see the soldier's anger is to see the soldier: not to see him as anything! But, of course, I am looking at a marked surface. In that sense, I see the soldier (depicted) in that surface.

According to Kemp, 'it is of the essence of aspect-perception that we are able, for example, to see the cloud as a camel, but at no point interrupt our perception of the cloud' (p. 187): but this is not Wittgenstein's use of the expression 'seeing-as'. In continuous object-seeing, I see and understand what others recognize as aspectual. The mistake here lies in asking if one could *say* this (in English or German) – not a concern of Wittgenstein or Wollheim.

For Wittgenstein, the seeing of aspects (or aspectual seeing) is not always expressed by talk of *seeing-as* – the point is to mark the key distinctions (in line with *PI*, § 79); and, for our discussion of *seeing-as* and *seeing-in*, these must be (a) what Wittgenstein introduces and then (b) what Wollheim decides. Yet both seem problematic. To take them in reverse order, Kemp reads Wollheim as urging that 'a picture represents y if and only if the maker successfully intends the envisaged audience to have an experience of two-folded perception with the picture as the primary object and y as the secondary object' (p. 188). No citation is given for the complete view; but is Wollheim really importing the exceptionlessness of 'if and only if'? One might think his generous account of the maker's intentions – functioning primarily to preclude mistaken accounts – spoke against this. After all, he granted early on: 'The spectator will always understand more than the artist intended, and the artist will always have intended more than any single spectator understands.'[25]

Moreover, Kemp recognizes that 'Wittgenstein did not take the seeing of an aspect to be our usual way of perceiving things – that, for example, when I see a chair, and recognize it as a chair, I am seeing it as a chair' (p. 192). (Wittgenstein might express this by saying that only of what *has* aspects can one see aspects.) Yet, despite granting that 'this was not Wittgenstein's view' (p. 192), Kemp wishes to use this form of words. Consider one of his examples:

> Suppose I look across the river on a midday walk and see what looks for all the world [Really? For *all* the world?] like a curled-up fox. Yet it is surely too exposed […] for a fox

[25] Ibid., 119.

> to be sleeping in broad daylight. I conclude that it is not a fox but a tree stump. I try seeing it as a fox and am successful; I try seeing it as a stump and am equally successful. […] In fact, it was a fox, as I was surprised to learn a moment later when I saw it move. Now I am back to seeing a fox as a fox. (p. 192)

Is it a bird? Is it a plane? I took it for either a bird or a plane until I realized it was Superman. If I was unsure what I was seeing (better, what I was looking at), it is not that each view is equally successful; rather, none is successful – I have not yet decided between what I recognize as alternatives. In the fox case, I *should* conclude that I was seeing a fox all along (no *seeing-as*) but I had been mistaken.

Kemp identifies Wittgenstein's concern as with 'a tiny sub-class of examples of the phenomenon of aspect-perception' – those where it operates explicitly, whereas 'normally it operates silently and automatically'; but, insofar as this is Wittgenstein's coining, he decides what are the relevant cases. Thus, Kemp concludes that, faced with Wittgenstein's remark that when seeing cuttlery, 'one would not be understood' saying 'I am seeing it as a knife and fork', nevertheless 'it is not ruled out that "I see a knife and fork" is true' (p. 193).

This strikes me as precisely what Wittgenstein was disputing with the knife-and-fork example (*PI*, p. 195; *PPF*, §§ 122–23 quoted above): the reason is, roughly, that in 'ordinary perception' I see objects for what they are. Suppose the earlier case comes out differently; then I recognize the stump for the stump it is. If I later learn that others *mistake* it for a fox, I can only offer my sympathy. But if this were an unusual object with aspects, where I see only one (what Wittgenstein called 'continuous seeing of an aspect': *PI*, p. 194; *PPF*, § 118), the context is aspectual even if I do not know/recognize it. Others might comment on my inability to see (some) aspects. Then if it is later pointed out to me, I may now ('suitably prompted')[26] be able to see either the aspect I had missed, or to see what is depicted in a painting. (That is the similarity!) And fundamental here will be the recognition that I no longer mistake one thing for another.

If I see the painting, then – by two-foldness – I can perhaps see Henry VIII in the picture. This is to recognize the *painting* and the *depiction*. But when I see the duck-rabbit, so that I say, 'Now I am seeing a duck – or, better, a picture-duck', that is incompatible with the claim I'd express as 'Now I am seeing a picture-rabbit'. Yet it is not incompatible with my recognizing the collection of lines – these are not among the claims when one's attention is on aspects.

As Kemp notes, the dawning of an aspect is a key idea (p. 192). But aspects can only dawn when there *are* aspects. Perhaps there are cases in general philosophy

[26] Richard Wollheim, *On Formalism and Its Kinds* (Barcelona: Fundacio Antoni Tapies, 1995), 34.

where insight is gained by contrasting one perspective on an event with another, and calling both aspects.[27] But, for depictions – Wollheim's topic – the matter is more straightforward. Kemp asks us to 'suppose I am seeing a cloud as a camel' (p. 196): but what exactly is this case? As he elaborates, 'When we come to see a passing cloud as a rabbit, we do the same sort of thing we do when we see a collection of drawn lines as a rabbit' (p. 202n10). Now I am puzzled as to what is even roughly 'the same' here. The cloud has no aspects! And I have never mistaken a collection of drawn lines for a rabbit – at best, I might see them as a picture-rabbit or as depicting a rabbit.

Of course (a) the drawn-lines might depict a rabbit (and hence be a candidate for seeing-in); the passing cloud cannot; (b) what does 'same sort of thing' mean here? As the example of a depiction makes clear, what is being seen is not irrelevant here; (c) the use of aspect-perception as an 'object of comparison' for genuine perception is undermined if all perception actually involves aspect-perception; and (d) as we saw Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes at least three cases here – Kemp seems unconcerned with Wittgenstein's view.

As far as depictions go, this might suggest the revealing case of *trompe l'oeil* effects, an example that can be developed in two directions: taking the painting itself for a curtain covering that painting and taking for a painting what was actually a small window onto a static landscape. Neither case may long survive; but, while they remain *trompe l'oeil* (or its opposite), each is a ringer one takes (mistakes) for an object of the other kind. So, they are not taken as depictive: to recognize the painting as a depiction requires precisely seeing through the *trompe l'oeil* effects. Kemp raises the question 'even if one is not deceived' (p. 195). But these *are* cases of genuine deception. Indeed, Wollheim's point about pictorial representation being perceptual means that while one's *oeil* is being *tromped* one is not seeing a depiction just because one takes it (mistakes it, if you like) for, say, the curtain it actually depicts. I see it as *trompe oeil* only when I recognize it as a depiction.

Further, as we have seen, Kemp's concern is not restricted to depiction in art, or even to depiction generally. Indeed, his concern with Kant connects directly to the themes of the volume, as reflected here: in particular, the questions whether all perception is aspect-perception and whether all perception is concept-mediated. For instance, he quotes 'the Kantian dictum that thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (p. 196) apparently as though this meant that all perception were aspect perception, on the way to offering 'the revised theory, [in which] *all* ordinary perception involves

[27] Compare Gordon Baker, *Wittgenstein's Method: Selected Aspects* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 279–93.

both seeing-as and seeing-in' (p. 201) – a view opposed, for instance, to the one we have just seen offered by Glock. This illustrates the internal complexity of the volume and the difficulty of the reviewer.

I hope that the foregoing has brought out some of the interest as well as the difficulty of this volume. Finally, I should not close this discussion without favourable mention of the Oxford comma in the volume title.

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