COLLINGWOOD AND 'ART PROPER': FROM IDEALISM TO CONSISTENCY

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Collingwood's 'art-proper' definition has been controversial. Wollheim argues that his Theory of Imagination assumes that the nature of the artwork exists solely in the mind, committing him to the Ideal Theory. Consequently, when Collingwood states that the audience is essential for the artist and the artwork, he is being inconsistent. In contrast, Ridley claims that Collingwood's Expression Theory saves him from Wollheim's accusations; hence he is consistent and does not support the Ideal Theory. I demonstrate that Collingwood both adheres to the Ideal Theory (contrary to Ridley) and is consistent in his art theory (contrary to Wollheim). I show that imagination is the sufficient condition of art and expression is the process of art's coming into existence. I argue that Collingwood is consistent in his theory because the audience and the externalization of the work are needed for an appreciation and understanding of the artwork as either good or bad, as either a work of a corrupt consciousness or not. Hence, an account of the role of externalization is a contribution to the epistemology, not the ontology, of art.

I. INTRODUCTION

In *Principles of Art* (*PA*) Collingwood defines 'artwork' as an imaginary experience by which we express our emotions.[1] This 'art proper' definition, however, has been controversial in the philosophy of art. Wollheim attacked Collingwood, accusing him of propounding the so-called 'Ideal Theory'. According to him, the Ideal Theory asserts that the work of art is something non-physical, mental, or even ethereal, whose place is the mind or some other mental field. The audience therefore lacks direct access to it; they just 'infer it, intuit it or imaginatively re-create it from its embodiment'.[2] Wollheim raises two main objections: first, he says that the relation between the audience and the artist is severed because it engenders a kind of aesthetic solipsism; second, the 'Ideal Theory totally ignores the significance of the medium'.[3] Consequently, he criticizes Collingwood for being inconsistent in the third book of *PA*, where Collingwood states that the audience is essential for the artist and the artwork. As a result, Wollheim asserts that the first book of *PA*, where Collingwood asserts Art-as-Imagination, and the third book of *PA*, where he argues that the role of the audience is to be a collaborator in the work of art, contradict each other.[4] Unlike Wollheim, Ridley

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1 R. G. Collingwood, *Principles of Art* (1938; New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 151.

2 Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 35.

3 Ibid.

4 Richard Wollheim, 'On an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood's Aesthetic', in *On Art and the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 250–59.

asserts that Collingwood is no supporter of the Ideal Theory and is therefore indubitably consistent.[5] Ridley claims that we should read *PA* 'more carefully and more charitably'.[6] According to him, Wollheim and his followers misinterpreted Collingwood and neglected his Expression Theory. 'I am fairly confident,' writes Ridley, 'that I can show that if one takes his Expression Theory seriously, and if one makes a (careful, charitable) effort to see how it might fit in with the chapter on imagination, the temptation to read Collingwood as defending the so-called Ideal theory at all should evaporate.'[7] He says that if we 'wrench out' the expression theory 'from its proper context', then it would suppress much more than it illuminates.[8] We would thus end up with the inaccurate conclusion that the physical medium is an accidental outcome of the imagined artwork: 'the dirty-handed artist's idea is *essentially* embodied in its public manifestation and […] the active-eared spectator, in engaging imaginatively with the manifestation, understands it.'[9] Therefore, according to Ridley, what Wollheim and others have attacked in Collingwood is untenable because 'Collingwood cannot really have espoused' any Ideal Theory.[10]

What exactly, then, is Collingwood saying? I agree with Wollheim that imagination for Collingwood is the sufficient condition for art. But Wollheim misreads the role of the audience and externalization. I claim that Collingwood considers them necessary for making the distinction between good art and bad art, not pseudo-art and art proper. Externalization and audience are necessary for art's epistemology not its ontology. Collingwood is therefore consistent. And against Ridley, I contend with John Dilworth[11] that while trying to be charitable to an author we should also abstain from changing what the author really meant, since that would definitely not be charitable to him. Collingwood, without doubt, would not be happy, after writing a big book explaining how art is something imaginary and expressive, if someone read him as claiming that this was absolutely not so. This conclusion would indicate that he was either confused about the theory or not 'able to write clearly enough'.[12] For an author, surely, rather than these conclusions, to abstain from changing the author's intentions is more charitable.[13]

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5 Aaron Ridley, 'Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 55 (1997): 263–72.

6 Ibid., 263

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 266.

9 Ibid., 267, emphasis added.

10 Ibid., 269.

11 John Dilworth, 'Is Ridley Charitable to Collingwood?', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 56 (1998): 393–96.

12 Ibid., 394.

13 Ibid.

Lastly, against Ridley's argument, I claim that Art-as-Expression is parasitic on Art-as-Imagination, since the latter acts as a mediator between the physical and the mental (consciousness). Collingwood should not, I argue, be dismissed as proposing inconsistent or untenable ideas. Instead, it should be acknowledged that the fact that a work of art is an ideal object presents valuable insight into the question of why aesthetic disputes are intractable. In this sense, the idea that artworks are imaginative entities is not a vice but a virtue. This is something we should celebrate, since it helps explain the contentious nature of aesthetics.[14]

II. IMAGINATION: THE ONTOLOGY OF ART

First and foremost, it needs to be demonstrated that imagination is sufficient for something to be art. In the first book of *PA*, Collingwood says: 'The work of art proper is something not seen or heard; but something imagined.'[15] It is intended for the end of 'total imaginative experience'. The term 'total imaginative experience' signifies a crucial part of Collingwood's work because, as he says, the artwork is not merely an imagined sound or patterns of colour; rather, it is the experience in its totality.[16] Hence, he gives the example of Cézanne, who, in his view, had started to paint 'like a blind man'.[17] When one looked at Cézanne's paintings, one was not only 'seeing' but also 'touching' them.[18] The paintings had maximized the tactile dimension. For the audience, therefore, art is also the product of their imagination.[19] Hence, Collingwood concludes, 'a work of art proper is a total activity which the person enjoying it apprehends, or is conscious of by the use of his imagination'.[20] These remarks of Collingwood's have to be considered the first signs of the role imagination plays in his theory as determining an artwork's ontological features. These remarks already give a rough idea of the role imagination plays in his ontology of a work of art.

The second book of *PA* is more about Collingwood's philosophy of mind, how the human mind works, and the role of its faculties. It seeks to explain that imagination is the main agent mediating between thinking and feeling.[21] Like Hume, Collingwood uses the term 'impression' for the immediate givens, such as sensations. Impressions, which we receive from the outside world, reside in our

14 I thank Gary Kemp who presented me with these valuable views.
15 Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 142.
16 Ibid., 151.
17 Ibid., 144.
18 Ibid., 146.
19 In order to experience the motor sensations of a Masaccio, Collingwood argues, 'we need not walk straight through the picture, or even stride about the gallery', but rather imagine ourselves as if we were moving in these ways. See ibid., 147.
20 Ibid., 151.
21 Ibid., 161–64.

psyche and we become aware of them as 'ideas' by means of our imagination. He continuously mentions Kant, for whom 'imagination is the blind but indispensable faculty'.[22] In this respect, Kemp asserts that the role of imagination in Collingwood's philosophy of mind is markedly Kantian and his art theory is much like Croce's.[23] The Kantian metaphysics of mind rejects the previously held Cartesian and Humean mind-as-theatre conception. Kant claims that mind is not a passive recipient, but rather itself actively creates its content; this act of creation is called 'synthesis'.[24] Understanding is formed by responding to sensations, and awareness occurs by means of imagination.[25] According to Collingwood, 'imagination contrasts with sensation as something active with something passive, something we do with something we undergo'.[26] But imagination must be preceded by consciousness or attention. Consciousness is a state of mind which enables the *sensa* to be interpreted. As a result, Kemp illustrates Collingwood's philosophy of mind as follows:[27]



Thus, the sensations that we receive from the external world – namely, impressions – are transmuted into ideas by means of consciousness. Consciousness interprets the raw data (feelings), and issues ideas that possess meaning. Without the faculty of imagination, however, consciousness in itself is unable to fulfil its task. It is by means of imagination that consciousness enables

22 Ibid., 171.

23 Gary Kemp, 'The Croce-Collingwood Theory as Theory', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 61 (2003): 171–93. This Croce–Collingwood similarity is a lot older than the assertions of Kemp. The views on these matters can be seen in John Hospers, 'Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art', *Philosophy* 31 (1956): 291–308; Alan Donagan, 'The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art', *Philosophy* 33 (1958): 162–67; Richard Sclafani, 'Wollheim on Collingwood', *Philosophy* 52 (1976): 353–59.

24 Kemp, 'Croce-Collingwood Theory', 173.

25 See the matchbox example in Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 192–94.

26 Ibid., 195.

27 Kemp, 'Croce-Collingwood Theory', 176.

the 'transmutation' process to take place. In other words, whereas consciousness or the act of being attentive might do the requisite work, each of them is impotent without the assistance of an agent – namely, imagination, as the agent of the synthesis between feeling and intellect. Furthermore, concerning their ontological features, although imagination is described as a faculty of the mind, consciousness is named as a state of mind, since it is required for imagination to function. Lastly, since the transmutation of sensations into ideas takes place by means of imagination, the end result (ideas) exists by inference as 'the ideas of imagination'. We can therefore make a slight change to the graph, and add the faculty of imagination and its products as follows:



This is also summarized and shown by Collingwood in the following passage:

> The sensuous experience need not exist by itself first. It may come into being under the very eyes, so to speak, of consciousness; so that it no sooner comes into being than it is transmuted into imagination. Nevertheless, there is always a distinction between what transmutes (consciousness), what is transmuted (sensation), and what is transmuted into (imagination).[28]

III. EXPRESSION: NECESSARY FOR IMAGINATION

Collingwood's second theory, Art-as-Expression, has led to the greatest debates among Collingwood scholars. I have something both negative and positive to say about the role of expression in Collingwood's theory. The negative comment is that, *pace* Ridley, who sees expression as the leading concept, Collingwood ranks expression as subsidiary to imagination, as something contributing to the epistemology of art; it is therefore irrelevant to the ontology of art. On the positive side, expression creates unity and totality in Collingwood's theory. First of all, we should bear in mind that Art-as-Expression enables us to treat emotion as raised to the level of consciousness without the artist being aware of its nature. As Collingwood says:

[28] Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 307.

> When a man is said to express emotion […] [a]t first, he is conscious of having an emotion, but not conscious of what this emotion is. All he is conscious of is a perturbation or excitement […] of whose nature he is ignorant. While in this state, all he can say about his emotion is: 'I feel … I don't know what I feel.' From this helpless and oppressed condition he extricates himself by doing something which we call expressing himself. This is an activity which has something to do with the thing we call language: he expresses himself by speaking. It has also something to do with consciousness: the emotion expressed is an emotion of whose nature the person who feels it is no longer unconscious.[29]

We understand expression in a way that can be classified as 'language' and an 'act of consciousness'. It raises to the level of the conscious an emotion that lies hidden in the unconscious. For the artist, it therefore works as a translator between these levels. This can occur either through a 'physical medium', an external and concrete process, or through a 'conceived medium', an inner process of expression. As evidence of a 'conceived' medium Wollheim relates Croce's description of Leonardo 'when he stood for days in front of the wall he was to paint, without touching it with his brush'.[30]

In *PA*, Collingwood writes first about Art-as-Expression and then about Art-as-Imagination. A comparison of the section headings of the chapters displays their proper roles in his philosophy of art. Whereas the chapter on Art-as-Imagination includes section headings such as 'Making and Creating', 'Creation and Imagination', and 'The Work of Art as Imaginary Object',[31] in the chapter on Art-as-Expression, no single heading indicates a relationship between creation and making or the ontology of art proper; instead, all the headings concern the interrelation of emotion and expression, such as 'Expressing Emotion and Arousing Emotion', 'Expression and Individualization', 'Expressing Emotion and Betraying Emotion'.[32] This suggests that when emotions are expressed, an artwork is not yet finished. We are still at an intermediate phase of making the artwork. This indicates that emotions are translated to the conscious level from the psychic level. Hence, for the creation of an artwork, expression is an intermediary station between the conscious state and sensation. The reason is, as we have seen, that expression helps the agent to elevate his or her emotional charges, which are blind data, to be raised to the level of consciousness, so that they can then be readied for the interpretative work of imagination. Expression is necessary for imagination. In other words, it is parasitic on imagination which marks the ontology of artwork as an ideal object: 'What has been asserted,' Collingwood argues, 'is not that the painting is a work of art, which would be as much as to say that the artist's

29 Ibid., 109.
30 Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects*, 40.
31 Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 128, 130, 139.
32 Ibid., 109, 111, 121.

aesthetic activity is identical with painting it; but that its production is somehow necessarily connected with the aesthetic activity, that is, with the creation of *the imaginative experience which is the work of art*.'[33]

We can therefore finish our graph as follows:



IV. COLLINGWOOD AND CONSISTENCY

The whole inconsistency debate is about the third book of *PA*, where Collingwood declares that an audience is essential for art. For Wollheim, if art were something existing in the mind, then the essentiality of the audience would be totally contradictory because Ideal Theory, according to him, holds that art is a private entity rather than a public one. I reject Wollheim's interpretation of idealism. True, by maintaining the ontology of artworks as imaginative entities in the mind, Collingwood seems to be limiting art within the borders of an individual. But idealism does not have to mean that no artwork need be externalized or shared with other people. This is one of the main deficiencies of Wollheim's reading. He takes the idealist view to extremes, even asserting that no artwork need be externalized since what we have in our mind is already complete as an artwork. Collingwood already argued that art needs interaction: 'Individualism conceives a man as if he were God, a self-contained and self-sufficient creative power whose only task is to be himself […]. But a man, in his art as in everything else, is a finite being. Everything that he does is done in relation to others like himself. As artist, he is a speaker […]. Like other speakers, [artists] speak to those who understand.'[34] This interaction, however, is important not for the ontology of art but for its epistemology. The epistemology of art is concerned with 'the nature of artistic appreciation, understanding and the conditions under which it is possible'.[35] In Collingwood's view, audience and externalization might be needed for *knowing* if

[33] Ibid., 305.
[34] Ibid., 317.
[35] David Davies, *Art as Performance* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 26.

art is good or bad, but not for differentiating between 'art proper' and 'pseudo-art'. Art proper differs from pseudo-art in that it will not be produced according to a preconceived end such as (a) utility in 'crafts',[36] (b) certain pre-determined emotions in 'magic',[37] or (c) pure 'amusement'.[38] Art proper is the imaginative activity by means of which emotions are truthfully expressed. It is not a means to any planned end. On the other hand, bad art is 'the unsuccessful attempt to become conscious of a given emotion',[39] whereas good art is the one that achieves this. In order to 'know' if something is good art or bad, in order to appreciate it, it is helpful to externalize it in a physical medium and leave it to be examined by the audience. This is what true consciousness requires, a 'confession to ourselves of our feelings', unlike 'false consciousness', that is, telling tales to oneself about oneself, thinking 'That feeling is not mine', which is the reason for bad art.[40] After being sure that the activity is an imaginative process in which the end has not been previously determined, we can check if the expression of emotions is sincere, if the consciousness is corrupt or not, in other words, if we are deceiving ourselves or not. The fact that consciousness is corrupt is a sign of false consciousness, a refusal to see oneself clearly and transparently with regard to one's experienced emotions and thoughts. This is the standard that differentiates between good and bad art and characterizes its epistemology. In that sense, the physicality of art is necessary.

It should also be remembered, however, that this is not necessary to determine if the work is 'art proper'. In other words, physicality is only one of the modes of an artwork's existence. As well as revealing itself as a 'physical medium', an artwork can also exist as a 'conceived medium' and remain as is in the mind.[41] Although this mode of existence would not at all diminish the artwork's ontological status as existing in the imagination, when it remains only as a 'conceived medium' it forgoes the chance of being checked as an achievement of consciousness or a failure. Moreover, some complex types of artwork – such as a symphony, a novel, Baroque architecture – could not exist only as a 'conceived medium'. With a 'physical medium' the artist needs to pass a justification test; physicality and interaction is necessary for this. As a result, in contrast to what Wollheim argues, the relationship between artist and audience in Collingwood, rather than being inconsistent, supports what he said in the first part of *PA*. A member of an audience is there to 'reconstruct' the work in his or her own mind as a 'total imaginative experience', and then transmutes these impressions to ideas by

36 Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 15.
37 Ibid., 57.
38 Ibid., 78.
39 Ibid., 282.
40 Ibid., 216.
41 For a detailed elaboration, see ibid., 216n29.

means of his or her imagination; the physical object is just a 'recording' of what the artist has in mind:[42]

> What is meant by saying that the painter 'records' in his picture the experience which he had in painting it? With this question we come to the subject of the audience, for the audience consists of anybody and everybody to whom such records are significant. It means that the picture, when seen by someone else or by the painter himself subsequently, produces in him […] sensuous-emotional or psychical experiences which, when raised from impressions to ideas by the activity of the spectator's consciousness, are transmuted into a total imaginative experience *identical* with that of the painter.[43]

The term 'recording' is highly important as evidence of Collingwood's idealism and consistency. When one records, one 'deposits an authentic copy' of the original form.[44] Hence, in recording, the thing undergoes no change; it is merely 'copied'.[45] The original, authentic form of the artwork remains only in the mind, and 'the copy' of it is formed by externalization. The audience is not there only to perceive the recorded copy of what the artist has in mind in the physicality of the object. By means of taking the physical object as a 'recording' of what the artist has in mind, the audience also creates it in a similar process in their own minds. The expectation of 'identicalness' also supports this argument. Collingwood does not give way to any hermeneutical interpretation that would treat every act of interpretation as an instance of a new artwork, that is, as a novel reading from the point of view of each member of the audience, but expects each viewer to create the artwork in his or her own mind as it exists 'identically' in the artist's mind. An artwork is ultimately still *one imaginative entity* that resides in the minds of the audience and in the mind of the artist, but the content of each is *exactly the same*. In fact, as with the term 'recording', Collingwood proposes a similar term in the philosophy of history. An analysis of the term may well shed light on our discussion in aesthetics. He asserts that in historical understanding the historian 're-enacts' in his or her own mind the thoughts of the historical agent.[46] The historian does not just explain the events and thoughts of the historical agents as would be the case in the natural sciences, but 're-creates' them 'inside his own mind' and 're-enacts for himself so much of the experience of the men who took part in them':[47]

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42 Ibid., 308.

43 Ibid.

44 *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, s.v. 'record', http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/record.

45 As we have seen, for some cases of artworks such as symphonies, novels, or some types of architecture, it would be impossible for them *not to be* copied: in order to exist, they have to be 'copied' because of the nature of their genres.

46 R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (1946; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 18.

47 Ibid., 39.

> But how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in his own mind. The historian of philosophy, reading Plato, is trying to know what Plato thought when he expressed himself in certain words. The only way in which he can do this is by thinking it for himself. This, in fact, is what we mean when we speak of 'understanding' the words. […] The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind.[48]

This 're-enactment' in one's own mind, however, means having not merely similar thoughts but exactly the same thought as that of the historical agent, precisely as is the case in artistic appreciation. The re-enactment thesis has been a contentious point among philosophers. Collingwood himself believes that the critics fall prey to 'the dogma' that there is only one form of identity in difference, 'namely specific identity in numerical difference':[49] one cannot have the same idea as someone else in the past because the ideas are numerically different. On the contrary, he argues, for example, that when we 're-enact' Euclid's statement that 'all angles are equal in an equilateral triangle', the proposition is numerically the same in everyone's mind because it is the same act of thought, no matter the differences in actual processes of consciousness.[50] In this sense, by means of 'recording' or 're-enactment' we are able to imagine and recreate the identical thought of the other in our own minds. This indicates that thoughts are not solely 'private terms' which are 'unique to the person', but are 'publicly rethinkable propositional contents'.[51] This propositional content, however, is also merged with expressive content, because, for Collingwood, the propositional and the expressive content are fused in a single thought.[52] In short, Collingwood expects the audience to have in mind the 'identical' work of the artist, just as he expects the historian to have the 'identical' thought of the historical agent, since they are 'ideas' which can be publicly re-thinkable.

Wollheim and others have criticized Collingwood by maintaining that this might lead to implausible consequences and create confusion.[53] I accept that some parts of *PA* might lead to such implausibility. In this respect, one can either assume that Collingwood can dig in his heels and accept the implausible

48 Ibid., 82.

49 Ibid., 109.

50 Ibid., 109–10.

51 Giuseppina D'Oro and James Connelly, 'Robin George Collingwood', in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, summer 2015 ed. (Stanford University, 1997–), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/collingwood/.

52 Ibid.

53 Wollheim thinks that if Collingwood defends art as imaginary, then the discussion about the role of audience in the third book of *PA* is contradictory. These two ideas, (1) art as an imaginary act and (2) the necessity of audience seem inconsistent. See Wollheim, 'On an Alleged Inconsistency'.

implications or, as I have been arguing, interpret his theory of 'recording' as contributing to an artwork's epistemology, that is, positing a criterion for distinguishing between good and bad art. My view is that we should read an audience's 'recording' of the 'identical' artwork in their own minds as being a check on the corruption or truthfulness of the artist's consciousness. The audience thereby checks the sincerity of the artist's expression of emotions and reflect their views back to him or her. This, however, does not rule out the fact that artworks are imaginative entities; it merely asserts that they might need audiences for their epistemological justification. The audience can act as contributors by justifying critical verdicts. In other words, the audience is useful for checking the consciousness of the artist, to find out if an expression of emotion has been a failure or an achievement, a deception or a sincere act; but the audience is not useful for discovering an ontological difference between pseudo-art and art proper.[54] As I have argued, we can either accept Collingwood's theory as having some implausibility, expect him to dig in his heels, or we can read him charitably, and take his expression theory to be related to the epistemology of art. Unlike Ridley, who rejects Collingwood's idealism, I hope to have presented a much more charitable reading, which tries both to save the consistency of his philosophy of art and to treat seriously the claim that the nature of an artwork is in the mind:

> a tune is already complete and perfect when it exists *merely* as a tune in [the artist's] head, that is, an imaginary tune. Next, he may arrange for the tune to be played before an audience. Now there comes into existence a real tune, a collection of noises. But which of these two things is the work of art? […] The answer is implied in what we have already said: the music, the work of art, is not the collection of noises, it is the tune in the composer's head. The noises made by the performers, and heard by the audience, are not music at all; they are only *means* by which the audience, if they listen intelligently […] can reconstruct for themselves the imaginary tune that existed in the composer's head.[55]

V. CONCLUSION

I have sought to demonstrate here that Collingwood both adheres to the Ideal Theory (contrary to Ridley) and is consistent in his art theory (contrary to Wollheim). First, as is demonstrated from the first and second books of *PA*, imagination is the sufficient condition of art, and expression is the process for art to come into existence. Expression works like a language between the psychic, unconscious level and consciousness, and, moving within this conscious state, imagination forms ideas. Expression is parasitic on imagination and necessary to it. Secondly, I have stated that Collingwood is consistent in his theory because

[54] The distinction of art proper is based on its being different from magic, craft, or amusement, as discussed in chapter 1 of *PA*.

[55] Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 139, my emphasis.

the audience and the externalization of the work are needed for an appreciation and understanding of the artwork as either good or bad, as either a work of a corrupt consciousness or not. Hence, an account of the role of externalization is a contribution to the epistemology, not the ontology, of art.

Wollheim and Ridley are unable to come to the same conclusion because, first, Wollheim reads Collingwood in extremes, and interprets him as saying that since the artwork is something imaginary, something in the mind, it need not be externalized, and he overlooks the distinction of good art and bad art and the role of the audience in this. Secondly, Ridley ignores the sufficiency of the imagination theory, and by using the principle of charity he too seems to distort what Collingwood actually said about expression and imagination.

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