

BROEKAERT, WIM

The Pompeian Connection: A Social Network Approach to Elites and Sub-Elites in the Bay of Naples

Journal of Historical Network Research 4
(2020) 156-224

Keywords

Municipal elite; Pompei; social history; local networks

Abstract

This paper focuses on the composition and interaction of Pompeian elite and sub-elite networks and the way in which these relationships shaped and transformed local politics. SNA can contribute to the ongoing debate on the composition and alleged stability or turnover within the Pompeian aristocracy. This dispute has a long tradition and the picture of the Pompeian society emerging oscillates between a democratic community with high levels of social and political mobility and a more traditional Roman city with well-established families dominating the political scene and newcomers rising and disappearing in the margin. I shall analyze and compare the different networks members of elites and sub-elites were circulating in and how they attempted to use, share, extend and manipulate networks to achieve their goals. The key to power thus lies in moving oneself in the most interesting position in the network, either through mobilizing inherited connections, power and wealth or carving out a new location by means of personal assets. The following sections will show how Pompeian elites, established families and newcomers alike, tried to find the most valuable position in the local network and consequently captured the inherent benefits of connectivity.

1 Introduction*

“Publius Vesonius Phileros, freedman of a woman, Augustalis, built this monument for himself and his kin in his lifetime, for Vesonia daughter of Publius, his patron, and for Marcus Orfellius Faustus, son of Marcus, his friend. Stranger, delay a brief while if it is not troublesome, and learn what to avoid. This man whom I had hoped was my friend, I am forsaking: a case was maliciously brought against me; I was charged and legal proceedings were instituted; I give thanks to the gods and to my innocence, I was freed from all distress. May neither the household gods nor the gods below receive the one who misrepresented our affairs.”¹

“Loreius, please support Cn. Helvius Sabinus, an honest man, as aedile, and he will vote for you.”²

These two Pompeian texts present only two manifestations of human interaction in a small city in the Bay of Naples. Some relationships apparently started out on friendly terms, soon to be strained by disagreement or betrayal; others vividly show the importance of reciprocity in maintaining and strengthening political support. Myriads of similar interpersonal connections structured the micro-cosmos of Pompeii, or of every other ancient town for that matter, and are thus prime evidence to analyze the social fabric of civic society. Human relationships define the connectivity of a community or the interaction between various components of its population. They reflect the openness of a society, its willingness to permit the entry of new members and elites, or instead its closed nature, barring the entry for outsiders. They help to understand decision-making in a distant past, by outlining the limitations and opportunities created by every individual's personal and shared networks. Despite these obvious advantages of a focus on relationships and networks, the potential of social network analysis (SNA) for ancient history is only now coming to be appreciated.³ That SNA has been slow to become established as a promising research methodology, is partly due to the limits of ancient evidence. The fragmentary and isolated nature of the evidence and the small number of ancient archives and letter collections preserved, compared to rich material available for other pre-industrial and modern societies, can sometimes be discouraging.⁴ I have argued elsewhere that SNA is able to cope with these and similar

* **Corresponding author:** Wim Broekaert, independent researcher; wimbroekaert@gmail.com

1 AE 1964, 160 and AE 1986, 166a, translated by COOLEY / COOLEY (2004), p. 152-153.

2 CIL IV, 7733.

3 GRAHAM / RUFFINI (2007); BROEKAERT (2013).

4 An obvious exception is Egypt, where the papyrological evidence allows SNA in great detail. See RUFFINI (2008) for an analysis of Late Roman Egyptian communities applying SNA.

restrictions and that the nature of the ancient evidence can in itself never be a valid argument to discard SNA.⁵ For this paper in particular, hesitation seems even less justified, for in the case of Pompeii historians are in a privileged position with respect to the wealth and nature of sources available. Together, monumental stone inscriptions, graffiti and dipinti provide information unavailable elsewhere. Many different types of relationships, such as offering political support or witnessing financial transactions, can only be analyzed at this level of detail in Pompeii. With over 10,000 inscriptions now published and an unparalleled range of archaeological research, Pompeii must be the ideal laboratory to test the potential of SNA.

This paper will focus on the composition and interaction of Pompeian elite and sub-elite networks and the way in which these relationships shaped and transformed local politics. It is not my intention to repeat the analyses and conclusions established in recent scholarship, but to approach the subject from a different angle, a network perspective.⁶ This particular method can contribute to the ongoing debate on the composition and alleged stability or turnover within the Pompeian aristocracy. This dispute has a long tradition and the picture of the Pompeian society emerging oscillates between a democratic community with high levels of social and political mobility and a more traditional Roman city with well-established families dominating the political scene and newcomers rising and disappearing in the margin.⁷ By introducing the concepts of SNA, I shall analyze and compare the different networks members of elites and sub-elites were circulating in and how they attempted to use, share, extend and manipulate networks to achieve their goals. This approach is founded on the pivotal observation made by Richard Emerson that power, rather than any individual attribute, should be considered a property of relationships between individuals.⁸ Simply stating that an individual, in this case a member of the Pompeian elite, was powerful is a vacant claim and does

5 BROEKAERT (2013).

6 For the scholarly tradition on Pompeian prosopography and magisterial families, see most recently FRANKLIN (2007).

7 Pompeii as a democratic society: GORDON (1927), accepting a large influx of provincial families who consequently entered the elite (in particular p. 169: "We may thus conclude that the *ordo* of Pompeii, while constantly recruited by fresh elements, bore the stamp of its origin as an old native aristocracy; like some ancient building, continually repaired, it retained its former structure and spirit, however little of the original fabric might remain.") and MOELLER (1970), claiming that different social groups have a fairly open access to the political elite, most notably a commercial bourgeoisie. More nuanced but still accepting a high turnover of aristocratic families: CASTRÉN (1975) and LÓS (1992). Predominance of well-established families: ETIENNE (1977); MOURITSEN (1988) and FRANKLIN (2001).

8 EMERSON (1962). For a more recent discussion of power in social exchange theory, see also COOK / RICE (2006).

not explain the conditions on which this power had been founded nor the reasons why he had been able to maintain his position of power over his peers. A network perspective on the other hand defines power in terms of an imbalance in benefits and value each partner in the relationship is able to capture from the tie between them, with the more powerful individual getting the majority of benefits. In the case of Pompeii, a more powerful elite member would be able to claim more favors from his colleagues or exert more political control than his less distinguished peers. In contrast, newcomers would most likely find themselves on the receiving end of power relationships. This imbalance is then considered the result of the embeddedness of the two parties in individual as well as overlapping networks. Occupying a more central and dominating position in a network creates social capital and possibilities transcending the opportunities accessible by a single individual. The key to power thus lies in moving oneself in the most interesting position in the network, either through mobilizing inherited connections, power and wealth or carving out a new location by means of personal assets. The following sections will show how Pompeian elites, established families and newcomers alike, tried to find the most valuable position in the local network and consequently captured the inherent benefits of connectivity.

2 Selecting the network data set: choices and limitations

At the outset I need to clarify how the data set was produced and which strata of the Pompeian community can be considered elites and sub-elites.

The traditional elite can fairly easily be established. The political offices and institutions of Pompeii closely resembled those of other Italian cities.⁹ The two annual magisterial offices responsible for administration, jurisdiction and public building were, in ascending order, the aedility and duumvirate, each simultaneously held by two magistrates. Every 5th year, the *duoviri* were appointed *quinquennales* in order to undertake the census and revise the membership list of the *ordo*. This office generally was considered the culmination of one's career in politics. Together these three magistracies are the backbone of Pompeii's political elite. To the *aediles*, *duoviri* and *quinquennales* should be added a number of extraordinary offices and honorary positions, viz. the *praefecti iure dicundo* (officials of the urban Roman legal magistracy) and the *tribuni militum a populo*. The former magistrates were nominated to represent the emperor or a member of the imperial family when they had been elected (honorary) *duovir* to confirm the city's loyalty to Rome, or to negotiate in case of internal crises, when for instance the city was required to substitute magistrates who had died while in office or normal elections could not take place. The *tribuni*

9 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 55-72 and MOURITSEN (1988), p. 28-30.

militum a populo on the other hand did not hold a particular office but were given a special honorary title by the emperor, reserved for prominent citizens and on the request of the assemblies. This title promoted them to equestrian rank.¹⁰ I finally also included priesthoods, because there is no clear separation between the people eligible for political offices and those holding religious functions. All public priests in Pompeii had previously been appointed municipal magistrates, and often more than once. Similar, public priestesses also belonged to the more prominent aristocratic families of the city. For the purpose of this paper, I treat candidates and successful magistrates on a par and consider them all to be part of the Pompeian elite.¹¹ Although there are considerable differences in status and wealth among the elite members themselves, as will be discussed later, candidates and magistrates at least equally qualified for the requirements stipulated to enter the *ordo*.

Turning to the sub-elites, I distinguished between the wealthy freedman elite of the *augustales* on the one hand, and the slaves and freedmen occurring in the epigraphy as *ministri* and *magistri* on the other. The latter category includes the *ministri* and *magistri uici / pagi*, responsible for the cult of the *Lares Compitales*; the Republican *ministri* initially making donations to Mercury and Maia alone, who however during the reign of Augustus became associated with the organization of the imperial cult and were from then known as the *ministri Augusti*; and finally the *ministri Fortunae Augustae*, assisting in another aspect of the imperial cult, that of Fortuna.¹²

Evidence for these Pompeian citizens comes from three different sources, viz. stone inscriptions, graffiti and *dipinti*, each with their own advantages and limitations.¹³ Stone inscriptions offer the most detailed information, in particular on family composition, offices held and colleagues in politics or associational life. However, not every period in Pompeian history has yielded an equally rich collection of texts.¹⁴ Most inscriptions can be dated to the Augustan and early Julio-Claudian period, offering a wealth of information on Pompeian members of the elite and sub-elite actually holding office. On the

10 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 98-99.

11 However, different offices are given different attribute numbers, in order to distinguish between various functions. See Appendix 1.

12 GREYER (1932); CASTRÉN (1975), p. 72-78; MOURITSEN (1988), p. 92-99.

13 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 83; LÓZ (1992), p. 266, fn.32.

14 I here adopt the chronology established by CASTRÉN (1975), distinguishing between the Republican period (80-49 BC), the period of Caesar and Augustus (49 BC-14 AD), the early Julio-Claudian period (14-50 AD) and the Neronian and Flavian period (50-79 AD). This approach allows us to distinguish between different timeframes but does not necessarily imply fundamental changes in the composition of the Pompeian aristocracy between periods. See MOURITSEN (1988), p. 112-122.

other hand, *dipinti* which allow us to reconstruct election campaigning and support to candidates, are virtually non-existent for this period. We thus only encounter Pompeian citizens who had been successful in running for election, and not the less fortunate candidates. The later Julio-Claudian and Flavian periods show a completely opposite picture, as many election notices survive, but few stone inscriptions.¹⁵ For the Republican period we can rely on both stone inscriptions and *dipinti*, yet in much smaller numbers, which seriously complicates the reconstruction of early elite and sub-elite networks. In addition, we should also take into account that for all periods, more prominent and wealthy families can be expected to have spent more money and effort on elaborate inscriptions commemorating their careers than less well-to-do families, so the use of stone inscriptions is marred by a considerable bias towards the more important families.¹⁶ The use of electoral propaganda is limited by the fact that, on the one hand, only a small amount of it has survived, either because the texts had already been overpainted in antiquity or did not survive until (or even during) the excavations, and on the other hand a considerable part of the city still remains unexcavated.

These restrictions make a comparison of elite and sub-elite families and their networks between different time frames particularly difficult. Nevertheless, the traditional order of the *cursus honorum* of Roman municipal magistrates, dictating that “no one can take on the higher functions of the magistracy before having held those of a lower degree”, sometimes allows us to bridge the gap between various periods.¹⁷ Only former *aediles* could hope to run for the office of *duovir*, and only *duoviri* could reach the most esteemed magistracy, viz. that of *quinquennalis*.¹⁸ As an interval of several years usually separated different offices, a career in politics could easily stretch a decade or more. Q. Coelius Caltilius Iustus for instance, *duovir* in 52 AD, must have started his involvement in Pompeian politics during the 40's.¹⁹ This approach can, to some extent, mitigate the problems discussed above and help us in following the political engagement of Pompeian families over longer periods of time than the snapshot of a single inscription initially allows.

15 For these late *dipinti*, see FRANKLIN (1980) and the critical remarks by MOURITSEN (1988), p. 37-41, followed by LÓS (1992). MOURITSEN (1988), p. 32-37 is particularly hesitant in dating any of the *programmata recentiora* to the period before the earthquake of 62 AD. FRANKLIN (2001) is considerably more optimistic in his approach to the *dipinti*, but his conclusions and analysis should be used with caution. For a review of Franklin's political history of Pompeii, see COOLEY (2003).

16 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 85.

17 Dig. 50.4.14.5.

18 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 62-67; MOURITSEN (1988), p. 28-30.

19 CIL IV, 3340.79 and 138.

For the purpose of this paper, I compiled a database of all known members of Pompeian elite and sub-elite families, including not only magistrates themselves but also all other members of the families occurring in the epigraphy of Pompeii. The best starting point for this kind of research remains Castrén's index of 479 families and his magisterial lists.²⁰ The collection of names was then supplemented by the latest discoveries and updated and corrected using more recent studies on Pompeian epigraphy.²¹ In a second stage, I added all non-elite families with whom the elite and sub-elite families were somehow connected according to the sources available.²² There obviously is considerable divergence in the nature of the connections possible: they include, among others, ties of marriage, adoption, support during elections etc. I excluded names and connections cited on *instrumentum domesticum*, as the readings and role of the individuals mentioned are often problematic to say the least. It is still very uncertain to what extent people whose names occur on *amphorae* were living, if only residing in Pompeii.²³ Cases of names are not particularly helpful either, because a single case does not correspond to a single role: a dative case for instance can identify a producer (local or not?), a consumer (resident or not?) or an intermediary such as an innkeeper or merchant (local or foreign?).²⁴ I also left out the (often temporary) relationships between witnesses in the Iucundus archive, because here the focus is on more solid connections between elites and the families operating in their periphery.²⁵ The result is a database of 938 individuals or nodes, connected by 1156 relationships or ties. That the number of ties is rather close to that of the nodes already suggests that many nodes will appear completely isolated in the network. This obviously is the consequence of the limitations of our source material rather than a reflection of the connectivity of the Pompeian community. For some parts of the subsequent analysis and

20 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 129-244 and 270-276. Individuals only known by their cognomen are evidently omitted, unless we can reconstruct their *gentilicium* on firm grounds. This final caveat is meant to argue against enthusiastic yet unwarranted assumptions and identifications, such as those which nowadays make the work of e.g. DELLA CORTE (1965) unsatisfactory. For a discussion of his methods and results, see in particular MOURITSEN (1988), p. 13-27.

21 In particular MOURITSEN (1988), FRANKLIN (2001) and (2007).

22 Excluded are the connections mentioned in CIL IV, 137; 262; 271; 272; 292; 415; 416; 447; 506; 665; 801; 843; 854; 869; 889; 929; 952; 1006; 1025; 1026; 1036; 1055; 1083; 1169; 2930; 2939; 3490; 3725; 7453; 7704. According to FRANKLIN (1980), p. 130 and MOURITSEN (1988), p. 126-159, these inscriptions contain mistaken pairings as a result of misreadings and erroneous restitutions.

23 JONGMAN (1988), p. 128-131.

24 For these and similar problems, see ANDREAU (1974), p. 223.

25 I have previously analyzed the connections in the Iucundus archive elsewhere. See BROEKAERT (2013).

visualization, it will be preferable to delete these non-connected nodes from the network.

For every single individual featuring in the database, all information provided by the inscriptional evidence was stored as numerical values, differentiating between attributes and vectors. Attributes contain information which allows the clustering of nodes in a limited number of subgroups, such as time period, membership of a family and office(s) held.²⁶ It should be noted that for individuals whose career can be followed through different stages, the most prominent office held is used as attribute.²⁷ Vectors on the other hand store particular information, which is often unique for every single node, but does not create distinct classes. In this case the frequency with which an individual occurs in Pompeian epigraphy or his ranking order in the lists of witnesses in the Lucundus archive can be considered vectors.²⁸ All network analysis was done using the Pajek software.²⁹

3 The early Republican period

The first phase of Pompeii's constitutional history, with the Roman conquest in 89 BC and the creation of the Sullan colony in 80 BC as major landmarks, continues to raise questions, in particular on the interaction and political strife between newly arrived colonists and indigenous Sabellian families. It has long been argued that in this early phase immediately after the colonization, the Pompeian territory was divided between two different urban communities, one for the native inhabitants and the other for the colonists. Moreover, both populations were assumed to have had different political rights. Castrén claimed that only colonists were able to stand for office and fully participated in the elections and that the local Pompeians on the other hand only enjoyed limited participation, being excluded from office-holding and maybe even from voting. By 55 BC, the political balance between colonists and Sabellians seems to have been restored, but how the alleged political differences had been leveled out remains unclear.³⁰ This model of a double community with unequal political

26 Attributes and their numerical values can be found in Appendix 1.

27 This reductionist approach matters little for the analysis, as the software easily allows the combination of, for instance, the networks of all *duoviri* (and hence previous aediles) with those of the aediles. A similar choice was made by JONGMAN (1988), p. 246 in his rank analysis of the witnesses in the Lucundus archive.

28 For the correlation between a person's social status and the ranking in which they sign the document, see ANDREAU (1974), p. 170-176 and JONGMAN (1988), p. 226-238.

29 Available at <http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php>. See DE NOOY / MRVAR / BATAGELJ (2005) for an introduction to the program.

30 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 54-55.

participation has now convincingly been refuted.³¹ A clear separation between the Pompeian *municipium* and colony can only have existed very briefly, but more importantly, the Pompeian citizens' political rights do not seem to have been curtailed in any meaningful way: the earliest *dipinti* (*programmata antiquissima*) clearly mention indigenous Pompeian candidates for the offices of *aedilis* and *duovir*.

Despite the very limited number of inscriptions reflecting the networks in place during this period, network theory can help to slightly adjust this picture. It is definitely true that indigenous families were not barred from taking part in the elections and office-holding, yet when analyzing the background and connections of the magistrates according to the attributes assigned to political offices as discussed in Appendix 1, it appears that some level of inequality in political participation did exist, perhaps not *de iure* but certainly *de facto*. When considering the family origin of both candidates and actual magistrates, there is a clear tendency to assign the most prestigious and influential offices to colonist families.³² This dominance of colonist office-holders becomes most obvious when focusing on the highest magistracies. The first (and indeed only) two *quinquennales* known for this period, M. Porcius and C. Quinctius Valgus, were important Sullan partisans and probably assigned rather than elected to govern the Pompeian community. One can imagine that the most crucial task the *quinquennales* were responsible for, viz. compiling a new list of the city's leading political aristocracy, was entrusted to reliable followers.³³ The only candidate for this office, Q. Caecilius, also belonged to a Roman rather than a local family.³⁴ Among the *duoviri*, only M. Popidius was a member of an indigenous family, and even this single occasion is highly dubious. The inscription has been preserved so badly that the editors of the CIL hesitated between reading the *gentilicium* as Porcius (the famous *quinquennalis*) or Popidius.³⁵ It therefore seems more prudent to omit M. Popidius from the list of early Republican *duoviri* and to conclude that local families had great difficulties in reaching the

31 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 86-89.

32 See Fig. 2. Numbers before the individual names correspond to the offices listed in Appendix 1. *Quattuorviri* have not been assigned to a category, unless they feature in other, more elaborate inscriptions as well. See e.g. T. Cuspius and M. Loreius, mentioned as both *duoviri* and *quattuorviri* in CIL X, 937-938. To determine the families' origin, I mainly relied on Castrén's prosopographical notes and corrections by Mouritsen. I agree with MOURITSEN ((1988) e.g. p. 197, fn.264) that Castrén sometimes fails to adduce sufficient evidence to identify colonist families and other immigrants.

33 CIL X, 852. See CASTRÉN (1975), p. 88-91 and MOURITSEN (1988), p. 71-72.

34 CIL IV, 24; 29-30 and 36. That q() designates *quinquennalis* and not *quaestor* or *quattuoruir*, has long been a matter for dispute. See MOURITSEN (1988), p. 72-73 for this discussion. For the gens Caecilia as a non-local family, see MOURITSEN (1988), p. 202, fn.350.

35 See the notes in CIL X, 956 and by MOURITSEN (1988), p. 199, fn.301.

office. Most of the other *duoviri* however can without doubt be connected to colonist families.³⁶ A similar disproportion between native and colonist families can be detected when moving further down the political hierarchy to the level of the duumviral candidates.³⁷ Indigenous families are not absent, but are clearly outnumbered by candidates from colonist families. The fact that some indigenous families were at least trying to reach the higher echelons coupled with the observation that successfully holding the duumvirate proved nearly impossible for local Pompeian elites, seems to suggest that the colonists wielded sufficient power to manipulate elections. They probably tolerated local families to hold the lower magistracies and the aedileship in particular, but at the same time tried to monopolize the higher offices. This 'power distribution' seems to be confirmed by the sources available for the lower offices. It should be noted however that for the *aediles* and the aedilician candidates the available evidence is far more limited, so establishing whether or not the colonist families also tried to dominate the lower levels of politics remains difficult. Nevertheless, despite the small number of *aediles* mentioned in the inscriptions, it is remarkable that two out of five appear to have been of local origin.³⁸ In conclusion, it seems that even though the office of *aedilis* was open to both local and colonist families, in this period the office of *duovir* was, for most indigenous families, a critical threshold extremely difficult to exceed.

How the colonists (apparently successfully) managed to exert control over office-holding is difficult to establish, but the 'trickle-down effect' of political power evidently facilitated subtle manipulation and intervention. The early development of Pompeii obviously had favored the colonist families. Confiscation and colonization must have earned many of them a fortune sufficiently large to be included in the *ordo* from which magistrates would be

36 Colonist families: P. Aninius (CIL X, 829); T. Cuspius (?) (CIL X, 937-938); L. Maevius (?) (CIL I², 1634); Q. Tullius (CIL X, 803-804); C. Uulius (CIL X, 829). Uncertain origin: L. Caesius (CIL X, 819); M. Cinnius (CIL X, 803-804); M. Loreius (CIL X, 937-938).

37 Indigenous: M. Artorius (CIL IV, 5); L. Gavius (CIL IV, 33); P. Veidius (?) (CIL IV, 20); M. Vesbius (?) (CIL IV, 19). Colonist: C. Aburius (CIL IV, 7118); L. Aquatius (CIL IV, 4); A. Cornelius (CIL IV 66); P. Furius (CIL IV, 67); L. Niraemius (CIL X, 819); C. Nunidius (CIL IV, 55); L. Olius (CIL IV, 11); L. Septumius (CIL IV, 23 add.); M. Septumius (CIL IV, 40 add.); L. Sestius (CIL IV, 6601); M. Tullius (CIL IV, 7119); N. Veius Barcha (CIL IV, 26); P. Vettius (CIL IV, 2983). Uncertain: P. Carpinus (CIL IV, 17); M. Marius (CIL IV, 1).

38 Aediles: Indigenous: C. Mammius (CIL X, 803-804); C. Naevius (CIL X, 803-804; I here disagree with Castrén, who does notice the Sabellian origin of the family, but nevertheless concludes in favor of a colonist origin because of the family's early presence in Rome). Colonist: L. Acilius (CIL I², 1636); C. Occius (CIL X, 819); A. Livius (CIL I², 1636). Aedilician candidates: Indigenous: P. Vibius Cac[---] (?) (CIL IV, 166). Colonist: D. Claudius (CIL IV, 38); P. Veius (CIL IV, 18); Cn. Vercinius (CIL IV, 41 add.). Uncertain: Cn. Nigidius (?) (CIL IV, 2905); M. Orcinius (?) (CIL IV, 6); M. Pomponius (CIL IV, 27).

elected. Their supremacy in the *ordo* was further guaranteed by the colonists' control over the office of *quinquennalis*. Moreover, the *duouiri*, who thus had every chance to belong to non-local families, presided over the elections and no doubt influenced the selection and appointment of magistrates. Together with the city council they compiled the list of candidates and were thus perfectly placed to check whether or not a candidate possessed all necessary qualifications, some of them tangible (gender, age and wealth), but others (good reputation) not quite so and hence easy to manipulate in order to exclude candidates. The best example of this kind of manipulation is the body of magistrates (*quattuoruiiri*) elected together with the previously mentioned M. Porcius, two of whom belonged to the *gens* Cornelia. This family has left few traces of political prominence in later periods, but in this early stage the founder of the colony and nephew of the dictator, P. Cornelius Sulla, relied on family members to monopolize the most important offices.³⁹ In this perspective it is probably no coincidence that the very few political networks reflected in the epigraphic material during the early Republic only attest connections between colonist families or families whose origin remains uncertain.⁴⁰ Only the single tie between C. Mammius and C. Naevius, who both held the junior office of *aedilis*, documents a connection between two successful politicians of indigenous origin.

4 The late Republican period

The previous section has shown that the first two generations of indigenous Pompeian families experienced great difficulties in participating in the political process, not because of any major legal reorganization in municipal rights of voting and office-holding, but rather as a consequence of the self-reinforcing power hierarchy dominated by colonist families. However, the particular features of the colonization process made it difficult to consolidate fully the newly established regime with its unequal power distribution. One of the most frequently discussed consequences of the Roman colonization process is the impact on local economic production. The settlement of veterans not all equally well versed in agriculture but suddenly assigned considerable plots of land in a fertile region (such as the Pompeian hinterland) could severely disrupt the agricultural production process and cause major problems for the newly established colonist families. As has been documented in other cities, some colonist families preferred to sell back the confiscated estates to the previous landowners.⁴¹ The fate of the less fortunate colonists was later eloquently described (and probably exaggerated) by Cicero, when relating how these

39 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 52.

40 See for instance the inscriptions of the *quattuoruiiri* (a comprehensive term to include both *duouiri* and *aediles*) in CIL X, 800 and X 938.

41 FRANK (1927), p. 94 on Praeneste.

disillusioned and impoverished settlers were willing to join Catiline in his final adventure.⁴² It is possible that some of the colonist families in Pompeii saw themselves confronted with similar economic problems and decided to offer the previous owners the opportunity to repurchase their estates, thus leveling out part of the land distributions. This evolution explains why, on the one hand, some indigenous families reappear on the political forum and, on the other, a number of colonist families present among the political elites of the first post-colonial generations completely disappear from Pompeian epigraphy, never to return again.⁴³ As a result of this process, the late Republican period witnessed a gradual integration between indigenous and colonist families, both finding their way into the political elite. The following sections will explore some of the late Republican networks and nodes in isolation.

5 Low levels of connectivity...a sign for what the future will bring?

I first focus on isolated nodes and small networks.⁴⁴ It appears that for a considerable number of *duoviri*, *quinquennales* and *tribuni* Pompeian epigraphy simply does not allow the reconstruction of a single connection, so these nodes give the impression of being isolated in the late Republican community. These low levels of connectivity obviously do not reflect actual isolation, but rather the visibility of these magistrates in the surviving inscriptions. Powerful magistrates such as the *tribuni* Cn. Clovatus and L. Cellius must have had access to at least a very basic network of political support to attain these high offices and distinctions. Readers unsympathetic to SNA might thus wonder how this conclusion can help us any further in the analysis of the networks in place in Pompeii. I start from the simple observation that for Pompeii, epigraphic visibility is not only dependent on the survival rate of the city's inscriptions. Given the high number of inscriptions preserved, epigraphic visibility can also be considered a proxy for actual levels of interaction within the community. I believe we can safely assume that elite members who frequently made donations, organized games or supported the careers of others (and their sons in the first place) have better chances to leave some trace of this interaction in Pompeian epigraphy than elite members who shared the same aristocratic network but were to a lesser extent exploring the opportunities and limits of this network. A good example is the career of A. Clodius Flaccus, whose activities in Pompeian city life can be followed through a small number of interesting inscriptions.⁴⁵ They attest to his remarkable generosity in making donations to the municipal fund and organizing games, hunts and musical entertainment,

42 SANTANGELO (2007), p. 158-171 and 183-188.

43 Indigenous families: e.g. the Holconii. Colonist families: e.g. Uulius and Vercinius.

44 See Fig. 3. For the numbers before the names, indicating the offices held, see Appendix 1.

45 CIL X, 793; 890; 936; 960; 1074d.

but also to his frequent interaction with other members of the community. It is therefore not a coincidence that we can reconstruct his network in greater detail than for any other Pompeian citizen during this period.⁴⁶ Following this assumption, and contrary to well-connected colleagues such as Clodius Flaccus, the ‘isolated’ magistrates are perhaps more likely to have followed a rather ‘discrete’ approach to politics, limited either by financial resources or by supporting connections.

From this point of view, it is interesting to note that a clear majority of the isolated nodes only participate in Pompeian politics during this period. Apart from the Tullii, Mammii and Vibii, none of them had played a role in politics during the early Republic. After this period, their families either completely disappear from Pompeian epigraphy or are only occasionally represented by a freedman in the archive of Caecilius Iucundus.⁴⁷ They must have moved on the fringes of the Pompeian elite community, only occasionally penetrating the highest levels, sometimes building on the successes obtained during the previous period (the Tullii), through strategic marriages with other elite families (the Cellii), but mostly for reasons completely unknown to us (Cn. Clovatus).⁴⁸

I now turn to a number of smaller networks, which apparently confirm the suggestion that the frequency of ties preserved in Pompeian inscriptions somehow reflects actual connectivity and distinction. For instance, L. Ceius Labeo, who served as a *duovir* twice and even held the office of *quinquennalis*, only presents a connection to his freedman Menomachus, who had been responsible for his burial.⁴⁹ Labeo was the first of his *gens* to enter the Pompeian elite, but after he had died without leaving any progeny (and probably

46 I shall return to his network below.

47 Unless indicated otherwise, references to all relevant inscriptions for the families cited hereafter can be found in Castrén’s prosopography. Disappeared: Caesetii; Cantrii; Cellii; Clovatii; Mammii; Oculatii; Piricatii; Saginii. Only freedmen: Atullii; Istacidii; Seii; Tullii. Others: QQ. Sallustii (clearly a family branch different from the Flavian CC. Sallustii, of whom C. Sallustius Capito occurs as an aedilician candidate). Exceptions: Vibii and Holconii, two of the most distinguished families in Pompeii whose members managed to hold office during different time periods. Note that the MM. Holconii are closely connected to Clodius Flaccus via M. Holconius Rufus, so the apparent ‘isolation’ of M. Holconius Celer is without much doubt the result of lacunae in the epigraphic records.

48 For the Tullii, see fn.36 and 37. A marital connection between the Cellii and Holconii can be deduced from the name of M. Holconius Gellius (CIL X, 895). The location of the inscriptions CIL X, 1074a and 1074e can suggest a marriage between L. Cellius Calvos and Clodia A.f., daughter of Clodius Flaccus, but the text of neither of the inscriptions explicitly mentions a connection. I therefore conservatively did not include this tie in the database nor in the Figures in Appendix 2.

49 CIL X, 1037. See FRANKLIN (2001), p. 174-175.

impoverished), the family quickly disappeared again: the Flavian candidate L. Ceius Secundus must have been a descendant of a minor branch of the family. The limited number of connections attested for other elite members can probably be attributed to their foreign origin. Sextilius Rufus who held several offices in Pompeii came from Nola and Avianius Flaccus Pontianus must have been the adoptive son of an Avianius, a member of a famous merchant family from Puteoli.⁵⁰ This period also presents a quite remarkable small sub-elite network of four slaves, who simultaneously had been appointed *ministri Augusti* and all belonged to the same family of the Istacidii.⁵¹ A slightly older inscription already mentioned Memor Istacidi, another member of the same *gens*, holding this office.⁵² The success with which the Istacidii managed to monopolize this minor religious office is certainly to be connected with the (temporary) prominence of the family in this period, indicated by the duumvirate of N. Istacidius Cilix and the religious function of *sacerdos publica* held by Istacidia N.f. Rufilla.⁵³ As the *ministri* were no doubt appointed by the city council, Cilix must have used his influence to gain control over the office. The success was short-lived, as the Istacidii never again managed to be part of the *ordo*. It is interesting to note that at the moment Memor Istacidi had been appointed, he shared his office with two members of the *gens* Arria. Other inscriptions of the *ministri* show that this family regularly managed to be elected.⁵⁴ Yet no Arrius seems to have entered the *ordo* during this period nor afterwards. On the other hand, we do find evidence that the Arrii continued to frequent the sub-elite circles, one of their members being elected *magister pagi* and another becoming *augustalis*.⁵⁵ Is it possible that the Arrii tried to make their way into the Pompeian elite by slowly accumulating minor religious offices, but in the end failed to do so?

6 The man in the middle: the network of A. Clodius Flaccus

One of the most distinguished Pompeians of the late Republican period and one of the few individuals whose network (or at least parts of it) we are able to reconstruct, was A. Clodius Flaccus.⁵⁶ He thrice served as *duovir*, once as a *quinquennalis*, and eventually was honored with the title of *tribunus militum a populo*. His epitaph succinctly describes the various acts of generosity during

50 CIL X, 1273 and 1064 respectively. On the origin of the Avianii, see CASTRÉN (1975), p. 141 with further references.

51 CIL X, 910.

52 CIL X, 888. This inscription probably predates the previous one, because of the dedication to Mercury and Maia.

53 CIL X, 857a and 10.999.

54 CIL X, 891; 892; 906; ILS 3207.

55 CIL X, 1042 and NS 1929, 188.

56 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 94 and 97; LAURENCE (1994), p. 32; FRANKLIN (2001), p. 23-26.

each duumvirate, including a pantomime featuring Pylades, one of the most famous actors of his age.⁵⁷

I visualized his network using two different partitions, viz. elite offices and distance.⁵⁸ Taken together, they present some interesting features of municipal elite networks. First, one can easily distinguish a select leading elite of *tribuni* who are either directly connected through jointly held offices (Holconius Rufus – Clodius Flaccus; Holconius Rufus – Curtius Vibius Salassus) or share a connection to another node (A. Veius, whose freedman A. Veius Phylax had – probably not by chance – been elected *minister Augusti* when Holconius Rufus and Clodius Flaccus were *duoviri*). The *gentes* they belonged to all survived into the following eras and continued to participate in local politics.⁵⁹ Their distinction is confirmed by the small distances between the *tribuni* and the priestesses Lassa, Holconia and Clodia. The *tribuni* thus seem to constitute a tightly knit core of the most prominent Pompeian elite members, whose shared identity and prestige in the community motivated close mutual connections, much closer than to other members of the *ordo*. Apart from the direct connections to their colleagues with whom they shared the duumvirate (Egnatius Postumus, Arcaeus Arellianus Caledus), distances to other *duoviri* in Flaccus' network are considerably higher. As most of them were members of *gentes* who only managed to hold office this single time (Alfidius Hypsaeus, Annius Marulus, Q. Cotrius, Numistrius Fronto), connections to these less prominent individuals had little to offer. The personal network of Clodius Flaccus thus clearly reflects the traditional internal hierarchy of the Pompeian elite, with a core of conspicuous and well-established families and a periphery of *homines novi*.

However, despite this elaborate network, the Clodii, like so many other families from the late Republican era, seem to have fallen victim to political and social decline. In the following periods, the *gens* virtually disappears apart from a small number of freedmen, most of them occurring in the archive of Caecilius Iucundus. Even though Clodius Flaccus could claim a high number of useful connections, his accomplishments in the *ordo* only reflected on his daughter Clodia and the religious office awarded to her. I previously argued that well-connected individuals established in the core of large networks should be able to capture the benefits associated with high levels of connectivity, so what went wrong? Perhaps his epitaph can offer a clue. None of the Pompeian magistrates provided such a detailed account of donations and it is possible that Clodius Flaccus, in an attempt to position himself as a worthy and generous member of

57 CIL X, 1074d. For the organization of pantomimes in Pompeii, see FRANKLIN (1987).

58 See Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.

59 Apart from the *gens* of Clodius Flaccus himself, for which see below.

the Pompeian elite, overestimated his resources.⁶⁰ Dire need for finances perhaps motivated the alleged marriage of Clodia and Cellius Calvos, who had not been particularly successful in building a political career but apparently belonged to a family sufficiently powerful and (more importantly?) rich to forge connections to other well-established elite families.⁶¹

7 The Julio-Claudian period

Unlike other periods of Pompeian history, the early Julio-Claudian years are only sparsely represented in the city's epigraphic records. Most sources preserved are honorific, dedicatory or sepulchral inscriptions with only a limited number of connections or had been dedicated by the *ministri* and thus only mention their names and the magistrates holding office during a particular year. From a network perspective, neither of these inscriptions are particularly helpful in analyzing the structure of and interaction within the Pompeian community. Because most individuals only occur in a single inscription, they are part of closed, complete networks in which all nodes are linked. Nevertheless, by using the techniques of network manipulation the few connections visible in this period can still disclose some information on the composition and hierarchy of the *ordo*. I selected the three most important networks and altered the lay-out according to the family and office partitions. The latter was transformed into a vector in order to relate the size of the nodes to the prominence of the office held: the more important a person was for Pompeian politics, the larger his node will be. Node colors and the numbers before the node labels refer to the *gens* the individual belonged to. The visualization of these networks easily allows some conclusions on the structure of the Julio-Claudian elite of Pompeii.

From the analysis of the visual representation, it appears that members of the *gens* Lucretia prominently feature in every single network, in particular the branches of the Marci and Decimi, which continue to participate in politics during the following period. The rise of this family can be traced back to the late Republican period, when a M. Lucretius decided to adopt L. Decidius Rufus, better known as M. Lucretius Decidianus Rufus.⁶² Why the anonymous Lucretius opted for a member of the Decidii remains unclear, as the family's only

60 This financial decline has been tentatively suggested by FRANKLIN (2001), p. 40 and corresponds to other research equally stressing the sometimes quick reduction of family fortunes within a few generations. See MOURITSEN (1988), p. 118 with further references. This attractive solution to explain the family's fading power is in line with the network approach of this paper, but it has to be stressed that the evidence remains particularly meagre.

61 See fn.48.

62 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 29-33.

accomplishment had been the election of M. Decidius Faustus as *minister Augusti*.⁶³ Yet his choice proved to be quite fortuitous, as the subsequent presence of the Lucretii in the Pompeian *ordo* shows. In the Julio-Claudian period, the family continued its policy of aligning its members to other powerful *gentes*. The Lucretii first adopted M. Epidius Flaccus, no doubt a close relative of M. Epidius Sabinus, the candidate for the duumvirate during the Flavian period. Moreover, it seems that they deliberately tried to hold office together with the most distinguished *gens* in Pompeii, the Holconii (the *aedilis* Cn. Lucretius Decens and *duovir* M. Holconius Gellius in 22-23 AD; the *quinquennalis* M. Lucretius Epidius Flaccus and *praefectus iure dicundo* M. Holconius Macer in 40-41 AD).⁶⁴ In addition, a slave of Holconius Anteros was elected *minister Augusti* in 31-32 AD, when M. Lucretius Manlianus was *duovir*.⁶⁵ The alliance between both families becomes even more apparent, when bearing in mind that in both cases the other two magistrates sharing power belonged to families of considerable lower standing. Most of them never entered the *ordo* again (L. Aelius Tubero, C. Vergilius Salinator and C. Adius), while L. Licinius obviously was part of a different branch of the *gens* Licinia than the Flavian aedilician candidates M. Licinius Faustinus and M. Licinius Romanus. There thus seems to exist a clear hierarchical distinction between the magistrates, with the more influential families trying to control political power through alliances and shared networks.⁶⁶ When the Lucretii in 33-34 AD managed to be elected for both the duumvirate and aedility, they tried to apply the same strategy.⁶⁷ The family of the other *duovir*, M. Vesonius Marcellus, would never again return to the Pompeian *ordo*, while the Albucii would only rise to political prominence during the Flavian era. The *aedilis* L. Albucius Celsus apparently was an up-and-coming member of the Pompeian elite, not yet fully established but at the same time sufficiently wealthy to hold a minor office.⁶⁸ A similar distinction in prominence and power between the *duoviri* can be detected when M. Lucretius Manlianus shared office with L. Albienus Staius, once again a member of a family otherwise completely unknown.⁶⁹

The figure also shows the importance of adoption in supporting one's political career. The *quinquennales* in the networks analyzed here all had been

63 CIL X, 892.

64 CIL X, 895 and 904.

65 CIL X, 899.

66 In a similar vein FRANKLIN (2001), p. 55, though primarily focusing on M. Lucretius Epidius Flaccus and less on the alliance with the Holconii.

67 CIL X, 901.

68 On the arrival of the Albucii in Pompeii and their wealth, see FRANKLIN (2001), p. 60.

69 Only his cognomen suggests some connection to the Staii, who during the late Republic had risen to duumviral rank once with M. Staius Rufus (CIL X, 817; 824 and 893).

adopted. Not all alliances proved to be as efficacious as those by the Lucretii mentioned above. M. Stlaborius Veius Fronto represented the end of political participation for both his original and adoptive families. M. Alleius Luccius Libella on the other hand first introduced his family to the Pompeian elite in this period, a success story to be repeated by his descendant Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius, *quinquennalis*, *flamen* and *princeps coloniae* during the 50's.

8 The Neronian-Flavian period

With the final phase of Pompeian history, we enter a period considerably better documented than the previous ones. The Neronian-Flavian era indeed offers the best opportunity for a detailed network analysis. The numerous electoral programmata and other notices scribbled and painted on the walls effectively reflect the various connections of support and cooperation in politics.

8.1 Isolated nodes and newcomers

I previously argued that epigraphic visibility, isolation in networks and social prominence are closely related, in the sense that the number of connections as preserved in Pompeian epigraphy can be considered a proxy for an individual's standing in the city. This conclusion is confirmed for the Neronian-Flavian period.⁷⁰ The majority of the candidates for the aedility and duumvirate who in the inscriptions appear without the support of a network of connections to other Pompeian elites belonged to families or branches of families mentioned only once (Ateii, Consii, Cordii, Fervanii) or only bringing forth a single candidate (Appuleii, Attii, Crassii, Fabii (?), Fadii, QQ. Lollii, Mesonii, LL. Naevii, LL. Nonii, MM. Salvii, Seppii, MM. Sextilii, LL. Veii). This cluster of newcomers entered the political scene very briefly and soon disappeared again, apparently unable to establish sufficient connections to survive the fray of the Pompeian elections.

For some candidates it is possible to grasp the reasons why they only hesitantly participated in Pompeian politics. The aedilician candidate Q. Lollius Rufus was probably a relative of the freedman Q. Lollius Felix, *minister Augusti* in 1 AD.⁷¹ Together they may have represented different stages of the social promotion of the QQ. Lollii, first being elected for a minor freedman function and then even joining the candidates for the junior office, but the success story apparently ended with Rufus. A similar case of social mobility and the problems encountered in establishing one's family among the civic elite is presented by

⁷⁰ See Fig. 7.

⁷¹ CIL X, 891 and 919.

the single inscription of Calventius Quietus, candidate for the duumvirate.⁷² He may have been the homonymous son of C. Calventius Quietus, *augustalis* and apparently a prominent figure in Pompeian society, considering the fact that in the Caecilius Iucundus archive he signed before other witnesses.⁷³ If Quietus junior was really the son of a freedman trying to enter the Pompeian *ordo*, he evidently had to manage without the support of previous generations having paved the way for his own career. The Calventii may have experienced some difficulties in becoming acceptable members of the elite, for in the Flavian era, they adopted a Sittius to strengthen their position. The strategy may have been a success, for C. Calventius Sittius Magnus appears also to have reached the duumvirate and was considerably better connected than the other members of his family.⁷⁴ Their choice for the Sittii may not be coincidental, for this family also had just entered the political scene during the Neronian era with P. Sittius Coniunctus, who was equally rather isolated among the Pompeian elite.⁷⁵ Moreover, the Sittii also appear to be strongly rooted in a freedmen milieu on the verge of social promotion: several slaves and freedmen had been elected *minister* and *augustalis*.⁷⁶ It thus seems that in the Flavian era two families with a very similar socio-political profile joined forces through adoption to further their position in the Pompeian elite.

Other candidates apparently tried to take advantage of and imitate the accomplishments of previous generations, but without much success. P. Gavius Proculus for instance can be connected to the *duovir* P. Gavius Pastor and may even have been his son.⁷⁷ Proculus most likely failed to hold any offices, for the PP. Gavii completely disappear from the Pompeian records. Another branch, the CC. Gavii, on the other hand did better and seem to have reached the duumvirate with C. Gavius Rufus.⁷⁸ A member of an equestrian family from Sicily, Cn. Pompeius Grosphus, later adopted a Gavius to establish his family in Pompeii, but whether this Gavius belonged to the branch of the PP. Gavii or the CC. Gavii remains uncertain.⁷⁹ A similar reconstruction can be made for P. Vettius Syrticus, most likely related to the *duovir* during the Augustan age, P.

72 CIL IV, 7604.

73 T. 50-51 and 87. It is well-known that the ranking order of witnesses is a proxy for the individuals' social prominence. See ANDREAU (1974), p. 170-176 and JONGMAN (1988), p. 224-238.

74 E.g. CIL IV, 85; 276; 292 and 376.

75 AE 1988, 336b; CIL IV, 726 and 3468.

76 CIL X, 885; 886; 887 and 1034.

77 CIL X, 827. Given the rarity of PP. Gavii in Pompeii, a connection between both individuals seems plausible, but direct parental ties remain uncertain. FRANKLIN (2001), p. 75 readily accepts the father-son relationship.

78 E.g. CIL IV, 103; 118; 155 and 198.

79 T. 143 and 145.

Vettius Celer.⁸⁰ This branch of the PP. Vettii disappeared in favor of the AA. Vettii, who during the final years made their presence in politics felt.⁸¹

8.2 Powerful Pompeians and lesser gods: a distance approach to connectivity

Moving from the isolated to the better-connected nodes, I now focus on aspects of the Neronian-Flavian network allowing a further distinction between more and less renowned members of the *ordo*. I again rely on the previously introduced concept of distance to analyze individual networks and the way they are connected to the wider Pompeian elite network.

As a case-study, I analyze the shared network of C. Memmius Iunianus and Q. Bruttius Balbus.⁸² They were aedilician colleagues in 56-57 AD, after which, as indicated by a small number of *programmata*, Balbus tried to stand for the duumvirate.⁸³ Iunianus on the other hand disappears from Pompeian politics. They are the only members of these *gentes* ever to have held office. I extracted their network with a maximum distance of 3, i.e. nodes removed more than 3 ties away from Iunianus and Brutus are not taken into account.⁸⁴ The figure quite clearly shows that the nodes closest to Iunianus and Balbus fall into two categories, viz. their non-elite supporters during the elections (Fabii, who also support L. Laelius Fuscus; a Caprasius and a certain Iulia Primigenia) and elite colleagues during office-holding (the *duovir* C. Vibius Secundus and *duovir* and candidate for *quinquennalis* Q. Postumius Modestus).⁸⁵ Little is known of Vibius Secundus, but Postumius Modestus was by then one of the most powerful and wealthy elite members.⁸⁶ The structure of the network clearly reveals that Iunianus and Balbus were of minor importance to the *ordo*. They only managed to be elected for the junior office of *aedilis*, were supported by a small number of Pompeians (although admittedly the level of support can be biased by the survival rate of *programmata*) and were only linked to other clusters of elite members through the core of 3 well-connected candidate *quinquennales* (Q. Postumius Modestus, L. Veranius Hypsaeus and P. Vedius Siricus). The careers of these prominent elite members may have been intertwined from an early stage onwards, for a notice on the house of Siricus, then *duovir*, urges him to

80 CIL X, 907-908.

81 See the careers of A. Vettius Caprasius Felix (candidate for the duumvirate) and A. Vettius Firmus (aedilician candidate).

82 CIL X, 826.

83 E.g. CIL IV, 3159; 3607; 3702 and 3773.

84 See Fig. 8.

85 Supporters: CIL IV, 935g; 3591; 3773. Colleagues: CIL X, 826.

86 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 82-84 with a discussion of the conspicuous residence Postumius Modestus inhabited and the jewelry discovered there.

elect Modestus as *aedilis*.⁸⁷ It is possible that this kind of texts reveal ties of mutual support among the most promising candidates and magistrates and that these connections to some extent buttressed the apparently quite successful rise to power of Modestus and Siricus. The difference in connectivity and the place occupied in the political hierarchy of Pompeii immediately becomes apparent when visualizing the ego-network of Q. Postumius Modestus, again with a maximum of distance 3.⁸⁸ The small ego-networks of Iunianus and Balbus continue to occupy only a minor position in the periphery, still owing their connection to the core to their colleague Modestus, but at the same time the shift of Modestus to the center immediately alters the nature of the network. A considerably higher number of nodes participates in Pompeian politics, either as candidates (the majority of connections in Veranius Hypsaeus' personal network) or elected *duoviri* (the connections with Vedius Siricus). Progressively raising the distances of the ego-networks does not alter the conclusions, but merely confirms the core-periphery structure of the network, with the candidate *quinquennales* firmly established in the center and controlling most of the connections to other nodes.

It may be interesting to note that the rise to power of the candidate *quinquennales* might to some extent be manipulated, in the sense that they appear to have been offered better opportunities to distinguish themselves among their colleagues in the *ordo*. It is quite remarkable that they all shared the aedility and duumvirate with colleagues of (more or less) minor importance. Modestus' colleague, C. Vibius Secundus, is the only member of the CC. Vibii ever to reach this office.⁸⁹ In Caecilius Iucundus' archive, all CC. Vibii rank particularly low among the witnesses, a clear indicator of their rather low social prominence.⁹⁰ It is quite remarkable that one of the witnesses, C. Vibius Chresimus, ranked so low, as the tablet dates to the year in which his apparent family member (or perhaps patron) C. Vibius Secundus was *duovir* (56 AD). One might have expected the prestige associated with the duumvirate to reflect on Secundus' freedmen and other family members, but apparently his position in the Pompeian community was not sufficiently high. Vedius Siricus shared his office as *aedilis* with L. Abonius Iugus and the duumvirate with N. Sandelius Messius Balbus.⁹¹ Iugus is the only member of this *gens* to find entrance to the lower

87 CIL IV, 805.

88 See Fig. 9.

89 Another C. Vibius only occurs as aedilician candidate in CIL IV, 1269 and aedilis in X, 827.

90 C. Vibius Alcimius: 8th place (t. 40); C. Vibius Chresimus: 8th place (t. 26); C. Vibius Palepatius: 5th place (t. 92).

91 Iugus: AE 2008, 330. Balbus: t. 144.

levels of the Pompeian *ordo*.⁹² Balbus on the other hand had apparently been born Messius Balbus and was later adopted by a Sandelius. Neither of these can be considered prestigious individuals, as the Sandelii are completely unknown outside Pompeii and the Messii's only other accomplishment was having the slave Phronimus elected *minister Augusti* in 34 AD.⁹³ It seems likely both families had the ambition to establish themselves among the Pompeian elite, but lacked the necessary resources and connections. Joining forces through adoption was a well-known strategy already encountered, and they appear to have been successful with the election of Balbus, albeit only once. Finally, Veranius Hypsaeus shared his term with L. Albucius Iustus, the first of the Albucii to hold the duumvirate in 58-59 AD, after his father L. Albucius Celsus had been elected *aedilis* in 33-34 AD.⁹⁴ In conclusion, in the absence of powerful colleagues during the first offices they held in the city, the future *quinquennales* must have been able to leave their mark on political policies and decision-making, hence adding to their prestige and paving the way for the most prestigious office.

8.3 Imperial freedmen and their descendants in Pompeian politics

The Pompeian *ordo* not only included well-established families and occasional newcomers; descendants of imperial freedmen also found their way to the municipal elite. They are represented by Ti. Claudius Claudianus, candidate for the duumvirate; Ti. Claudius Verus, *duovir* in 61-62 AD; and C. Iulius Polybius, candidate for the duumvirate as well.⁹⁵ When analyzing the Pompeian network of the city's final decades, it strikes one as remarkable that all three men share a considerable number of connections and clustered together in a small group. I drew their network with the *duovir* Claudius Verus in the center.⁹⁶ He probably received political support from two apparent newcomers from rather small families, Obellius Firmus *filius* and Rustius Verus. The former lived in the vicinity of Verus' dwellings and was the son of M. Obellius Firmus *pater*, whose name occurs among the witnesses in the Iucundus archive, but nothing is known

92 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 129 suggests Abonius Iugus eventually reached the duumvirate, but as rightly pointed out by MOURITSEN (1988), p. 204, fn.371, this assumption is based on the misinterpretation of the very fragmentary inscriptions CIL X, 912-914.

93 CIL X, 901.

94 CIL X, 901-902.

95 Claudianus: CIL IV, 2947 and 7912. Verus: e.g. CIL IV, 367; 369; 418; 425; 440 and t. 151. Polybius: e.g. CIL IV, 94; 98; 99; 107; 108; 113; 114; 121; 132; 133; 134 and 146. I exclude Ti. Claudius Rufus, mentioned in NS 1936, 348, for the reading of the praenomen and the eventual office are far from certain.

96 See Fig. 10.

about any engagement of his in politics.⁹⁷ His homonymous son however reached the duumvirate and must have been a rather conspicuous person, as the city council, the *pagani* and their magistrates all contributed to his funeral.⁹⁸ Both Obelli were petitioned to support Claudius Verus during his campaign for the duumvirate.⁹⁹ Rustius Verus was the first and only member of his *gens* to enter the Pompeian elite. He recommended Claudius Verus for the duumvirate and apparently at a later moment stood for the same office, as he reminded Verus of his own previous backing.¹⁰⁰ Rustius shared his office with Ti. Claudius Claudianus, who must have been either a direct relative of Claudius Verus (his son perhaps), or a descendant from a fellow imperial freedman.¹⁰¹

Anyhow, it is obvious that the mutually supportive connection already in place between Claudius Verus and Rustius must have encouraged Claudianus to strengthen this relationship in order to benefit from the advantages associated with this tie. Rustius Verus was also supported by another rising member of the elite whose name equally suggests a descent from an imperial freedman, viz. C. Iulius Polybius.¹⁰² This man also shared a connection with Claudius Verus, as both were asked to be elected by Fufidius, who is most likely to be identified with N. Fufidius Successus, an avid supporter of other candidates such as L. Caecilius Capella and C. Numitorius Serenus.¹⁰³ Moreover, Polybius was closely related to C. Iulius Philippus, as indicated by a notice in which Philippus is urged to elect a candidate whose name is now virtually illegible, and then assured that in return the anonymous candidate will support C. Iulius Polybius.¹⁰⁴ Della Corte tentatively suggested identifying this candidate with Rufius Verus, but it has been pointed out, and with good reason, that no evidence can be adduced to sustain this reading.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, the apparently close-knit network of imperial freedmen, their families and the few candidates with whom they cooperated must at least give some credibility to Della Corte's proposal. Similar to Claudius Verus, Iulius Polybius maintained the closest connections to newcomers (M. Cerrinius Vatia and M. Licinius Romanus) or with a member of a family fallen into disgrace for their close tie to

97 T. 81. ANDREAU (1974), p. 200 considers an office for Obellius Firmus pater unlikely. Whether or not he was involved in the wine trade, as suggested by FRANKLIN (2001), p. 135, cannot be confirmed.

98 JONGMAN (1978-1979).

99 CIL IV, 3828.

100 CIL IV, 3741 and 3760.

101 CIL IV, 2947.

102 CIL IV, 7942 and 7954.

103 CIL IV, 7304a; 7305; 7308a-b (with restitution of the cognomen Successus) and 7997.

104 CIL IV, 7316.

105 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 159; FRANKLIN (2001), p. 144, fn.45.

the reign of Caligula, viz. the MM. Lucretii.¹⁰⁶ In 40-41 AD, the year the emperor was assassinated, M. Lucretius Epidius Flaccus had functioned as *quinquennalis* together with Caligula and it seems that this association severely harmed the family's prestige in Pompeii.¹⁰⁷ The MM. Lucretii apparently disappeared from the political scene in the years immediately following Caligula's death and only returned with the candidacy of M. Lucretius Fronto, and with success: during the final years of the city, Fronto stood for *quinquennalis*.¹⁰⁸ This apparent similarity in connections held by descendants of imperial freedmen is difficult to explain.¹⁰⁹ Did the stain of manumission attached to their families and so clearly signaled by their *gentilicia* and sometimes even *cognomina* (Polybius) exclude them from close relationships with the city's more powerful and well-established families?¹¹⁰ Was the link with the imperial family not strong enough to give them a head start in trying to gain entrance to the *ordo*? From the network reconstructed here, it seems that descendants of imperial freedmen deliberately shared personal connections. Is it too far-fetched to assume that they recognized a common identity (a homophily in SNA terms) sufficiently strong to cluster together and hoped to profit from each other's connections to other elite families? This clustering can be taken quite literally, for as far as we are able to identify these people's houses, they were all located in the northeast part of the city, within walking distance from each other.¹¹¹

9 The long arm of Rome: a comparison of the ego-networks of candidates for the duumvirate

Previous analysis has suggested a certain core-periphery structure for the Pompeian *ordo*, in which a relationship can be established between connectivity and social and political standing, often translated into the success rate of candidates in being elected for the more prestigious offices. In this section I will

106 CIL IV, 132 (Cerrinius Vatia); CIL IV, 699 (Licinius Romanus) and 973 (Lucretius Fronto).

107 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 49.

108 CIL IV, 7184.

109 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 147 argues these families may have shared a background in trade, but this has yet to be proven. The notion of a commercial bourgeoisie penetrating the traditional municipal elite, present in Roman and indeed Pompeian historiography from the days of Rostovtzeff, looms in the distance. See however the literature cited in fn.7.

110 It should be noted that the most conspicuous individual in this small network, Obellius Firmus filius, was petitioned to support Claudius Verus, but we don't know whether Verus actually received any help.

111 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 149. I do not believe that the network cluster we can trace in the inscriptions is only the result of these people living close to each other. What are the odds that all politically active descendants of imperial freedmen known to us coincidentally ended up in the same corner of the city and decided to support each other, without some deliberate networking backing up this cluster?

argue that connectivity and a central position in the Pompeian network was duly recognized by Pompeian citizens as well as outsiders, and that the level of connectivity was able to shape careers from a rather early stage, i.e. the candidacy for the duumvirate.¹¹² For this purpose I analyze five ego-networks of candidate *duoviri*, viz. M. Epidius Sabinus, A. Suettius Certus, N. Popidius Rufus, L. Ceius Secundus and M. Holconius Priscus. The candidates are not chosen arbitrarily, but answer to different profiles: a candidate with a remarkable level of support (Epidius Sabinus), two candidates directly connected to the first (Suettius Certus and Popidius Rufus), a candidate rather located in the periphery of the network (Ceius Secundus) and a candidate situated more in the center (Holconius Priscus).

The career of Epidius Sabinus stands out among his colleagues, for he is the only Pompeian candidate to receive support from an outsider, the imperial agent T. Suedius Clemens. Clemens was serving in the military during the reigns of Otho and Titus, but had also been engaged by Vespasian to reclaim public lands in Pompeii which had been seized by private individuals.¹¹³ During his stay in the city, he apparently became involved in the political strife, for he decided to support Epidius Sabinus' candidacy for the duumvirate at the request of his neighbors.¹¹⁴ The *ordo*, in response, resolved to follow Clemens' political preference, as witnessed by a number of notices explicitly stating the council's support of Sabinus, and thus evidently secured his election.¹¹⁵ Clemens' choice for Sabinus at first sight seems somehow strange, but was definitely not coincidental. The family of the Epidii was not particularly renowned for taking part in Pompeii's political life, but still enjoyed some

112 For the function of *duovir*, elections were no real elections, for all *programmata* only present two candidates, exactly the number needed. It seems likely that through previous maneuvering, networking and negotiation, the selection was already made by the *ordo* before the actual campaign. Candidates may thus have had previous connections to the *ordo* (most notably sons of *decuriones*) or were successful in gaining favour by networking and socializing (JONGMAN (1988), p. 317). Nevertheless, candidates continued advertising, because they wished to be visibly connected (and for a longer period of time than their office) to the highest office in the city. See FRANKLIN (1980), p. 100 for this part of the elections. Anyhow, this particular feature of Pompeian politics is a powerful argument in favour of the application of SNA, as negotiation and networking prior to the elections apparently determined the outcome.

113 For details on Suedius Clemens' career and particular commands, see FRANKLIN (2001), p. 156-158.

114 CIL IV, 1059.

115 CIL IV, 768 (*consensu ordinis*); CIL IV, 7203 (*orat vos faciatis sanctus ordo facit*); CIL IV, 7576 (*ordo sanctissimus facit*); CIL IV, 7579 (*orat vos faciatis dignissimum iuvenem sanctus ordo facit*); CIL IV, 7584 (*sanctus ordo consensu populi facit*) and CIL IV, 7605 (*consentiente sanctissimo ordine*).

prestige among the local elite, as in the previous period several members had been adopted by other *gentes* and each time managed to reach the duumvirate.¹¹⁶ This already suggests that despite their absence from politics, a tie to the Epidii was considered a valuable asset during the elections. When visualizing the ego-network of Epidius Sabinus, one immediately understands why.¹¹⁷ He was connected to a remarkably high number of elite members, including 16 candidate-aediles, 12 candidate-duoviri, 2 duoviri, 2 candidate-quinquennales and 1 *tribunus militum a populo*.¹¹⁸ Many of his more isolated colleagues, such as A. Vettius Caprasius Felix and A. Suettius Certus, had to thank Sabinus for their access to the core of the elite community, as most of their connections to colleagues in the *ordo* were mediated through him.

To highlight his extraordinary level of connectivity even more, I include five tables presenting each candidate's network of nodes to which he was directly connected (i.e. at distance 1). The result hardly needs commentary. First, Sabinus controlled a rather large network, with 12 direct connections to other individuals. To assess the meaning of this number, I add a degree frequency distribution table for the Neronian-Flavian period, which allows us to determine the level of connectivity of nodes in comparison to the network. Degree is a node attribute simply measuring the number of ties to other nodes. All nodes with an identical degree number are gathered in the same class, with class numbers representing the nodes' degree scores. Only 4 individuals out of 523 (or 0,76% of the network) appear to have a higher degree score than Sabinus. This result clearly stresses his remarkable level of connectivity.

Yet, not only do the differences in size of this particular kind of network strongly argue in favor of Sabinus' central place in the community, but what is even more important is the identity of the nodes each candidate was linked to. More isolated nodes administer a higher percentage of connections to non-elite members, viz. the ties to their supporters, the Pompeian citizens asking passers-by to elect the candidate. This feature applies in particular to the network of Ceius Secundus, who indeed is located in the periphery of the community, but to some extent even to a more central node as Holconius Priscus. Ceius Secundus' limited number of politically relevant ties is reflected in the modesty of his house and perhaps also in his familial background, allegedly being the

116 M. Herennius Epidianus: CIL X, 802; 831 and 939. M. Lucretius Epidius Flaccus: CIL X, 901; 902 and 904.

117 See Fig. 11. Relevant candidates are marked in orange. I again limited the network to nodes with a maximum distance of 3.

118 All these individuals can easily be found in the figure, as the label of the nodes is preceded by the number corresponding to the partition for elite offices (See Appendix 1).

son of a freedman.¹¹⁹ Franklin already argued that “the man of a prominent family drew on that political capital, while the less well known encouraged the advertisement of his name as widely as possible. The result is that the most powerful candidate in any given year is likely to be the least well supported by the *programmata*.”¹²⁰ This feature of Pompeian campaigning can indeed explain the remarkable differences in the composition of the networks. For Epidius Sabinus, I counted 46 notices, 119 for Ceius Secundus and 95 for Holconius Priscus. Cn. Helvius Sabinus, candidate-*aedilis*, was supported no less than 138 times and it comes as no surprise that the structure of his network is very similar to that of Ceius Secundus, with a high percentage of connections to non-elite citizens and a limited number of ties to colleagues, so the general pattern fits the networks in question quite well. Ceius Secundus and Helvius Sabinus apparently added more weight to the quantity of support and many Pompeian citizens posted notices in their favor. More prominent and well-connected candidates such as Epidius Sabinus on the other hand rather valued the prestige attached to their ties to other elite members and thus seem to have focused less on the support of ordinary people. Suedius Clemens hence perfectly knew whom to select as ally for his difficult task of recovering municipal property. Sabinus was the most appropriate candidate to negotiate Clemens’ decisions with the other members of the *ordo*, hoping to gain support for his verdicts and facilitate the compulsory expropriation of territories. Whether Sabinus continued his rise among his peers after the duumvirate seems plausible, but most remain uncertain. It has been argued that the paintings and architecture of his house strongly suggest he eventually was elected *flamen Vespasiani*.¹²¹ As this religious office was never advertised in the *programmata* and only mentioned in monumental inscriptions, few of which survive for this period, evidence for further offices is absent.

119 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 174-176, arguing for the freedman status of Secundus’ father. It should be noted however that any details on the status and wealth of his father are missing.

120 FRANKLIN (1980), p. 94-100 (quote on p. 100).

121 FRANKLIN (2001), p. 162.

Individual	Notes
Cn. Helvius Sabinus	candidate-aedilis
N. Herennius Celsus (II)	candidate-aedilis
Q. Marius Rufus	candidate-aedilis
P. Paquius Proculus	duovir
N. Popidius Rufus	candidate-duovir
A. Suettius Certus	candidate-duovir
A. Suettius Verus	candidate-aedilis
A. Trebius Valens (II)	candidate-aedilis
A. Vettius Caprasius Felix	candidate-duovir
Postumii	supporters
Paccius Alexander	supporter
Furius	supporter

Table 1: Nodes in Epidius Sabinus' network at distance 1

Individual	Notes
M. Epidius Sabinus	candidate-duovir
N. Herennius Celsus (II)	candidate-aedilis
A. Suettius Verus	candidate-aedilis
Clodius Nymphodotus	supporter

Table 2: Nodes in Suettius Certus' network at distance 1

Individual	Notes
M. Epidius Sabinus	candidate-duovir
M. Holconius Priscus	candidate-duovir
P. Paquius Proculus	duovir
L. Caecilius Capella	candidate-duovir
Minatius	supporter
Sextilius	supporter

Table 3: Nodes in Popidius Rufus' network at distance 1

Individual	Notes
A. Trebius Valens (II)	candidate-aedilis
M. Amullius Cosmus	supporter
Q. Caecilius Iucundus	supporter
Sex. Caecilius Iucundus	supporter
Calventius Faustus	uncertain relationship
Sex. Ceius	supporter
Loreius	supporter
Postumii	supporters
Statius	supporter
Stronnius	supporter
Sutoria Primigenia	supporter
Vatinia	supporter

Table 4: Nodes in Ceius Secundus' network at distance 1

Individual	Notes
C. Cuspius Pansa (III)	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
C. Gavius Rufus	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
P. Paquius Proculus	<i>duovir</i>
N. Popidius Rufus	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
L. Popidius Secundus (II)	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
M. Salaris	supporter
Sextilius	supporter
Vettius Donatus	supporter
Loreius	supporter
Helvius Vestialis	supporter
Lutatius	supporter
Marius	supporter
Clodius	supporter

Table 5: Nodes in Holconius Priscus' network at distance 1

Cluster	Freq	Freq%	CumFreq	CumFreq%
0	306	58.50	306	58.50
1	98	18.73	404	77.24
2	50	9.56	454	86.80
3	25	4.78	479	91.58
4	11	2.10	490	93.69
5	5	0.95	495	94.64
6	9	1.72	504	96.36
7	5	0.95	509	97.32
8	3	0.57	512	97.89
9	3	0.57	515	98.47
11	2	0.38	517	98.85
12	2	0.38	519	99.23
13	2	0.38	521	99.61
14	1	0.19	522	99.80
16	1	0.19	523	100.00
Sum	523	100%	523	100%

Table 6: Degree frequency distribution table (Epidius Sabinus' class marked)

10 The first steps in politics: the aedilician candidates

After analysing the duumviral networks in the previous section, I now turn to the *aediles*. Part of the aedilician networks obviously overlap with those discussed above, as candidates for the duumvirate and *duoviri* had first held the office of *aedilis*. I therefore only focus on the aedilician candidates for whom we have no information on further career development. This may not be a very robust criterion, as the survival rate of the *programmata* determined by decay and overpainting together with the virtual absence of stone inscriptions describing the full career path of Pompeian elites can seriously affect our reconstruction of the *ordo*. Some of the candidates listed below might eventually have reached the

duumvirate, others will have failed to be elected at this very first stage. However, with the current state of knowledge, I accept the criterion as a suboptimal approach to analyse the networks of aedilician candidates and the inherent benefits the connections had to offer.

I rely on two measures of centrality, viz. the distance approach and dyadic constraint. For every single candidate, I first list the number of nodes at distance 1 (a figure corresponding to the node's degree score, introduced above), distance 2 and the cumulative number. I assume the individuals within these ego-networks can actively contribute to a candidate's campaign, either directly by offering personal support (distance 1) or through the mediation of the candidate's most intimate entourage (distance 2). Together the figures represent the number of people a candidate could easily and personally reach to request support (the cumulative number). The final column adds the nodes' aggregate constraint, a slightly different approach to a person's position in a network. Constraint measures a node's opportunities to broker and mediate between other nodes and the risks a node takes in withdrawing from the network.¹²² High constraint numbers (i.e. numbers equal to or approaching 1) indicate few opportunities to broker or take advantage of structural holes in a network and a high dependency from surrounding nodes. This measure thus reflects the abilities of the candidates to take advantage of connections and their obligation to maintain ties to other, more central and important nodes. For candidates still trying to gain entrance to the *ordo*, the benefits secured by connections to more senior elite members and their ability to manipulate these ties evidently closely relate to the candidate's expected success rate. In conclusion, the lower the constraint number, the higher the chances should be for a candidate to be elected. It is important to note that there is a close correlation between the ties managed at distance 1 and 2 on the one hand, and constraint on the other. People with a particularly low number of direct connections (distance 1) yet benefitting from the ties controlled by their immediate neighbours in the network, may be able to interact with many individuals in the network, but will still have high constraint scores, as they are completely dependent from good relationships with their neighbours. Sallustius Capito and Vedius Nummianus both offer a case in point. On the contrary, individuals with a high number of direct connections which in turn do not exponentially raise the total amount of nodes at distance 2, such as Helvius Sabinus and Cerrinius Vatia, have low constraint scores, as they themselves are able to control and manipulate connections and their own position in the network.

The two centrality measures allow us to distinguish between different categories of candidates. A first group includes all individuals with a limited

122 DE NOOY / MRVAR / BATAGELJ (2005), p. 144-150.

number of connections and corresponding high constraint figures. A considerable number of candidates appear as completely isolated nodes or maintain very few ties. Similar to the conclusions reached for previous periods of Pompeian history, the isolated candidate usually belongs to families (Ateii, Consii, Cordii, Fervanii, Mallii) or branches of families (Sexti Attii, PP. Gavii, LL. Naevii, LL. Nonii) otherwise unknown in the city's epigraphy. Others only seem to be related to contemporary freedmen and it has been argued that these newcomers may have been sons of freedmen (M. Fabius Rufus, A. Vettius Firmus and P. Vettius Syrticus).¹²³ This argument for a high level of social mobility among Pompeian freedmen has rightly been criticized, because due to the gaps in our knowledge of the Pompeian *fasti* these aedilician candidates may actually belong to the younger generation of elite families trying to establish themselves among the other members of the *ordo*, but so far invisible in the inscriptional evidence.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, some families do present the features one would expect to allow intergenerational mobility, such as sufficient wealth and prestige. The MM. Fabii for instance, even though frequently attested in monumental epigraphy and in the Iucundus archive, only tried to enter the *ordo* once (as far as we know) through the candidacy of M. Fabius Rufus. At the same time, many of the freedmen of the family appeared to have enjoyed some esteem. M. Fabius Eupor, presumably a wealthy wine merchant, in an electoral programma calls himself the *princeps libertinorum* and some of his fellow freedmen rank rather high among the witnesses in the Iucundus archive.¹²⁵ The support Eupor offered to other candidate-aediles Cuspius Pansa and Cerrinius Vatia, both of whom were far better connected than Fabius Rufus, can be read as an invitation to return the favour and add strength to Rufus' campaign.¹²⁶ With money and prestige present, the MM. Fabii may have taken their chances to have one of their members stand for *aedilis*, although so it seems with little success. This conclusion thus corroborates the idea that freedmen's sons definitely had the opportunity to be enlisted as candidates, but may have found it difficult to become elected, partly due to the absence of a large supportive network. The Fabii can have shared this background of combined money and prestige with the Fadii. L. Fadius, the only candidate of this *gens*, must have been related to the only other L. Fadius encountered in Pompeii, viz. L. Fadius Neptunalis. The latter occurs in the Iucundus archive as first witness and may also have been

123 LÓs (1992), p. 295. See also CASTRÉN (1975), p. 118-124.

124 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 121-122.

125 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 119. Eupor: CIL IV, 117 and ANDREAU (1974), p. 267. High-ranking MM. Fabii in the Iucundus archive: Agathinus (t. 91); Diadumenus (t. 14 and 28); Eupor (t. 37; 71; 92 and 97); Philocalus (t. 80); Proculus (t. 24; 46 and 93) and Thelus (34; 77 and 97).

126 CIL IV, 117 and 120.

engaged in trade, assuming his *cognomen* somehow offers a clue for his and perhaps his patron's activities.¹²⁷ This particular aspect of Roman onomastics has a parallel in other inscriptions.¹²⁸ More difficult to explain is the absence of ties for P. Vettius Syrticus, as a P. Vettius had been elected *duovir* during the Augustan age.¹²⁹ However, the *cognomen* Syrticus may suggest that this candidate was no direct descendant of the *duovir*, but rather a freedman's son.¹³⁰ Also belonging to this first group are nodes with a single connection, but no additional ties, such as Numisius Rarus, Numitorius Serenus and Vestorius Priscus. The fact that they receive so little support and that nothing else is known about the people favouring their candidacies suggests their supporters must have been close friends and family members. It is perhaps no coincidence that 2 out of 3 candidates (Rarus and Priscus) were supported by females (Oppia and Mulvia Prisca respectively), presumably their wives or close neighbours.

A second group consists of candidates maintaining a rather small yet not irrelevant number of direct connections (I assume for the sake of argument a range of 2 to 5), as these ties open up new opportunities to interact with other individuals. Some candidates appear to have failed to make the most of this option. Licinius Romanus and presumably his son Faustinus shared most of their connections, in particular a tie of support to Iulius Polybius, already encountered in a previous section.¹³¹ Others were more successful, such as for instance C. Lollius Fuscus, who despite controlling only two direct connections had access to no less than 20 individuals at distance 2. He stood for *aedilis* together with Popidius Secundus *filius*, a famous and highly-connected member of the well-established aristocratic family of the LL. Popidii.¹³² Fuscus, being the only C. Lollius to ever occur among the civic elite, obviously was the less important of the two candidates. We already discussed above that cooperation between more prominent and less important candidates was a recurring feature of Pompeian politics. Fuscus therefore definitely benefitted from this connection, yet at the same time it should be noted that this hierarchy among the candidates made Fuscus highly dependent from Popidius Secundus' ego-network, which explains his high constrain score. Similar conclusions can be drawn for Marius Rufus, standing together with the extremely well-connected Epidius Sabinus, whose network I discussed above, and for Sabellius Modestus,

127 T. 26.

128 See e.g. CIL XIII, 1942, in which the maritime shipper Q. Capitonius Probatas senior was buried by his freedmen Nereus and Palaemon, both of whom carry the name of a sea god.

129 CIL X, 907-908.

130 See Lós (1992), p. 272 for a similar assumption, albeit for Sextilius Syrticus, the candidate for the duumvirate mentioned in CIL IV, 799 and 7762.

131 See Fig. 10.

132 CIL IV, 295.

whose *gens* is otherwise unknown in Pompeii but who profited from his connection to the popular Helvius Sabinus.¹³³ Yet, standing together for the same office was not the only strategy available to less prominent candidates to gain access to the networks of more important colleagues. Candidates aspiring both the duumvirate and aedility regularly tried to work out an agreement of mutual support, urged colleagues to back up their campaign and promised to return the favour. Ovidius Veiento for instance stood for *aedilis* together with Vettius Firmus.¹³⁴ Being the only Ovidius ever to occur in Pompeian epigraphy, it seems likely that he was the less distinguished of the two candidates. A comparison of the direct ties controlled by each of them confirms this distinction, as Veiento has only half the amount of connections maintained by Firmus. However, in order to strengthen Veiento's candidacy, A. Trebius Valens *filius* was urged to assist him in exchange for mutual support.¹³⁵ Valens was the son of the homonymous Trebius Valens *pater*, a respected *duovir* and candidate-*quinquennalis*.¹³⁶ Valens *filius* obviously had easy access to the elite connections established by his father and facilitating his own rise in the community. By associating himself with Valens *filius*, Veiento immediately multiplied the possible ties he could reach and benefit from.

That the distance approach introduced here also has its limitations is obvious from the case-study of Lucretius Valens, as his centrality measures are slightly misleading. Being the son of D. Lucretius Satrius Valens, the adoptive son of the homonymous Lucretius Valens, Valens (III) belonged to a prominent family engaged in politics from at least the Julio-Claudian era.¹³⁷ He was the third generation of Lucretii Valentes to participate in the elections and thus should have access to a wide network. However, as he was the youngest member of the family still at the beginning of his career, a large part of his personal network hinged on the connections forged by his father and his adoptive family. The gradual expansion of the network as other members of the family are included becomes apparent when slowly increasing the distance of Valens' network, because every single step nearly doubles the number of connections, often running through ties his father and grandfather controlled within the elite community.¹³⁸ Yet, making the same exercise for the other aedilician candidates listed below to test the validity of the methodology employed here, I found only minor alterations to the networks reconstructed

133 Rufus: CIL IV, 222. Modestus: CIL IV, 6616.

134 CIL IV, 3618.

135 CIL IV, 7429.

136 CIL IV, 7488 and 7633. See FRANKLIN (2001), p. 89-90 for Valens *pater*.

137 See CIL X, 901-902 for the *aedilis* Lucretius Valens (I) and AE 1994, 398 for the *duovir* Lucretius Valens (II). For a stemma of the family, see COOLEY / COOLEY (2004), p. 144-145.

138 Distance 3: 21 ties; distance 4: 42 ties; distance 5: 101 ties.

with a maximum distance of 2. The case of Lucretius Valens seems exceptional, but nevertheless serves as a firm warning against taking the results of SNA at face value: additional prosopographic research is essential to interpret the conclusions.

A final category of candidates includes nodes controlling a higher number of direct connections. A first subcategory can clearly be established and is formed by the descendants of elite members already well-established in the *ordo*. They enjoyed the access to a wide network of connections, most of them established and maintained by fathers and other family members, but at the same time facilitating the creation of new ties to other aristocrats. A good example is Cuspius Pansa, son and grandson of a homonymous father and grandfather. Pansa *avus* was one of Pompeii's most eminent elite members, having been elected *duovir* no less than four times and once as *quinquennalis*. Moreover, he had been appointed *praefectus iure dicundo* in 62 AD, when after the devastating earthquake regular elections could not be organized and a trustworthy and respected politician was required to restore order in the city.¹³⁹ Pansa *pater* also reached the duumvirate and in addition had been elected *pontifex*.¹⁴⁰ When Pansa *filius* eventually entered Pompeian politics, he obviously brought with him the connections established by his illustrious father and grandfather. This group also contains the network of Postumius Proculus, the son of the previously discussed Postumius Modestus, a leading *duovir* and candidate-*quinquennalis*.¹⁴¹ When analysing Proculus' connections, it appears that he shared some ties with his colleague Cerrinius Vatia, but most ties can be traced back to the network established by his father.¹⁴² Similar network structures and 'inherited' connectivity can be found for Herennius Celsus and Trebius Valens.

A second subcategory consists of apparent newcomers, whose *gens* is often particularly rare in Pompeian epigraphy and never played any important role in politics, such as Casellius Marcellus. He obviously could not rely on former networks and had to find his own way. His most direct connections to the Pompeian elite were forged by the candidates with whom he shared his campaign, viz. Albucius Celsus and Caecilius Capella.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, apart from gaining the support of a number of non-elite citizens, Marcellus was considered the equal (*optimus collega*) of the famous Veranius Hypsaeus, three

139 CIL X, 790 and 858. See FRANKLIN (2001), p. 149-151.

140 CIL X, 791 and 859.

141 See Fig. 9.

142 CIL IV, 7245e.

143 CIL IV, 3469 and 588 respectively.

times *duovir* and candidate-*quinquennalis*.¹⁴⁴ This honourable (and from a network perspective most valuable) comparison may have been motivated by Marcellus' extraordinary munificence, in particular in financing games. One notice actually praises him as a great organizer of games (*munerarius magnus*).¹⁴⁵ The network of Cerrinius Vatia shows a similar structure. His closest connections to the elite were controlled by his colleague Postumius Proculus and Iulius Polybius, whose candidacy he supported.¹⁴⁶ All the other ties are established by non-elite supported, including M. Fabius Eupor, the previously mentioned *princeps libertinorum*. It is important to stress this connection to the Pompeian sub-elite, as the Cerrinii had been slowly securing their rise in Pompeii by holding several minor offices. The history of the family's attempt to gradually move closer to the *ordo* starts in 47 BC, when a M. Cerrinius occurs as *magister pagi et compiti*.¹⁴⁷ During the final period of the city's history, a M. Cerrinius Restitutus had been elected *augustalis* and had been granted the privilege to be buried on land donated by the city council, an obvious indication of his local prestige.¹⁴⁸ This clear connection to a world of ambitious, and above all wealthy, freedmen can explain the support given by Eupor and at the same time the limited number of direct ties to the elite. The same network structure also applies to Helvius Sabinus, whose ties I discussed above.

Finally, the networks of Popidius Ampliatus and Popidius Secundus appear to combine features of both subcategories. They receive support from a number of non-elite citizens, including several family members such as Taedia Secunda, Secundus' grandmother, and Popidius Dionysius, his freedman, but at the same time better connected candidates such as Trebius Valens are urged to support them.¹⁴⁹ Why did the networks of these apparently closely related candidates somehow differ from the two subcategories discussed above? With the first they share some connection to the *ordo*, if only because another branch of the Popidii, the NN. Popidii, had already been elected for the aedility and the duumvirate in this period.¹⁵⁰ The association with the civic elite evidently is much weaker than, for instance, for Cuspius Pansa, which might explain the limited amount of elite support. With the second category they have in common wealth and

144 Hypsaesus: CIL IV, 187.

145 CIL IV, 3338.

146 CIL IV, 7300 and 132 respectively.

147 CIL IV, 60.

148 CIL X, 994-995.

149 Taedia Secunda: CIL 4.7469. Popidius Dionysius: CIL IV, 1041. Trebius Valens: CIL IV, 7614; 7624 and 7632.

150 CIL IV, 603 and 735: N. Popidius Rufus as candidate-*aedilis* and candidate-*duovir*. CIL X, 846 and 848: N. Popidius Celsinus, son of N. Popidius Ampliatus and decurio through *adlectio* at the age of 6 because of the generous donations by his father.

perhaps also the presence of servile blood in previous generations.¹⁵¹ The connection to the famous *gens* Popidia may thus to some extent have paved the way to secure some support from the elite, the LL. Popidii still remained newcomers with cash to spend on acts of munificence, but without a strong foothold in the *ordo*.

Candidate	Node	Connections			Aggregate constraint
		Dist1	Dist2	Cum	
C. Ateius Capito	99	0	0	0	1.000000
Sex. Attius Amplus	102	0	0	0	1.000000
M. Casellius Marcellus	179	9	13	22	0.208761
M. Cerrinius Vatia	198	8	9	17	0.135802
C. Consius	235	0	0	0	1.000000
L. Cordius	236	0	0	0	1.000000
T. Crassius Firmus (?)	261	0	0	0	1.000000
C. Cuspius Pansa (III)	270	14	29	43	0.104499
M. Fabius Rufus	319	0	0	0	1.000000
L. Fadius	328	0	0	0	1.000000
Fervenius Celer	331	0	0	0	1.000000
P. Gavius Proculus	349	0	0	0	1.000000
Cn. Helvius Sabinus	365	16	20	36	0.075617
N. Herennius Celsus (II)	385	6	14	20	0.319245
M. Iulius Simplex	441	0	0	0	1.000000
Iunius	442	0	0	0	1.000000
M. Licinius Faustinus	460	2	4	6	0.500000
M. Licinius Romanus (II)	462	3	6	9	0.333333
C. Lollius Fuscus	467	2	20	22	0.619473
Q. Lollius Rufus	471	0	0	0	1.000000
D. Lucretius Valens (III)	485	4	7	11	0.394649
M. Mallius	506	0	0	0	1.000000
Q. Marius Rufus	516	4	16	20	0.393195
L. Naevius Rufus	564	0	0	0	1.000000
L. Nonius Severus	577	0	0	0	1.000000
L. Numisius Rarus	582	1	0	1	1.000000
C. Numitorius Serenus	596	1	0	1	1.000000

151 On the wealth of the LL. Popidii and their possible relationship to freedmen, see FRANKLIN (2001), p. 115 and 169-174 and WELCH (2007), p. 567.

L. Ovidius Veiento	619	4	20	24	0.294404
L. Popidius Ampliat- tus (II)	666	7	20	27	0.158936
L. Popidius Secundus (II)	684	12	32	44	0.132014
Q. Postumius Procu- lus	699	3	15	18	0.333333
C. Sallustius Capito	723	2	6	8	0.878906
M. Salvius	726	0	0	0	1.000000
M. Samellius Modes- tus	728	5	25	30	0.226000
Seppius	737	0	0	0	1.000000
P. Sittius Magnus	769	1	7	8	1.000000
A. Suetlius Verus	810	6	15	21	0.273278
T. Terentius Felix (II)	814	2	1	3	0.500000
A. Trebius Valens (II)	834	14	49	63	0.118731
M. Valerius	852	0	0	0	1.000000
L. Varius	858	0	0	0	1.000000
P. Vedius Nummianus	864	2	6	8	0.500000
L. Veius Rufus	876	0	0	0	1.000000
C. Vestorius Priscus	898	1	0	1	1.000000
A. Vettius Firmus	901	8	7	15	0.164063
P. Vettius Syrticus	912	0	0	0	1.000000

Table 7: The centrality of aedilician candidates

11 How to find a broker in Pompeii? Affiliations and mediation

In this section I analyze the various roles individuals can play in a network, how they are able to control and manipulate connections and why some people manage to obtain a more powerful position in the network and others fail to do so. The centrality measures used above clearly indicated the advantages of being well connected, but only considered particular ego- and sub-networks as required by the specific analytical focus (candidates for the duumvirate and aedility). Here the emphasis is on the position individual nodes occupy within the whole network. In other words, not only the number of ties controlled by individuals matter to determine their connectivity, but also the occupation of strategic and sometimes even unique positions, yielding them the power to connect or disconnect smaller parts of the network and to broker between more isolated clusters. For this purpose, I first eliminated all isolated nodes from the network, as they obviously do not participate in brokering between other nodes. The new network now contains 217 individuals, to which the partition of elite offices was applied, because the *programmata recentiora* provide excellent information on electoral campaigns and office-holding, yet sub-elite offices remain underrepresented and thus unsuitable for this kind of analysis.

A first approach to the intermediating role of nodes rests on the idea that some nodes are more crucial than others for the survival and connectivity of the network. Certain nodes can easily be deleted without disrupting a large number of connections, while others are more important in holding the network together and guaranteeing its level of connectivity. Those central nodes are obviously better posited to secure and manipulate ties, an advantage they can use to their own benefit. In SNA, the level of control a single node is able to exert is measured by the concept of betweenness.¹⁵² The higher a node's betweenness score, the more important he is in connecting parts of the network. Pajek can export betweenness scores as a vector. The tabular output with frequency distribution can be found below. In a visual representation, betweenness scores are translated into node size, which implies that nodes unable to broker or influence the network's connectivity will be invisible.¹⁵³

Class	Vector values	Frequency	Freq%	CumFreq	CumFreq%
1	0.000	146	67.2811	146	67.2811
2	0.000-0.019	38	17.5115	184	84.7926
3	0.019-0.038	13	5.9908	197	90.7834
4	0.038-0.057	6	2.7650	203	93.5484
5	0.057-0.076	7	3.2258	210	96.7742
6	0.076-0.095	2	0.9217	212	97.6959
7	0.095-0.114	2	0.9217	214	98.6175
8	0.114-0.133	2	0.9217	216	99.5392
9	0.133-0.151	0	0.0000	216	99.5392
10	0.151-0.170	1	0.4608	217	100.0000
Arithmetic mean: 0.0096					

Table 8: Betweenness scores and frequency distribution (10 classes)

The conclusions from the table are pretty straightforward. An absolute majority of nodes are completely irrelevant for the survival of the network. This feature is common to relatively small networks, in which the presence of a small number of highly centralized nodes suffices to maintain most of the connections. With increasing network size, betweenness scores for individual nodes as well as the arithmetic mean tend to rise: then the network requires a proportionally higher number of better connected nodes¹⁵⁴. Nevertheless, to contextualize the scores for the Pompeian network, I compared them with the betweenness of other networks of similar size, randomly created by Pajek. It appears that Pompeii

152 DE NOOY / MRVAR / BATAGELJ (2005), p. 131-133.

153 See Fig. 12.

154 EVERETT / BORGATTI (2005).

presents slightly lower scores than average.¹⁵⁵ To some extent this feature can be explained by the high number of non-elite supporters, expressing their favour for a single candidate and otherwise not interfering in the network structure. Less prominent elite members, such as the aedilician candidates with high constraint scores already mentioned above, also present zero or extremely low betweenness scores. I will now focus on the individuals with the 10% highest scores, i.e. represented by class 4 and above.

Class	Individual	Notes
4	Cn. Audius Bassus	candidate- <i>quinquennalis</i>
	M. Fabius Eupor	<i>princeps libertinorum</i>
	M. Holconius Priscus	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
	Loreius	candidate?
	P. Paquius Proculus	<i>duovir</i>
	A. Trebius Valens (I)	candidate- <i>quinquennalis</i>
5	L. Caecilius Capella	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
	L. Ceius Secundus	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
	C. Iulius Polybius	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
	L. Popidius Secundus (II)	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
	Q. Postumius Proculus	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
	P. Vedius Siricus	candidate- <i>quinquennalis</i>
6	L. Veranius Hypsaeus	candidate- <i>quinquennalis</i>
	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
7	M. Epidius Sabinus	candidate- <i>duovir</i>
	M. Casellius Marcellus	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
8	Cn. Helvius Sabinus	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
	M. Cerrinius Vatia	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>
10	Q. Postumius Modestus	candidate- <i>quinquennalis</i>
	A. Trebius Valens (II)	candidate- <i>aedilis</i>

Table 9: Individuals with highest betweenness scores

A first important, though perhaps unsurprising conclusion is that the most powerful positions in the network were being monopolized by the more distinguished elite members. Virtually all candidate-*quinquennales* of this period occur among the nodes with the highest scores, thus confirming that this office was only reserved for the most respected and trusted members of the *ordo*. Even though the absolute number of ties preserved in the surviving inscriptions, may be low (e.g. for Veranius Hypsaeus and Trebius Valens *pater*) and would thus suggest a position in the network with few opportunities to exert control, the

155 Randomly created Erdős-Rényi networks present arithmetic means of 0.0144, 0.0164 and 0.0174.

betweenness approach confirms their prominence in the *ordo*.¹⁵⁶ However, when moving to the lower levels of the aristocratic hierarchy, viz. the candidates for the duumvirate and aedility, a proportionally lower percentage of all candidates manage to occupy the more strategic positions. This conclusion endorses previous results, stressing the highly varied background of the candidates, with some trying to enter the *ordo* relying on previously established, valuable ties and others virtually without supportive connections. The high scores for Cuspius Pansa, the Trebii Valentes and the QQ. Postumii can thus be related to the long family tradition of engaging in politics and the ‘inheritance’ of a powerful network, as discussed above. Among the apparent newcomers, Cerrinius Vatia again stands out. I previously discussed the slow rise of this family in Pompeian politics, somehow accounting for his connectivity, but his high betweenness score and corresponding power are also the result of his support to C. Iulius Polybius, thus forging a connection between the rather closed cluster of descendants from imperial freedmen and other colleagues.¹⁵⁷ Other newcomers, such as Ovidius Veiento and Marius Rufus, who showed above-average levels of connectivity when using the distance and constraint measures in the previous section, now appear to be less important for the network as a whole. I previously claimed that the alleged centrality of these people was only the consequence of the highly developed networks of the candidates with whom they organized their campaigns. This argument is now corroborated: with the focus moving to the position of power held by each individual and their importance for the survival of the network, they no longer rank high among the Pompeian elites.

It is remarkable to find two (alleged?) non-elite citizens in Table 9, viz. Loreius and M. Fabius Eupor. The first was a very active supporter of a number of candidates, and thus established ties between otherwise less connected individuals.¹⁵⁸ One may wonder at first sight whether the support offered by Loreius is a sufficiently strong argument to assume some kind of connection between the candidates and thus argue in favour of a strategic position held by Loreius. The phrasing of some *programmata* however, in which Loreius is urged to support a candidate and ascertained that the man will return the favour, suggests that Loreius himself might have stood for an office, although we do not

156 This conclusion can also be considered a powerful argument against those claiming the limited number of surviving inscriptions and arbitrary selection procedure preclude a SNA of Pompeian politics.

157 CIL IV, 132.

158 L. Popidius Ampliatus: CIL IV, 7517. L. Ceius Secundus: CIL IV, 7539. P. Paquius Proculus and A. Vettius Caprasius Felix: CIL IV, 7724. M. Holconius Priscus: CIL IV, 7727. Cn. Helvius Sabinus: CIL IV, 7733. A. Trebius Valens filius: CIL IV, 7735.

know which one.¹⁵⁹ These notices place Loreius among the people qualifying for membership in the *ordo* and part of his zealous support may be aimed at gaining assistance from more prominent candidates. Nevertheless, support by a colleague in Pompeian politics must have been valued by candidates and noticed by passers-by, thus (perhaps unconsciously or through active mediation by Loreius himself) distinguishing between candidates who received Loreius' support and others who did not. Moreover, Loreius was not alone in applying the technique of 'striking a deal' during the elections. Trebius Valens *filius* actively supported or was asked to support no less than 7 other candidates.¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, Fabius Eupor, the *princeps libertinorum*, obviously was a freedman and hence excluded from standing for office. His high score is the result of the support he offered to Cuspius Pansa and Cerrinius Vatia, two candidates otherwise not directly connected to each other.¹⁶¹ Being a wealthy and prominent citizen, his support and above all negotiation power over his friends and family members should not be underestimated. Yet it seems he campaigned for two candidates with a completely different background, the newcomer Cerrinius Vatia on the one hand and the established candidate Cuspius Pansa on the other.¹⁶² Whether or not Pompeian citizens were aware of this difference in political profile of Vatia and Pansa is uncertain, but earning the support of one of the city's most important freedmen must somehow have linked both candidates.

A second approach to the nodes' individual positions in the network is that of group affiliation. All nodes belong to particular affiliations, i.e. groups (e.g. elite versus non-elite citizens or freedmen versus freeborn) and subgroups (e.g. the various offices stored as attributes) in which the members share a number of features. Within the affiliations, some members are better positioned to negotiate with outsiders and reach an agreement than others or, put differently, to manipulate connections to outsiders and abuse this position of power. Figuring out who holds the best position in an affiliation yields considerable advantages, as this knowledge opens opportunities to quickly spread information or reach a large part of the affiliation without much effort.¹⁶³ The person holding a position of power can then use this leverage capital to compel the candidate to provide reciprocal support or other services, hold back

159 CIL IV, 7539 (*o(ro) u(t) f(acias) Lorei et ille te faciet*) and 7733 (*Lorei fac(it) et ille te faciet*). See also CASTRÉN (1975), p. 120 and 184.

160 L. Caecilius Capella: CIL IV, 7617. L. Ceius Secundus: CIL IV, 7627. C. Cuspius Pansa: CIL IV, 7630. M. Epidius Sabinus: CIL IV, 7605. C. Lollius Fuscus: CIL IV, 7619. L. Popidius Ampliatus: CIL IV, 7618. L. Popidius Secundus: 4.7614.

161 CIL IV, 117 and 120.

162 For his possible motives to back up Vatia, see above.

163 See TÄUBE (2004) for the translation of network positions into power and social capital.

information or simply refuse assistance. Applying this concept to Pompeian politics, one can assume that for candidates, and in particular the newcomers among the aedilician candidates, it was important to know which colleague or member of the superior ranks in the *ordo* should be addressed to gain as much support as possible. Information on the abilities and potential of candidates could prove useful when deciding on allies during the campaign. I previously discussed the cooperation during elections (especially for the office of *aedilis*) between more powerful and less distinguished candidates. For newcomers still trying to forge meaningful connections in particular, it was important to know how to communicate their ambitions and to present themselves as promising partners. One can imagine that before actual campaigning a considerable amount of networking and negotiating took place among the aedilician candidates, the *ordo* and between candidates and *duoviri*, because the latter decided on the organization of the elections. Establishing the proper connections thus was an important skill in standing for an office and was supported by the candidates' social prestige and munificence. Candidates however also did well to apply a similar strategy towards non-elite groups. Supporters in one's neighbourhood (the *uicini*) or elsewhere in the city writing the notices on the walls greatly enhanced a candidate's visibility. Here as well it was crucial to know whose assistance it was better to seek, as some non-elite members possessed more social capital than others, and were thus better posited to assess and above all influence the electoral preferences of their peers. The previously mentioned Fabius Eupor for instance, a most prominent freedman, definitely was a non-elite citizen whose support actually mattered.

Nodes can maintain and manipulate connections within and between affiliations in various ways and SNA thus distinguishes between different so-called brokerage roles:¹⁶⁴

Coordinator: broker and nodes belong to the same group.

Itinerant broker: nodes from one group use a broker from outside.

Gatekeeper: a single node from the group brokers to a node outside.

Liaison: a broker mediates between two groups to which he himself does not belong.

164 GOULD / FERNANDEZ (1989). See DE NOOY / MRVAR / BATAGELJ (2005), p. 151 for the application in Pajek. The program allows the analysis of 5 types of brokerage roles in directed networks. In undirected networks however, such as the one discussed in this paper, the roles of representative and gatekeeper coincide.




Figure 1: Different brokerage roles in triads

For the analysis of the network, it is important to establish the most dominant brokerage role as well as search for shared characteristics of the persons playing certain roles. A single node obviously can play a single role multiple times and at the same time have different types of brokerage roles, depending on which relationship to which group is being analysed. Pajek is able to count the frequency of brokerage roles in the network and creates new partitions for each role. The frequency tables and a comparative table can be found below. Class numbers refer to the number of triads for which the nodes play the particular role. These numbers are multiplied by the frequency of nodes present in the class to obtain the total amount of roles played in the network.

Class	Freq	Freq%	CumFreq	CumFreq%	Representative
0	202	93.0876	202	93.0876	Aemilius
2	8	3.6866	210	96.7742	M. Casellius Marcellus
4	1	0.4608	211	97.2350	Q. Veranius Rufus
6	4	1.8433	215	99.0783	M. Epidius Sabinus
12	1	0.4608	216	99.5392	N. Popidius Ampliatus
16	1	0.4608	217	100.0000	A. Trebius Valens (II)
Sum Coordinator: 72					

Table 10: Frequency tabulation of coordinator roles

Class	Freq	Freq%	CumFreq	CumFreq%	Representative
0	180	82.9493	180	82.9493	Aemilius
2	10	4.6083	190	87.5576	Aemilius Celer
4	1	0.4608	191	88.0184	N. Herennius Celsus (II)
6	6	2.7650	197	90.7834	Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius
8	3	1.3825	200	92.1659	Fabius (II)
10	1	0.4608	201	92.6267	Loreius
12	4	1.8433	205	94.4700	L. Albucius Celsus (II)
14	1	0.4608	206	94.9309	Q. Bruttius Balbus
16	1	0.4608	207	95.3917	P. Vedius Siricus
18	1	0.4608	208	95.8525	M. Casellius Marcellus
24	3	1.3825	211	97.2350	M. Epidius Sabinus
30	2	0.9217	213	98.1567	M. Cerrinius Vatia
56	2	0.9217	215	99.0783	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)
88	1	0.4608	216	99.5392	L. Ceius Secundus
180	1	0.4608	217	100.0000	Cn. Helvius Sabinus
Sum Itinerant Broker: 702					

Table 11: Frequency tabulation of itinerant broker roles

Class	Freq	Freq%	CumFreq	CumFreq%	Representative
0	175	80.6452	175	80.6452	Aemilius
1	12	5.5300	187	86.1751	Cn. Audius Bassus
2	10	4.6083	197	90.7834	L. Albucius Celsus (II)
3	4	1.8433	201	92.6267	L. Caecilius Capella
5	2	0.9217	203	93.5484	C. Gavius Rufus
6	1	0.4608	204	94.0092	N. Popidius Rufus
7	3	1.3825	207	95.3917	M. Cerrinius Vatia
9	1	0.4608	208	95.8525	L. Popidius Ampliatus (II)
10	1	0.4608	209	96.3134	M. Casellius Marcellus
12	1	0.4608	210	96.7742	A. Vettius Firmus
14	1	0.4608	211	97.2350	Q. Postumius Modestus
15	1	0.4608	212	97.6959	Cn. Helvius Sabinus
18	2	0.9217	214	98.6175	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)
20	1	0.4608	215	99.0783	L. Popidius Secundus (II)
22	1	0.4608	216	99.5392	M. Epidius Sabinus
41	1	0.4608	217	100.0000	A. Trebius Valens (II)
Sum Gatekeeper: 260					

Table 12: Frequency tabulation of gatekeeper roles

Class	Freq	Freq%	CumFreq	CumFreq%	Representative
0	169	77.8802	169	77.8802	Aemilius
2	17	7.8341	186	85.7143	L. Albucius Iustus
4	4	1.8433	190	87.5576	L. Caecilius Capella
6	4	1.8433	194	89.4009	D. Lucretius Valens (III)
8	3	1.3825	197	90.7834	Aemilius Celer
10	1	0.4608	198	91.2442	A. Vettius Caprasius Felix
12	5	2.3041	203	93.5484	Q. Bruttius Balbus
14	1	0.4608	204	94.0092	Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius
18	1	0.4608	205	94.4700	L. Ceius Secundus
20	2	0.9217	207	95.3917	C. Gavius Rufus
22	3	1.3825	210	96.7742	M. Casellius Marcellus
24	1	0.4608	211	97.2350	L. Popidius Secundus (II)
28	1	0.4608	212	97.6959	Cn. Helvius Sabinus
30	1	0.4608	213	98.1567	P. Paquius Proculus
42	1	0.4608	214	98.6175	A. Trebius Valens (II)
44	1	0.4608	215	99.0783	M. Epidius Sabinus
50	1	0.4608	216	99.5392	M. Holconius Priscus
52	1	0.4608	217	100.0000	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)
Sum Liaison: 576					

Table 13: Frequency tabulation of liaison roles

The tables indicate first, that the network is dominated by itinerant broker roles. To some extent this conclusion is the result of the nature of our evidence. An elite member supported by two isolated non-elite citizens obviously plays the role of an itinerant broker, even though this role and the subsequent connection are not particularly interesting for the analysis of Pompeian politics. Widely supported candidates such as Cerrinius Vatia, Ceius Secundus and Helvius Sabinus, whom I previously identified as apparent newcomers relying on connections to non-elite citizens in the absence of a network sustained by their family, obviously score high for this role. An exception is, once again, Trebius Valens. Pompeian citizens not only asked him to support his fellow candidates for the aedility, which made him the foremost coordinator (see below), but also the campaigns of people standing for the duumvirate. Some of these candidates otherwise appear separated from each other (Ceius Secundus, Epidius Sabinus, Gavius Rufus and Caecilius Capella).¹⁶⁵ His support was valued in the Pompeian community, both by his peers and by the more established members of the *ordo*. These connections to various levels of the Pompeian elite explain

165 See fn.160.

why his support was much sought after. The network of the candidate-*duovir* Epidius Sabinus has been discussed above.¹⁶⁶ As a former aedilician candidate, he centralized many connections between several of his junior colleagues (Trebius Valens, Helvius Sabinus, Marius Rufus and Herennius Celsus). The particular position Sabinus held in Pompeii and the support received from an imperial agent easily explain his mediating power.

Coordinator	Itinerant broker	Gatekeeper	Liaison
M. Casellius Marcellus	C. Gavius Rufus	M. Samellius Modestus	A. Suettius Verus
M. Holconius Priscus	L. Popidius Ampliatus (II)	N. Popidius Rufus	Cn. Alleius Nigidius Maius
C. Munatius Faustus	A. Vettius Firmus	M. Cerrinius Vatia	L. Ceius Secundus
L. Popidius Ampliatus (II)	Q. Bruttius Balbus	P. Vedius Siricus	C. Gavius Rufus
L. Popidius Secundus (II)	P. Vedius Siricus	A. Vettius Caprasius Felix	P. Vedius Siricus
Q. Postumius Modestus	M. Casellius Marcellus	L. Popidius Ampliatus (II)	M. Casellius Marcellus
M. Samellius Modestus	M. Epidius Sabinus	M. Casellius Marcellus	C. Iulius Polybius
A. Vettius Caprasius Felix	P. Paquius Proculus	A. Vettius Firmus	Loreius
Q. Veranius Rufus	A. Trebius Valens (II)	Q. Postumius Modestus	L. Popidius Secundus (II)
M. Epidius Sabinus	M. Cerrinius Vatia	Cn. Helvius Sabinus	Cn. Helvius Sabinus
L. Ovidius Veiento	L. Popidius Secundus (II)	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)	P. Paquius Proculus
N. Popidius Rufus	M. Holconius Priscus	M. Holconius Priscus	A. Trebius Valens (II)
A. Vettius Firmus	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)	L. Popidius Secundus (II)	M. Epidius Sabinus
N. Popidius Ampliatus	L. Ceius Secundus	M. Epidius Sabinus	M. Holconius Priscus
A. Trebius Valens (II)	Cn. Helvius Sabinus	A. Trebius Valens (II)	C. Cuspius Pansa (III)

Table 14: Most important representatives for each role

166 See Fig. 11.

More interesting is the surprisingly low amount of coordinator roles. Networks in general tend to be characterized by coordinators rather than by other brokerage roles, because people presenting similar features (i.e. belonging to the same affiliation) are more likely to broker between each other than to maintain and manipulate connections to outsiders, as this requires more powerful positions. Again, this conclusion must be related to the category of inscriptions preserved for this period. The absence of stone inscriptions, usually aimed at describing family relations within an affiliation, combined with the high number of *programmata* result in a small amount of brokers operating within their own group. Nevertheless, this feature also shows that only a minority of elite brokers mediated within the civic aristocracy, i.e. explicitly lended support to each other in the *programmata*. This medium clearly was aimed at expressing non-elite electoral preferences. Candidates standing for office multiple times in different alliances however were sometimes able to establish connections between otherwise unconnected individuals. Popidius Secundus for instance joined forces with Lollius Fuscus and Cuspius Pansa and was thus in a position to mediate between these candidates.¹⁶⁷ The same reasoning applies to Casellius Marcellus, who had stood for *aedilis* together with the otherwise unconnected Samellius Modestus, Albucius Celsus and Caecilius Capella.¹⁶⁸ Samellius Modestus in his turn established a connection between Casellius Marcellus and Helvius Sabinus.¹⁶⁹ Epidius Sabinus again scores high; as a candidate with remarkable centrality scores, he connected fellow candidates for the duumvirate (Popidius Rufus and Vettius Caprasius Felix) and the aedility (Helvius Sabinus and Herennius Celsus).¹⁷⁰ These examples clearly show that candidates, even after an unsuccessful campaign, still had some negotiation power during following campaigns: previously forged networks must have been considered an asset by the new colleague and added support to their election. Newcomers to the political fore therefore preferably joined forces with more experienced and better connected candidates, a feature of Pompeian politics already discussed. We therefore should not only focus on the power held by the more prominent candidate over the newcomer and the latter's difficult position, but also on the access he gained to the network of his colleague. It may be surprising to find Ovidius Veiento among the most important coordinators. I previously argued he was a rather isolated and less distinguished candidate. However, precisely because he twice stood for *aedilis* with apparently more prominent yet unrelated candidates (Satrius and Vettius Firmus), he is able to bridge the gap between

167 CIL IV, 295 and 785a.

168 CIL IV, 3674, 188 and 588 respectively.

169 CIL IV, 6616.

170 CIL IV, 122; 222; 7708 and 7709.

them and, even though of more humble social origin, mediate between them.¹⁷¹ Moreover, Veiento was urged to elect Trebius Valens, in exchange for his own support to Veiento's career, thus establishing a tie to a candidate unconnected to Satrius and Vettius Firmus and once again moving himself into a position of power.¹⁷² This case-study thus corroborates the suggestion that less prominent candidates had little to lose and a lot to gain from the connections forged during the campaigns. One can imagine that with the slow advancement in the Pompeian political hierarchy, candidates started to profit from the cumulative benefits offered by all previously established ties. Evidently, the techniques available to less important candidates could also be applied by distinguished candidates. Vettius Firmus for instance seems to have specialized in forming electoral alliances with more isolated and/or inferior candidates (Sallustius Capito, Sittius Magnus and Ovidius Veiento).¹⁷³ This strategy obviously yielded him a superior position in which he was able to control several connections to his own advantage. It may have been this network of support that eventually backed up the career of his adopted son, A. Vettius Caprasius Felix, who successfully held the office of *aedilis* and stood for the *duumvirate*.¹⁷⁴ The champion of the coordinators however was Trebius Valens, who, as mentioned before, actively assisted in or was asked to support the campaigns of several of his colleagues.¹⁷⁵

The distribution of gatekeeper roles holds few surprises. People holding powerful positions within their own group (and hence often playing the role of coordinator) and in relationship to other groups (frequently occurring as itinerant brokers) combine these roles as gatekeepers. A distinction can be made between on the one hand less powerful gatekeepers primarily maintaining connections between their elite peers (aedilician candidates) and non-elite supporters (Cerrinius Vatia, Helvius Sabinus), a position which will yield visibility but few negotiating power among the members of the *ordo*, and on the

171 Satrius: CIL IV, 7766. Even though virtually nothing is known of this Satrius, he must have been related to the other Satrius known to have been engaged in Pompeian politics, viz. the famous candidate-*quinquennalis* M. Satrius Valens, later adopted into the family of the Lucretii and henceforward continuing his career as D. Lucretius Satrius Valens. See Franklin (2001), p. 101-106. Vettius Firmus: CIL IV, 3851. For the electoral successes of his adopted son, see Franklin (2001), p. 181-183.

172 CIL IV, 7429.

173 Sallustius Capito: CIL 4.380. Sittius Magnus: CIL IV, 1077.

174 CIL IV, 204 and 222. For the adoption by Vettius Firmus, see FRANKLIN (2001), p. 181-185. LÓs (1992), p. 285 offers a slightly different hypothesis and considers Vettius Caprasius Felix the adopted son of the *augustalis* A. Vettius Conviva and Vettius Firmus the son of either Vettius Caprasius Felix or Conviva. Franklin however correctly points out that the notices supporting Firmus predate the Flavian period and probably belonged to the days of Claudius.

175 See fn.160.

other hand people holding crucial positions within the elite community, being able to negotiate between different levels of magistrates and candidates (Epidius Sabinus, Trebius Valens, Postumius Modestus). The latter category also includes Cuspius Pansa, as his family's long-standing and successful engagement in politics allowed him to play a gatekeeper role between his peers (the aedilician candidates Trebius Valens and Popidius Secundus) and his father, who had held the duumvirate. This connection also explains Pansa's high score for the liaison role, as from a theoretical point of view, he was able to broker between his non-elite supporters and a prominent *duovir*. This position however obviously yielded him less power than his role as gatekeeper. Similar network structures and insignificant liaison roles can be found for less distinguished candidates enjoying few connections to the elite but widely supported by non-elite citizens (Ceius Secundus, Helvius Sabinus). More important however was the liaison role played by, once again, Trebius Valens. Apart from his connections to the other aedilician candidates (coordinator role) and duumviral candidates (itinerant broker and gatekeeper), he was the only person in this tightly linked network to maintain an additional tie to a candidate-*quinquennalis*, viz. his homonymous father. It seems very likely that whenever one of his colleagues wished to contact a member of the most distinguished elite group, the *quinquennales*, Trebius Valens *filius* was the right person to start negotiations with. The liaison role played by Loreius should be put in perspective. I previously argued that despite the limited information available in the *programmata*, Loreius may have run a campaign, though it is uncertain for which magistracy. As he is therefore not included in any elite office partition, he appears to broker (through the support he offers in several notices) between aedilician and duumviral candidates. Assuming for the sake of the argument that he stood for *aedilis*, it seems better to assign him a role as coordinator or itinerant broker. Finally, a remarkable person to occur among the brokers playing a liaison role is Iulius Polybius, the aforementioned candidate-*duovir* and descendant of an imperial freedman.¹⁷⁶ As the SNA of Polybius' personal network and that of the other families of imperial freedmen in Pompeii suggested, these people tended to cluster together and mainly exchanged mutual support, apart from a limited number of ties to newcomers and families trying to re-establish their prominence in the *ordo* (the MM. Lucretii). Polybius was connected to a few non-elite supporters, the aedilician candidates Cerrinius Vatia and Licinius Romanus and the candidate-*quinquennalis* M. Lucretius Fronto. From a structural perspective he was indeed able to play a liaison role between these people and it is possible he relied on his connection to Lucretius Fronto to mediate for Vatia and Romanus. On the other hand, his more isolated

176 See Fig. 10.

position in the Pompeian network at large and the social profile of his direct connections confirms that he can only have held a position of limited power.

In conclusion, what were the options for newcomers to the Pompeian elite, wishing to integrate as quickly as possible into the local social and political fabric? How should they decide whom to turn to in order to gain access to influential networks promising a quick rise in the *ordo*? Only five people appear to have played every single brokerage role available, viz. Casellius Marcellus, Holconius Priscus, Popidius Secundus, Epidius Sabinus and Trebius Valens. Each offered slightly different benefits to ambitious newcomers. Some belonged to distinguished indigenous families with considerable experience in local politics, relying on the family name and illustrious predecessors (Holconius Priscus and Popidius Secundus). Others had been catapulted into a position of prominence and acclaim through external forces, more or less bypassing the usual slow rise to power but capable of manipulating a considerable amount of connections (Epidius Sabinus). Still others could not boast of an age-old engagement in local politics, but of the prestige and distinguished position of the previous generation, which was still sufficiently fresh in the mind of the civic community to acknowledge the potential of the younger generation (Trebius Valens).

12 A long-term perspective on the Pompeian elite: networks and statistics

While the general outlines of the historical development of Pompeii's constitution and the ruling class are now commonly accepted, the long-term evolution of the *ordo*'s composition remains rather vague. Was the turnover in elite families more pronounced during one period than another? When did newcomers and sons of freedmen have better chances to enter the *ordo* or did they struggle regardless of which period? This uncertainty evidently is the consequence of the considerable lacunae in the lists of Pompeian magistrates and the subsequent difficulties in assessing the change of families in the elite of Pompeii.¹⁷⁷ The uneven distribution of information on elite families between different time periods therefore distorts a long-term perspective on the magisterial body. Especially after Mouritsen's severe criticism of previous attempts in reconstructing Pompeian *fasti* by, among others, Gordon, Castrén and Franklin, and his conclusion that the limitations of the evidence make a reconstruction of the history of the Pompeian elite virtually impossible, historians have been rather hesitant to trace the long-term development of the local *ordo*.¹⁷⁸ The limited information available for the final decades of the

177 See fn.7.

178 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 112-124. FRANKLIN (2001) is a notable exception, but see fn.15.

Republic and early Imperial era clearly contrasts with the well-documented final years of Pompeii. Many of the alleged 'new' families of the Neronian and Flavian era may already have entered the *ordo* during the previous period. However, Mouritsen may have been too pessimistic about the potential of Pompeian epigraphy in recognizing broad trends in the composition of the *ordo*.¹⁷⁹ In this section I will rely on the statistical technique of cross-tabulation to detect the level of association between elite families and branches of families during different periods of Pompeian history. I first shrunk the network according to the family partition and created additional partitions for all four periods in which a distinction was made between elite and non-elite families. This technique allows the comparison of partitions of equal size and referring to the same network. Pajek is able to compute two indices of association, Cramér's V and Rajske's information index. Both indices range between 0 and 1 and I here follow as a rule of thumb that "values between 0 and .05 mean that there is no association, values between .05 and .25 indicate a weak association, values from .25 to .60 indicate a moderate association, and values over .60 indicate a strong association."¹⁸⁰ The statistics do not need to concern us here, but both indices allow a quantification of association and dependence between two different moments in Pompeian history. In other words, we can measure how strong (or weak) the correlation is between the elite families during for instance the early and late Republic (Cramér's V) and the extent to which the composition of the *ordo* in a later period can be predicted by that of an earlier period (Rajski C1→C2). Due to the restrictions of our evidence, it is obvious that the indices in itself should be interpreted with considerable care. On the other hand, by comparing the indices computed for every single transition between periods, it should be possible to approach the relative (and not absolute) level of turnover during different time frames of Pompeian history.

A similar exercise has been made to establish the correlation between sub-elite and elite families. A relatively high correlation has major consequences for the possible trajectories of social mobility present in the Pompeian community. If the analysis would suggest that some families predominantly featuring among the various sub-elites only managed to enter the *ordo* during the following period, one might expect the sub-elite offices to act as a kind of 'waiting room' for wealthy and ambitious *gentes*. Castrén for instance pointed out the remarkable coincidence between the *praenomina* and *gentilicia* of newcomers of the final period and those of powerful freedmen during the early reign of Nero.¹⁸¹ Mouritsen on the other hand criticized this attempt to argue in favor of a marked presence of descendants of freedmen among the upper class.

179 LÓs (1992), p. 266-269.

180 DE NOOY / MRVAR / BATAGELJ (2005), p. 49-51 (quote on p. 50).

181 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 119-121.

He stated that the survival rate of inscriptions and limitations to Pompeian prosopography exclude this kind of analysis.¹⁸² Alleged newcomers to the *ordo* during the Flavian period, for whose families only freedmen occur during previous periods, may indeed belong to more prominent families so far invisible in the surviving inscriptions.

Despite this criticism I did compute the level of correlation between the sub-elites of the early Imperial period and the upper-class of the Neronian and Flavian era. To somehow counter the argument that such an attempt is futile, I diverge from Castrén's methodology of trying to connect every single freedman from all pre-Neronian period to an elite member holding office during the final two decades. First, I only take into account the slaves and freedmen of the Julio-Claudian period, and only those who can be considered to belong to the most prominent families, i.e. the *ministri* and *augustales*. This selection is motivated by the fact that *ministri* were appointed and *augustales* recommended by the city council, clearly indicating that not every single slave or freedman qualified for these functions.¹⁸³ Only individuals with particular accomplishments (most notably wealth) or ties to prominent individuals vouching for their respectability and capacity met the requirements, which basically are comparable to those stipulated for elite members trying to enter the *ordo*. Second, I regard the index not as an absolute indicator of association, but only in relation to other indices of turnover among the Pompeian elites and sub-elites. The correlation index thus should be compared, first, to the association between elites and sub-elites during the early Imperial period, to establish to what extent the elite families tried to dominate the sub-elite functions by electing their own freedmen (thus refuting the idea of a 'waiting room'), and second to the other correlation indices established as a proxy for the turnover among elite families. I hence assume that, if the correlation index for the sub-elites trying to enter the elite is considerably higher than the indices to which it is compared, the sub-elite functions can indeed be considered a first step in the direction of acquiring a place in the *ordo*.

The results in the tables below indicate that absolutely no, or only a very weak, association can be found between the families present in the *ordo* during subsequent time periods. To some extent this conclusion must be related to the limitations of the data set and the uneven distribution of information. In this respect, Mouritsen was certainly correct in emphasizing the methodological difficulties of trying to establish the rate of turnover among the Pompeian elite. It is no surprise that the highest (but statistically still barely relevant) values can be found for the comparison of the two final periods, when the evidence for the

182 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 121-122.

183 CASTRÉN (1975), p. 74.

ordo's composition during the last decades is abundant. Nevertheless, the values are remarkably low, especially when considering that they represent only a single aspect (elite family or not) of Pompeii's civic community between not too distant periods.¹⁸⁴ To contextualize the values, I created a number of random networks of the same size in Pajek and with the same number of classes and had the program compute the same indices of association. The results were more or less comparable to the values for Pompeii, ranging between 0.021 and 0.044 for Cramér's V, and between 0.002 and 0.005 for Rajske's information index. The main difference between the Pompeian and the random networks however is that the latter obviously were created without any historical context or expected relationships between nodes and partitions whatsoever. Logic and statistics predict that for these completely random networks and partitions association values will be extremely low. That in the case of Pompeii, for a historical network with obvious connections and relevant partitions, the values approach those of random constructions can indeed be relevant. This conclusion may suggest (although I cannot prove this idea) that methodological limitations to the evidence alone are insufficient to explain the low values. Mouritsen assumed that 30% of the Pompeian families can be considered to belong to a nobility, frequently holding office during several generations, and that 40 to 60% of the elite families consisted of newcomers only briefly participating in politics.¹⁸⁵ Nearly one in three Pompeian families then belonged to a core of traditional elite families, surrounded by a periphery of newcomers. This figures are obviously inspired by Hopkins' famous analysis of the succession rates of senatorial elites during the Republic and Empire.¹⁸⁶ More recent demographic studies have confirmed the difficulties Roman elite families continuously faced in securing intergenerational continuity.¹⁸⁷ The association indices cited below however indicate that a figure in the range of 30% may be too high and that the turnover of families in the *ordo* was a more important feature of civic elites than sometimes assumed. The major causes for the turnover have already been identified: renewal of the elite is due to, first, the Roman law of inheritance by which the family ran the risk of seeing its fortune gradually diminishing because of equal division between heirs, thus failing to meet the census requirement of wealth, and second, due to demographic trends with considerable infant

184 This is the reason why I only compared the periods in chronological order, and not for instance the early Republican with the Flavian period. The distance between those makes comparisons even less relevant.

185 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 118.

186 HOPKINS (1983), p. 31-200.

187 SCHEIDEL (1999); TACOMA (2006).

mortality and low life expectations.¹⁸⁸ Yet, these two factors may have had far more impact on the *ordo's* composition than expected. Moreover, another reason why the core of noble families in Pompeii can be expected to be smaller than that in Rome is the level of wealth required from the candidates. A census requirement of 100,000 sesterces for the municipal elite allowed recruitment from a considerably larger pool of candidates than the 1,000,000 sesterces necessary to enter the senate in Rome. It is no wonder that most of the (alleged) new families from the Flavian era feature so prominently among the aedilician candidates, but less among the *duoviri*. How large the 'noble core' actually was is impossible to calculate, but a guesstimate of 10-20% of the Pompeian families may not be too far from the truth.

Moving to the association indices between elite and sub-elite families, the results are more or less similar. Values are again very low and statistically hardly relevant. With the usual caveat that the survival rate of inscriptions seriously complicates this kind of exercises, the conclusion seems to be that, first, apart from a few exceptions, elite families did not bother to monopolize the minor offices held by prominent slaves and freedmen by appointing members of their own families.¹⁸⁹ Second, the weak association between sub-elite families of the early Empire and the *ordo's* composition in the Flavian era suggest that neither the descendants of the *ministri* or nor the sons of *augustales* had better chances to enter the *ordo* than newcomers without family members having held these offices, although again exceptions can be found.¹⁹⁰ Even though, once more, we should be extremely careful in reading too much in the statistics, I believe it is safe to agree with Mouritsen and abandon Castrén's thesis of a rise of freedmen's sons in the Pompeian elite during the final decades.

	0	1	Total
0	151	37	188
1	41	6	47
Total	192	43	235

Table 15: Association index between elite families of period 1 and 2

Rows: Elite families during period 1.clu (235)

Columns: Elite families during period 2.clu (235)

Cramér's V: 0.07153664

Rajski(C1 -> C2): 0.00575938

188 MOURITSEN (1988), p. 118-199. The logic of this argument had already been developed in Hopkins (1983). See also JONGMAN (1988), p. 311-329 for a similar argument based on the evidence from Canusium, and ZUIDERHOEK (2011) for the Roman East.

189 One of the exceptions may be the family of the Istacidii, discussed above. Cf. fn.51.

190 Cf. fn.72 and fn.148.

	0	1	Total
0	167	25	192
1	39	4	43
Total	206	29	235

Table 16: Association index between elite families of period 2 and 3

Rows: Elite families during period 2.clu (235)

Columns: Elite families during period 3.clu (235)

Cramér's V: 0.04371404

Rajski(C1 -> C2): 0.00271902

	0	1	Total
0	148	58	206
1	16	13	29
Total	164	71	235

Table 17: Association index between elite families of period 3 and 4

Rows: Elite families during period 3.clu (235)

Columns: Elite families during period 4.clu (235)

Cramér's V: 0.11941961

Rajski(C1 -> C2): 0.01096747

	0	1	Total
0	128	39	167
1	53	15	68
Total	181	54	235

Table 18: Association index between elite and sub-elite families of period 2 and 3

Rows: Elite Families during period 2 and 3.clu (235)

Columns: Sub-elite families during period 2 and 3.clu (235)

Cramér's V: 0.01395303

Rajski(C1 -> C2): 0.00018163

	0	1	Total
0	132	49	181
1	32	22	54
Total	164	71	235

Table 19: Association index between sub-elite families of period 2-3 and elite families of period 4

Rows: Sub-elite families during period 2 and 3.clu (235)

Columns: Elite families during period 4.clu (235)

Cramér's V: 0.12523312

Rajski(C1 -> C2): 0.01234013

13 Conclusion

In conclusion, a SNA approach to the make-up of the Pompeian aristocracy largely confirms the center-periphery model, with a clear distinction between a smaller, more permanently established nobility in the core and a larger group of quickly rising and disappearing families in the margin. The *ordo* thus was certainly open to new families, but that did not alter the nature of the municipal elite. New candidates required approval by the *ordo* and one way of getting support was conforming to values and behavior already in place.¹⁹¹ Throughout Pompeian history, a minority of families (30% according to Mouritsen, but probably considerably less) dominated the political scene through several generations and with a number of candidates and magistrates simultaneously running campaign and holding office. Despite the uneven distribution of inscriptions between various periods, the network analysis consistently finds these families established in those parts of the Pompeian network with the highest levels of connectivity. This may not be a particularly earth-shattering conclusion, but the formal and statistical analysis adds strength to the rather metaphorical and impressionistic use of the terms ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ in similar research. The analysis has also shown that money and prestige could buy newcomers a ticket to the Pompeian *ordo*, but also that establishing and manipulating connections to other new families as well as the long-standing nobility facilitated the entrance to the elite, or at least to the outer fringes of the elite. Most new families can evidently be found among the aedilician candidates and *aediles*, and they seem to have had considerable difficulties in taking the next step to the duumvirate. These newcomers are exactly the nodes which in the SNA of the Pompeian elite appear to be often more isolated or located in minor networks, only weakly connected to the more powerful core of the nobility. The approach used in this paper offers some explanations for their failure to reach the higher levels of the elite and also suggests which trajectories could have been followed to increase a newcomer’s rate of success: “It’s the network, stupid!”

191 JONGMAN (1988), p. 311.

14 References

- J. ANDREAU (1974), *Les affaires de monsieur Iucundus*, Rome.
- W. BROEKAERT (2013), Financial experts in a spider web. A social network analysis of the archives of Caecilius Iucundus and the Sulpicii, in *KLIO* 95, p. 471-510.
- P. CASTRÉN (1975), *Ordo populusque Pompeianus: polity and society in Roman Pompeii*, Rome.
- K. S. COOK / E. RICE (2006), Social exchange theory, in J. DELAMATER (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, New York, p. 53-76.
- E. COOLEY (2003), Politics at Pompeii. Review of *Pompeis difficile est*. Studies in the Political Life of Imperial Pompeii by J. L. Franklin Jr., in *CR* 53, p. 419-421.
- E. COOLEY / M.G.L. COOLEY (2004), *Pompeii. A sourcebook*, New York / London.
- M. DELLA CORTE (1965), *Casa ed abitanti di Pompei*, Naples.
- W. DE NOOY / A. MRVAR / V. BATAGELJ (2005), *Exploratory Network Analysis with Pajek*, Cambridge.
- R. M. EMERSON (1962), Power-Dependence Relations, in *American Sociological Review* 27, p. 31-41.
- R. ETIENNE (1977), *La vie quotidienne à Pompéi*, Paris.
- M. EVERETT / S.P. BORGATTI (2005), Ego network betweenness, in *Social Networks* 27, p. 31-38.
- T. FRANK (1927), *An Economic History of Rome*, Baltimore.
- J. L. FRANKLIN (1980), Pompeii: the electoral programmata, campaigns and politics, *A. D.* 71-79, Rome.
- J. L. FRANKLIN (1987), Pantomimists at Pompeii: Actius Anicetus and his troupe, in *AJPh* 108, p. 95-107.
- J. L. FRANKLIN (2001), *Pompeis difficile est: studies in the political life of imperial Pompeii*, Ann Arbor.
- J. L. FRANKLIN (2007), Epigraphy and Society, in J. J. DOBBINS / P. W. FOSS. (eds.), *The World of Pompeii*, New York, p. 518-525.
- M. L. GORDON (1927), The ordo of Pompeii, in *JRS* 17, p. 165-183.
- J. GOULD / J. FERNANDEZ (1989), Structures of mediation: A formal approach to brokerage in transaction networks, in *Sociological Methodology* 19, p. 89-126.
- S. GRAHAM / G. RUFFINI (2007), Network Analysis and Greco-Roman Prosopography, in K. S. B. KEATS-ROHAN (ed.), *Prosopography Approaches and Applications. A Handbook*, Oxford, p. 325-336.
- G. GREYER (1932), Pompeian Ministri, in *CPh* 27, p. 59-65.
- K. HOPKINS (1983), *Death and renewal*, Cambridge.
- W. JONGMAN (1978-1979), M. Obellius M.f. Firmus, Pompeian Duovir, in *Talanta* 10-11, p. 62-65.
- W. JONGMAN (1988), *The economy and society of Pompeii. Dutch monographs on ancient history and archaeology* 4, Amsterdam.

- R. LAURENCE (1994), *Roman Pompeii. Space and society*, New York.
- LÓS (1992), *Quibus patet curia municipalis. Remarques sur la structure de la classe dirigeante de Pompei*, in *CCGG* 3, p. 259-297.
- W. O. MOELLER (1970), *The riot of A.D. 59 at Pompeii*, in *Historia* 19, p. 84-95.
- H. MOURITSEN (1988), *Elections, magistrates, and municipal élite: studies in Pompeian epigraphy*, Rome.
- G. R. RUFFINI (2008), *Social Networks in Byzantine Egypt*, Cambridge.
- F. SANTANGELO (2007), *Sulla, the Elites and the Empire. A Study of Roman Policies in Italy and the Greek East*, Leiden.
- W. SCHEIDEL (1999), *Emperors, aristocrats and the Grim Reaper. Towards a demographic profile of the Roman élite*, in *CQ* 49, p. 245-281.
- L. E. TACOMA (2006), *Fragile hierarchies. The urban elites of third-century Roman Egypt*, Leiden.
- V. G. TÄUBE (2004), *Measuring the Social Capital of Brokerage Roles*, in *Connections* 26, p. 29-52.
- K. E. WELCH (2007), *Pompeian Men and Women in Portrait Sculpture*, in J. J. DOBBINS / P. W. FOSS. (eds.), *The World of Pompeii*, New York, p. 550-584.
- ZUIDERHOEK (2011), *Oligarchs and benefactors. Elite demography and euergetism in the Greek east of the Roman Empire*, in O.M. VAN NIJF / R. ALSTON (eds.), *Political Culture in the Greek City after the Classical Age*, Leuven, p. 185-195.

Appendix 1: Attributes and their numerical value

Time periods

Republican (80-49)	1
Caesar-Augustus (49-14)	2
Early Julio-Claudian (14-50)	3
Neronian-Flavian (50-79)	4
Unknown	999998

Political offices (in ascending order)

<i>aedilis</i> (candidate)	1
<i>aedilis</i>	2
<i>duovir</i> (candidate)	3
<i>duovir</i>	4
<i>quinquennalis</i> (candidate)	5
<i>quinquennalis</i>	6
<i>tribunus militum a populo</i>	7
priestesses	8
no office	999998

Excluded are the (very few) *quattuorviri* and *interreges* and the candidates for whom the office is unknown.

Sub-elite functions

<i>ministri / magistri</i>	1
<i>augustalis</i>	2
no office	999998

Family

Abonius	1
Aburius	2
Acilius	3
...	...
Vinullius	233
Virius	234
Volusius	235

Appendix 2: Figures




Fig. 2. Elite offices during the early Republic




Fig. 3. Isolated nodes and small networks during the late Republic




Fig. 4. Network of A. Clodius Flaccus (elite offices)




Fig. 5. Network of A. Clodius Flaccus (distance)




Fig. 6. Early Julian-Claudian networks




Fig. 7. Isolated candidates during the Neronian-Flavian period






Fig. 8. Network of Memmius Iunianus and Bruttius Balbus (distance 3)








Fig. 11. Network of Epidius Sabinus and his colleagues




Fig. 12. Betweenness scores