

VOGEL, CHRISTIAN

Quintus Cicero and Roman Rule

Networks between Centre and Periphery

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the governorship of Quintus Tullius Cicero (102[?]-43 BCE) during his three year-long administration of the province of Asia from 61 to 58 BCE and during his command of a Roman legion under Caesar in Gaul in 54 BCE. Both commands represent different stages and situations of Roman rule over different regions and cultures. The relationship between rulers and ruled, between governors and governed peoples, will be studied by means of SNA. The chapter will examine Quintus' networks in Gaul and in Asia and situate them within the larger sphere of Roman government. It will also discuss the benefits and obstacles that historical network research has to face in these examples and present considerations to provide grounds for more general reflections on the application of SNA in Greco-Roman history, especially regarding structures of control and empires.

1 Introduction*

We all know that networks and networking are essential to furthering our careers, getting information, and calling in all kinds of favours that we personally or our direct environment cannot provide. In short: we use networks to get what we want.

In the American TV series *House of Cards*, Will Conway battles against Frank Underwood, the sitting president of the USA, for votes to win the presidential election and move into the White House for the next four-year term in office. The line quoted above stands for networking at its best: in order to win the campaign for the Oval Office, you need more people than your opponent, e.g. the voters you reach out to with speeches or handshakes. You also need the more capable people – the political experts, spin doctors, and all different kinds of advisors – who can provide information or are in a position to do something for you, e.g. collect money for your campaign. But each of these people within such a campaign machine naturally brings their own individual interests to bear. The candidate has to conduct them all as if in a large orchestra, within a working network with the purpose of steering their efforts in the desired direction, i.e. gaining power.

Communication is paramount for exercising power, and networks are structures of communication.¹ I would argue that the process of administering a province or keeping subjugated tribes in check can be investigated using social network analysis as a tool for historical network research. As can be seen from Quintus Tullius Cicero's two important career phases as *legatus legionis*, under Caesar in Gaul and as governor of the province of Asia, communication (e.g. mediation or dealing with interests and stakeholders) was a crucial part of Roman rule, even in warzones. From this perspective, raising taxes was also a question of communication, via acceptance or refusal. Power was a matter of negotiation, as long as it did not come to blows. This rather metaphorical use of the notion of networks is utterly comprehensible to us, because networks are by now deeply rooted in our way of thinking. Discussion of networks is widespread² and the concept as a metaphor is used generously,³ but the full analytical potential of the more scientific notion of networks is not always exploited. Historians are in most cases compelled to use fragments of social

* **Corresponding author:** Christian Vogel, independent researcher; vogel-chr@web.de

1 CASTELLS (2011), p. 774-775.

2 Cf. VON KEYSERLINGK (2013), p. 466, fn. 6.

3 GRAMSCH (2013), p. 15-18; see also ROLLINGER (2014), p. 367-372.

network analysis, always geared to the needs and demands of their research questions.⁴

As network analysis is still rather uncommon within classics, small-scale case studies can be used to explore and illustrate the potential and possibilities of network analysis in our research and understanding. Accordingly, this paper should be seen as a contribution to the discussion over whether and how network analysis can answer research questions, or if and how it can provide a different perspective on the sources and traditional methods of historiography.⁵ This can only be usefully carried out with a clearly-delineated research question.⁶ For this chapter, then, the question is this: how did Roman governors administer provinces, *socii*, and local elites, and how should their powers in and over the provinces be interpreted in the light of network analysis?

Quintus Tullius Cicero's situation as governor of a Roman province will serve as our case study. In some ways, his term as governor was similar to Will Conway's situation. For Conway, gaining power is about building networks by collecting people. Quintus, like all other Roman magistrates, wielded absolute power in theory,⁷ but his office as *propraetor* of Asia during the years 61-59/58 BCE presented him with the problem of how to deal with a mass of people and their individual interests. He could not simply rely on his office, he also had to 'collect' people. This made adjustments in behaviour necessary, which Quintus was unwilling to make. At least, this is what two of Marcus Cicero's letters to Quintus⁸ tell us of the latter's administration. These were written in 60-59 BCE and thus in the second and third year of Quintus' time in the province of Asia. In both, we find criticism addressed towards the younger brother.

Within the letters, there appears a discrepancy between Quintus' theoretical authority as the highest-ranking Roman magistrate in Asia, and his actual room for manoeuvre. Here, the Roman governor as the representative of Roman power was called into question, as he was not the only link that connected Rome to its province. They also shed light on the controversial and highly discussed matter of Rome's ability (or inability) to rule over the Mediterranean.⁹ The sheer vastness of the Roman Empire has been identified as contributing to the crisis and downfall of the Roman Republic. One possible explanation has been

4 In the past, this has led to the conclusion that no fully-fledged social network analysis can be implemented, with the more general notion of historical network research being suggested instead (REITMAYER / MARX (2010), p. 869; see also VON KEYSERLINGK (2013), p. 467).

5 Cf. ROLLINGER (2014), p. 434.

6 ROLLINGER (2009), p. 216, and ROLLINGER (2014), p. 372-381 and cf. his chapter above.

7 SCHULZ (1997), p. 13-15.

8 Cic. *QFr.* 1.1 and 1.2.

9 DAHLHEIM (1977), p. 2-3; BLÖSEL (2011), p. 55.

proposed in the form of a more or less general lack of interest or ability of the highest ranking aristocrats for actually entering the provinces and undertaking administrative tasks.¹⁰ However, if we look at the inner conflicts throughout the Roman sphere of power in the late Roman Republic, no lethal threat to Roman rule can be found. Even the first Mithridatic or Sertorian wars, which involved forces from outside and inside the empire or from its aristocratic elite, were mainly local and could be overcome with relatively moderate effort. Ultimately, they did not endanger Rome's supremacy. Thus, its dimension and reach were obviously not contributing factors in the downfall of the senatorial rule over the Mediterranean. Not only that, but the Roman dominion remained stable even during the civil wars of Caesar and after his death. Except for the wars against the Bosporean kingdom¹¹ and the Dalmatians shortly before the battle of Actium (if they are to be seen as some form of strife within the Roman *imperium*), there were no challenging uprisings against Roman rule by subjected tribes, peoples, towns or kings during the time of the civil wars.¹²

The notion of a bored or even incompetent aristocracy also does not take into account the next-highest rung in social hierarchy, namely the men from the back benches of the senate and from the *municipia*. More and more of these men went into the provinces as governors, legates, tribunes, or fulfilled military and administrative tasks, without holding an office in order to gain social status and the favour of the *nobiles*. The more well-known names in the late republic were M. Petreius or L. Afranius, who went to Hispania for Pompeius, (M. Vitruvius?) Mamurra, L. Munatius Plancus, C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, L. Cornelius Balbus, C. Oppius, C. Trebonius, T. Labienus – all serving under Caesar in various roles. At the same time, the number of those with a senatorial rank serving as legates or military tribunes decreased throughout the period of the late republic.¹³

A closer look at the individuals who replaced the *nobiles* promises a better understanding of how the *res publica* administered the heterogenic collection of allies and subjected peoples, polities, states and territories around the Mediterranean during the difficult last decades of its history before Augustus transformed it. The most extensive sources regarding the career of a non-*nobilis* on the Roman periphery are centred around Quintus Cicero. Marcus' letters to his brother provide an unparalleled insight, and there are almost no other surviving testimonia with such detail for others from the group below the

10 Cf. HÖLKESKAMP (2009), p. 4-5; BLÖSEL (2011), p. 55, 60-62, 76; BLÖSEL (2016); WALTER (2011), p. 232.

11 Plut. *Caes.* 50; Suet. *Caes.* 35.2; App. *civ.* 2.13.91.

12 Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 8-21; App. *civ.* 2.5.33.

13 ROLLINGER (2014), p. 274-275.

highest society. What interests did they have? What functions did they fulfil? How, or on what terms, did they carry these out? Who was involved? What we call today networking and gaining or exercising power in and through networks was daily business in Quintus' task in the administration of a secure province.

2 Relations

If he wished to keep order, avoid political problems both in the province and in Rome, and keep his reputation in order, governor Quintus would have had to adjust his beliefs and ideals, as well as his behaviour. However, he did not collect people and gain their goodwill quite as well as he should have, at least according to his brother. Therefore, Marcus thought it necessary to write two letters that were intended to convey advice.¹⁴ In the first, Marcus lectures him on how to be a good administrator in general, before going into detail about practical problems which Quintus had encountered. Marcus praises his brother's personal qualities while also reprimanding him for his flaws. He comments on his actions as administrator and finds Quintus responsible for both good and bad practices. Yet notably, up to that point, the famous orator had had no personal experience whatsoever as an administrator in charge of a province, although he had served as *quaestor* in Sicily some fifteen years before Quintus went off to Asia.¹⁵ Under the veil of well-meant advice came the admonition for Quintus to modify his somewhat quick-tempered behaviour when confronted with influential people in the province who did not share his opinion. Word of discontent had reached Rome, and Marcus. He mentioned various issues, interests, and stakeholders. Those relations are the material for this network analysis.

Since his consulship of 63 BCE, Marcus had entertained close relations with the Roman *equites* and *publicani*. He wanted them to be satisfied, because in his eyes they were important not only for him but also for the *res publica*.¹⁶ So, when the *publicani* quarrelled with representatives of the communities of the province of Asia, he wrote to Quintus, believing his younger brother could do more for his friends. The *publicani* demanded tariffs when goods were transported through the province; the Greeks (who were affected) did not want to pay, and the problem was brought before Quintus, who as Roman governor in Ephesus embodied the supreme legal authority. Quintus evaded the problem by transferring the case to the senate in Rome. Here, Marcus asked his friend Titus Pomponius Atticus for help, who was an influential *eques* with close ties to the

14 GELZER (1969), p. 122.

15 Cf. Cic. *Verr.*

16 Cic. *QFr.* 1.1.32 and 35. For Marcus' generally positive stance on the *publicani* cf. BLEICKEN (1995), p. 17-18, who presents a close look at the sources for this perception.

societates of the *publicani*.¹⁷ Another issue with the *publicani* had been the amount of money they had paid for the right to collect the taxes in Asia. They had dangerously miscalculated this, and had run into serious problems to recoup their expenses. They thus raised the taxes on the province more and more. At the same time, they asked for a discount on the sum initially paid for the tax contract. At the same time as this case was being brought before Quintus, Marcus was also approached by his friends among the *publicani*, who then asked his brother to decide in their favour.¹⁸ Quintus had issues with the *publicani* and Marcus was well aware of the impact of his request, although he played it down somewhat: *haec est una, si uere cogitare uolumus, in toto imperio tuo difficultas*.¹⁹

However, it was not only the *publicani*, merchants, or community envoys who wanted the Roman magistrate to do something for them, or simply to let them get on with their business. In at least two more cases, Marcus was approached by people who were upset by Quintus' judicial decisions against a certain Paconius, as well as a person named Tuscenius, though it is unknown what exactly happened or what were the true issues at stake.²⁰ Quintus was also harsh in his actions and words against Titus Catienus, an *eques*, as well as his father. He insulted a tax collector named Licinius, calling him a 'kidnapper', and wanted C. Fabius to burn him at the stake, or at least to bring him to Quintus' court where he would be sentenced to death by fire. This, too, came to Marcus' attention.²¹

Local dignitaries from the many communities of the province also followed their individual personal agendas, which at times brought them into contact with the Roman magistrate. Among those mentioned in Marcus' letters, most remarkable of all was Zeuxis of Blaundos. Quintus accused him of matricide and wanted him to stand trial. His aim was to make an example of him: everybody should see who was in charge and nobody would be left with any doubt that Quintus was a strong magistrate, even in the hinterland of the province. But he could not get a grasp on Zeuxis. He tried to bring him to his court and lure him into a trap with flattery, but without success. Zeuxis instead used his connections in Rome; Marcus then had to intervene again and humiliate himself by getting in touch with Zeuxis, because the latter had influence in his hometown in the hinterland of Asia and held the ear of some in Rome.²² Marcus saw this as a danger to Quintus' standing in Rome as well as in the province, or

17 Cic. *Att.* 2.16.4.

18 Cic. *QFr.* 1.1.34; Cic. *Att.* 1.17.9. BLEICKEN (1995), pp. 19, 71, 75. ROLLINGER (2009), p. 54.

19 "This is – if we want to consider it properly – the only difficulty in your entire administration." (Cic. *QFr.* 1.1.32; transl. C. Vogel)

20 Cic. *QFr.* 1.1.19-20.

21 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.6.

22 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.4-5.

at least the eastern part of it. But there were more, who also had to be pampered: Hermippos of Dionysopolis, Hephaistios of Apameia, Megaristos of Antandros, Nikias of Smyrna, and Nymphon of Kolophon were all too important to be snubbed by Quintus. He appears to have overreacted in some way, or was too eager to make a point of showing that he was in charge and a true Roman aristocrat. Marcus does not provide any details apart from their names, and the fact that he felt compelled to atone for his brother's actions against them.²³

But stakeholders within the province were not the only ones disagreeing with Quintus. Complaints reached Marcus, which means they also reached Rome. The city's aristocrats had individual ties to various people in the province, too. They wanted Quintus to protect their interests and tried to work around (or even against) him to get what they wanted. One of these ties represents the case of a monument for Quintus Publicius²⁴ that was to be erected in the Lycian community of Hypaie. Quintus somehow prevented or interdicted payments for the monument. Attalus of Hypaie, a local dignitary from the same community, approached Marcus personally in Rome, requesting that he urge his brother to end this interference.²⁵

In another case, Quintus was able to improve his reputation, although to a limited extent. He had his subordinates look for the runaway slave Licinius, owned by the Greek actor Aesopus, who lived in Rome and was a friend of Marcus. Licinius fled to Athens, where he was captured by Platon of Sardes, a philosopher and friend of Aesopus who took Licinius with him into the province of Asia to Ephesus. Since it was unclear whether he had handed him over to the public prison or to the *pistrinum*, Quintus went to find out and return the slave to Rome.²⁶

Matters were more complicated with the Roman aristocrat Lucius Flavius,²⁷ who had inherited the assets of L. Octavius Naso. Quintus prohibited the sale of these assets until the claims of C. Fundanius – his friend – against the now dead Octavius were satisfied. Accordingly, he wrote a letter to the *procuratores* of Flavius. He also told the *Apollonidenses* – most probably their representatives or local dignitaries – to prevent any sale of assets whatsoever. This evolved into an

23 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.4.

24 Presumably praetor in 67 (BROUGHTON (1952), p. 143).

25 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.14.

26 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.14.

27 Marcus: "*homo mihi ualde familiaris*" (Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.10); Pompeius' supporter, if not creature, *tribunus plebis* 60, and praetor 58 (BROUGHTON (1952), p. 184 and 194).

affair, because Flavius was Marcus' friend. But even more importantly, Pompeius and Caesar had sided with Flavius and asked Quintus to relent.²⁸

In all these matters, a minor role was played by the subordinates of the Roman governor and his private retinue. They had neither Quintus' responsibility nor his power because they either held subordinate offices or none at all. Yet they had to act and behave in a manner that at least preserved Quintus' reputation. Their personal agendas and interests do not seem to have had a great impact on Quintus' administration. However, Marcus perceived Quintus' freedman Statius as a negative factor for Quintus' reputation, as he acted in an inappropriate and overconfident manner, which caused rumours and gossip in Rome. Quintus was considered to be too willing to hear Statius' advice and to act accordingly.²⁹

We do not know for every instance if or when Marcus acted on the gossip, rumours, complaints, or direct appeals made to him, but he clearly saw the need to write to his brother before things went awry. Quintus claimed his administration was not perceived as badly as Marcus thought, because he had the support of a number of Roman aristocrats like Q. Mucius Scaevola, C. Cassius Longinus, L. Cassius Longinus, Q. Cassius Longinus, Antonius, and L. Marcius Censorinus. Marcus acknowledged this, but still had his reasons for contradicting or even interfering, as Quintus' undiplomatic behaviour stained both his and his brother's reputation.³⁰

The instances recounted here are but examples, with which we have to be content, as the sources are limited. However, whether or not this small picture and the numbers can be generalised or extrapolated onto a bigger picture is a question without definitive answer, and a matter of perspective and acceptance. Yet no one would argue that these relations bear no relation to Roman rule merely on the grounds that no institutions, armies, infrastructure projects, etc. were mentioned. These threads of communication represent a network across the Roman sphere of power and influence. Provincial government under the republic was communication with the stakeholders, as we can see in Quintus' administration of *Asia*. In the two letters of Marcus Cicero to his brother Quintus, the province appears mainly as a communicative entity. Quintus Cicero's

28 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.10-11.

29 Cic. *QFr.* 1.1.10-15 (apart from Statius, the retinue's members known by name were the Legates L. Aelius Tubero, Aulus Alienus, and Marcus Gratidius; those without a stated office or function were L. Caesius, L. Labeo, and Chairippus; the name of Quintus' quaestor is unknown).

30 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.13.

position during his three years in *Asia* can thus be described as being interlinked in relationships that crisscrossed the Mediterranean.

3 Applied Social Network Analysis

In terms of Roman rule over provinces, governmental institutions in the modern sense were virtually non-existent. Seeking the Roman style of rule invariably means looking for the governor's practice of ruling.³¹ This gives a striking description of the most important elements needed to take a closer look at Roman rule, namely the people involved and their interactions. As a result, research on the practice of ruling and political culture provides the basis for extending the perspective on Roman rule by examining how exactly they were interlinked.

The relations laid down in the two surviving letters from Marcus to Quintus in *Asia* – supported by information from letters to Atticus³² – result in a list of 41 persons or groups of people who were involved in Quintus' administration, directly or indirectly. It is indicative of the complexities of gubernatorial practice and Roman rule that we should be able to identify such a considerable number of persons from so few sources, within the comparatively short period of one year, to say nothing of the complicated interactions between different characters, with different positions, agendas, and interests.

With social network analysis, these actors can be embedded into a wider context, which helps to locate Quintus Cicero within the web of relationships originating from Rome and spanning the *imperium populi Romani*. It also provides another tool of interpretation, besides the traditional interpretation of the sources regarding the practice of governing, as it focuses not only on actors (as the prosopographic method does) but equally and importantly on relationships as both influenced by people and influencing people in their actions.³³ Social network analysis is intended to process information found in the sources in a way that helps the historian to better arrange this information and make complex matters easier to handle.³⁴ This will be useful in analysing the situations described in Cicero's letters, in which it becomes very clear that, despite his overall legal authority, Quintus simply could not do as he saw fit. The framework of a governor influenced in his actions by a network of contacts and interests also recognises the influence that was undoubtedly exercised by local dignitaries. These were subject to the Roman magistrate, and although they

31 SCHULZ (1997).

32 Cic. *Att.* 1.15; 1.16; 1.17; 1.19; 2.16.

33 Cf. SCHULZ (1997), p. 14 for the more traditional approach to Roman provincial government.

34 GRAMSCH (20139, p. 81-83.

had the means to narrow this theoretical gap, they would have been unable to truly equal the official power of a *promagistratus* endowed with *imperium*.³⁵ These irregular or informal relations representing the crossing of boundaries can be merged with other regular or formal relations in one network and analysed with social network analysis – together, not separately.

Christian ROLLINGER applied social network analysis in his study of the Roman aristocracy.³⁶ He saw aristocrats of (slightly) different social and political statuses interlinked in a so-called ‘small world’ network, meaning that anybody was potentially linked to anybody else in the network through a connection to someone else, who in turn knows another person, who in turn knows another person, and so on. Unsurprisingly, the most important nodes in ROLLINGER’s network were the great figures of late republican history: Caesar, Pompeius, Crassus, and Lucullus. But an analysis of their embeddedness within the network showed that their position was not only a consequence of obtaining extraordinary offices or military efforts and success, but also often a result of their widespread and far-reaching contacts and relations. Both aspects could influence each other in a reciprocal process – although institutional, organisational, and legal structures were inherently independent from this informal network.³⁷ It also had traits which many networks of very different origin share:³⁸ those of a scale-free network.

Scale-free networks consist of a potentially endless number of nodes – i.e. actors, persons and groups – as well as edges, that is relations visualised as connecting lines between nodes.³⁹ This in itself is not a characteristic. But many networks have a certain number of nodes which have only a very small number of connections to other nodes. The network ROLLINGER extracted from Marcus Cicero’s letters had around 400 individuals. GRAMSCH, meanwhile, counted nearly 70 actors who as princes of late medieval Germany had taken part in the conflict between the German king Frederick II and his son Henry VII, who was also crowned king, during their dual kingship 1225-1235 CE.⁴⁰ In *Asia*, Quintus

35 Cf. PINA POLO (2015), p. 37: “To provincials, the patronage of members of the Roman elite represented a form of indirect access to the stages where decisions were taken that affected the entire Empire.”

36 ROLLINGER (2014).

37 ROLLINGER (2014), p. 424-425

38 BARABÁSI / BONABEAU (2003), p. 52.

39 When researchers encountered this phenomenon for the first time, it seemed to them that the number of connections, termed degree, was endless and could not be displayed on a degree distribution chart: therefore, it was called scale-free.

40 GRAMSCH (2014).

Cicero was embedded in a network of 41 actors (see figs. 1-2).⁴¹ Despite the differences in number, an equally large share of the nodes in each network had just one or two edges. On the other hand, across all three networks, very few nodes had very many edges.

These nodes with a seemingly disproportionate number of connections are called *hubs*.⁴² They fulfil the crucial function of keeping a network together. Networks disintegrate, or even cease to exist, if their hubs are extinguished. They are the heart of dense groups of interlinked people, called clusters, and are often the link to another cluster. This makes them very important to the high stability of scale-free networks, but this strength can also be a weakness, if a significant or sufficient number of hubs no longer fulfils its function. The hub's high degree of centrality and crucial functions in scale-free networks⁴³ gives them a high standing in a hierarchical order, especially when talking of members of a political culture such as that which the Romans inhabited. Assuming that the most important nodes in the network have the most edges, the significance of individuals did not solely depend on their social status, e.g. due to their rank of office gained in the *cursus honorum*. Of course, the results of social network analysis have to be connected and compared with the interpretation that a conventional historical investigation provides. Nonetheless, social network analysis makes visible a structure that is often not obvious, even when describing the special role a person played or when alleging that someone was embedded in a 'network' (used in the metaphorical sense).⁴⁴

ROLLINGER demonstrated that the relationships of support between Roman aristocrats constituted a small world network of high cohesion. For him, the basic assumption of social network analysis was proven correct: networks constitute informal, potentially independent structures that exist parallel to formal and legal institutions (although this should not be taken to mean that

41 The open-source software Gephi 0.9.1 beta (<https://gephi.org/>; retrieved 14 June, 2016) was used to automatically calculate and visualise the collected data in all graphs. The network comprised 41 nodes, 77 edges. The graph is neither weighted nor directed. All the nodes and edges will not be discussed in detail here, as it is the big picture of Roman rule – centered around Quintus – that matters here.

42 For the role of hubs and a brief definition of the different kinds of centrality values see ROLLINGER (2014), p. 394-396, 423.

43 BARABÁSI / BONABEAU (2003), p. 54-56.

44 GRAMSCH (2013), p. 13-16, describes the political system of the time of the German medieval Interregnum as being dominated by horizontal relations between more or less equal actors without needing a king to rule and administer the realm (GRAMSCH [2013], p. 16, agrees with the notion of network as "[...] Verflechtung von individuellen und korporativen Akteuren als ein wesentliches Strukturelement sozialer Ordnungen, welches Denk- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Beteiligten determiniert".

networks were not governed by rules or ‘institutions’; they were).⁴⁵ ROLLINGER’s theoretical and empirical work on Rome’s aristocracy network of the late republic, i.e. the high degree of importance of interpersonal relations and communication, apart from (or even more than) official or institutional dealings, can be taken as a steppingstone. As he has shown, *amicitia* became an increasingly regulative influence on daily interactions within aristocratic relationships⁴⁶, and it is thus reasonable to assume that similar relations and communication were also of importance in other environments, e.g. with local dignitaries in provinces. In fact, in the absence of fixed bureaucratic institutions for (or a developed idea of) systematic provincial administration, the Romans employed what they knew: *amicitia*. This enabled them to organise the occupied territories in a flexible way, giving them sufficient influence without constricting them with unbearable, irrevocable obligations. Informal networks presented adequate and functional means for widespread governing territories.⁴⁷ Although *amicitia* originally implied that the friends were equal, this must not have been the case; in fact, this was rather uncommon even amongst Romans. When they made friends with local dignitaries or kings, their unparalleled superiority in the Mediterranean thus made it overtly clear, if not impossible to assume, that a Greek *amicus* was of the same *gravitas* as a *nobilis*.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, it should be clear that to rely on these (unbalanced) *amicitiae* (however influential they may have been within the provincial administration or Roman rule⁴⁹) instead of a bureaucracy makes it possible to apply social network analysis to areas and contexts which lie beyond the border of the *urbs*,

45 ROLLINGER (2014), p. 423: “Netzwerke sind informelle, weitgehend stabile und regelhafte, aber inkonstante und zeitlichem Wandel unterworfenen Bündelungen von Beziehungen zwischen Personen oder Personengruppen. Sie binden die vernetzten Personen oder Personengruppen in ein dominantes soziales Bezugssystem ein, das von institutionellen, organisatorischen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen weitgehend unabhängig ist, und bieten ihnen Aktionsmöglichkeiten und Nutzungschancen, die über die formellen Rahmenbedingungen hinausgehen. Netzwerke weisen gewöhnlich einen Kern- und einen Peripheriebereich auf, sind oft hierarchisch strukturiert und verändern sich oder lösen sich auf, wenn sich im zentralen Bereich – also bei den dominanten Knotenpunkten – gravierende Wandlungsprozesse ereignen oder Leistungsfunktionen nicht mehr adäquat besetzt sind”; cf. also fn. 44.

46 ROLLINGER (2014), p. 412 and 420-422.

47 TIERSCH (2015), p. 242-243, referring to BURTON (2011), p. 76-245. BURTON (2015), p. 234: “[...] the international *amicitia* relationship was fundamentally dynamic and fluid, being adjusted and recalibrated by the partners according to (real or apparent) fluctuations in circumstances, relative status, behaviour, and morality.” This applies to the second century BCE, but was also common from that time and throughout the late republican era (Lehmann (2005), p. 271).

48 SNOWDEN (2015), p. 210-224. BURTON (2011), p. 63-75. TIERSCH (2015), p. 251-252. ROSILLO-LÓPEZ (2015), p. 263-280.

49 PINA POLO (2015), p. 41.

but were still linked to it through its aristocrats.⁵⁰ They had their friends and antagonists in Rome, as well as in the provinces, as Quintus' relations in Asia have shown – not to mention the interventions of his brother Marcus or the support of Pompeius and Caesar for Lucius Flavius and his prefects against C. Fundanius. All these relationships could presumably have influenced Quintus in his decisions as Rome's highest magistrate in Asia in 61-59/58 BCE.⁵¹ They were at least damaging to his reputation, if Marcus was right, and they made him influence his younger brother: Marcus wrote that Statius was being gossiped about due to what was assumed to be his high level of influence on Quintus. Quintus made himself appear weak every time he gave an ear to Statius and acted on his advice too openly – this was the actual message that Marcus wished to convey.⁵² Relationships of support also existed, just like those that ROLLINGER identified, but these were not always in Quintus' favour. In fact, there were very few positive relations. Most prominently, Quintus found support from Romans who were in Rome, not in Asia: Lucius Marcus Censorinus, M. Antonius, the Cassii, Quintus Mucius Scaevola.⁵³

ROLLINGER's perspective has been slightly altered here to allow for conflicts as well as supportive relations to enter the data, as the question in this paper is not the structure of the small-world Roman aristocracy, but that of Roman rule over the Mediterranean and what function men like Quintus had within it. This had to incorporate relations which caused problems, because to maintain control over a province, territory, settlement, or tribe would have meant potentially having to cope with various different opposing factors.⁵⁴ A simple example will illustrate how relations of support and conflict can both be combined within a social network analysis in order to provide insight into the structure of the *imperium populi Romani* and the function of its magistrates.

Although Quintus waged war as legate and legion commander under Caesar in 54-51 BCE, even in times of war and occupation, diplomacy was very important, as it was in the administration of provinces.⁵⁵ Rome's aristocrats kept

50 Cf. ROLLINGER (2009), p. 124-127.

51 See "2. Relations".

52 Cic. *Q.Fr.* 1.2.1-3.

53 Cic. *Q.Fr.* 1.2.13.

54 As seen in "2. Relations".

55 DAHLHEIM (2013), p. 326-327: "Glücklich die Städte, für die im Lager der Kriegsherren einer der ihren als Fürsprecher auftreten konnte. Davon allerdings gab es viele, hatten sich doch bereits seit dem Beginn der römischen Eroberungszüge die Sieger bemüht, mit den Honoratioren der griechischen Städte Freundschaften zu schließen – vorausgesetzt, diese bezeugten in Wort und Tat ihre Ergebenheit gegenüber Rom." Likewise, Ariovistus was declared *amicus populi Romani* (Caes. *B.Gall.* 1.31). In Gaul, Caesar had several relations to Gaul aristocrats

their relationships alive, even if they ventured into territories few Romans had set foot in before, e.g. northern Gaul or Britain. Quintus went to Gaul in the summer of 54 BCE, where at the time Caesar had already been waging war for four years. When Quintus arrived, Caesar was about to order the second invasion of Britain, and Quintus went with the legions across the sea from Belgica to the northern isles. That Quintus was in command of a legion when he was in Britain is unlikely; however, after returning to the continent, he certainly led a legion as a *legatus legionis*. Caesar deployed him and his legion in the winter of 54/53 BCE in the territory of the Nervii, a tribe with a highly belligerent reputation.⁵⁶ Caesar used the word *amicitia* for the relationship between Quintus and the *duces principesque Nerviorum*, in whose territory the legion made winter camp.⁵⁷ Although labelled with this particular term, this relationship was not the same as the bond between Roman *amici*. However, there is a brief mention of Quintus being in frequent and somehow close contact with the leaders or other important dignitaries,⁵⁸ indicating that Caesar did not just use an empty phrase, but rather a meaningful Roman term that was commonly used in the provinces and with local dignitaries. The specific reasons for this are not mentioned, but presumably the question of how to feed a legion would have been most pressing in a northern Gallic winter. As one of the most dangerous tribes in Gaul, the Nervii had to be kept under control. The latter was achieved by keeping them busy and under close observation, so that they could do nothing without Quintus noticing. The relationship cannot have been very strong, because the latest development featured the Nervii fighting in the uprising of the Eburones under Ambiorix against Caesar's legions – and besieging Quintus' legionary camp.⁵⁹

Other relationships can also be translated from the given information in the sources into data for a social network analysis. Thus, more and more nodes and edges come together from the nine different letters from Marcus Cicero to his brother and to Titus Pomponius Atticus, friend of Marcus and Quintus' brother in law.⁶⁰ The network in Gaul (fig. 3) comprised 16 nodes and 32 edges,⁶¹ which results in a network density⁶² of about 0.2666. Thus, nearly 27 per cent of a

or dignitaries he used for his interests, both in times of peace and war (Wolters (1990), p. 28-29, 45-46, 79-80).

56 Caes. *BGall.* 2.15.3-6.

57 Caes. *BGall.* 5.41.1.

58 Caes. *BGall.* 5.41.1: "*duces principesque Nerviorum*".

59 Caes. *BGall.* 5.38-53.

60 Cic. *Att.* 4.16(14).2; 4.17(16).7; 4.18(15).10; 4.20(18).5; Cic. *QFr.* 2.11.4-5; 2.13.3; 2.14.1 and 3; 2.16; 3.1,8-10 and 20-22.

61 See figure 3: Network in Gaul Winter 54/53; figure 4: Nodes for gallic network; figure 5: Edges for gallic network.

62 Network density: $\frac{\text{actual connections}}{\text{potential connections}}$; potential connections: $\frac{n[\text{number of nodes}]*(n-1)}{2}$.

potential 120 edges existed in this network, as per the sources. The network graph has been adapted to show individual groups: nodes exclusively connected to Quintus, among them the Nervii and people of his private entourage, are on the left. Marcus does not relate in detail who was with his brother. Out of a group of otherwise unknown persons he mentions only Hippodamos, a freedman of Quintus, by name. In the centre of the graph are those actors who were present in Gaul; at the top are those individuals who were very close to Caesar. The right side shows nodes in Rome or near the *urbs*. Those at the bottom of the figure have been commended by Marcus and Quintus to each other in letters.

Apart from simply calculating the values of centrality in the next step, it must be kept in mind that the data cannot stand alone as evidence for a historical assessment. The common argument against historical network analysis is the fact that the data and networks will never be complete because of the lack of sources, or their fragmentation. The same is true for every historical research.⁶³ In the case at hand, the origin of the letters must be considered. It seems clear that Marcus and Quintus (together with Caesar) are the most important people in this network. In the case of the two brothers from Arpinum, this was because one wrote the letters and the other received some of them and they would discuss their own matters more intensively than those of others in their own letters. Caesar was, of course, also important due to his historical role as the commander of all Roman armies in Gaul and his status within the Roman aristocracy. After Quintus, he was the most important according to degree,⁶⁴ closeness,⁶⁵ and betweenness centrality⁶⁶.

What the calculations ultimately tell us is that Quintus was more important than Caesar in this area of the Gallic theatre. But during the entire campaign, Quintus was a subordinate officer under Caesar and was clearly of lesser importance than him. A knowledge of the historical context can thus rectify the data within the network analysis.⁶⁷ From this qualitative perspective, Quintus' importance in the network is reduced and we see Caesar for what he was: the most important person in the overall 'military network' in Gaul. The three points

63 GRAMSCH (2013), p. 83-84.

64 The number of edges/relations a certain node has. Quintus Cicero: 14 edges; Caesar: 12 edges; Marcus Cicero: 9 edges.

65 Measures how near a particular node is to all other nodes; the node with the highest calculated value is the most central in the network. Quintus Cicero: 0.9375; Caesar: 0.8333; Marcus Cicero: 0.7143.

66 Betweenness centrality is a measure of how important a node is for linking otherwise unconnected nodes in the network. Measures for Quintus Cicero: 52,333; Caesar: 26,333; Marcus Cicero: 11,333.

67 GRAMSCH (2013), p. 83-84.

on the lower right represent Marcus with his nine edges, Caesar with 12 and Quintus with a tally of 14. Five individuals had just three contacts, six persons were connected to two others, and only two actors had just one relationship in the network. There was also “Hippodamos and no small number of others”,⁶⁸ who Marcus makes clear were under the authority and protection of his brother and thus inferior to him, as well as the Nervii, who had to answer to Quintus as *legatus* and representative of Caesar as *proconsul* and endowed with *imperium* by the Roman senate. This confirms the hierarchical or authority gradient, running from Caesar down to the subdued Gallic tribes parallel to the Roman chain of command, but from the perspective of network analysis. The important point is that this is not only based on the Roman understanding and their ranks, but correlated with it – it perfectly depicts who was in charge, who gave the orders and who was expected to follow them.

The Nervii were also part of the network in Gaul; they have the lowest value in every category. The degree distribution combines the degrees of every node in one chart (fig. 6). In the case of the Nervii, an argument against the validity of their position and role in the network, and thus in the hierarchy of Caesar’s Gallic wars, would be that their further contacts, who were not related to Quintus or any other person in the network, are not regarded. The same is true for Caesar’s other legion commanders who took camp on the territories of other tribes. As a result, the network would be larger, but Caesar would remain in the heart of it as commanding general and hub of hubs.

There did emerge a considerable threat, however: the Eburones, and their leader Ambiorix. These do not appear in the graph because they are not mentioned in the letters considered. Their uprising against the Romans⁶⁹ took place after the establishment of the winter camp and contact with the Nervii. Eventually, this uprising shattered the network in this part of Gaul and thus Caesar’s conquests in the region. Violence was and is a powerful means of cutting threads in a network by taking out nodes physically, and this was precisely Ambiorix’s plan. He wanted to kill, capture, or drive off the legionaries and thus remove Roman control over the territory. The Eburones can be incorporated into the network as a disturbing factor when the situation was calm and the relationship between Quintus Cicero and the Nervii played out well, or shortly after.

For the time when the Eburones and Ambiorix made their attempt to persuade the Nervii to fight against the Roman legion in their territory, there is one new node and at least two new edges to be added to the network: the

68 Cic. *QFr.* 3.1.9: “*Hippodamo et non nullis aliis*”.

69 Caes. *BGall.* 5.38-48.

Eburones, their connection to the Nervii, and their hostility towards the Romans. The Nervii accepted joining the Eburones and their allies. As they had a good relationship with Quintus Cicero, they wanted to talk to him before the violence started and explain the situation to him. Their intention was to cause him to lay down weapons and withdraw from their territory, which Quintus Cicero simply could not do as a *legatus* of Rome, and certainly not as a *legatus* of Caesar, who was attempting to conquer all of Gaul – or, at least, what he said Gaul was.

This particular change in the situation can be analysed by including aspects of balance theory into the network analysis. According to balance theory, dynamic processes in networks or historical environments appear as part of the network. They are not instrumental to it, but rather seen as potential disturbances which may lead to the disintegration of clusters or even entire networks, thus representing configurations of political conflicts between actors, e.g. the medieval German princes just before the so called Interregnum.⁷⁰ To calculate the centralities, then, is no longer the main objective of the network analysis, but rather to envision the whole configuration of all of the relationships as a structure, as well as to survey a particular situation and reassess (or even reveal) driving forces in conflicts.

Political tactics, configurations, and proverbs like *'divide et impera'*, *'the friend of my friend is my friend'* and other variations, like *'the enemy of my friend is my enemy'*, *'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'* are thus no longer merely metaphorical explanations, but can be examined with the help of mathematical terms, categories, and calculations. By drawing lines to represent the conflicts between hostile nodes, the shifting of the balance of power in a cluster can be visualised. The most simple and basic situation is a triad of three nodes, each connected with each other. Let us return to Quintus in Gaul for a simple example: the Eburones, the Nervii, and Quintus are selected and arranged into a small network of their own (fig. 7).

The contact between the *duces principesque Nerviorum* and Quintus and the Eburones was neutral. The Eburones intended to fight Quintus. According to balance theory, this triad is not in balance.⁷¹ The Nervii are under so called cognitive stress – they will have to decide between two positive connections, if one of their friendly contacts (who are hostile to each other) asks them to. Theoretically possible options for the development of relationships of such *'positive non-balanced'* triads⁷² are: *'relaxing'*, i.e. either the Romans withdraw or make friends with the Eburones; *'escalating'*, i.e. the Nervii cut their positive

⁷⁰ GRAMSCH (2013), p. 34-52.

⁷¹ GRAMSCH (2013), p. 35

⁷² GRAMSCH (2013), p. 37-38, 41-45

connection to one of the other groups and fight together with the remaining positive contact; and the last option, ‘neutralising’, i.e. the Nervii cut both positive connections and take no part in the fight between the Eburones and the Romans. This particular situation makes just a few of these options probable. Quintus and his legion had their winter camp in the heart of Nervii territory, so they could not just idly sit out the conflict, even though the Nervii made an attempt to neutralise the situation by asking them to leave.⁷³ A ‘neutralising’ development was obviously not an option, because the Eburones were determined to end the Roman occupation. To calm Ambiorix and his Eburones, as well as all their allies that marched against the Roman legions, would have seemed impossible to the Nervii. They also did not want the Romans encamped near their own settlements.⁷⁴ This led to escalation. The Nervii could have fought alongside the Romans, which would have been an escalation that would see the Eburones on the downside. But again, they wanted the Romans to break their winter camp and move off. So, after considering the different options and comparing them to the evidence found in the sources, it was not surprising to see that the Nervii joined forces with the Eburones.

Of course, this is a limited and very simple example. Northern Gaul was at war and the Nervii, despite Caesar’s assertions of *amicitia*, had only just been subdued, as well as having a Roman legion on their territory, which they most certainly had to provide with food. But this banal example facilitates a better understanding of the difficulties in Quintus’ administration of Asia from the perspective of social network analysis.

That network was much more complex, and we have already seen that his theoretical authority as Roman governor was far from decisive in the situations he had to confront. In Gaul, the threat of military force kept the chain of command either intact or brought rebels back in line – or just saw them killed. Of course, this was ultimately possible in *Asia* in the worst case, too; but the general setting was another. *Asia* had been a Roman province for over 60 years when Quintus became governor, thus Roman soldiers were not pitted against local soldiers. Roman businessmen were present; Roman aristocrats had their agents in *Asia*; local dignitaries also had a say, at least on the municipal level. The governors themselves were also embedded in the Roman society and the network back in the *urbs*, as was Caesar and his officers in Gaul. The extended aristocracy network linked Rome’s aristocrats to Roman or local actors in the provinces, and thus also constituted a hierarchical gradient. However, the local

⁷³ Caes. *BGall.* 5.41.6.

⁷⁴ Caes. *BGall.* 5.41.5.

dignitaries could approach Roman aristocrats to petition their own interests, without legal regulation on behalf of provincial affairs or vice versa.

Marcus Cicero feared for his and his brother's reputation back in Rome because several of his brother's decisions against certain Romans, Greeks, and other inhabitants of *Asia* were considered to be harsh.⁷⁵ In the first letter to the younger Quintus, his older brother back in Rome appeals to consider the matter of reputation.⁷⁶ In the second letter, he makes clear how his reputation is diminished in Rome: too many people have listened too willingly to the complaints of the Greeks.⁷⁷ This implies that making friends in the province could help in Rome. To prevent this sort of negative gossip, Marcus himself approached certain Greek dignitaries from the province's hinterland to establish good relationships and thus to support his brother. A network of 41 actors emerges from the sources.⁷⁸ This network had 77 edges. The most important nodes represent the Cicero brothers, of whom Quintus was much more central, which would seem to reflect his status as the province's governor but is naturally also connected to the fact that he was the addressee of Marcus' letters.⁷⁹ But viewed from the perspective of closeness centrality, their respective positions in the network were not that different, with Quintus measuring 0.8511 and Marcus 0.7692. This means that Quintus was potentially closer to every other node in the network than Marcus by only a little margin.

With around two thirds of Marcus' value for closeness centrality, the next most important nodes in the network were L. Flavius, *universa Asia et negotiatores* and T. Pomponius Atticus (0.5128). Zeuxis of Blaundos, Pompey, Caesar and the two groups of *publicani* ranged close behind (0.5063). They led the majority of the nodes in the network (values between 0.5128-0.4444). The least important nodes were M. Cascellius (0.339), the philosopher Platon of Sardes (0.32) and the slave Licinius (0.32). Thus, the largest share of the nodes were close together according to the values for closeness centrality, while Marcus and Quintus were the most central (and therefore most important) actors in the network (fig.1). In another category, the difference between Quintus and Marcus in terms of importance was even less pronounced: Quintus was part of 36 triangles or triads, while Marcus was part of 34. According to their results for eccentricity,⁸⁰ Marcus also had shorter, more direct connections throughout the network, i.e.

75 Cic. QFr. 1.1.43-44.

76 Cic. QFr. 1.1.45: "*quod ad laudem attineat*".

77 Cic. QFr. 1.2.4: "*ego cum Graecorum querelas nimium ualere sentirem*".

78 See section 2.

79 Nearly ten per cent of the potential edges existed; a betweenness centrality for Quintus of 464.9166, ahead of Marcus who had a value of 298.9166.

80 Measuring the longest chain of connections, the node has to reach the most distant node in the network; 3 for Quintus and 2 for Marcus.

he had easier access to the most distant actors. This begs the question of what their positions were in the network and what role they played in Quintus' administration of *Asia*: Marcus appears to have been nearly as important as his brother, the governor, who had both legal authority and more connections.⁸¹ His retinue, in particular, gave him the edge over Marcus in this network and certainly in governing *Asia*, but Marcus had valuable connections to another group of actors in *Asia*, which played a crucial role in the province.

Although Quintus was eager to be on good terms with many municipalities in *Asia*, helping them to reduce or clear the debts they owed to Roman nobles and businessmen, his irascibility and harshness with certain local dignitaries and Romans gave him a bad reputation. Marcus repeatedly praised his brother, but very often a reproach followed shortly after the praise. For instance, Quintus attempted to lure Zeuxis of Blaundos, who was in Quintus' opinion guilty of matricide, before court to illustrate his determination as governor. Harassing and ignoring local dignitaries in the hinterland both caused serious problems. Marcus did not mention this explicitly, but the network balance analysis shows several conflicts. Indeed, most of Quintus' connections had been part of conflicts (fig. 8).⁸² It is uncertain whether these were seen by Marcus as a danger to the tranquillity of the province due to the negative relationships with local dignitaries. However, the local dignitaries quarrelling with Quintus had the support of their municipalities, which were mostly located in the heart of the province, between the rivers Hermos in the north and the great Maiandros in the south (fig. 9). Blaundos was the most eastern municipality, while the others lay closer to Ephesus, where the Roman governors traditionally resided. It seems that Quintus wanted to show that Roman magistrates were not obliged to work with local elites; either this, or his authority was in question and he thus reacted undiplomatically (to say the least). Word of this had reached Rome and his brother, and Marcus Cicero was certainly provoked into doing something, but it is impossible to say if he saw the situation as being as bad as the graph of the network balance analysis suggests (fig. 10, Quintus' connections highlighted).

Quintus' positive contacts were mainly among his retinue, either personal or official.⁸³ Another bundle of positive connections led to Rome. Apart from his brother, there was Caesar and Pompey, all three of whom were very important individuals in Roman politics of the time. The Greek dignitaries are depicted in the upper middle section of the graph. Relationships with this group was strained. In total, Quintus had 16 positive and 13 negative connections, which

81 Quintus had 35 connections, Marcus 28 ("degree" in fig. 1).

82 Network in *Asia* 60/59 BCE. Red lines represent conflicts.

83 Shown in figures 9 and 11 on the far left, near to Quintus Cicero.

on its own does not necessarily denote that he was in danger. However, his actions and behaviour certainly placed the link – or relationship – to parts of the political elite of the province at risk. Thus, as the representative of Roman rule, he endangered the grip of the Roman state on at least a significant number of municipalities, with the largest problems occurring in the hinterland east of Ephesus, but also in Antandros on the coast opposite the island of Lesbos.⁸⁴

Quintus did not act against formal guidelines or principles.⁸⁵ On the contrary, his actions were fully sanctioned by his authority – an authority that he seemed anxious to have acknowledged. In this he struggled, and when he failed to achieve it with his personal qualities, he tried other, more forceful methods. But all these conflicts – grave and otherwise – accumulated. The conflicts with the local dignitaries in particular compelled Marcus to lecture his brother and use his standing and influence to attempt to calm the situation in Asia.⁸⁶ He made friends with Greeks whom he did not like;⁸⁷ he attempted to satisfy the *publicani* with the help of Titus Pomponius Atticus, who was on good terms with them and famous for his good reputation in Athens, as well as his other contacts in the Greek part of the Mediterranean. In effect, Quintus' connections were broadly complemented by those of Marcus,⁸⁸ thus counterbalancing Quintus' conflicting relations in the province.

4 Conclusion

Whereas studies on constitution or organised institutions have struggled to explain Roman rule from a structural perspective,⁸⁹ studies on the practice of ruling⁹⁰ have demonstrated that it is worthwhile to concentrate on the actors, their communication and their interactions. Both approaches can be combined in network analysis⁹¹ with a perspective that originates from *amicitia* as a shared phenomenon in both inner Roman social relationships and in 'imperial'

84 Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.4.

85 These did not exist (SCHULZ (1997), p. 14) except for the demand to keep the province calm (DAHLHEIM (2013), p. 324) and there were several Romans who looted the provinces as governor, e.g. Verres on Sicily (cf. Cic. *Verr.*)

86 See figure 11: Marcus Cicero's connections highlighted.

87 E.g. Megaristos of Antandros, whom he considered as having no personal qualities at all (Cic. *QFr.* 1.2.4).

88 See figures 10 and 11.

89 SCHULZ (2011), p. 255-257, with more literature; EICH (20059, p. 48-60, emphasises the continuity of a 'personalised' – instead of institutionalised – bureaucracy from Republic to Empire.

90 Cf. SCHULZ (1997), p. 13-15.

91 VON KEYSERLINGK (2013), p.467.

relationships within the Roman Empire.⁹² Network analysis has proven to be an appropriate method for interpreting information on Quintus Cicero's two career positions on the periphery of the Roman Empire, albeit one that must be carefully applied. It shows that there was a structure – not of institutions or offices, but a structure made from intra-human relations.⁹³ This was the reason for a discrepancy between the theoretical authority and the actual power structure in the province, as the interests and connections of several actors within the Roman aristocracy could prove to be an equally strong factor. This resulted in conflicts. Quintus was too eager to prove himself as a strict administrator, and did not want to be too dependent on the cooperation of local dignitaries, who themselves acted overconfidently.

However, it was dangerous to use authority without considering all the factors at work, or even to underestimate them – which Quintus obviously did. He was the representative of Roman power and endangered not only his own reputation but also his brother's. Balance theory has proven helpful in understanding this situation. As part of the network analysis, it facilitated another perspective on the complicated web of relationships as a whole and provided a broader base for an assessment of his time as legate commanding a legion's winter camp as some kind of peacekeeper in Gaul, or as governor of Asia.

In Gaul, a considerable number of the elites from the Eburones and the Nervii refused to cooperate. Eventually, the Eburones were fought off and Roman control was re-established. Just as at the end of Caesar's campaign, all of Gaul was conquered. This shows that the Roman military machine was highly capable of reconnecting various network clusters, or of crushing others and thus creating the possibility to build new ones. In *Asia*, the famous Marcus Cicero intervened before serious trouble could arise. Quintus failed to link all the parties involved. But without Marcus, an important group within the network – namely a number of local dignitaries – would have been cut off from the rest of the network. It is very hard to predict the possible consequences of that situation. But this outcome was not desired by Marcus – not least for personal reasons. He thus took action and acted as a 'substitute hub', positioning himself as a stabiliser and neutraliser for most of the conflicts his brother had sown. Thus, the governor was not the only – perhaps not even the most important – link between Rome and its provinces. If he had controlled the province and the actors, managed their interests and the conflicts that came with it, functioned and acted as a hub, held all the vital parts of the network in Asia together, then

92 Cf. p. 11.

93 In accordance with the basic assumption that networks can cross social and political borders/boundaries and are potentially changing all the time (cf. fn. 52).

only a major military threat could have threatened Roman rule. This did not come from within the Roman sphere of control during the time of the late Roman republic, as only the Parthian Empire was capable of posing such a threat to the Rome. At least, this is what Marcus feared even before arriving in Cilicia, where he was to be governor.⁹⁴ What Marcus feared ten years before his own governorship was that Quintus would stumble over local conflicts in Asia. So he acted and made visible the critical position of Quintus in the middle, between centre and periphery.⁹⁵ Centre and periphery⁹⁵ are here defined by the actors themselves, as well as to whom they made their pleas or complaints, where they asked for advice and support, or where these came from. Quintus himself was, in more than one way, subject to more important aristocrats in Rome.

He was not totally unaware of these political risks, however, and felt the pressure from both sides. When he sensed problematic issues, which involved actors from Rome and the province, he was able to come up with a strategy that did no harm to his reputation. When the *publicani* wanted tariffs for goods that were moved within the province, he shied away from a decision and referred the parties of the dispute to the senate in Rome.⁹⁶ Other, more famous (or notorious) names, e.g. Caesar and Pompey, can also be found in the networks. For them, Quintus and the men like him, such as Balbus, Oppius, Afranius, Petreius, Mamurra, from the second political row, did their share of waging war and administration. They functioned as relays of Roman rule, embodying and representing it in increasing numbers, while an increasing number of *nobiles* did not go to the provinces in person. However, the latter still pulled the strings through their agents, friends, clients, and connections, be they Roman or local.⁹⁷ The nobility may have refrained from taking up tasks in the provinces, but they still had the power and the control – just without the offices.

The perspective of this particular network analysis is limited, of course. It concentrates on Quintus Tullius Cicero, one individual, as a representative of Roman rule. The network and its analysis are centred on him. It is an ego-centred network, which is why it is not a surprise to see Quintus at its centre and core. It is still no surprise even if we leave network analysis aside and rely only on classicist methods: he was the governor of a province and a *legatus legionis*. In the case of the latter office, it is clear that Quintus was the centre of the network, as the spotlight was shone on a very confined regional stage. Caesar's other

94 First in Cic. *Att.* 5.9.1.

95 See also footnote 45.

96 On top of this he declared that his advisors favoured this procedure (Cic. *Att.* 2.16.4). Cf. BLEICKEN (1995), p. 19.

97 Cf. ROLLINGER (2009), p. 94-97: M. Brutus and his henchman M. Scaptius as another example, as well as the involvement of senators in the *societates publicanorum*, through which they had influence in the provinces.

legates were left out for the sake of the example of balance theory, but even so, Caesar's role was nearly as central as that of Quintus. However, the network of Quintus' administration had a surprise in store, in the form of Marcus Cicero's position and gravitas. Without any formal authority, he was of almost equal importance to his brother, the governor. Here, network analysis shows how restricted Quintus' authority actually was, particularly considering Quintus was part of the aristocracy network of Rome. He extended the aristocracy network into the province, but there were other ties, too. Local dignitaries and other actors within the province were also interlinked into this structure. This made it possible to bypass the magistrates to enforce their own demands, agendas, and claims.⁹⁸ If we see Roman rule as a network from this perspective, from the periphery's point of view, then we realise that all political roads led to Rome. It was the hub of the world as long as the channels and threads of communication and cooperation – or collaboration – were intact. Within this, provincial governors such as Quintus Cicero fulfilled an important function, albeit not necessarily the most important one.

98 Another example from some 90 years later was the prefect of Iudaea, Pontius Pilatus. At that time the backbenchers and aspirants from the rows of the Roman knights had been more common among governors. He also had to work with local elites. This kind of situation was obviously a constant during Roman rule (DAHLHEIM (2014), p. 67).

5 Figures

id	label	degree	eccentricity	closeness- centrality	betweenness- centrality	triangles
1	Quintus Tullius Cicero	35	3.0	0.8511	464.9166	36
2	Marcus Tullius Cicero	28	2.0	0.7692	298.9166	34
3	Lucius Aelius Tubero	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
4	Aulus Allienus	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
5	Marcus Gratidius	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
6	unknown quaestor	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
7	Lucius Caesius	1	4.0	0.4651	0.0	0
8	Chairippos	1	4.0	0.4651	0.0	0
9	Lucius Labeo	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
10	Paconius	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
11	Tuscanus	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
12	Statius	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
13	Zeuxis of Blaundos	3	3.0	0.5063	39.0	1
14	Hermippos of Dionysopolis	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
15	Hephaistios of Apamea	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
16	Megaristos of Antandros	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
17	Nikias of Smyrna	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
18	Nymphon of Kolophon	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
19	Titus Catienus	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
20	Gaius Fabius	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
21	Lucius Flavius	5	3.0	0.5128	3.3333	7
23	L. Flavius' procuratores	4	4.0	0.4819	1.5	3
24	Apollonidenses	2	4.0	0.4706	0.0	1
25	Gaius Fundanius	2	4.0	0.4706	0.0	1
26	Pompeius	4	3.0	0.5063	0.0	6
27	Caesar	4	3.0	0.5063	0.0	6
28	Lucius Marcius Censorinus	1	4.0	0.4651	0.0	0
29	Antonius	1	4.0	0.4651	0.0	0
30	Cassii	1	4.0	0.4651	0.0	0
31	Quintus Mucius Scaevola	1	4.0	0.4651	0.0	0
32	Attalos of Hypaiepe	3	3.0	0.5	4.8333	2
33	Q. Publicius	2	3.0	0.4444	0.0	1
34	Licinius	2	4.0	0.32	0.0	1
35	Aesop(us)	3	3.0	0.4598	76.0	1
36	Platon of Sardes	2	4.0	0.32	0.0	1
37	publicani in Asia (tax contracts)	4	3.0	0.5063	0.0	6
38	publicani in Asia (tariffs)	4	3.0	0.5063	0.0	6
39	universae Asiae et negotiatoribus	5	3.0	0.5128	0.25	9
40	Titus Pomponius Atticus	5	3.0	0.5128	0.25	9
41	L. Caecilius	2	3.0	0.4938	0.0	1
43	M. Cascellius	1	4.0	0.339	0.0	0

Fig. 1. Network in *Asia* 60/59 – Nodes

Source	Targets			
1	2	11	20	30
	3	12	21	31
	4	13	23	32
	5	14	24	37
	6	15	25	38
	7	16	26	39
	8	17	27	40
	9	18	28	41
	10	19	29	
2	3	12	19	35
	4	13	20	37
	5	14	21	38
	6	15	26	39
	9	16	27	40
	10	17	32	41
	11	18	33	
13	43			
21	23			
23	24	25		
26	21	27		
27	21			
32	33			
34	36			
35	34	36		
39	37	38		
40	37	38	39	

(Although named "Source" and "Targets" there is no further meaning to it, because the graph is unweighted; each edge is only mentioned once, e.g. the edge between Q. Cicero [1] and Zeuxis of Blaundos [13] is not again listed under Source [13])

Fig. 2. Network in *Asia* 60/59 – Edges




Fig. 3. Network in Gaul – Graph

id	label	degree	eccentricity	closeness- centrality	betweenness- centrality	triangles
1	Q. Tullius Cicero	14	2.0	0.9375	52.33	16
2	M. Tullius Cicero	9	2.0	0.7143	11.33	13
3	Caesar	12	2.0	0.8333	26.33	16
4	M. Orfius	3	2.0	0.5556	0.0	3
6	C. Trebatius Testa	3	2.0	0.5556	0.0	3
7	M. Curtius	2	3.0	0.5	0.0	1
8	C. Oppius	2	2.0	0.5357	0.0	1
9	Hippodamos and others	1	3.0	0.5	0.0	0
10	L. Cornelius Balbus	3	2.0	0.5556	0.0	3
11	C. Trebonius	3	2.0	0.5556	0.0	3
12	P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus	3	2.0	0.5556	0.0	3
13	Salvius, freedman of Caesar	2	2.0	0.5357	0.0	1
14	L. Minucius Basilus	2	2.0	0.5357	0.0	1
15	L. Labeo	2	2.0	0.5357	0.0	1
16	T. Pinarius	2	2.0	0.5357	0.0	1
17	duces principesque Nerviorum	1	3.0	0.5	0.0	0

Fig. 4. Network in Gaul – Nodes

Source	Target
1	2
	3
	4
	6
2	3
	4
	6
3	6
	7
4	3
11	1
	2
12	1
	2
13	1
14	1
15	1
16	1

(Although named "Source" and "Targets" there is no further meaning to it, because the graph is unweighted; each edge is only mentioned once, e.g. the edge between Q. Cicero [1] and Salvius [13] is not again listed under Source [1])

Fig. 5. Network in Gaul – Edges




Fig. 6. Network in Gaul – Degree Distribution




Fig. 7. Network in Gaul – Uprising of the Eburones




Fig. 8. Network in Asia – Graph



Fig. 9. Municipalities of Greek dignitaries in conflict with Quintus Cicero (in Ephesus)⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Own work; map taken from <https://maps-for-free.com/> (retrieved 5 April, 2016); edited with open-source image editor GIMP.




Fig. 10. Quintus Cicero's connections highlighted




Fig. 11. Marcus Cicero's connections highlighted

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