

The Journal of
**HISTORICAL
NETWORK
RESEARCH**

12 | 2025
special issue

Time and Temporality as Categories of Connectedness

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The Evolution of Relations between Italian Antifascists and US Intelligence Agents from World War II to the Early Cold War

Time Dimension in Alfredo Pizzoni and Allen Dulles' Ego-networks

Journal of Historical Network Research 12 (2025)

Keywords Time Dimension, Cold War, World War II, Ego-networks, Transatlantic Relations

Abstract The research project presented in this paper examines the legacy of relations between Italian antifascists and the US secret services, which emerged during the Second World War and persisted into the early years of the Cold War. The analysis concentrates on the case study of the networks of relations that emerged surrounding the actions of two protagonists, namely the American Allen Dulles and the Italian Alfredo Pizzoni, in building relations between Italy and the United States, respectively. The period considered spans from 1943 to 1953. During the decade that bridges the last two years of World War II, with the emergence of the first tensions of the Cold War, Dulles and Pizzoni met each other and started to cooperate in the context of the antifascist struggle. Their relationship persisted and evolved during the following years. The social and political context around this relationship also evolved, moving from the wartime subversive antifascist actions to the elitist milieu of Wall Street. The ego-networks of Dulles and Pizzoni are reconstructed here in order to explore this evolution. The time

dimension is therefore crucial in the analysis, as it is deeply entangled with the overall goal of this project. This paper focuses on the dialogue between the temporalities suggested by the nature of the historical sources, the time dimension in graphs, and the research objectives.

Introduction

During the Second World War, the struggle against the Fascist Regime and the German occupation in Italy led to a rapprochement between the agents of the Anglo-American strategic services and the Italian antifascists. From the Anglo-American perspective, this collaboration was essential to destabilize the enemy through guerrilla and covert operations and to gather intelligence. Conversely, from the Italian antifascist perspective, collaboration with the Anglo-Americans was crucial to obtain financial aid, equipment, and political legitimacy.¹ The relationships that originated in this context represent a continuity with subsequent years. A detailed examination of the historiography on the relations between Italian antifascist resistance and the Anglo-Americans, as well as on US political warfare and the cultural cold war, reveals the recurrence of certain individual connections.²

The personal and professional relations that originated during the antifascist and anti-Nazi struggle persisted, albeit in limited but meaningful cases, and had repercussions on transatlantic relations in the postwar years. One such example is the friendship between the American Allen Dulles and the Italian Alfredo Pizzoni. During the Second World War, the former was president of the Committee for the Liberation of Northern Italy (Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia, CLNAI). The latter was Chief of the Office of Strategic Services station in Bern, Switzerland.³ Following the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, Pizzoni assumed the role of president at one of the most prominent banking institutions in Italy at the time, the Credito Italiano. He had been employed at the bank since 1920. In 1951, Dulles was appointed Deputy Director of the recently established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a position he held until 1953, when he became Director.⁴ The rationale behind selecting Pizzoni and Dulles as case

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- 1 On the cooperation between the Italian resistance and US and British wartime strategic services, namely the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), see De Leonardis 1988; Piffer 2010. For a transnational European perspective see Wieviorka 2019. On OSS activity in Italy see Tompkins 2005; Corvo 2005; Naftali 1995. On SOE activity in Italy see Stafford 2012; Bailey 2014.
- 2 See for example Guasconi 1999; Mistry 2014; Filippelli 1989; Del Pero 1998; Krabbendam and Scott-Smith, ed., 2003.
- 3 The CLNAI was formed in 1943, after the armistice between Italy and the Allies. It played a crucial role in coordinating partisan activities and uprisings against the Fascist regime and German occupation in Northern Italy. The OSS was the United States' wartime intelligence agency during World War II. Established in 1942, it conducted espionage, sabotage, and reconnaissance operations behind enemy lines.
- 4 On Allen Dulles see Grose 1994; Kinzer 2014; Petersen 2010. Alfredo Pizzoni had been largely neglected by Italian historians for an extended period. On his wartime work see Piffer 2005. To date, there is no published literature on his postwar activities.

study subjects to examine the legacy of wartime relations between American strategic services and Italian antifascists is twofold. First, the decision to focus on the relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni is based on its continuity. Second, their biographies suggest a potentially significant political role, both during the war years and the post-war period.

The relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni originated in the context of the formation of OSS networks in Italy during World War II and continued to evolve in the post-war years. This paper will introduce research that aims to understand not only why this happened and its political repercussions, but also to reconstruct the social context it originated in and how it evolved.⁵

This study aims to adopt a dual historiographical perspective on transatlantic relations. It seeks to identify continuities between the years of World War II and the early years of the Cold War, rather than focusing on ruptures between the two different phases.⁶ It also examines relations between the United States and Italy through channels that are not strictly diplomatic, such as private networks.⁷

Private networks that operated beyond traditional diplomatic channels played a significant role in connecting transatlantic elites. The focus on Dulles and Pizzoni's actions within financial and political circles intertwines with the analysis of individual and private contributions to the Cold War, which has recently garnered increased attention from historians. This has led to several studies focusing on the role of non-governmental cultural networks.⁸ Nevertheless, the influence of financial and entrepreneurial elites on matters beyond the purely economic sphere remains understudied, particularly in the context of Italy. While Alfredo Pizzoni is entirely absent from the post-war historiographical panorama, Allen Dulles, on the other hand, has attracted a great deal of historiographical interest, due to both his leading role in the CIA and his brother John Foster's role as Secretary of State at the same time.⁹ This disparity in the attention paid to the two protagonists in this study makes it all the more interesting to bring to light the story of their friendship and collaboration. Conceptually, it is possible to place this study in the context of the historiography of the cultural Cold War, of propaganda promoting Western – as opposed to Communist – values that the Pizzoni-Dulles relationship had its most significant outcome. It is also interesting to note how the same Cold War paradigm must be problematized when analyzing the Italian perspective of Pizzoni. In fact, in terms of his actions, the theme of opposing communism in the pursuit of his relationship with Dulles would only emerge

5 The work presented in this paper was part of my doctoral dissertation (Clarizia 2023).

6 Miller 1986; Di Nolfo 2010.

7 Guasconi 1999; Laville and Wilford, ed., 2006

8 See Krabbendam and Scott-Smith, ed., 2003. Laville 2006.

9 On Allen Dulles see for example Grose 1994; Kinzer 2014.

in 1953, while his general intention to promote Italian interests and raise its status through his private channels was much more nuanced and complex.

Network analysis was employed to trace the evolution of Pizzoni and Dulles' network from the Second World War to the Cold War era. The objective of this analysis was to reconstruct the history of the collaboration between the two protagonists and to comprehend the political and social context in which it occurred and to ascertain the extent of its continuity. How did Dulles' network of relations with Italian anti-fascists and Pizzoni's network of relations with the Americans, and more generally with the Anglo-Americans, originate? With whom did the two protagonists establish relationships that had political fallout concerning the building of relations between Italy and the United States? And which of these relationships persisted at the end of the war, and thus with the substantial changes in political, but also biographical, contexts that this entailed?

The context in which the collaboration between Pizzoni and Dulles developed is based on their individual relationship networks. The reconstruction of this through graphs has enabled me to further refine my research questions. The changes in the international and biographical contexts of the two protagonists, as well as the availability of historical sources of a different nature, led to the construction of two different types of graphs. The first, a bimodal and multi-level analysis, was used for the years of the Second World War. The second, a one-mode ego-network that focused solely on the figure of Pizzoni, was used for the Cold War years. The following paragraphs will explain why this approach was effective in tracking the evolution of the relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni, the context in which it occurred, and its political repercussions.

In conclusion, the utilization of network analysis in this study represented an experimental application within my field of expertise, namely the history of international relations. It is notable that the use of network analysis in this field is surprisingly limited, particularly in Italy, given that the concept of 'relations' is intrinsic to the discipline's very name. Indeed, there have been few studies of international history that have employed this specific methodology and theoretical approach to date. Such studies include the work of Martin Grandjean, who employed network analysis to examine the international cooperation networks that emerged around the League of Nations in the period between the two world wars.¹⁰ Another example is David Stenner's study, *Globalizing Morocco*, which employed SNA to examine the transnational dimensions of the Moroccan independence movement.¹¹ The objective of this study is thus to present an illus-

10 Grandjean 2022

11 Stenner 2019.

tration of implementing network analysis in the examination of the relationship between Italy and the United States, in accordance with the methodology previously outlined.

Despite certain limitations, which will be discussed in the following analysis, the experiment proved successful. As previously mentioned, both the theoretical approach and the concrete tools of network analysis were instrumental in guiding the investigation.

If the objective was to comprehend the evolution of the Pizzoni-Dulles relationship within the context of social networks, then the temporal dimension is of paramount importance, as it is at the core of the very concept of this evolution. This paper will present a methodological reflection on the intertwined relationship between time and temporalities with the available historical sources, and how this subsequently affected the presented network analysis. It should be noted that unavoidable gaps in historical sources and the schematization and simplification of reality that is reflected in networks and graphs challenge the idea of a continuous flow of time.¹² It was also not possible to maintain the same approach to the time dimension throughout the entire period under consideration, from 1943 to 1953. Two main approaches differentiate the analysis of the war years' networks from those of the postwar years. The networks in the years 1943–1945 are reconstructed in a continuous manner. Conversely, a continuative network analysis was not feasible for the post-war years, due to the nature of Pizzoni and Dulles' activities in US-Italian relations and the nature of the available sources. The following two sections will describe and explain these two approaches, along with the analysis of how the networks being considered evolved over time between World War II and the postwar years. The first section will focus on the war years, the second on the postwar years. In both sections, concepts of continuity and evolution will be at the core of the analysis, making time and temporalities a crucial factor to be considered and demonstrated with network analysis.

Pizzoni and Dulles' networks during World War II: visualizing continuity

The relationship between Pizzoni and Dulles was established during the Second World War, specifically in October 1944. They met in Switzerland, during a mission undertaken by Pizzoni, in his capacity as President of the CLNAI, to secure financial and material support for the Italian Resistance from the Anglo-Americans.¹³ The direct connection occurred within the broader network of ties between the agents of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the

¹² Lemercier 2012

¹³ Pizzoni 1993, p. 180; Piffer 2005, p. 125.

American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and Italian antifascists in Northern Italy. The graphs pertaining to the war years networks (figures 1 to 6) are intended to reconstruct the evolution of the broader network around Pizzoni and Dulles as egos. The reconstruction was developed in a continuous manner, covering approximately two and a half years, from January 1943 to May 1945. The period in question was divided into three phases for analysis. The graphical representations of the networks permit us to take a snapshot of each phase, thus enabling us to compare and follow the evolution of the network.

This project was therefore constructed around the examination of individual and institutional relations. The relation between the two main actors was reconstructed through a qualitative analysis, while graphs were employed primarily to reconstruct the ego networks of Dulles and Pizzoni. The graphs in figures 1 to 6 illustrate multi-layer, bimodal ego-networks, where the egos are either Pizzoni, Dulles, or a combination of both.¹⁴ The nodes in the graphs represent individuals and the private or public institutions that they were representing when a certain tie occurred. At the lower level, we find individual horizontal ties, while at the upper level we find institutional horizontal ties. The two layers are then connected vertically, as individuals are linked with the institution they were affiliated to. Horizontal ties are weighted, while vertical ties are not. The graphs in question are complex, and are designed to show the relationship between macrostructures at the institutional level, and microstructures at the individual level.¹⁵ As anticipated, one final and crucial characteristic of the network analysis presented in this paper is its longitudinal nature. The reconstruction of the evolution of the Dulles and Pizzoni network with a continuous approach is motivated by the nature of their activity during the war and by the availability of suitable sources for the construction of the network analysis dataset.¹⁶

From Dulles' arrival in Bern in November 1942 until the end of the war in Europe, establishing relations with Italian antifascists constituted one of his duties. This task was among a number of others, including the establishment of contact with resistance movements in other Central European countries. Never-

14 Perry et al 2018

15 The generation and analysis of simple bimodal networks, as well as multilayered analysis, necessitate specific considerations when utilizing software such as Gephi. The software itself does not inherently distinguish between different types of nodes. Consequently, this distinction has been established by assigning an attribute, either 'entity' or 'individual', to each node. This allows the application of filters and graphical characteristics to differentiate the two types of nodes, both visually and in terms of measuring the graph's properties. The same approach can be applied to the distinction between horizontal and vertical relationships. This has been achieved by assigning an attribute to individual edges, which are then classified as either horizontal or vertical. On multilayered graphs in Historical Network Analysis see Grandjean 2020.

16 Lemerrier 2015.

theless, contacts with Italian antifascists can be traced on a regular basis until the end of the war, although with varying degrees of intensity. Similarly, Pizzoni, in his role as president of the CLNAI, was consistently engaged in the construction of networks with Anglo-American agents and army officers. The graphs only reflect the relations that the two protagonists built in these efforts, leaving aside activities that were not strictly related.

These regular activities left a substantial imprint on the historical record. Dulles' relations with Italian antifascists (and even with a few repentant fascist representatives in Switzerland) are documented in OSS reports authored by Dulles himself, or by his representative in Lugano, Donald Jones. A number of these reports are also readily accessible, having been published in the volume edited by Neal H. Petersen, *From Hitler's Doorstep*.¹⁷

As previously indicated, the graphs presented in this paragraph encompass two dimensions: one pertaining to individual relations, the other to institutional relations. Nevertheless, the initial focus in the extraction of relational data from historical sources was on individual relations. In reconstructing Pizzoni's network from 1943 to 1945, three types of sources have been identified. We have access to his correspondence with Anglo-Americans and Italian colleagues who were involved with them, his mission's diaries, and his memoir, which was written in 1946, shortly after the end of the war.¹⁸ The sources employed to construct the datasets and graphs are diverse in nature, necessitating a critical approach to their integration. Nevertheless, this was possible due to the incorporation of consistent data regarding interactions between Anglo-American officers and Italian antifascists, whether in the form of correspondence or records of meetings. In the majority of cases, the information in question comprises a list of participants or the names of correspondents, accompanied by a full date (day-month-year). In a small number of instances, a complete date was absent; however, it was feasible to extrapolate the month and year from the surrounding context in these cases. This final aspect is of particular importance when one considers that a primary objective of the network analysis was to trace the evolution of the network.

The information provided by the sources is much more inconsistent when it comes to the topics discussed during meetings. For this reason, I opted to exclude this aspect from the graph construction process, instead relying on a qualitative analysis.

17 Petersen 2010. Additional documentation is held at the US National Archives at College Park. Records of the Office of Strategic Services, National Archives College Park (NACP), RG 226, Entry A1 190c, Bern Field Station Files, 1942 – 1948.

18 Pizzoni 1993; Istituto Nazionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia (INSMLI), Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 4, Fasc. II, Missioni di Alfredo Pizzoni per conto del Clnai.

Each contact, regardless of whether it occurred on the same day, was regarded as a distinct link between two individuals, regardless of its nature, with no qualitative differentiation in terms of its significance.

In constructing the dataset, I considered the transition from the level of individual relationships to that of institutional relationships. This entailed taking into account which entity or institution the individual represented at the time a certain contact took place. This necessitated an interpretative effort, as the information was not always present in the same historical sources from which the relational data was derived. Furthermore, the affiliations of the individuals in the dataset are not always distinct. For example, Pizzoni was simultaneously affiliated with both the CLNAI and the Credito Italiano. However, in the context of the activities described here, it can be argued that he was acting on behalf of the CLNAI. Similarly, some individuals in the network were affiliated with both political parties and the CLNAI. In such cases, it was necessary to determine whether they represented the party, the committee, or both. Given the inherently political nature of the relationships under examination, it is unlikely that the individuals in the network would act solely on a personal level. In cases where no affiliation was identified, this was more likely due to a lack of information than an interpretative choice.

In practical terms, the ‘messy’ dataset was organized to include the affiliations for each individual link in two dedicated columns, labeled ‘source’s affiliation’ and ‘target’s affiliation’. In the node dataset, both individuals and entities have been included, with the two categories distinguished using an attribute. In order to generate the multilayer network analysis from the dataset, it was necessary to cross-reference the source, target, and their affiliations so that three types of information, all contained in a single row in the dataset, were aligned: the horizontal relationship between individuals; the horizontal relationship between entities; and the vertical relationships between individuals and the entities they were affiliated with. To achieve this, I copied and pasted the necessary columns from the original dataset into the clean dataset, ensuring that the order and number of rows remained unaltered.

In Gephi, vertical and horizontal ties were distinguished by the use of an attribute. The matching data were merged, but in the case of vertical ties, the weight was maintained at 1. Conversely, matching ties on the horizontal levels resulted in a tie occurring multiple times. It was therefore meaningful for the analysis to have them weighted, as will be discussed below.

In terms of the longitudinal network analysis, I divided it into three phases with two sub-phases each. The initial phase of the analysis spans from January 1943, when I identified the initial contacts between Dulles and some Italian antifascists, until the armistice in September 1943. The second phase then extends from the armistice until September 1944. It is followed by the third phase, which

begins in October 1944, with Pizzoni's second mission to Switzerland, and continues until the end of the war. This approach aims to capture particularly significant moments of network development, while also including a larger amount of data to achieve a more comprehensive analysis. The first phase is illustrated by graphs in figures 1 and 2. These graphs show only Dulles' ego-network between January and September 1943, as Pizzoni was not yet active in building relations with the Anglo-Americans.

Dulles arrived in Bern in November 1942 and promptly commenced the process of establishing his network with Italian antifascists.¹⁹ The initial months of Dulles' activity also coincided with the final months of the Fascist Regime, as Benito Mussolini was deposed on the 23rd of July 1943. In this initial phase, Dulles was primarily occupied with gathering information about the Italian internal situation and expanding his network.²⁰ Following the collapse of the Mussolini regime, however, Dulles' actions also sought to leverage his connections to persuade the new Italian government to surrender.²¹

In Figures 1 and 2, we are presented with a small, descriptive network, which is readily comprehensible. In particular, it can be observed that Dulles' primary interlocutors were affiliated with the Italian Action Party.²² This trend would be further substantiated in the following months.

Dulles' relationships with Italians underwent an evolution in line with the expansion of OSS activities in the peninsula, where new bases were established as the Allies advanced. Concurrently, the Resistance in territories occupied by German troops was becoming more established. The issue of Anglo-American support for partisan bands became a pivotal aspect of the relationship between the OSS and the SOE and antifascists in general, particularly in relation to the work of the Bern station. Nevertheless, several months elapsed before the Resistance, guided by local CLNs and the more central CLNAI, could establish itself as a unified and reliable institution in the eyes of the Allies, both militarily and politi-

19 Italy was just one of the war theaters that attracted the attention of the American agent, and certainly not the most significant, when compared for example with the German sphere. It is therefore important to emphasize that Dulles' network with Italian antifascists represented a relatively minor aspect of the ties he established during his years in Bern, even if our focus is limited to the Italian case. Petersen 2010, p. 21. Piffer 2010, p. 110.

20 Telegram 516, March 21, 1943, in Petersen 2010, p. 53.

21 See Miller 1986, pp. 48–51; Aga-Rossi 2003, pp. 90–92; Ellwood 1977, pp. 56–57.

22 The Italian Action Party (Partito d'Azione) was founded in 1942. It was a left-wing, anti-fascist party that played a significant role in the Italian resistance movement against the Fascist regime and Nazi occupation. The party advocated for a republican form of government and social reforms, but dissolved in 1947 due to internal divisions and poor electoral performance. De Luna 2006.




Fig. 1 WWII, Phase I, Subphase 1, January 1943–July 1943. Dulles' Ego-Network. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight.




Fig. 2 WWII Phase I, Subphase 2, January 1943–September 1943. Dulles' Ego-Network. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight.

cally.²³ In the context of this endeavor, Alfredo Pizzoni's role emerged, and his relationship with Dulles began to develop.

Upon the announcement of the armistice, Alfredo Pizzoni, a banker and executive at the central management of Credito Italiano, donned his army uniform and prepared to defend Milan from the Germans. Although he held anti-fascist sentiments, he was a committed patriot and had volunteered for the Italian army in 1942. Nevertheless, he soon resumed his civilian occupation following an injury sustained during the sinking of the ship *Victoria*, where he had been serving. Following this experience, Pizzoni reestablished contact with former anti-fascist associates. He subsequently became involved in the re-emergence of clandestine political activity in Milan. Upon the establishment of the Committees of National Liberation in both Central and Northern Italy, Pizzoni assumed the role of president for the latter.²⁴ He was seen by fellow antifascists as the ideal candidate because he was not officially affiliated with any political party, enabling him to adopt a neutral stance.²⁵

The CLNAI comprised two operational bodies: a military committee and a financial committee. Pizzoni, in his capacity as President, was not a member of any of the committees. However, when the CLNAI's financial demands increased, he intervened directly to secure funding. In this context, Pizzoni emphasized the need to seek assistance from the Anglo-Americans in Switzerland.²⁶ This prompted the first mission of the President of the CLNAI into Swiss territory at the end of March 1944. Nevertheless, this was not the first time representatives of the Anglo-American forces at the OSS and SOE stations in Bern had been approached by emissaries from the CLN. In the weeks following the armistice, Ferruccio Parri, prominent figure of the Action Party and head of the CLNAI military committee, had already reached out to Dulles and John McCaffery, head of the British SOE in Bern. His aim was to request military assistance and official recognition of partisan bands as a centralized army.²⁷ Although other parties within the CLN were not pleased with the way the Action Party had monopolized the attention of the Anglo-Americans in Switzerland, it is important to highlight that it was precisely thanks to this initiative that Dulles and McCaffery began to recognize the value of the Resistance and the authority of the CLNAI.²⁸ Between the fall of 1943 and the winter of 1944, it became clear to Dulles that providing aid to antifascists was a priority. However, headquarters were hesitant and sought

23 On the complex relations between the Italian resistance and the Allies see Piffer 2010.

24 Pizzoni 1993, p. 3.

25 Piffer 2005, p. 81.

26 Millan 2009, pp. 11–16; Piffer 2005, pp. 82–84.

27 The Anglo-Americans opposed this approach, not only for political reasons, but also because, from a military perspective, they believed that smaller groups would draw less attention and minimize the risk of reprisals. Piffer 2005, p. 115; De Leonardis 1988 p. 160.

28 Pizzoni 1993, p. 37.

guarantees regarding the solidity of the groups the aid would be directed to and their genuine willingness to carry out acts of sabotage. The fear of wasting resources on an uncertain advantage was strong.²⁹

As mentioned, In the spring of 1944, financial needs pushed Pizzoni to undertake his first mission in Switzerland. He was in fact convinced that only Anglo-American support could give the Italian Resistance the help it needed. At the same time, Pizzoni believed in the need to establish an official delegation in Switzerland tasked with engaging with the Anglo-Americans. This would replace the unofficial dialogue initiated by the representatives of the Action Party, or the “men of Parri”, as Pizzoni refers to them (with a hint of disdain) in his memoirs.³⁰

Pizzoni’s first mission in Switzerland was not particularly significant in establishing his relationship with Dulles or the Americans in general, as his contacts were mostly with the British.³¹ However, the mission marked the beginning of Pizzoni’s direct connections with Anglo-American agents, connections he would never abandon.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the combined ego-networks of Pizzoni and Dulles. The graphs have become more articulated, although they remain limited in size and easily readable. Consequently, it can be asserted that, despite Pizzoni’s intentions, the relations between OSS and the Action Party continue to be predomi-

29 Telegram 319–21 to Algiers, March 20, 1944, in Petersen 2010, p. 245. The issue must also be seen in the broader context of the dominance of British interests in the Mediterranean, acknowledged by the United States during the early stages of the war, which resulted in a greater influence of the SOE in relations with antifascists. With the liberation of Rome and the formation of the Bonomi government, the relationship between the Anglo-Americans and the Resistance entered a new phase, characterized by more substantial and organized support from the Allies up until winter. As the military advance progressed, it became necessary to strengthen the role of sabotage and guerrilla groups, especially considering that with the opening of a second front with the Normandy and Provence landings, six divisions were withdrawn from the Italian theater of war to be moved to France. Thus, the actions of partisans during the summer of 1944 became even more crucial.

Other factors also contributed to convincing the Allies of the military value of the Resistance. One was the assistance that clandestine groups in the North provided in freeing Anglo-American prisoners from the Germans. The second factor was the increase in available information, which was valuable to the Allies. The third involved the establishment of a direct relationship between Anglo-American agents and partisans, with a more decisive effort from the CLNAI on one side, and the dispatch of the first missions composed of Allied personnel to Northern Italy on the other. Dulles, who had previously advocated for the benefits of supporting the Italian Resistance, reaffirmed his belief in the importance of the partisans’ contributions to Washington immediately following the liberation of Rome. Pizzoni 1993, p. 182.

30 Pizzoni 1993, p. 37; pp. 197–202.

31 Pizzoni 1993, pp. 182–183. Piffer 2005, p. 136.

nant in this phase. On the institutional level, Pizzoni represented the CLNAI. Nevertheless, this node still has a limited centrality, as well as an extremely limited weight of its tie with OSS (and SOE, its British counterpart). (OSS-Action Party: 22; OSS-CLNAI: 1). This is also determined by the fact that members of the Action Party formed the largest party group in the network. Out of a total of 33 nodes corresponding to Italian antifascists belonging to four different parties, 12 belonged to the Action Party (36%). Moreover, excluding the egos for Pizzoni and Dulles, which have a degree centrality of 20 and 19 respectively, the four nodes with the highest degree centrality are Luigi Casagrande, Pizzoni's collaborator (19), and three members of the Action Party (Rino de Nobili-19, Pietro Tino-16, Ferruccio Parri-14). The graphs thus help us to conclude that Pizzoni's mission had broken the Action Party's monopoly in relations with the allies, but had not affected its dominance.

Pizzoni's second mission in Switzerland marks the beginning of the third phase of the war years (Figure 5 and 6). The mission took place in October 1944. At that time, the CLNAI had two main objectives: to further increase its funds and to gain institutional recognition from both the Italian government and the Allied military leaders. In order to achieve these goals, it was essential to organize an expedition to liberated southern Italy. At that time, the Italian institutions were based in Rome, while the Allied headquarters were located in Caserta, near Naples.³² However, an official delegation from the CLNAI had not yet been able to reach the South.³³ As funds began to dwindle, a second mission to Switzerland could be a good opportunity to stir things up and secure new and more consistent funding from the Allies.³⁴

Pizzoni and Dulles met on 27 October. The head of the OSS station in Bern had recently returned from the United States, where he had spent several weeks. In a note in his diary, Pizzoni described Dulles as appearing irritated but nevertheless "always pleasant and gentlemanly".³⁵ The primary focus of the meeting was financial in nature, specifically the request for a monthly loan of 160 million, which Dulles supported.³⁶ In the same period, the CLNAI mission in Southern Italy was also authorized. Pizzoni was appointed by the committee as part of the

32 Following the cessation of hostilities on 8 September 1943, the Italian royal family and the government evacuated the capital and fled to the south, where they were subsequently occupied by the Anglo-American military forces. It was not until the liberation of Rome in June 1944 that Italian institutions were able to return to the city. Aga-Rossi 2003.

33 Pizzoni 1993, p. 49.

34 Valiani 1995, p. 233. Pizzoni 1993, p. 51. Stafford 2012, pp. 236–237.

35 INSMLI, Fondo Alfredo Pizzoni, Busta 4, Fasc. II, Missioni di Alfredo Pizzoni per conto del Clnai.

36 INSMLI, Fondo Alfredo Pizzoni, Busta 4, Fasc. II, Missioni di Alfredo Pizzoni per conto del Clnai. Piffer 2005, p. 153.




Fig. 3 WWII Phase 2, Subphase 1. September 1943–April 1944. Dulles and Pizzoni's ego-networks combined. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight.




Fig. 4 WWII Phase 2, Subphase 2. September 1943–September 1944. Dulles and Pizzoni's ego-networks combined. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight.

legation, which also included Parri, the communist Giancarlo Pajetta, and the monarchist Edgardo Sogno, who was to act as military expert.³⁷ The four members of the legation correspond to the most central nodes in Figure 5 and 6.

During the numerous discussions held by the CLNAI delegation during its mission, a multitude of issues were addressed. The overarching theme of the discussions held by the delegation with both Italians and Anglo-Americans was the dissemination of information regarding the situation in the North, and the activities of the CLNAI over the preceding months and in the future. It was therefore imperative that the CLNAI succeeded in persuading the decision-makers in Rome and the Allied command in Caserta of the necessity for continued antifascist and anti-Nazi activity in the final months of the war.³⁸ Pizzoni collaborated closely with Anglo-American agents and officers, fostering a relationship of trust and friendship with several of them. He became a pivotal intermediary for the Anglo-Americans, frequently considering them the sole entity capable of providing meaningful assistance to the Resistance in the North.³⁹ This collaboration resulted in the most significant accomplishment of the mission: the signing of an agreement between the CLNAI and the Supreme Allied Commander Henry Maitland Wilson. The agreement included a provision for financial support for the CLNAI, but also implied its recognition in broader political terms.⁴⁰

The graph in Figure 5 shows how Pizzoni's network grew rapidly during this period. In particular, the number of entities with which Pizzoni, and thus the CLNAI that he and other delegates represented, established a relationship increased. In particular, the Anglo-American military and political entities (in orange in the graph) entered the network, and their representatives, even at the level of individuals, represent an important part of the total number of entities in the network. Other relevant subgroups include representatives of the Italian government and military. Compared to Pizzoni's earlier contacts, the number of Anglo-American agents also increased, as Pizzoni expanded his network to include agents in the South and in Switzerland, as shown in the box on the right, including Dulles. Parties, on the other hand, are secondary, if not absent. This is not because the individuals in the network no longer belonged to them, but because in the circumstances of the mission to the South, the individuals mostly

37 Catalano, p. 6.

38 Pizzoni 1993, p. 67.

39 Among Pizzoni's main Anglo-American friends were the British Captain Gerry Holdsworth, SOE Operations Commander in Italy, the American Colonel Leo King, and William Stawell, chief of the Special Operations Mediterranean, the operational coordination body between the military headquarters and intelligence services. Pizzoni 1993, pp. 90–91. De Leonardis 1998, p. 292.

40 INSMLI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 20, Fasc. 61, "Corrispondenza con capi e autorità alleate dopo la liberazione e amici alleati". Catalano, p. 20.




Fig. 5 WWII Phase 3, Subphase 1. October 1944–December 1944. Dulles and Pizzoni's ego-networks combined. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight.




Fig. 7 Legend for figures 5 and 6.

Fig. 6 WWII Phase 3, Subphase 1. October 1944–May 1945. Dulles and Pizzoni's ego-networks combined. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight.

acted as representatives of the CLNAI or the government, despite the political divisions within them.

As for the OSS and the SOE, although the number of agents belonging to each of the two agencies is approximately the same (10 SOE agents and 8 OSS agents), the centrality of the SOE at the agency level is 29, while that of the OSS is 15. This confirms the fact that the agents of the SOE were more active and present towards the anti-fascists of the delegation than those of the OSS, who, as we have seen, also worked for the recognition of the CLNAI. By comparing the most recent data analyzed, we can say that the centrality of the SOE is largely due to the centrality of a single node, that of the British agent Gerard Holdsworth, who played a leading role in facilitating the recognition of the CLNAI by SACMED. (Degree Centrality of 20, the highest if we exclude those of the members of the legation).

In the period between 6 April and 26 April 1945, which coincided with the final stages of the war, Pizzoni undertook a second journey to Southern Italy (Figure 6). The objective was to secure as many resources as possible up until the conclusion of the war, with the intention of intensifying the partisan struggle and preparing a favorable environment for peace negotiations. During this mission, Pizzoni was able to further expand his network and consolidate the relations that had been established during previous missions.⁴¹

Adding the contacts Pizzoni had in the last weeks of the war to those of the previous months, almost all the trends of the network limited to the period October-December 1944 are confirmed. In fact, the weight of the CLNAI-SOE arc is 160, much higher than that of the CLNAI-OSS arc (97). This confirms that, until the end of the war, the antifascists' relations with SOE agents were still stronger than those with OSS agents. However, the weight of the link between the CLNAI and the AFHQ is 41.

Dulles' relations with Italian anti-fascists form part of the network, although they are of a secondary nature. The reason for this disproportion is twofold. In the final phase of analysis, Pizzoni was engaged in the process of establishing connections with the Anglo-Americans, and he left a substantial record of these in his diaries and memoirs. The aforementioned sources permitted the reconstruction of the network in question with a high degree of detail. It is evident that the collaboration with the American and British strategic services, as well as with the Anglo-American military and civil command on Italian territory, was of great importance. Conversely, by the end of the war, Dulles' attention was focused on contexts other than Italy, such as Germany. One exception to this was

41 Pizzoni 1993, p. 121.

his involvement in the Sunrise mission to persuade the SS command in Italy to surrender.⁴²

In conclusion, an analysis of the network's evolution across the three phases under consideration reveals a transition from the action party's predominant role in contacts with the Anglo-Americans, and with Dulles in particular, to the emergence of the CLNAI as a central institution above the parties, largely due to Pizzoni's actions. In this context, Dulles and Pizzoni became acquainted with one another. Nevertheless, their relationship within the network during the war is relatively weak both in terms of quantitative and qualitative analysis. They established a relationship of cordial collaboration, but one that did not particularly stand out when compared to other relations in the graph. (i.e. that between Pizzoni and Holdsworth). However, the graphs do not allow us to recognize that Dulles constituted Pizzoni's main American interlocutor in Switzerland. The disparity between the qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the Pizzoni-Dulles relation would become much more evident in the postwar phase. Following the conclusion of the war, it can be observed that while the quantitative link between Pizzoni and Dulles remained relatively weak, the two men developed a personal friendship and political collaboration of a qualitatively different nature.⁴³

Pizzoni's networks in the postwar years: snapshots of scattered moments

The relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni during the war had been defined within a specific context and network of relationships, namely the connections between the OSS and the Italian Resistance. These relationships were aimed at collaborating to defeat Nazism and Fascism and to bring the conflict in Italy to an end. In a similar way, the friendship between Dulles and Pizzoni in the postwar period did not remain an isolated relationship; it was situated within a precise social and political context: the elitist environment of Wall Street, primarily linked to the US Republican Party and the support of anti-communist values.

As previously stated, the methodology employed to analyze Pizzoni and Dulles' networks in the post-war period differs to that employed for the war years. This distinction can be attributed to two key factors. First, the analysis only considers Pizzoni's perspective. Second, the timeframe of the network analysis is not continuous. Conversely, the graphs that describe Pizzoni's network in the US cover specific periods, which correspond to several business trips that the Italian banker made in the United States in 1949, 1951 and 1953. The duration of these

42 Telegram 585 to Caserta, March 29, in Petersen 2010, p. 486. Aga-Rossi and Smith 2005, pp. 58–63.

43 Granovetter 1982, pp. 105–30.

trips was approximately one month, and new ties were recorded almost daily in Pizzoni's diaries.

The rationale behind the decision to utilize solely Pizzoni's diaries in order to reconstruct his network in the US can be attributed to the historical and biographical context, as well as the nature of the historical sources available. In fact, the end of the war brought about a radical change in the international context, with the emergence of Cold War tensions. Italy was struggling to rebuild and overcome political divisions, with the country home to the most powerful communist party in Western Europe.⁴⁴ Consequently, Pizzoni and Dulles' approach to US-Italian relations underwent a transformation. Dulles' biographers report traces of his continued interest in the Italian case, particularly in relation to the Italian political election of April 1948.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, a cursory examination of Dulles' papers reveals an extremely limited presence of exchanges with the Italians.⁴⁶ His correspondence with Pizzoni represents a notable exception. This is a significant finding in terms of the continuity of wartime collaboration. In the case of Dulles, it was particularly limited, if not exclusive to the case of the relationship with Pizzoni. Moreover, in his postwar activities, which we know to have been extremely wide-ranging due to his apex role in the CIA, no specific attention can be traced to the Italian case. In the absence of such data, Dulles' perspective has not been included in the graphs of this section.

With regard to Pizzoni, his postwar activities were multifaceted. He was appointed President of Credito Italiano in August 1945 and subsequently relinquished his official political commitments. Nevertheless, he remained a prominent figure in the political sphere, albeit unofficially or in a quasi-official capacity. In his correspondence, there are numerous references to his dedication to the Italian reconstruction and the implementation of the Marshall Plan. In addition to his activities at the domestic level, Pizzoni was also engaged in the development of transatlantic relations. Financial relations were undoubtedly his principal domain, but it is also evident that cultural associations and the publishing industry were of great importance in his transatlantic relations. Indeed, Pizzoni was involved in the transatlantic cultural relations contest. He served as the president of the Italian edition of the US magazine *Reader's Digest* from 1948, and was active in various associations aimed at fostering transatlantic relations and cooperation, including the *Associazione Italo Americana* from 1945,

44 Mistry 2014; Formigoni 2016

45 Kinzer 2014, p. 90; Mistry 2014, p. 180.

46 This does not imply that they did not exist. Dulles' personal papers are held at the Princeton University Archive. The informative section of the archival records states that part of Dulles' correspondence, especially in the postwar years, is classified. Pizzoni, Alfredo, 1946 – 1958, Princeton University Library (PUL), Allen W. Dulles Papers, Box 45, Folder 3.

and the World Brotherhood from 1951.⁴⁷ In pursuing all these activities, Pizzoni gave centrality to building ties and consolidating old wartime friendships. It is no coincidence that a folder of his post-war correspondence is entitled: “Correspondence with allied leaders and authorities after the liberation and allied friends”⁴⁸. Nevertheless, this correspondence is somewhat fragmented. Conversely, the diaries of his business trips represent an intriguing source of compact relational data that perfectly aligns with the research question being investigated. Pizzoni’s entire focus during these trips is on establishing connections with American counterparts. He provides references to daily encounters, often with specifics related to the topics covered in conversations. The relational data were therefore extracted in order to construct the ego-networks presented in Figures 8 to 11. As with the graphs pertaining to the war phase, Pizzoni’s networks during his visits to the United States were constructed on the basis of considering each contact between two individuals as a link. However, as only one type of source was utilized in the construction of the graphs, these consisted exclusively of in-person meetings, which were invariably documented in the travel diaries. Each individual meeting was counted as a distinct event; thus, if two individuals attended two different meetings on the same day, they were counted as two distinct contacts.

The analysis of Pizzoni’s network evolution is conducted through a comparison of time slices. However, it should be noted that each graph represents a specific trip, which typically covers a period of a few weeks. In this visualization, time is not represented in a linear manner. Instead, it includes substantial gaps between one graph and the others. Unlike the wartime networks, the post-war networks are neither multi-level nor bimodal. The nodes represent the individuals in Pizzoni’s network during his trips to the United States. This was due to the fact that graphs are used to answer different questions. It was not a priority to understand the institutional relationships that Pizzoni shaped, since he acted on a semi-official basis. He traveled around the United States representing his bank, but in fact his mandate was broader, as we will see. I was interested in understanding what contacts Pizzoni maintained from the war years. In addition,

47 The Associazione Italo-Americana was funded in Milan in 1945 on the initiative of the pharmaceutical entrepreneur Guido Zerilli Marimò. Its aim was to promote cultural relations between Italy and the US. Pizzoni became its treasurer. The World Brotherhood was established in March 1950 through the initiative of the American National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), with the scope of promoting universal values through broad cultural means, encompassing education, science, religion, and communication channels. In the context of the Cold War, the association was linked with anticommunist purposes, and US intelligence vertices, as Dulles himself, were involved. Pizzoni promoted the establishment of the Italian section of the association and became its treasurer. INSMI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 24, Fasc. 74, “Associazioni, circoli, clubs”. Princeton University Library (PUL), Allen W. Dulles Papers, World Brotherhood Organization, box 59, folder 12.

48 INSMI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 20, Fasc. 61, “Corrispondenza con capi e autorità alleate dopo la liberazione e amici alleati”.

I wanted to examine the social groups and clusters in Pizzoni's network in relation to the social backgrounds of the nodes. As the legend indicates, the color of the nodes reflects their membership in a particular group, while their arrangement emphasizes the clusters within the network. Comparing Pizzoni's networks in these three emblematic moments enables us to follow their evolution over the years, and to retrieve both elements of continuity and disparities with the networks of the war years.

Prior to analyzing Pizzoni's networks, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the evolution of his relationship with Dulles from the end of the war to their first post-war meeting in 1949.

At the conclusion of the conflict, Pizzoni was replaced in his capacity as President of the CLNAI by the socialist Rodolfo Morandi.⁴⁹ Pizzoni was dismissed from his position for the same reason he was elected president in the first place: he did not represent any political party.⁵⁰ The Committee's political approach was found to be deeply unsatisfactory by its former president. He was disillusioned by the fact that political parties were mainly preoccupied with internal divisions and the pursuit of power for their factions. Furthermore, he expressed his disquiet at the lack of attention paid by the new leadership to the relations with the Anglo-Americans that he had built up over time.⁵¹ The aforementioned critics remained largely unchanged throughout the subsequent months, even after the formal establishment of the Italian Republic on 2 June 1946.⁵² On 9 August 1945, Pizzoni was appointed president of Credito Italiano, a position that was more ceremonial and honorific than administrative. This afforded him considerable scope for political engagement, in the broadest sense of the term.

It has been observed that in the weeks preceding the conclusion of the conflict in Italy, Dulles concentrated on negotiating the German surrender, with minimal engagement with the antifascists, whom he considered to be already well-established. Following the conclusion of the Italian campaign, Dulles relocated to Germany, where he remained engaged in intelligence work within the Strategic Service Unit (SSU) following the dissolution of the OSS.⁵³ Among the numerous relationships established by Dulles with Italian antifascists, his connection with Pizzoni was one of the few that remained significant in the post-war period. Indeed, Pizzoni continued to cultivate relationships with SOE and OSS agents and

49 Piffer 2005, p. 218. Pizzoni 1993, pp. 167–168.

50 Piffer 2005, pp. 217–218.

51 Pizzoni 1993, p. 83.

52 INSMLI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 20, Fasc. 61, "Corrispondenza con capi e autorità alleate dopo la liberazione e amici alleati".

53 Grose 1994, pp. 248–249.

military leaders even after the war, sowing the seeds of future collaboration that would bear fruit in the years to come.⁵⁴

In the spring of 1946, Pizzoni and Dulles resumed their correspondence, with Pizzoni sending Dulles a rare Italian book as a gift.⁵⁵ The seemingly straightforward act of offering a gesture of courtesy and recognition should be viewed as part of Pizzoni's strategic focus on cultivating human relationships as an important resource. This is not to suggest that Pizzoni acted with a dual motive, or that he sought to establish relationships for personal gain. Nor does it imply insincerity in his gratitude. Rather, Pizzoni's approach should be regarded as a logical investment in and appreciation of relationships, as evidenced by his own reflections recorded in his diaries from both wartime and post-war periods. This meticulous attention enabled Pizzoni to rekindle his relationship with Dulles. The correspondence between the two men exhibited a range of intensities, and their relationship continued until Pizzoni's death in 1958.

Pizzoni's gift arrived to Dulles at a time when he was experiencing a profound sense of nostalgia for the action and adrenaline that had characterized the previous years. Several months before, Dulles had resigned from his position in the US government and returned to his lucrative, though less stimulating, pre-war occupation at the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell.⁵⁶ In September 1945, the Truman administration disbanded the OSS, which had fulfilled its purpose with the conclusion of the conflict. This resulted in the United States being without a centralized intelligence agency. Consequently, Dulles returned to New York and resumed his previous role, expressing profound discontent, as he believed that the United States, in its newly assumed leading role on the international post-war stage, required a structured and centralized intelligence agency even in peacetime. In the early post-war months, against the backdrop of rising tensions with the Soviet Union, which would soon lead to the bipolar conflict between the two superpowers, Dulles engaged in lobbying for the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Meanwhile, Pizzoni took action from his new position as President of Credito Italiano and his seat on the Consulta Nazionale, the assembly that replaced the parliament pending elections, to leverage his international connections and secure favorable peace conditions for Italy.

54 INSMI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 20, Fasc. 61, "Corrispondenza con capi e autorità alleate dopo la liberazione e amici alleati".

55 Dulles to Pizzoni, April 1st, 1946, Princeton University Library (PUL), Allen W. Dulles Papers, Pizzoni, Alfredo, 1946 – 1958, Box 45, folder 3.

56 Kinzer 2014, p. 86.

Their ongoing correspondence and relationship demonstrated a shared understanding of the importance of strategic alliances and mutual interests in navigating the complexities of the postwar world. Both men were aware of the value of maintaining strong international relationships, particularly in a period of significant global political upheaval. From 1948 onwards, the relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni became inextricably linked with the fundamental political issues that were igniting debates in Italy. These issues centered on the development of a relationship between Italy and the United States based on the Marshall Plan, bilateral economic aid, and the construction of a defense perimeter that included Italy, which would make it a part of the Western system.⁵⁷ Pizzoni's primary objective was to convey these matters to both Dulles and his extensive network of contacts in the United States between 1948 and 1949. It was during this period that he undertook his inaugural postwar visit to the United States.

Pizzoni departed for the United States on 22 January 1949.⁵⁸ This trip occurred concurrently with the ongoing deliberations regarding Italy's potential inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance. There are no direct references in Pizzoni's travel diary to any formal or informal assignment linking his mission to New York and Washington with the question of Italy's participation in the emerging Western defense system. However, it is reasonable to assume that Pizzoni sought to leverage his contacts, particularly with senior US military officials he had met during World War II, to gain insight into the US stance on Italy's inclusion in their defense perimeter.⁵⁹ In any case, Pizzoni's trip was primarily a business trip, during which he represented the Credito Italiano. It is therefore unsurprising that the majority of interlocutors were high-level representatives of the US financial and business world (nodes in green in figures 8 to 11). What is of greater interest is that it was in this context that Pizzoni and Dulles were able to re-establish contact with one another. As previously stated, at the time in question, Dulles was employed by Sullivan & Cromwell and possessed extensive connections within the financial sector of Wall Street.⁶⁰

In Figure 8, the labeled nodes represent individuals that Pizzoni had encountered during the war in Italy. The majority of these individuals (11 out of 21) were part of a military and political cluster that Pizzoni encountered in Washington. Several members of the Army-affiliated group (King, Hume, Metcalf, and Bradshaw) have relatively high degree centrality (19), just as the arc connecting them to the Pizzoni node has a relatively high value compared to the other nodes in

57 Smith 1991, pp. 66–73; Nuti 1989, pp. 186–190.

58 Diario di viaggio negli USA, 1949, INSMLI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 25, Fasc. 77, “Relazioni dei miei viaggi all'estero”.

59 Smith 1991, p. 89.

60 Diario di viaggio negli USA, 1949, INSMLI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 25, Fasc. 77, “Relazioni dei miei viaggi all'estero”.




Fig. 8 Trip to the United States, 1949. Pizzoni's ego-network. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight. Labeled nodes correspond to wartime acquaintances.

the graph. Pizzoni's contacts within the military were of particular significance in light of the delicate period during the formation of the Atlantic Pact. Pizzoni seized the opportunity to discuss the matter with his acquaintances, receiving encouraging responses regarding the prospect of Italy's inclusion in the US defensive perimeter. Additionally, he sought to ascertain the likelihood of a future conflict with the USSR.⁶¹ At this stage of the research, it has not been possible to determine what information obtained from his interlocutors Pizzoni conveyed to Italian policymakers and military leaders.

The analysis of Pizzoni's first transatlantic trip suggests that it contributed to the creation of a social substrate within the Wall Street community (nodes in green) which was already becoming intertwined in the process of establishing transatlantic cultural associations with political aims. This process would intensify in the years to come, in parallel with the increasing influence of political warfare operations within the context of US strategy during the Cold War.⁶²

61 Diario di viaggio negli USA, 1949, INSMIL, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 25, Fasc. 77, "Relazioni dei miei viaggi all'estero".

62 Krabbendam and Scott-Smith 2003; Aldrich 1997.

The extent to which Pizzoni's network was intertwined with the transatlantic cultural associationism network can be observed in Figure 9, which refers to the 1951 trip. The nodes that have been labelled are those that were linked to Pizzoni by association; they include nodes that were primarily connected to Pizzoni by association (in purple), as well as nodes that were unconnected to Pizzoni, for various reasons. Although Pizzoni and Dulles did not meet in 1951, they were nevertheless engaged in the same environment, as both were active or connected with associations such as the America-Italy Society or the World Brotherhood.

The reason for the absence of any reference to a meeting between Pizzoni and Dulles in 1951 is not explicitly stated. Furthermore, Dulles is not even mentioned in the diary. It seems that they had not been in communication since 1949. However, it is reasonable to assume that the latter was deeply engaged in his new role as deputy director of the CIA, for which he was appointed on 2 January 1951.⁶³

In comparison to the 1949 trip, the overall characteristics of Pizzoni's network remained largely unchanged. It is notable that there is a continued prevalence of contacts in the financial and business sectors, as well as a notable presence of significant personal connections in the military. Nevertheless, there was a decline in the significance of individuals who joined Pizzoni's network during wartime, accompanied by an intensification of his connections with contacts in international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (in particular with Southard and Cigliana). Outside the financial environment, the relationship with the US military again stands out, although at the individual level we see the emergence of different nodes than in 1949. Indeed, we do not find a quantitatively significant presence of Pizzoni's old friends such as King, Noce and Hume, and instead new acquaintances appear. Finally, as can be seen in Figure 9, the presence in the network of people he knew in Italy during the war is obviously lower than in 1949 (Figure 8).

Looking instead at the formation of clusters at the individual level, Figure 9 confirms the trend observed in 1949 of mostly homogeneous groups in the financial and military environments, instead of a more diverse composition of clusters around the government and IMF environments. Also, compared to the situation in 1949, the network structure is less clustered, with a greater presence of small groups or nodes that are individually connected to Pizzoni.

Dulles's absence from Pizzoni's network was only temporary. By contrast, Pizzoni's relationship with Dulles underwent a significant transformation in 1953. This was closely tied to Dulles's ascension to the role of CIA Director and the

63 Kinzer 2014, p. 97.




Fig. 9 Trip to the United States, 1951. Pizzoni's ego-network. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight. Labeled nodes correspond to wartime acquaintances.




Fig. 10 Trip to the United States, 1951 (2). Pizzoni's ego-network. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight. Labeled nodes correspond to associationism's acquaintances.

change in the US administration following Eisenhower's electoral victory.⁶⁴ At the end of January, the newly inaugurated President of the United States officially appointed Allen Dulles as Director of the CIA, while his brother John Foster was appointed Secretary of State. In his study of the Dulles brothers, historian Stephen Kinzer notes that they shared a similar worldview, viewing the global conflict as an ongoing necessity. History should not be allowed to simply unfold in an unstructured manner; rather, it needed to be shaped in a particular way. Furthermore, it was unprecedented that two brothers should exercise control over the overt and covert aspects of US foreign policy.⁶⁵

In addition to the impact on the role of covert operations within US strategy, Dulles' new position also had consequences for his relationship with Pizzoni. Dulles, Pizzoni, and Eisenhower's psychological warfare advisor, Charles Douglas Jackson, collaborated on an anti-communist propaganda project in Italy, which was realized between 1955 and 1956.

In the autumn of 1953, it is perhaps not coincidental that Pizzoni decided to embark on a new trip to the United States, following the formation of the new government in Italy led by the Christian democrat Giuseppe Pella. An Analysis of Pizzoni's network reveals that during this trip, there are fewer nodes in the financial and economic sphere (Figure 11). This can be hypothesized to be linked to an intent to consolidate significant relationships rather than expand his network. The strength of Pizzoni's connections with the US military remains consistent. The presence of Pizzoni's wartime contacts remains below the levels observed in 1949 (6 in 1953 versus 21 in 1949). However, he did re-establish his connection with Dulles. From the perspective of individual clusters, the graphs enable us to note that on this trip Pizzoni had meetings with representatives of the IMF in a more isolated manner than on previous trips. This was in contrast to previous occasions when they were in more varied groups, which also included representatives of US political institutions and the Italian Embassy. This might be a sign that on his third trip, he was more familiar with such an environment.

64 1953 was a crucial year for the development of the Cold War. In the United States, after the presidential election held on 4 November 1952, Eisenhower, the candidate of the Republican Party, won with 55% of the vote, and with the new year his term of office began. A few weeks later, Stalin died, and was replaced by the collegial leadership that led to the search for an armistice in Korea. In Italy, 1953 was also a year of change, with the end of the De Gasperi era following the June 1953 elections and the formation of the Pella government. As mentioned above, these political changes had important repercussions on the anti-communist strategy in Italy, which took the form of the implementation of the Demagnetize/Clydesdale plan, an action aimed at weakening the communist forces and strengthening the centrist parties. Guasconi 1999, pp. 141–143; Del Pero 1998.

65 Kinzer 2014, p. 103.




Fig. 11 Trip to the United States, 1953. Pizzoni's ego-network. The size of nodes reflects their Degree Centrality. Edge thickness reflects their weight. Labeled nodes correspond to wartime acquaintances.

As he had done in 1949, Pizzoni informed Dulles of his impending arrival.⁶⁶ Dulles responded that Pizzoni was a great friend and that he would be happy to see him.⁶⁷

The two individuals met on two occasions. The initial meeting took place in Dulles' office at the CIA, where the two discussed significant political matters, including the restitution of the city of Trieste to Italy, which had been contested with Yugoslavia and had been internationalized under the terms of the 1947 peace treaty.⁶⁸ The second meeting was much more informal. Dulles extended an invitation to his Italian colleague to dine at the residence of Charles Douglas Jackson, Eisenhower's advisor for Psychological Warfare. Pizzoni accepted the invitation.⁶⁹ That evening, discussions emerged that pertained to a covert propaganda project

66 Pappas to Dulles, September 30, 1953, PUL, Allen W. Dulles Papers, Pizzoni, Alfredo, 1946–1958, Box 45, folder 3.

67 Pappas to Dulles, October 13, 1953, PUL, Allen W. Dulles Papers, Pizzoni, Alfredo, 1946 – 1958, Box 45, folder 3.

68 Diario di viaggio negli USA, 1953, INSMLI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 25, Fasc. 77, “Relazioni dei miei viaggi all'estero”. Giampaolo Valdevit, *La questione di Trieste 1941–1954. Politica internazionale e contesto locale* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1986).

69 Diario di viaggio negli USA, 1953, INSMLI, Fondo Pizzoni, Busta 25, Fasc. 77, “Relazioni dei miei viaggi all'estero”.

with the objective of promoting Western values in Italy. The project involved the participation of Jackson himself, as well as the Italian Selezione of Reader's Digest's executive director Pietro Giordana, with whom Pizzoni was linked due to his role as president of the Italian edition. The project culminated in the publication of a column in a weekly mass magazine, *Bolero*, entitled "Le lettere dello Zio Giuseppe" (The letters of Uncle Giuseppe). In these fictitious missives, the godfather, Giuseppe, dispensed sagacious counsel to his godson about societal norms and occupational conduct. He lauded the liberal and democratic values that post-war Italy had embraced, aligning itself with the Western bloc of the Cold War.⁷⁰

The three graphs relating to Pizzoni's trips to the United States in 1949, 1951, and 1953 make it possible to draw a number of considerations regarding the network he constructed (Figure 8 to 11). Across the three years, Pizzoni's network displays similar characteristics. Although with quantitative differences, in each of his trips he maintained active wartime contacts, especially in the military. The relationship with Dulles, as anticipated, remains quantitatively weak but of great interest due to the position the latter held, at the CIA but also more generally in Wall Street high finance circles. The fact that Pizzoni built his network of post-war US contacts in predominantly the same environment facilitated the evolution and continuity of his relationship with Dulles. The Pizzoni-Dulles relationship can also be considered as an example of the theoretical conceptualization of the "strength of weak ties".⁷¹ This became particularly evident when Dulles connected Pizzoni with Jackson, paving the way for the implementation of the anti-communist propaganda project. In this project, graphs generally fail to highlight qualitatively important relations. If not constantly sided with a qualitative analysis of historical sources, they would risk presenting a distorted reality

Pizzoni's efforts in engaging with key figures in the United States were instrumental in strengthening Italy's position within the Western bloc and ensuring its participation in the emerging security framework. His strategic approach to fostering relationships across various sectors, including politics, finance, and the military, provided Italy with an advantage in navigating the changing geopolitical landscape of the postwar world. Through his network and partnership with Dulles, Pizzoni played a crucial role in aligning Italy with the strategic interests of the United States and its allies.

70 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (EL), Jackson, C. D.: papers, 1931–1967, box 62, Italian project.

71 Granovetter 1982

Conclusion: Time and temporalities in the Pizzoni-Dulles networks

The case of the network surrounding the relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni illustrates that it is indeed possible to delineate a continuity between the relationships that emerged during the war. However, at the same time this continuity, or at least that of which traces remain and which represent politically interesting characters, probably concerns a small number of individuals. Limiting the analysis to Pizzoni's network in establishing relations with the United States, network analysis made it possible to quantify this phenomenon over time. The presence of wartime acquaintances in Pizzoni's postwar network faded over time, but remained qualitatively significant in the case of some individuals, such as Dulles himself. The history of the relationship between Pizzoni and Dulles, and in particular the way in which the two protagonists of this paper built and used their networks of contacts for the development of transatlantic relations, allows us to refer to one of the main themes of the historiographical debate on U.S.-Italian relations, namely the importance of both U.S. and Italian personal initiatives to define that relationship. The relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni can be described as asymmetrical. From what has been reconstructed, it is plausible to believe that Pizzoni considered his relations with his American interlocutors more important than Dulles considered his relations with the Italian antifascists he met during the war. This is evidenced by the fact that Pizzoni made an obvious effort to keep these relations alive, which was not the case for Dulles, whose activity, as has repeatedly been recalled, was broader in scope than Italian relations. The asymmetry in this relationship does not mean, however, that it was the result of an unidirectional interest. In any case, the relationship between Dulles and Pizzoni was dialectical, mutually cultivated, in which both saw political utility, although most of the requests that Pizzoni addressed to his friend Dulles, as well as to his other U.S. interlocutors, often fell on deaf ears.

This project has thus brought to light the fact that the contacts resulting from the anti-fascist struggle had repercussions in the financial context, in which Pizzoni was primarily active, facilitating for example his dialogue at the IMF, or in the military context, to obtain preferential access to information. Pizzoni's actions also played a role in the establishment of cultural relations between Italy and the United States, in some cases linked to a more or less explicit anti-communist propaganda purpose. It is in this area that we can witness the most concrete result of the friendship between Dulles and Pizzoni: "The letters of Uncle Giuseppe". Pizzoni's involvement in transatlantic associationism and his anti-communist propaganda initiative should probably be read in light of his desire to promote his country's interests, which for Pizzoni coincided with building a solid relationship with the United States. In this context, one has to ask what role the anti-communist ideological component played. While it probably played a significant part in Dulles' conception of the role the United States should play on a global scale, by 1948 Pizzoni's attitude does not reflect a view of communism as a danger and an enemy to be defeated. On the contrary, such a view was ex-

plicitly promoted by Pizzoni after the 1948 elections, in his correspondence with his American and British interlocutors, first and foremost Dulles, and then with the propaganda project initiated in 1953 and carried out in 1956 with “The letters of Uncle Giuseppe”. It can be said, however, that Pizzoni’s post-war policy was aimed not so much at fighting communism as establishing a solid relationship with the United States and the Western world in general, and that only in limited episodes did it take on the character of an action aimed at weakening the Italian Communist Party, going so far as to find reductive the widespread view of international relations according to the paradigm of the East-West conflict on the occasion of his last trip to the United States.

In fact, one of the objectives of this project is to bring into the historiographical debate certain elements that have mostly been neglected, such as the political role of Pizzoni and, more generally, of the financial world in the post-war period, as well as to highlight the elements of continuity between wartime and the post-war period.

The construction of the graphs has allowed me to reconstruct the evolution of Pizzoni and Dulles’ relationships in the context of their respective actions to build relations between Italy and the United States during the reference period. The conclusion I draw from this project, as an HNA experiment, is that within the study of the history of international relations, this methodology can prove profoundly useful in understanding complex dynamics that can be read through a relational lens. I believe it is important not to fall into the misconception that HNA involves graph processing and dataset construction at all costs, or that its value ends there. On the contrary, in the case of my work, visualizations and mathematical properties were of relative value as finished products, but of immense value as investigative tools in the operational phase. In particular, the construction of the dataset led me to interrogate the sources and reflect on the relational information within them in a way that influenced the entire work. One of the most useful components of my graphs in developing my thinking concerns the use of attributes to qualitatively distinguish the social groups that make up the networks analyzed. This gave me a clear understanding of the social and political contexts in which Pizzoni and Dulles operated. The properties of nodes and arcs, such as degree centrality and the arcs’ weight, were macroscopically useful in identifying the axes of support in the network, albeit not always extremely meaningful. The reason for this is that I chose not to assign qualitative weight to nodes and arcs, but the quantitative element does not allow us to capture historically relevant relational dynamics, such as the relationship between Pizzoni and Dulles itself. Placing my traditional qualitative analysis in a quantitatively structured context proved to be a successful way to draw out the considerations discussed above. Finally, graphs were essential for tracking the evolution of the Pizzoni and Dulles network over time, albeit with the limitations discussed above.

In light of the project presented here, we can conclude that the wartime and post-war graphs reflect two different approaches to temporality, as far as the relationship between one graph and the other is concerned. While the wartime graphs can be read in continuity, the post-war graphs imply chronological jumps. This choice reflects both the historical reasons related to the context and activity of the two protagonists of the study, and the nature of the sources available. However, the underlying approach to the dimension of time within the individual graphs in its substance remains the same. Each graph, in its synthesis and simplification of reality, traps the relational data extracted from historical sources, which were in fact constructed over several weeks. The dimension of time is thus inevitably squeezed into a still instant, a snapshot. As Claire Lemerrier writes, the comparison between these, one of the simplest but perhaps most immediate methods of dealing with the problem of time in network analysis, plays the part of the passage of time.

However, since within a graph, time also becomes an attribute, or a category of connectedness, I do not exclude the possibility that an alternative visualization of the temporal dimension in the graphs processed could highlight different aspects of the evolution of the Pizzoni and Dulles networks. Dynamic visualizations could also bring added value to the analysis, and surely deserved to be explored. The methodological reflections presented here should therefore be considered as a starting point for future developments of the analysis.

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