

## Towards a New International Order or Towards Chaos

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### Abstract

*This article examines the conditions shaping the new international order, or rather, chaos. The West's global dominance, under the banner of liberal democracy and globalization, which began after the end of the Second World War, is coming to an end with the major gathering in Tianjin, China, on 31 August and 1 September. Donald Trump seems to want to cooperate more with Putin and the Chinese leader than with the EU, from which he is hastening to distance himself amid the EU's current decline. The new American leader is not interested in the rest of the world, but only in America, which he will try to make great again with the help of tariffs. The new international order will be multipolar, dominated by the integrated South, with its own leadership and specifications that will be completely different from those of the West. However, it is doubtful that this new international order, which will no longer be governed by international law, will not lead to chaos, the return of wars and the primacy of force, according to Thucydides.*

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### Introduction

Following Donald Trump's second election as US president, the world is reeling from geopolitical threats that have effectively abolished the old international order without establishing a new one in its place. There is, therefore, justified widespread concern about the form that the new international order will take. But, above all, there is a fear that it will be non-existent, in the form that prevailed after the end of World War II.

However, the shadows surrounding the globe did not arise out of thin air. In reality, it is the result of a long period of decline, brought about by the combination of the West's decline and the rapid rise of its successor, China, to the top of the world (note 1).

In other words, it is a succession of civilizations, each end of an era that occurs approximately every 200 years and is inevitable in the eternal passage of the centuries [Spengler, 1918].

In this long journey, on the one hand, the West, which has held the planetary scepter from the end of World War II to today, and on the other hand, China, which has emerged dynamically in the meantime, have had a constant, complex, and highly destructive relationship. The West considered all non-Western economies to be inferior, unworthy of its attention, and at times even pariahs, dangerous and harboring terrorism.

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But on the part of the countries of the South, there was rapidly growing dissatisfaction with this disparaging attitude of the West towards them, which in 2009 led to the creation of the BRICS [Deneuville, 2025].

The banner of Western supremacy over other countries with a subordinate status has been liberal democracy, immediately after the end of World War II and until today, liberal democracy. It was both a system of international governance and an ideology. In essence, it was this ideology that secured America's hegemony in the world. Through it, America derived the right, but also the obligation, to impose liberal democracy on the rest of the world as the only form of government compatible with capitalism. That is, according to it, with the progress and prosperity of the world. Countries with other forms of government were characterized as pariahs, terrorists, and vagabonds, against whom even wars could be justified in order to secure a better future for their populations.

However, as early as 2018, during his first presidency, Donald Trump expressed doubts about whether the US political system is free or perhaps an "illiberal democracy" [Muller, 2018]. Indeed, since then, Donald Trump has questioned the US's obligation to ensure peace in the West, arguing that countries at risk of conflict should, in the future, either pay the US for its services or take responsibility for their own security [PoLeesen, 2018]. In doing so, he has opened Pandora's box regarding what exactly constitutes the principles of liberal democracy and has indirectly acknowledged China's views that the West lacks democracy, precisely because it insists on imposing the complete transplantation of its own American political system on the rest of the world [Ang, 2018].

Approximately seven years after these views were leaked, they are now being implemented in Trump's second term. At the same time, however, it is becoming clear that the abandonment of liberal democracy, if not replaced by another system/ideology, leaves the world without an international order.

Along with liberal democracy, Trump is also abolishing the freedom of international trade, another stronghold of the West, which has also recently been abandoned to the Chinese Communist Party [Lambert, 2025]. This is because Trump rejected globalization, as he appears convinced that it is a system of international trade that exploits America. He is thus moving towards protectionism, which, according to Trump, promises to make America great again (note 2).

Along with the abolition of globalization and liberal democracy, Trump announced his intention to effectively abolish international law and international organizations (note 3), which he confirmed with actions from the first day of his second term [Woods, 2025]. Among other things, he suspended all US aid missions abroad for 90 days. Furthermore, in early February, he ordered a radical 180-day review of all international organizations in which the United States participates. Even more aggressive moves are expected to follow.

To the extent that the coming changes can be predicted, we are returning to the 19th century, when there were no international law or international organizations. Their role was replaced by diplomacy, but also by power relations. With the return to the nation-state and the need for each country to protect its borders, Thucydides' observation that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" is revived.

These prospects may not be as frightening as they seem at first glance. In the sense that very often, even in the previous international order that is already being abandoned, the existence of international law provided utopian protection to small and weak countries. Moreover, I believe that public law will not be officially and completely abolished, but its effectiveness will be even more limited and even less objective than it is today.

In the main body of my presentation, in both parts, I will try to shed light on what awaits a world that is in danger of moving forward without an international order. Although it is clear, I would like to point out that, because nothing is definitive, some of the assumptions or findings of this paper may, in the course of time, develop differently.

## **1. The World without an International Order**

Numerous scattered pieces are floating around on the international scene, reflecting the desires, intentions, fears, and individual plans of the powerful, which may in the future form some international order. However, for the time being, we can only use our imagination, based on knowledge from the past and assumptions based on various statements made by the powerful in the past and present, to search blindly, hoping to guess the general lines within which some form of future international order will move. Or at least some form of balance of power.

### **1.1. Common characteristics and goals of the new world leaders (which differ from those of the West)**

The new world leaders, invited by the powerful Chinese leader Xi Jinping on September 31-1 this year in Tianjin, and some of them on September 3 at the grand parade in Beijing, have certain common characteristics, some more strongly than others:

\* The first and most important thing they have in common is their deep and long-standing hatred of the West, which has looked down on them and pushed them to the sidelines for years, treating them like second-class citizens because they were not part of liberal democracy. Although not all 20 invited leaders belong to the BRICS, they are nevertheless all part of the "integrated South" in their minds. And they are satisfied with the grandiose appearance of Xi Jinping, who has abandoned his hitherto humble style and is imposing himself as the new world leader [Thibault, 2025]. Sitting in his magnificent car, he surveys the parade of unimaginable power, high technology, and unprecedented size. Among Xi Jinping's intentions is for the BRICS to surpass the G7.

\*The second thing they have in common is that they don't represent or run countries with liberal democracies, but with illiberal ones. What are the differences? In a liberal democracy, there is supposed to be more freedom of individual rights, separation of powers, free elections, and the rule of law, while in an illiberal democracy, these freedoms are limited. I add, however, the word "supposedly" because the ongoing rapid decline in many aspects of the West significantly limits these differences. And let us not overlook the fact that true democracy is currently practiced by a tiny percentage of the world's population.

\*A third common characteristic of these leaders is that they are patriots and are interested in the progress and greatness of their own countries, not in third countries. The Chinese leader, in particular, defines the new international order as a system that guarantees each country's freedom to choose the type of government it desires.

### **1.2. What are the differences between Donald Trump's goals and those of the new non-Western leaders?**

Now, let's take a look at the differences that may separate Donald Trump's goals from those of the new non-Western leaders of the world.

First of all, there is a positive development, namely the lack of differences in terms of the aspirations and governance of the world between the American and non-Western

leaders who suddenly appear at his side as co-rulers. Unfortunately, however, all signs point to this being a utopian hope.

Indeed, as unrealistic as it may seem, the American leader wants to co-govern the world with Putin and Xi Jinping, but without ceasing to compete with China, as this competition is the cornerstone of his policy. It should, of course, be emphasized that Donald Trump admires Putin, that he does not generally dislike dictators, and that he would like to distance himself from the Chinese leader, who, despite his compliments, remains his number one enemy, as he is already dangerously claiming global supremacy (note 4).

However, from what we have seen so far, Putin is not impressed by the honors and positive solutions to the war in Ukraine that Donald Trump is offering him, and he remains inseparable from Xi Jinping [Quenelle & Thibault, 2025]. With Putin, as everything indicates, Donald Trump agrees more than with the Europeans, whom he considers decadent, and this is the main reason why he accepted, behind the EU's back, Putin's basic demands regarding peace in Ukraine, while seeking Russia's reintegration into the G7 and the lifting of sanctions against it [Richard, 2025]. And despite the fact that Donald Trump has abandoned Western ideologies surrounding liberal democracy, it is likely that the courtesies towards Putin date back as far as 1949, when the West had to give Russia certain guarantees for the reunification of the two Germanys in 1980 and its entry into NATO, and which, in Donald Trump's mind, may now be due [Richard, 2025].

Donald Trump, as far as one can conclude from his scattered statements, behaviors, and choices, is not interested in global governance but is focused on his passionate desire to "make America great again," based on economics rather than ideology, and of remaining at the top himself, of course. This means that it is necessary to slow down China's economic progress, especially in terms of new technologies (with an emphasis on semiconductors).

Consequently, the imposition of tariffs by Donald Trump, which so far appears to be the dominant measure of his foreign policy, is mainly aimed at achieving this slowdown and is directed primarily against China. To this end, the US is rushing to increase its investment in new technologies and prevent China from accessing them.

Whether Donald Trump will achieve the desired result, which can be summed up as his attempt to slow down China's rise to the global throne, is a matter of debate and certainly requires ad hoc investigation, which is beyond the scope of this article. For now, and after reminding you that it is never certain in advance whether a tariff war will achieve the desired results, I would add that Donald Trump has so far achieved some significant results from the imposition of tariffs. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the independent fiscal watchdog in the US, estimated in June that the increase in revenue based on the new tariffs imposed by the US between January 6 and May 13, 2025, is expected to reduce the cumulative US public debt by \$2.5 trillion over the decade to 2035 [Chu, 2025]. Despite the parallel losses in working hours and growth rate, the projected significant reduction in US public debt is considered extremely important for ensuring the continued status of the dollar as an international reserve currency. On the other hand, relevant information suggests that China has also rapidly implemented measures that significantly reduce its dependence on US imports and exports.

In addition to the coalition government with Putin and Xi Jinping, which Donald Trump seems to want in principle, without specifying its content at this stage, diplomacy is already being added to the mix. Donald Trump focused on this before his second election in order to use it against China, with the main goal of avoiding war. For the time being, the main diplomatic objective seems to be to unite the countries of Asia that surround China and

are not friendly towards it. The US will try to rekindle these countries' antagonism towards China in an effort to limit its options for war [Mitchell, 2025].

### **1.3. And how will they govern?**

This basically concerns Trump and Putin, as Jinping clearly plays a very important role in developments, but remains somewhat in the shadows, as Donald Trump acts as a brake on his intentions and, contrary to appearances, remains his enemy. Of course, the Chinese leader's moves are crucial and can make it hard or even impossible for Donald Trump to reach his goals. As an example, I would mention the negative effect of Donald Trump's behavior towards the EU, which he ignores and seems to have made his enemy, and his intention to cooperate with China. But also, his attitude towards India, which was dissatisfied with the imposition of high tariffs against it, and, it seems, has also turned against Donald Trump and in favor of China.

But how many and who will rule the world in the immediate future? And how will they govern it?

As everything indicates, there will be several, but with different degrees of influence on the course of events. Three key figures in future developments are Trump, Putin, and Jinping. The EU, as everything indicates, will have no say in development; it will be a moon, but it is not clear to which of the three. The same seems to apply to the Middle East, which is currently facing its thorny problems.

However, these three leaders not only do not have the same interests and goals as leaders of the world, but they are also at odds on several key issues. Let's start with Donald Trump.

#### *\* Donald Trump*

The American leader is interested, as he himself claims, primarily only in the economy, which he hopes to keep America at the top for a few more years through tariffs. For the time being, he seems to want to avoid war. He is linked to Xi by a kind of camaraderie. He does not seem interested in creating a new international order reminiscent of the one that was destroyed, because he is focused on national profit. Carried away, obviously, by the content of the nation-state, which is opposed to globalization, Donald Trump seems to have embraced the view that he does not need allies [Brands, 2025]. This cannot be correct.

It should also be made abundantly clear that Donald Trump completely separates his position from the previous and long-standing policy of the US, which was based on the ideology of liberal democracy, with a large dose of hypocrisy, unfortunately, in its implementation. He is replacing it with force, with Thucydides' relevant thoughts under his pillow. Moreover, Donald Trump is fully aware of the feelings of his two counterparts towards him, as evidenced by the congratulatory message he sent to the Tianjin gathering, to which he was not invited, although he would have very much liked to attend. Donald Trump wrote the following message to Xi Jinping to congratulate him: "Please convey my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un as you conspire against the United States" [Kempe, 2025].

In the modern geopolitical scene, the balance of power is constantly shifting as the leaders of the world's major powers shape the future with their choices and strategies and impose them on smaller and weaker countries.

Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping are at the center of these developments, with their alliances, their confrontations, and their basic goal of strengthening

their influence on the globe. The interplay of their interests and the quest for dominance creates a complex web of relationships that determines the prospects for world peace, economic growth, and stability or chaos.

*\*Vladimir Putin*

While, as his statements suggest, Donald Trump has abandoned the ideological values of the West, Putin, on the contrary, seems to be moving respectfully towards his own. These clearly differ from Western values and can be summarized as follows. His vision is to unite the Slavic and Orthodox worlds. I believe this is a theoretical desire, even though Putin is in favor of power and war whenever necessary. The EU cites these general principles and Putin's preferences as an excuse and rushes to militarize (with inexcusable delay, of course) in anticipation of Putin's attack.

Regarding the possibility of coexistence and cooperation with Donald Trump for the governance of the world, the various aspects of the problem do not seem to be able to come together as a unified whole. Firstly, there is the rejection of Russia by the West after World War II, when those in power at the time considered themselves to belong to it. Since then, there has been a series of offensive behaviors by the West, which one could say that those involved were constantly looking for opportunities to diminish Russia. And it is the war in Ukraine, in which case, although Russia's attack against it is reprehensible, rather than seeking mitigating circumstances, I would wish for greater recognition of responsibility on the part of the West for the causes that led to it. The West's unacceptable statements against Putin, as well as the serious and long-standing preoccupation of its leaders with how to destroy him, have opened an unbridgeable gap between them. This gap cannot be bridged, even by Donald Trump's extremely tolerant and indeed friendly attitude towards him.

But beyond this very serious problem, which prevents sincere cooperation with Donald Trump on global governance, there is another significant obstacle to its success. This is Putin's great dependence on the Chinese leader, which precludes the possibility of Putin making independent decisions.

Consequently, it is the two of them against Donald Trump.

*\*Xi Jinping*

The Chinese leader no longer hides his intentions, because he believes he is very close to achieving them, but also because he is not afraid that they might be thwarted. He proudly displays Beijing's military power with the parade on September 3. He no longer bows his head to the West, which emphasizes and proclaims its progressive decline in all directions. It is taking measures, as far as possible, to ensure that Donald Trump's tariffs hinder China's continued economic and technological rise as little as possible, and it wishes for peace so that its goals may be achieved. These goals are diametrically opposed to those of Donald Trump, who insists on remaining at the top of the world, while Xi Jinping is working to displace him. And while Donald Trump is not interested in securing alliances or seeking impossible alliances, such as with Putin, Xi Jinping, in addition to Putin, has both the BRICS and the SCO (note 5) on his side. Let me remind you that the ever-growing number of BRICS and SCO members includes countries with different preferences and interests, but all of them, albeit to varying degrees, are turning against the West. Donald Trump's behavior, in general, and in particular his imposition of tariffs against them, is turning more and more members against the US with increasing anger. His message regarding his style of governance focuses on the need to depart from Western principles and values and on his attempt to impose China as a pole of stability in an unstable environment [Kempe, 2025].

As a partial conclusion to the first section, it seems necessary to acknowledge the disappointing and frightening realization that the world will henceforth proceed in a state of disorder, with tariffs creating an environment of constant conflict. At the same time, despite the Chinese leader's desire to create a new order that is fairer and more friendly to all, there are still many difficulties. Among other things, several Asian countries do not seem to want Xi Jinping to govern the world. Furthermore, Europe, which was not present in Tianjin, does not seem to have decided which direction to take [The Economist, 2025].

In the next section, I will attempt to outline the consequences of this global disorder.

## **2. The Consequences of the Collapse of the International Order**

The world is entering uncharted waters without American leadership. This is the view of Robert Kagan [2023], who describes the new world as a return to the jungle. Donald Trump now realizes that he must do something for America, focusing on the economy. And he seems convinced that while America was ensuring security in the world, it was being exploited by other powers [Farrel & Newman, 2025]. That is why he refuses to continue in the same direction and has opted for selective, obvious isolation.

The pressing question now is whether peace can continue (Note 4) to the extent that it was ensured until recently, even without the "regional hegemon" of recent decades. Or whether, on the contrary, war is looming. According to John Mearsheimer's basic theory [2003], states seek to maximize their power over their rivals at every opportunity. This means that "neither the international institutional framework, nor globalization, nor the theory of democratic peace are sufficient analytical tools for understanding and explaining international events" [Mearsheimer, 2003]. Peace is guaranteed as long as the "regional hegemon," which for the last 80 years or so has been the United States, is not threatened by any other power. But it is already under threat, and increasingly so. Indeed, in recent years, China has been developing economically and militarily and is already competing with the US in its role as peacemaker.

In the already looming anarchy, with Donald Trump's behavior officially refusing to continue the US's peacemaking role (Note 5), it is important to emphasize the role played by the decline of globalization and the resurgence of the importance of the nation-state.

We are, therefore, on the verge of a period of intensified international anarchy (Note 6), and although the specific consequences cannot be predicted, it is nevertheless possible to attempt to explore, on the basis of current or emerging developments, what the future holds for us. The basic assumption behind this endeavor is that a return to the international order that has prevailed until now is out of the question. What might the successor situations be?

### **2.1. The dawn of a new international order**

The Tianjin summit is likely to herald a new international order that will be directed against the West and represent the "integrated South." It will bring together the BRICS countries, whose latest developments, with Trump's tariffs, are increasing the degree of cohesion among their members, starting with India, which in the past was quite closely linked to the United States. The very important presence of the BRICS in Tianjin is complemented by the OCS, a relative of the BRICS, with several members already and the same specifications, which will co-govern the globe, while obeying the big and powerful. The presence of Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General, also came as a surprise,

formalizing, in a way, the gathering there, but also its representation at the UN [Thibault, 2025].

The Chinese leader certainly wants to take over the governance of the world, with all his followers, who are now multiplying. For the time being, however, there are a host of unanswered questions about what this leadership will look like, whether there will be conflicts, how serious they will be, and what the West's position will be. Furthermore, and most importantly, how Donald Trump will co-govern, if he does.

With regard to the West, it is worth mentioning the parallel gathering in Paris of 30 democratic leaders, who spontaneously attended to show their support for Ukraine. The gathering was not only attended by European leaders, but also by Japan, Canada, and Australia. Donald Trump's absence should be considered more striking in the case of the gathering in Paris than in Tianjin.

It is reasonable to ask whether these 30 Western leaders will claim a share of global governance without the Western leader who, until recently, was with them. It must be considered certain that it is leaning towards the powerful and does not want to hear anything about the EU, except for the fulfillment of its commitments to militarize itself, increasing the cost from 2%, as it has been until now, to 5% of its GDP. The EU's subservience has reached the point where it has committed itself to the US for investments worth €600 billion, which it then admitted it does not have (Note 7).

If, in the end, a system similar to the one described above prevails, the question arises as to whether it will be unipolar or multipolar, and even whether it will be generally accepted or whether it will operate in an environment of tension. The answers to these questions are neither easy nor, above all, certain. At the risk of giving a risky answer, I would argue that it will be essentially unipolar, but officially multipolar. This is on the condition that Donald Trump does not develop an interest in the tariff program as it evolves according to his wishes, that the EU does not become dangerously active, and that the BRICS and SCO do not intensify their differences. As for Putin, who will be the Chinese leader's right-hand man, no disagreements between them are expected. However, despite these theoretical predictions, the system will be unstable, mainly because it will not yet have a solid foundation and will therefore be open to all kinds of destabilizing developments, as well as threats of military conflict. It goes without saying that, despite the reassuring assurances of Xi Jinping and those around him, the consequences of his governance are unpredictable.

## **2.2. The emergence of a multipolar system**

In the highly unstable environment that humanity is currently experiencing, there are, in theory, many solutions, regardless of whether they will be effective. Therefore, the possibility of multipolar systems should not be ruled out in advance. The old international order is not coming back. But something similar is being sought to replace it.

I will refer to one of the many relevant possibilities in this category, which is already being proposed, among others, as a feasible solution [Froman, 2025].

This is the possibility for states to participate in one or more cooperation networks. Certainly, this system risks being less effective than the previous one, but it is hoped that it will be able to prevent chaos, even though there will be no comprehensive international order.

The existence of such a system, which regulates international transactions to a certain extent, is based on the belief that, despite the risks and some negative consequences,

its complete absence leads to significant and possibly insurmountable problems in international trade, and therefore substitutes are sought.

These coalitions will certainly have less scope than the former general international order and will aim, as far as possible, at the peaceful settlement of specific problems of international trade. Such coalitions will lay the foundations for the necessary mechanisms for free trade, or as coalitions that will impose restrictive conditions on trade for the sake of protecting national security, and that will aim to limit, as far as possible, the chaos caused by the lack of rules governing international trade.

Summarizing the abolition of the rules of the international order, we should note that the WTO had been dysfunctional for years, long before Donald Trump, and indeed with the agreement of both Democrats and Republicans. The complete absence of regulation of international trade, combined with the imposition of tariffs, which are the highest in a century, by Donald Trump, poses serious risks to the international economy, including, among others, a restriction of trade, a decline in growth, uncertainty in trade, and reduced productivity. According to Donald Trump, however, free trade is responsible for the drastic reduction in jobs in the US. However, recent studies conclude that new technologies are responsible for 88% of job losses in the American industrial sector, and international trade for only 12% [Froman, 2025].

The restructuring of the international order is not being attempted for the first time with Donald Trump, but for the third time, with America always playing a leading role in its efforts to serve its interests better. The first time was in 1944, when America imposed the Bretton Woods monetary system on the world, with the dollar at its center. The second was with Nixon's abolition of Bretton Woods. And the third, by Donald Trump, which, unlike the previous two, was sweeping. It left nothing standing [Adeyemo & Joffer, 2025].

### **2.3. The return of war [Hathaway et al., 2025]**

The destruction of the international order, which had regulated developments in the world for about 80 years, was announced by Donald Trump as soon as he took office for his second term. In a tone that was not entirely serious, it is true, he declared his desire to take over Greenland and the Panama Canal. He then made himself clearer, announcing the end of the US's role as guardian. In other words, he announced humanity's return to chaos, or more accurately, to the interests of the powerful.

As expected, these statements by the US president created insecurity and concern around the world, as we return to the 20th century, when war was the accepted way of resolving disputes between different states. And, therefore, it was perfectly acceptable for more powerful countries to conquer other countries or parts of them. Wars were a means of acquiring wealth and power.

International agreements such as the Aristide-Briand Pact of 1927, which completely prohibited war, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, signed by 58 states at the time, attempted to set limits on this absolute lawlessness.

However, these efforts to ban war as a means of resolving disputes between countries were ridiculed with the outbreak of World War II. After its end, the peacemakers returned, and in 1945, the UN Charter was signed, prohibiting the threat and use of force against the territorial integrity of another country. This new effort to abolish wars has been quite successful, since in the 65 years since its signing, the wars that have taken place on the globe have been only 6% of those that occurred before the UN Charter came into force. It

could be argued that the significant growth of international trade, despite its problems, has largely replaced wars in the pursuit of wealth and power.

Certainly, these conditions did not eliminate wars, but they must be acknowledged as having limited them to a very significant degree. At the same time, however, a climate of hypocrisy and discrimination developed in the ways in which they were dealt with. I would mention, by way of example, the US war against Vietnam and the invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, there is the application of double standards, on the one hand, with the international community's indifference to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus for 50 years, and on the other hand, the widespread outcry and condemnation of Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. However, with the new world leader, the response to Ukraine has changed radically, since in April 2025, Donald Trump threatened Zelenski that if he did not agree to cede 20% of his country's territory to Russia in order to achieve peace, he risked losing his entire country [Froman, 2025].

### **General Conclusion**

The new picture of the world seems frightening, especially for the smaller and weaker countries of the planet, which no longer seem to have even the utopia of protection from above.

But is the new situation really so frightening? Is it really so hopeless that it justifies the frenzied resort to the militarization of the world? Or, beneath this threat, particularly in the case of the panicked EU, which has decided to endure several years of even stricter austerity than that imposed by the Stability Pact, is there a shadow of vested interests?

The risk of attacks, from country to country, is clearly greater now than before. However, the fact that the new world leader is primarily interested in reducing America's trade deficit, combined with the fact that approximately 50% of European military equipment has come from the US in recent years, may partly explain some of the EU's panic about a possible Russian invasion.

Of course, there will be a new international order, very different from the previous one, but probably not as frightening as total chaos. Donald Trump both wants and does not want to cooperate with the two world leaders, Russia and China. But let's assume that there will be some form of cooperation, even if only from a distance. If so, always assuming, they will form a "specter" of a new international order, in which there will be no apparent competition, but conspiratorial relations, since Xi Jinping will remain Donald Trump's enemy. And, thanks to this kind of strange cooperation, the American leader hopes to secure conditions of security and peace in the world. The rather frequent contacts between the American and Russian leaders in recent times refer to the identification and emphasis of common points that bring them closer together. Such as, for example, that both countries fought against the Nazis. That both love their countries and that cooperation between them could prove very positive. Such as the future possibility of coexisting in NATO without hindering the realization of their respective aspirations. And it must be taken for granted that Donald Trump admires the other two leaders and prefers to coexist with them rather than with the Europeans. As for the Chinese leader, he clearly does not want, and is not ready for, World War III.

All of the above, of course, cannot alleviate our reasonable concerns about the developments that may result from the total destruction of the previous international order.

But, in any case, there is hope, which, however, if chaos prevails, will unfortunately prove to be false.

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### Notes

(Note 1) In my 2018 book, I argued that China would soon replace the US as the world's leading power and that, in my opinion, this was an irreversible development, unless a Third World War intervened. My argument was twofold. First, China's spectacular economic growth, which is unprecedented in global economic history, and which, moreover, was the only country in the world that managed to combine capitalism and communism successfully. And second, the decline of the West, which is already taking on nightmarish proportions, as the main reason for its loss of global primacy. Developments, in general, were as I recorded them in my relevant book, although the upheavals I had predicted prevailed more quickly than I had initially estimated. However, my predictions at the time were initially met with skepticism by a number of economists.

(Note 2) What is certain is that globalization decisively accelerated China's rise to the top of the world.

(Note 3) What remained of it, of course, beyond the "fantasy" of its existence.

(Note 4) It should be noted that at this point, Trump is following US policy since 1922, whose primary goal is to prevent the emergence of a competitor.

(Note 5) The SCO, or Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is an intergovernmental organization consisting of 10 member countries: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its goal is to promote peace, security, and economic and political cooperation among member states, addressing issues such as terrorism, separatism, and organized crime, and promoting a more democratic international order. The organization also has observer states and numerous dialogue partners, further expanding its regional and global influence, as well as promoting a new, more democratic, fair, and rational international political and economic order.

(Note 4) To the limited extent, of course, that it existed with American hegemony, which no longer exists.

(Note 5) Although, it should be noted, this was quite controversial, but also selective, as there was no shortage of wars, with mainly ideological justifications, during the long period of US dominance.

(Note 6) Which never ceased to exist, but let's say it was partially controlled.

(Note 7) Banking News 28/07/2025.