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DID JESUS NEED THE SPIRIT? AN APPEAL FOR PNEUMATIC CHRISTOLOGY TO INFORM CHRISTOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

CHRISTA L. MCKIRLAND*

Carey Baptist College

ABSTRACT. A central claim of the Christian faith is that Jesus is not only fully human (and fully God), but that he reveals true humanity to us. This requires that all of our anthropologies, in some way, ground themselves in Christology, providing a 'Christological anthropology'. Consequently, any Christological anthropology requires some formulation of Christology proper. In light of this, the main contention of the present paper is that one cannot adequately formulate a Christological *anthropology* without including a *pneumatic* Christology. The justification for this necessity can be articulated through the concept of fundamental need. The incarnate Logos, Jesus of Nazareth, fundamentally needed the Spirit in the same way that all human persons fundamentally need the Spirit. 'Fundamental need', as a technical concept, can help to clarify both the continuity and discontinuity between Jesus' likeness to all humanity. This does not collapse the 'who' of the incarnation into the many 'who's' of humanity since the incarnate Logos always possessed this Spirit as his own Spirit of Sonship, as opposed to how non-divinely hypostasized human persons must receive the Spirit of Sonship by adoption. The distinctiveness and similarity between Jesus and all of humanity can be most clearly seen by paying special attention to the difference between incarnation and indwelling. Thus, by examining incarnation and indwelling, as well as introducing fundamental need into theological discourse, the significance of the Spirit for informing both Christology and anthropology will be made clear.

KEYWORDS: Christological Anthropology, Theological Anthropology, Spirit Christology, Christology, Fundamental Need

Introduction

A central claim of the Christian faith is that Jesus is not only fully human (and fully God), but that he reveals true humanity to us. This requires that all of our anthropologies, in some way, ground themselves in Christology, providing a 'Christological anthropology'. Consequently, any Christological anthropology requires some formulation of Christology proper. In light of this, the main contention of the present paper is that one cannot adequately

* CHRISTA L. MCKIRLAND (PhD 2018, University of St Andrews) is Lecturer in Theology at Carey Baptist College in Auckland, New Zealand. She is grateful to the John Templeton Foundation for the funding to work on this paper as well as the Logos Institute for allowing her to workshop these ideas. Email: christa.mckirland@carey.ac.nz.

formulate a Christological *anthropology* without including a *pneumatic* Christology. The justification for this necessity can be articulated through the concept of fundamental need. The incarnate Logos, Jesus of Nazareth, fundamentally needed the Spirit in the same way that all human persons fundamentally need the Spirit. In other words, he needed to depend upon the Spirit in his daily life just as we do. This does not collapse the 'who' of the incarnation into the many 'who's' of humanity since the incarnate Logos always possessed this Spirit as his own Spirit of Sonship, as opposed to how non-divinely hypostasized human persons must receive the Spirit of Sonship by adoption. According to the pneumatic Christology endorsed here, Jesus both received and gave the Spirit, embodying the eternal reciprocity of the Logos and Spirit, which is also shared with the Father.

In contrast, the Christian tradition has tended to see pneumatology as a function of Christology (Badcock 1997: 2). Roughly, this means starting with thinking of Christology by thinking about the 'pre-existent Son' and his relations within the Godhead from all eternity. The manner in which these eternal relations are sorted then becomes the control for how the biblical accounts are read, especially regarding how Jesus and the Spirit relate to one another. The Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, primarily comes 'after' the sending and doing of the other trinitarian persons. Thus, the role of the Spirit in Jesus' life is emphasized in the same way—proceeding from the Word. As a historical gloss, this view will be called 'Logos Christology', and has been the dominant view (Crittenden 2018: 317-8). Logos Christology stands in contrast with Spirit Christologies which focus on Jesus of Nazareth as the New Testament presents him in order to understand Christology and even the Trinity (Habets 2010: 29). One version of Spirit Christology, here called 'pneumatic Christology', can helpfully clarify Jesus' real dependence on the Spirit while Logos Christology, when properly applied, can helpfully clarify Jesus' divine-human personhood and its metaphysical composition. Logos Christology and pneumatic Christology thus become complementary perspectives on the same person, and when held together, provide a richer Christology and a clearer connection to anthropology.

At the same time, the relationship between Christology and anthropology is a tricky one. While Jesus is fully human, he is not merely human, and this distinction makes for careful sailing in the waters of Christology proper. In light of Jesus' unique personhood, it would seem that Jesus had access to the Spirit in a unique way from other humans. Yet, this does not necessarily negate the fundamentality of his need for this Spirit. Furthermore, as the original after whom all humanity is patterned, Jesus' intended need for the Spirit entails humanity's need for the Spirit. Historically, this fundamental need for Jesus' reliance upon the Spirit has been largely obfuscated in the theological

tradition as Logos Christology, especially in the West, has dominated the Christological landscape. This paper appeals for a pneumatic corrective.

Moving forward, I assume that Jesus is indwelt by the Spirit without measure and typifies what it means to be human, thus strengthening existent Christological anthropologies. Since Jesus reveals the fullest expression of what it means to be human, his human need for the Holy Spirit must be actual. In order to argue this claim, I proceed in three parts. First, the pneumatic Christology advocated here is clearly defined and its historical trajectory (as well as its suppression) briefly mapped. Second, the continuity and discontinuity between Jesus' Spirit of Sonship and the invitation for humanity to become adopted into the family of which he is 'firstborn', is explored by attending to the difference between incarnation and indwelling. Indwelling is here understood as the most intimate divine-human relation that humans can experience on this side of the eschaton. Ultimately, union with God is the most fundamental end of human beings and whether this union requires indwelling in the eschaton is entirely speculative. What does seem to be the case is that whatever the mode of union between humans and God, it is no less intimate than what indwelling allows in this present age. As this indwelling mode of union seems epitomized in Jesus, it is the focus of this paper. Third, the concept of fundamental need is introduced to make sense of the continuity of reliance on the Spirit between the humanness of the incarnate Son and the humanness of all human beings, since Jesus himself needs the same Spirit that we do.

Spirit Christology: Definition and History

To begin with a clarification, how 'Spirit Christology' has been used in theology is varied, and it is in light of this varied use that the phrase 'pneumatic Christology' will be used for the position advocated here. Typically, Spirit Christology comes in three broad varieties. In its most extreme form, Spirit Christology supposes the divine element within the incarnate Son to be the Spirit itself. This divine element is accidental to Jesus of Nazareth and not essential to him. Such a Spirit Christology would therefore constitute a replacement of Logos Christology. This view denies the Trinity since there is only the Father and Son/Spirit. However, in its less extreme and conciliar form, it means the 'reciprocal relationship between the Spirit and Jesus' and stands alongside Logos Christology (Habets 2010: 4). The Trinity is maintained, as well as the full divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. This is the view advocated in this paper: pneumatic Christology. Finally, in its weakest form, Spirit Christology views Jesus as being merely human, but so exemplary that the Father anointed him with the Spirit and adopted him as his Son (Habets 2010: 57). He was not always divine but became so at some point subsequent to his birth. This form of Spirit Christology denies the Trinity and

Jesus' eternal divinity. Thus, we see *replacement Spirit Christology*, *pneumatic Christology*, and *adoptionist Christology*. While pneumatic Christology is entirely consonant with Chalcedon, it was not well-integrated with the Christology proper of early Christian thinkers. For instance, in view of the need to defend the deity of Christ, the early Christian community latched onto the importance of the Logos, especially from John's Gospel, in the work of Justin the Martyr (Habets 2010: 57). According to a brief history in Gary Badcock's theology of the Holy Spirit, Justin needed to argue against the charges that Christianity was superstitious and barbaric. To do this, his central claim was that the true Reason (the Logos) of God was made known to humanity (Badcock 1997: 38; Cf. McGrath 2016: 216). Furthermore, to argue the supremacy of this Logos as revealed in Christ, Justin argued that Jesus had no need of the Spirit, but that the Spirit's anointing was purely for humanity's sake that we might see that Jesus was more than a carpenter (Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho the Jew*, Dialogue 87-88). For Justin, the Spirit added nothing to Jesus' 'consciousness of God or to his intrinsic power, for as the Logos he possessed all of this and the Spirit, too, from birth' (Badcock 1997: 38). Thus, the primary role of the Spirit was to provide support to the work of the Logos. Consequently, Jesus' divinity was magnified, but his human need for, and reliance on the Spirit was minimized.

Historically, not only was there a positive focus on the Logos, there was also a negative focus on the Spirit due to misconceptions as to the role of the Spirit in Jesus' life. For instance, the adoptionist Christology of a Jewish sect known as the Ebionites (as best as can be determined based on reconstructing their theology) held that due to Jesus' obedience to the Law, he was anointed to become the Messiah by the Spirit at his baptism, becoming adopted as God's Son (Badcock 1997: 39; Cf. McGrath 2016: 233). Such a view magnified Jesus' humanity while denying his eternal divinity.

In the Gentile world, this adoptionist Christology also surfaced in the writings of Theodotus who was active in Rome around 190, and Paul, bishop of Samosata from around 260 to 268 (Badcock 1997: 40). For both of these thinkers, they were concerned that the dominant Logos Christology 'left insufficient room for the biblical theme of the messianic anointing of Christ' (Badcock 1997: 40). Also, the idea that God would become incarnate was reprehensible since it impugned divine transcendence. Instead, the thought that God might influence a human being through the Spirit was far more palatable to Greek sensibilities than the radical view of an incarnation (Badcock 1997: 40). The thought that God might influence a human being through the Spirit was far more palatable to Greek sensibilities than the radical view of an incarnation (Badcock 1997: 40). Like the Ebionites, this adoptionist view magnified Jesus' Spirit-anointed humanity but denied his divinity.

Badcock comments on the significance of this adoptionist Christology for the development of any orthodox form of Spirit Christology:

> One of the most unfortunate things to happen in the history of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit occurred as an indirect result of the expulsion of the likes of Theodotus and Paul of Samosata from the church and the proscription of their views. The exclusion of their versions of Spirit christology in favor of the emerging Logos christology amounted to a deliberate choice of Logos christology rather than Spirit christology, which meant that subsequent attempts to develop the pneumatological aspects of christology would inevitably be regarded as suspect (Badcock 1997: 40).

Later, under Nestorius, the role of the Spirit was magnified again to the point of leading to an adoptionist Christology, which was condemned at the Council of Ephesus in 431 (Habets 2010: 77; Cf. Crittenden 2018: 319-20). 'Nestorianism' became the term for the heresy that Christ was really two persons, one human and one divine. Under this view, it was also held that Christ required the Spirit to fulfil his saving work thereby confusing his incarnation as a divine person with his need for the indwelling of the Spirit for his human operations. However, such reliance on the Spirit was not (and potentially, could not be) disentangled from the rest of Nestorius' views. One entanglement was a lack of recognition that incarnation and indwelling are two different things, but that they can also happen to the same person (Leidenhag, Mullins 2018: 196). Thus, echoing some of Justin's thoughts, Cyril of Alexandria's ninth anathema against Nestorius made affirming a pneumatic Christology difficult as it sought to affirm the incarnation but made this seemingly incompatible with indwelling. This anathema does not make it impossible to affirm a pneumatic Christology, however, and will be taken up again in the next section. In the meantime, the challenge such an anathema posed to those wanting to affirm Jesus' actual reliance on the Spirit as a separate, though inseparable person from the incarnate Logos, is clear. Such a challenge was exacerbated by the swing of the pendulum to replacement Spirit Christology.

The replacement Spirit Christology wherein the divinity of Jesus was actually understood to *be* the Spirit was also problematic. Thinkers such as Lactantius, Tertullian, and to a lesser extent, Hippolytus and Cyprian held this view (Habets 2010: 57). As mentioned above, this replacement Spirit Christology collapses the second and third persons of the Trinity into one another in such a way that this entity is not consubstantial with the Father. Additionally, it fails to recognize the distinct personhood and agency of the Holy Spirit.

As the understanding of the Holy Spirit as a member of the Trinity became more developed, pneumatic Christology faded into the background due to the fear of either replacing the Logos with the Spirit or advancing a mere

adoptionist Christology. Since the Spirit Christologies being advocated in these early years of the church's existence vacillated between these two extremes, a properly pneumatic Christology never came to be the consensus view. However, there were still Christian thinkers who wanted to keep a Logos Christology and a pneumatic Christology bound together in such a way that maintained the deity of Christ while also seeing his humanity as fully human and reliant on the Spirit. This was especially true in the Christologies of Irenaeus, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians (Habets 2010: 54, 69, 76). Habets notes that these thinkers continued to develop a Logos Christology while 'retaining a very real place for the Holy Spirit and indeed a very crucial counterbalance to the excesses of mediatorial Logos Christology, by using an implicit Spirit Christology' (Habets 2010: 6, 9). Irenaeus, for instance, recognized the Spirit as the Wisdom of the Old Testament over against Origen, Tertullian, and Novatian who associated this exclusively with the Son (Briggman 2012: 209-10). Irenaeus relied heavily on the Jewish traditions for his understanding of the Holy Spirit as opposed to relying on Hellenistic categories of the Logos to ground his Christology (Briggman 2012: 214-15; Cf. Heron 1983: 65). Much later, Ambrose would stand out in the theological tradition *vis-à-vis* understanding the Spirit as central to the entire economy of salvation (Badcock 1997: 66). He does this by seeing that not only did the Father give the Son, but the Spirit also gave the Son as 'the Spirit that rests upon Christ also leads him in his mission' (Ambrose 1.12; referenced in Badcock 1997: 65).

Unfortunately, for the Western tradition, an exclusive Logos Christology became the dominant view. This dominance was reinforced by work on the doctrine of the Trinity, especially by Augustine. For Augustine, the Spirit is the bond of love between the Father and Son. Consequently, the idea of the Spirit's personhood, agency, and distinctiveness became difficult to discern (Badcock 1997: 74, 78).

Later, after the Reformation, the Spirit's role was to confirm the significance of the Word. Thus, the preaching of the Word became the precondition for the work of the Spirit (Badcock 1997: 80). While many of the Reformers also sought to remain conciliar, at least through Chalcedon, they also understood Chalcedon as promoting a Logos Christology, starting with Christ's deity and then trying to fit 'the (problem of his) humanity into the divinity' (Habets 2010: 87; Cf. Crittenden 2018: 319). However, as Ian McFarland argues, this is only one interpretation of Chalcedon. In McFarland's concern over replacement Spirit Christologies, he argues for a 'pneumatic Chalcedonianism', which he sees as maintaining the role of the Spirit in understanding Jesus' humanity holistically. This notion will be explored further in the next section (McFarland 2014: 144).

In summary, the extremes of replacement Spirit Christology and adoptionist Christologies are not the only options for re-integrating the Spirit into Christology. While theologians disagree as to how a pneumatic Christology actually functions, the fact remains that it has precedent in the theological tradition. More to the point, present-day advocates for pneumatic Christology see this view as having greater scriptural support than its exclusive Logos Christology counterpart (Badcock 1997: 45; Weinandy 2011: 26; Turner 2002: 169; Yarnold 1966: 26; Turner 1975: 56-70; Turner 2002: 167-86; Fee 1994; Strauss 2012: 276). Pneumatic Christology is better able to account for the continuity between Jesus' need for the Spirit and common human persons' need for the Spirit, whereas Logos Christology is helpful for determining Jesus' metaphysical discontinuity from the common human person.

Jesus and the Spirit: Continuity and Discontinuity

The continuity and discontinuity between Jesus and common humanity opens the way to connect Christology and anthropology while also constraining its relation. Ian McFarland's work on Christology and anthropology is especially helpful. He argues that Chalcedon has been misunderstood by interpreters failing to understand the difference between nature and hypostasis. The nature is the thing, or 'whatness', whereas the hypostasis is the person, or who. In light of this, 'the one *whom* we see in Jesus is none other than the Son of God, *what* we see in Jesus is simply and exhaustively human flesh and blood' (McFarland 2019: 8). Thus, *what* we see hungers, thirsts, tires, and actually needs to depend on the Holy Spirit even as *who* we see has pre-existed in aseity for all eternity. Yet, because this divine *who* assumed this human *what*, the divine-human *who* also hungers, thirsts, tires, and needs to depend on the Holy Spirit. For Jesus, nature and hypostasis are distinct such that the divine-human person experienced these things through his human nature but not his divine nature. He is one person with two natures. For humanity, by contrast, we are our human natures—nature and hypostasis are inseparable. Thus, human nature is shared in common with Jesus and humanity such that Jesus was fully human, though unlike humanity, Jesus was not merely human.

By contrast, mere human beings exist as human persons with human natures without being hypostasized to the divine nature of the eternal Word. In the case of Jesus, however, his divine personhood is united with his human nature. As Leidenhag and Mullins, interpreting the Council of Constantinople (553), summarize, '[t]he human nature is not, nor could have been, a person independent of the Son's assumption' (Leidenhag and Mullins 2018: 194; Cf. Crisp 2013: 40). Thus, the incarnation is its own special divine-human relation, one not shared in common with other human beings. How this human nature is assumed is a Trinitarian operation: the Father wills the

hypostasis of the Son; the Son wills to be hypostasized; and the Spirit hypostasizes the Son to the created human nature. This act of union by the Spirit is the means by which Jesus of Nazareth comes to exist (Matthew 1:18-20; Luke 1:35). Such a union is unique to Jesus as God incarnate. In contrast to incarnation, Leidenhag and Mullins can go on to claim, 'the relation of indwelling is a matter of human flourishing, not a matter of human existence' (2018: 196). Jesus required this direct act of the Spirit in order to exist. Common human persons still require the gift of God in order to exist since all of material reality exists because God graciously wills this to be so, but this is quite different from being hypostasized to the material reality as an eternal person. By grace, God creates the world and causes all things to exist. However, the circumstances of history that God provides entail that human persons will also need to experience union with God (which we see in human history as the relation of indwelling) in order to flourish. Jesus is fully flourishing as the one indwelt by the Spirit from conception onward.

The incarnation is an act of union of the Word with the human nature by the Spirit and is separate from indwelling. However, at the incarnation, the divine-human person of Jesus came to exist by the Spirit, while also being indwelt by this Spirit. Having established the distinction between incarnation and indwelling, we can now return to the ninth anathema from the Council of Ephesus, since this distinction is unclear:

> If anyone says that the one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Spirit, as making use of an alien power that worked through him and as having received from him the power to master unclean spirits and to work divine wonders among people and does not rather say that it was his own proper Spirit through whom he worked the divine wonders, let him be anathema (Tanner 2001: 60).

As the Logos, the full Godhead is present in Jesus, and as such the Spirit is his own proper Spirit. This divinity is what the ninth anathema aims to safeguard. However, while this helps safeguard one kind of divine-human relation—incarnation, it makes it difficult to discern another kind of divine-human relation—indwelling. This is a good example of where pneumatic Christology can strengthen Logos Christology by affirming both relations. The Spirit is uniquely Jesus' own because he is fully divine. In no way was this Spirit alien to him. However, Jesus also relied upon this Spirit due to having a complete human nature. Such a claim does not weaken Jesus' divinity but allows for a tension between Jesus' supreme uniqueness as God, while also being fully human just as we are. It is in light of being just as we are that the relation of indwelling is so important. This indwelling relation is accessible to human persons, thereby opening a way to talk about anthropology in its relation to Christology.

This relation is further articulated by McFarland. He builds upon Chalcedon and utilizes the thinking of Aquinas, whereby the 'grace of union' establishes Jesus' *sui generis* identity as the Son of God since only he has the hypostatic union. While McFarland does not state whether this grace of union is the work of the Spirit (according to Aquinas), this particular grace is unique to Christ, and precedes habitual grace, which is given by God's indwelling Spirit (Aquinas ST III.7.13). While one need not follow Aquinas' whole theological system, this distinction of the experience of grace seems to map onto the difference between incarnation and indwelling. Aquinas is concerned to maintain Jesus' supreme uniqueness, while also grappling with scriptural statements about Jesus' likeness to humanity. Such grappling is a critical feature of Jesus' mediation and is thus of concern for one central theologian for pneumatic Christology—John Owen. According to Lucy Peppiatt, 'Owen draws and builds on Thomist thought, where we find an insistence on the need for habitual grace in Christ, designated as a work of the Spirit' (Peppiatt 2018: 171). She further explains, following on from Aquinas, that for Owen '[i]f the Son's response to the Father is not a human response by grace, then his link with the rest of humanity is severed and his role as Mediator is annulled' (Peppiatt 2018: 173). The real human experience of reliance on grace, which for Aquinas and Owen is synonymous with the Spirit, is critical for Jesus' mediatorial role to be effective. In an effort to account for the scriptural support for Jesus' learning and growth, and his likeness to our humanity, Owen seeks to demonstrate Jesus' real reliance on the Spirit. While Owen may go further than some theologians are comfortable regarding the causative agency of the Spirit in Jesus' life, the fact remains that the scriptural picture of Jesus is of a fully human individual who grows and learns. Ultimately, Logos Christology struggles to incorporate this picture into itself.

McFarland, whose pneumatology seems more constrained than Owen's, is still supportive of Jesus' reliance on the Spirit recognizing that Jesus required the Spirit to be sanctified and thereby live in accordance with the will of the Father (McFarland 2014: 154). He believes this reliance of Jesus on the Spirit is consonant with Chalcedon, which is why he calls his view a 'pneumatic Chalcedonianism', stating, 'For it is only in and through the gift of the Spirit that any human being, whether Jesus or Mary or Chloe or Paul, may live as a child of God' (McFarland 2014: 154). Radically, McFarland's pneumatic Chalcedonian reading advocates 'that *the Spirit is not what makes Christ divine but rather what make him human*, in that Jesus fulfils his specifically human vocation from conception to glory through the power of the Spirit' (McFarland 2014: 158; Cf. Badcock 1997: 264; Spence 1992: 75-97). Here we see another distinction, which may be deemed a distinction in degree. Unlike the incarnation, which is a unique *kind* of relation between the Spirit and Logos, indwelling for Jesus and common humanity would be different by way of *degree*.

Jesus experienced the indwelling of the Spirit from his conception onward and without measure. Human beings experience the indwelling Spirit after they are born (except, perhaps, for John the Baptist) and only in part, not in fullness. [Giving of the Spirit in degrees has precedent even before Jesus in 2 Kings 2:9, as well as with reference to the Spirit being 'poured out' in a new way and to a different degree in Isaiah 44:3, Joel 2:28, and Acts 2:17].

For Jesus, and Jesus alone, the Holy Spirit is also his Spirit (McFarland 2014: 158). As Kathryn Tanner asserts, the 'hypostatic unity is what makes the Spirit the sure possession of the humanity of Christ: the humanity of Jesus cannot lose the Spirit because he is the Word. One with the Word, the humanity of Christ receives the Word's very own—the Word's own Spirit' (Tanner 2010: 71). Because of the eternal relation of the Son and the Spirit, when the human nature of Jesus is assumed by the Son, the Spirit establishes the union (grace of union) of the divine and human natures as well as indwelling Jesus. In the case of Jesus, and Jesus alone, these two realities are contemporaneous. In the words of McFarland: 'The grace of union establishes Jesus' unique identity as the Son of God, but it is by the Spirit's gift of grace that Jesus is sanctified so as to be able to live a life of faithfulness and love. In short, if it is by the hypostatic union of the Word with a human nature that Jesus *is who he is*, it is by the power of the Holy Spirit that Jesus *does what he does* in the flesh' (McFarland 2014: 154). Despite being a divine-human person and thereby having a different instantiating relation to the Spirit than any other human being, this does not undermine his having the same indwelling relation to the Spirit that is made possible for other merely human persons. Logos Christology is adept at defending the former and pneumatic Christology the latter, so holding them together provides a more robust Christology. If this is the case, then Jesus cannot be understood apart from the Spirit, nor can anthropology be understood apart from its adoption by this same Spirit. And such seems to be the case. By the Spirit, Jesus is hypostasized, empowered, anointed, led, and raised from the dead. Such an intimate relationship between the Spirit and Jesus further reveals a benefit of pairing Logos Christology and pneumatic Christology. The inextricability of the Son and Spirit is well stated by McFarland:

> Even apart from the incarnation, the Son is not the Son without or apart from the Spirit, so it is entirely consistent with the eternal identity of the Second Person that in his earthly ministry he should at every point be accompanied and empowered by the Spirit. And in the same way that it is only in and through the Spirit that Jesus is the Son, so it is only through the same Spirit that we, too, become sons and daughters of God (McFarland 2014: 158).

The Spirit who empowers Jesus is the same Spirit that is then given by Jesus to make humans God's children. Thus, one of the clearest biblical categories for relating Christology and anthropology is the language of adoption.

Ironically, the fear of some thinkers to come too close to an adoptionist Christology can actually be mitigated by a pneumatic Christology. In fact, in order to be adopted into the divine family, God saw it most fitting to send the Person who is the Son by nature, through the Spirit, to extend God's family by this same Spirit. Only a Son by nature could accomplish such a feat. Erin Heim is especially insightful here. She makes a compelling exegetical case that adoption is the 'telos of human existence' and provides a biblical category for what the Eastern and Western traditions have labelled '*theosis*' and 'beatific vision', respectively (Heim 2018: 130). Jesus, as the Son by nature, is the *locus* of adoption (Heim 2018: 130). However, this adoption is appropriated by the Spirit, who adopts human persons and allows them to cry out, 'Abba, Father', just as Jesus does (Heim 2018: 130; Mark 14:36; Romans 8:15; Galatians 4:6. Cf. McFarland 2019: 120). Again, the distinctiveness between Jesus' Sonship and our own is made clear in Romans 8 and Colossians 1:15, whereby Jesus is fastidiously ascribed the title 'firstborn', such that '[a]lthough those who live by the Spirit have received the Spirit of adoption, Christ is 'firstborn' among the many adopted brothers and sisters (8:29)' (Heim 2018: 134; Cf. Habets 2012: 269). This rich adoption language also appears in Romans 9:4; Galatians 4:5, and Ephesians 1:5, and as such 'is a symbol of humanity's creaturely dependence upon God' (Heim 2018: 143). This adoption language helps to highlight the continuity and discontinuity between Jesus and other human persons. Jesus' relating to the Son by the Spirit must be different from an ordinary believer's relationship because Jesus' relation to the Son by the Spirit 'provides salvation, whereas our relationship to the Spirit allows us to receive salvation' (Leidenhag and Mullins 2018: 198-199). In other words, Jesus, as the Son by nature, not only depends upon this same Spirit as his own, but also gives this Spirit to those who become children of God (Matthew 3:11, cf Mark 1:8, Luke 3:16, John 1:33; John 6:63; 7:39; 15:26; 16:7; 20:22; Acts 2:33; Galatians 3:14).

To conclude this section, an exclusive Logos Christology implicitly reifies the position of Justin and Cyril of Alexandria, in that Jesus actually had no *need* of the Spirit due to his divinity, casting suspicion on his true humanity and his role as the divine-human mediator. However, as we have seen above, the lack of clarity between incarnation and indwelling has obscured Jesus' actual reliance on the Spirit. Instead, pairing pneumatic Christology with Logos Christology can maintain Jesus' absolute uniqueness without compromising his correspondence with the rest of humanity. Consequently, pairing pneumatic Christology with Logos Christology better accounts for how Jesus lived a truly human life. Since I have proposed that Jesus' reliance on the

Spirit is different by way of degree and not kind to the rest of humanity, the question for the remainder of this paper is how his need for the Spirit shares continuity with our need for the Spirit. Here, Garrett Thomson's analytic formulation of fundamental need provides one way to address the puzzle of how to connect Christology and anthropology (Thomson 1987: 88-89; 2005).

Fundamental Need: Continuity

We now move to a primary concern that pneumatic Christology seeks to address; that Jesus assumed a true humanity, a humanity that actually needed the Holy Spirit and did not just appear to need the Spirit for our benefit. While not denying that everything Jesus did was ultimately for our benefit, the incarnation does not invalidate the actuality of him truly entering into the human condition and needing the Spirit.

The need for God's indwelling presence, as we have seen, is separate from gift of existence. Existence is a precondition for flourishing, and how existence is instantiated does not undermine the conditions for flourishing. For this reason, using Thomson's rubric for fundamental need will be qualified in that all 'fundamental needs' are actually relative given that God could have created the world differently than it is. As it stands, however, God so deigned to create the world in such a way so that to be human would be to have certain needs. However, ultimately, all is gift.

Assuming the gift of existence, we now move to fundamental needs while recognizing that they are ultimately relative. A fundamental need is that which is necessary for the flourishing of a certain entity and cannot be separated from the constitution of that entity. Since indwelling is related to flourishing, the concept of fundamental need helps provide a bridge between Jesus and the rest of humanity. This reasoning flows in two directions: from Jesus to common humanity and from common humanity to Jesus. From what we see for creatures of the kind 'human', to be the kind of creature that they are, anyone claiming to be human would require this need for union with God. Whether or not Jesus had a fallen human nature, understood as inheriting original sin, becomes secondary because the need persists regardless of the condition of this human nature (Crisp 2004: 283). Further, those who argue for and against Jesus having a fallen human nature still agree that his human nature was affected by living in a fallen world (Crisp 2004: 287). He hungered, grew tired, was tempted, and could die. None of these realities undermine fundamental need. Regarding the second flow of reasoning, from common humanity to Jesus, as I argue in a longer work, a strong scriptural case can be made for the centrality of God's presence for understanding the identity and function of humankind (McKirland forthcoming). From what we see for creatures of the kind 'human', to be the kind of creature that they are, anyone claiming to be human would require this need. Humans, as creatures

made in God's image, have a unique relation to Godself and a unique function to carry out in light of this relation. Consistently, God desires to dwell with humankind, and humankind flourishes when it is receptive to this dwelling. Progressively, this dwelling *with* becomes a dwelling *in* as the degree of flourishing deepens and is epitomized in Jesus, bringing us back to the first flow of reasoning.

Both flows of reasoning face objections, firstly whether or not Jesus' relation to the Spirit is prototypical since it is so unique (Cole 2007: 175); and secondly, whether one can reason from mere humans to Jesus' human nature. While these are both valid concerns, and likely only two of many, fundamental need remains a helpful concept. It can take into account Jesus' supreme uniqueness since he reveals this fundamental need being met to its greatest extent, both in a fallen context and in the quick glimpse of Jesus' glorified humanity. To the second objection, my response is one of plausibility. According to the scriptural witness, especially of the Gospels, we see Jesus hungering, tiring, thirsting, and dying—entering into the common experiences of organic life. We do not have explicit statements of Jesus getting cold or hot, needing to use the toilet, etc. However, we assume that he had these experiences. Similarly, but to an even greater extent, we see intimately relating to God's presence to be central to God's intention for humanity. This pertains to human persons in all stages of the scriptural epochs, from before sin, after sin, after Jesus, and in the eschaton. It is thus reasonable that to be human is to be intended to relate to God in an intimate way, indeed, to be intended for union with God via the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Given all that has been said about Jesus thus far, such a union with God finds its height of expression in Jesus, not only hypostatically but also in a dispositionally human way.

Returning to the positive case for fundamental need, one primary feature of this concept that has theological purchase is that this kind of need "indicates a disposition and does not imply a lack' (Thomson 2005: 175). For instance, a human person continues to need food even while she is eating. At the same time, if the need cannot be met, then a person is lacking what she needs. However, fundamental need is not *necessarily* constituted by lack. By assuming a real human nature, Jesus assumed real human needs, not simply for nutrients, hydration, and rest, but also for a deep and abiding relationship with the Father through the Spirit (hereafter called 'union with God', but distinct from 'grace of union' described above). For the first time in human history, union with God was experienced as an abiding indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Thus, Jesus' need for the Spirit does not imply that he lacked anything, but that he willfully entered into the human condition of receiving and relying on the Spirit. This reliance had many effects: knowing the mind of God, performing signs and wonders, having supernatural knowledge, etc.

Furthermore, even though the Spirit was indissolubly bound to Jesus does not negate the actuality of the need. Jesus has a human nature even though he is also a divine-human person. Non-divinely-hypostasized human beings also have human natures. Because the human nature is shared in common, so is the need for the person who subsists in a human nature. This provides sufficient warrant for connecting Christology and anthropology even while the distinctiveness of Jesus' personhood is maintained.

Now we will move through Thomson's criteria in more detail by applying it to the need for God's Spirit (union) for Jesus and all human persons. Indwelling, in contrast to incarnation, is the divine-human relation best suited to the category of fundamental needs. This brings us to the technical definition of fundamental need. For a need to be fundamental, it must meet certain criteria that ensure this need is bound to the entity's nature. These criteria require that the need is non-derivative, inescapable, and non-circumstantial. Most simply, a fundamental human need is that which is necessary for the well-being of a certain entity and cannot be separated from the constitution of that entity (Thomson 1987: 88-89; 2005). Further, if someone does not have the need met, or the means to have this need met, then she necessarily experiences significant harm. To be harmed is to be deprived of intrinsic goods, which is the opposite of flourishing, and will be discussed briefly below. Thomson defines the strength of fundamental needs as that of a necessary condition for understanding an entity's nature (Thomson 1987: 124). He goes on to elaborate on this necessity, which is tied to the nature of the entity as it relates to harm:

> The antecedent of a need is necessary in the sense that it is essential to A. 'Need' contains the idea that A needs X to be A or to function as A, and it implies that the 'purpose' for which X is needed by A is defined by A's essential nature. The rich sense of 'need' determines that the antecedent of a 'need'-statement must be A's life or the quality of his life, or more specifically, the avoidance of an especially serious type of harm (Thomson 1987: 124).

In summary then, a fundamental need is inextricably bound to an entity's nature, whereby the meeting of the need directly affects the entity's flourishing or experience of harm. The need must not have any other needs beneath it, it must be bound to the internal nature of the being, and it cannot change based upon the external conditions of the being. Now we will move through Thomson's criteria in more detail by applying it to the need for God's Spirit for Jesus and all human persons.

First, for a need to be non-derivative, Thomson means that this need is necessary in and of itself. As such, it is not a need that has another need undergirding it since any additional scaffolding would make the need instrumental instead of fundamental. So, while it would be true that a person needs

money to buy a car, the money is instrumental to the purchase of the car. The acquisition of the car does not make the car a non-derivative need since having the car meets the need of driving to work, which meets the need of earning money, which is again instrumental to buying food, which is then the object of the necessity to satisfy hunger. The need for food is the non-derivative need, hunger is the indication of that need, and eating food satisfies the need even though it does not negate the disposition of the need for food. Since the biblical and theological traditions converge on the ultimate ends of a flourishing humanity as being unified with God and given that this union is provided by the Spirit, the need for union with God is the most fundamental human need. One might object that the need for union with God is the ultimate end, and the Spirit is the means for this union, thereby making the Spirit instrumentally needed. Such would be the case if the Spirit was not God. Since this is a trinitarian operation, such a union is with the Spirit of the Father and Son. Being united with God is being united with the Spirit. Further, the role of the Spirit as the One who unites persons would seem to entail an eternal union of believers with God as Spirit (though this mode of union may be different from indwelling, but no less intimate). As proposed above, Jesus typifies this union with God by the Spirit. After his ascension, Jesus also sends the Spirit to indwell his followers. By the Spirit, God continues to graciously perfect the human creature through ongoing union. If this is the ultimate end for which humanity was made, then a human need for union with the Spirit fits the non-derivative criterion.

The second criterion is that of being non-circumstantial. As Thomson describes how a need is non-circumstantial, a human being 'needs food because of his physical make-up… The need for food can be called 'a constitutional need' and the need for bread 'a circumstantial need'. A constitutional need is, in a sense, a need whatever the circumstances' (Thomson 1987: 21). Again, for Thomson, the constitution of the subject determines the kind of needs it has, such that 'the need is innately, rather than environmentally and socially determined' (Thomson 1987: 32). The need for union with God is reasonably applicable regardless of the human condition: prelapsarian, postlapsarian, redeemed, Jesus' humanity, and glorified humanity. Through the biblical witness, we see Jesus uniquely conceived by the Spirit, then led by the Spirit during his earthly ministry, and raised by this same Spirit at his resurrection. Thus, while he would have received the Spirit differently from other human beings, his dispositional need for the Spirit is shared in common with other human beings. Again, while God could have created the circumstances to be different than they are, the world gratuitously given entails being the kind of creatures who need union with God for their full flourishing.

The criterion of being non-circumstantial may seem the same as inescapability, but this standard has its own nuance. A need is inescapable if there is

nothing a human being can do to avoid having this fundamental need. In other words, God has created the world such that only union with Godself is how one experiences ultimate well-being. So where fundamental need is non-circumstantial regarding external contexts of the person, it is inescapable internally in that no matter what the subject does or does not do, having this need is required due to her nature. In other words, the need cannot be substituted by anything else, which means that if the subject does not have what she needs, she is harmed.

Consequently, undergirding all these criteria is the notion of harm: 'If a person lacks what he needs, the quality of his life must suffer' (Thomson 1987: 36). This is a broad definition of harm, so further examination is necessary. Thomson proposes two questions by which to analyze harm: What does harm deprive humans of? And why is that thing good? (Thomson 1987: 44). This 'good' can even be something that the human person has never experienced such that her quality of life is affected without her knowing it. This is possible since harm is primarily about deprivation explaining why 'harm need not be felt' (Thomson 1987: 36-37). Consequently, harm is inherently difficult to identify as it is characterized by what it is not: flourishing—or by its effects—deprivation. Returning to Thomson's questions, what does harm deprive humans of? Union with God's Spirit. Why is that thing good? It is the end for which humans were created.

Recalling pneumatic Christology as previously articulated, in the same way that human persons have been intended for union with the divine life by becoming children of God, so Jesus of Nazareth embodies that filial relation with the Father through the Spirit. He reveals what human nature is supposed to look like, even though his is assumed by the eternal Logos. Here, Logos Christology is again critical and opens one more avenue by which fundamental need might be theologically useful. That is: The divine life of the Godhead, as relationally constituted, epitomizes need without lack. Each person needs the other in order to be who they are, yet this is a need unlike any need in the contingent order—one might call it the 'Supreme Fundamental Need'. As McFarland states:

> The three divine persons are not in any respect threatened by one another; each one lives entirely in and by the other two, such that at no point does the flourishing of one come at another's expense; quite the contrary, it is the nature of divinity that the 'expense' of giving whereby the divine life is sustained does not diminish any person but rather constitutes the persons as the one God (McFarland 2019: 59).

Perhaps the need that grounds all others is found in the Godhead itself where again the need to exist and the need to flourish run in eternal parallel. To be who they are the Father needs the Son and the Spirit, the Son needs the Spirit

and the Father, and the Spirit needs the Father and the Son. By living in this eternal union as the Son, when the human nature is assumed, the maximum creaturely dependence upon the divine life is expressed in the fallen contingent order as the divine-human person of Jesus.

In summary, a fundamental need is that which is non-derivative, non-circumstantial, and inescapable, such that the entity experiences serious harm if this need is not met. However, even in the 'meeting' of this need, since this need is bound to the disposition of that entity, to *be* that being is to *have* that need. Yet, the entity does not have to be aware of the need, or the harm she is experiencing by its being unmet for the need to be real. Insofar as that need *is* met, the entity experiences flourishing instead of harm, but the need itself is constitutional. If the fundamental human need is union with God, such that one is not human without this need, then the need for union with God's Spirit is intrinsic to what it means to be human. Jesus experienced this need in a real human way because he was fully human. He reveals what a fully flourishing human being can look like in a context constrained by the effects of sin. However, while he truly needed the Spirit, as God by nature, he could not *not* have the Spirit at all times. Though the nature of his Spirit reception is thus different from mere human Spirit reception, this does not negate the actuality of the dependence.

Conclusion

By living in this eternal union as the Son, when the human nature is assumed, the maximum creaturely dependence upon the divine life is expressed in the fallen contingent order as the divine-human person of Jesus who relies on the Spirit each day. Historically, the role of the Spirit in Christology has often been treated as an add-on or a complete mystery. Such has been the case due to the concern to keep Christ, the Logos, front and center as the divine Word. However, now that the centrality of the Word has been established and the heresies detracting from his deity and his humanity have been addressed, I appeal that we can revisit the ways we have leaned too heavily upon an exclusive Logos Christology, at the Spirit's expense. Given the essential role of the Spirit in the life of both the eternal and incarnate Son, a complementary pneumatic Christology to Logos Christology enriches how we think of Christ. A further consequence of this thinking will be that our Christological anthropologies will become more pneumatic as well. Such an understanding of Christology will square far better with the biblical picture of Jesus and the Spirit's relationship while also helping provide a pivotal thread of continuity between Christ's humanity and our own—fundamental need for union with God, which occurs by the Spirit.

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