

# Participation of the Czech Republic in NATO Peace Support Operations: Analysis of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

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**Abstract:** *NATO, as one of the most important security organisations, has been involved in a large number of operations of all kinds since its establishment. Peace Support Operations are the most common type, as they include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. Some states participate in these operations very often, others only rarely. This study aims to examine the participation of the Czech Republic, a small state that has a small but well-trained and specialised army. The research aims to determine the most common reasons for Czech participation in NATO's Peace Support Operations. The work uses qualitative comparative analysis to determine the necessary reasons or sufficient conditions for the participation of this state. Five types of reasons – political reasons, security reasons, economic reasons, institutional reasons and normative reasons are tested. The analysis points to the fact that security reasons are the most important reasons.*

**Keywords:** *Czech Republic; NATO; Participation; Peace Support Operations; Security*

## NATO and Czech Participation

NATO was founded in 1949 and the main goal of this organisation was to protect its members. This organisation has undergone a long transformative development. In 1989, NATO began to engage outside the territory of member states. This has been accompanied by the development of theories and procedures for

the use of force in response to new forms of threats and the need to ensure security and stability in the area of interest (Zůna 2002: 9–10). Once NATO became involved in Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the territorial scope of the member states was expanded and a new indoctrination was created. The key was the adoption of the new Strategic Concept in 1991, where it was stated that security must be ensured through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries (NATO 2006: 20–21). In 1992, NATO's support was provided in the framework of peacekeeping operations under a United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandate. This process was finalised during a meeting in Athens in 1993. Agreed-upon principles and conditions were established under which NATO would provide support for peace operations. The guiding principle was that the doctrine of NATO's peace operations must be in line with the UN Charter and that all other activities of NATO must be conducted based on a mandate from the UN Security Council (Zůna 2002: 8). The term Peace Support Operations has been used within NATO since 1995 when peacekeeping operations doctrines were transcribed. Three doctrines were created – NATO Multinational Joint Operational Doctrine, ACE Doctrine for Peace Support Operations and the Functional Planning Guide for PSO. The current Peace Support Operations are also based on these pillars. The process itself was completed in 2000, when several other documents, including, for example, AJP – 3-4-1 NATO Peace Support Operations and AJP 3-4-1-1 Tactics Techniques and Procedures for NATO Peace Support Operations were finalised (NATO 2019a: 37–44).

NATO Peace Support Operations are defined as multifunctional operations that are impartial, involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. This includes a wide range of operations using various tools such as situation monitoring, consultancy or humanitarian aid. All PSO activities can be defined as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief (NATO 2019b: 2–9). Peace Support Operation, therefore, covers a wide range of activities. The basic principles of the PSO include impartiality, transparency and the principle of consensus of the parties to the conflict. Unlike the UN, NATO does not further restrict the use of force to only self-defence and this does not even presuppose the passive nature of forces. These operations are also affected by other principles such as the coordination of military and civilian activities, cooperation with national authorities and the principle of sustained effort and multifunctionality (NATO 2001: 3–9).

The Czech Republic (CR) has been actively participating in NATO missions and operations since joining the Alliance. NATO's first mission with a huge Czech Republic involvement was the Allied Force mission in 1999. However, the launch of an air operation against the Serbian regime was criticised by both political leaders and the general public in the Czech Republic. The Czech

Republic sent contradictory signals when, on the one hand, it accepted the operation (but after a very close vote in favour of the operation) and approved overflights and rail transport through the territory of the Czech Republic, but on the other hand, the public and politicians were split on the issue, and there was criticism from all sides (Eichler 2012: 12–24). Nevertheless, the Czech Republic subsequently joined other operations in the Balkans. As of today, it can be stated that the Czech army has been involved in more than thirty NATO operations that took place in Europe, Asia and Africa.

This study aims to examine the reasons for the involvement of the Czech army in PSOs and to analyse what primarily shapes the decision as to whether Czech soldiers will be involved in operations of NATO or not. Unlike its large coalition partners such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic was not involved with any other state outside Europe by colonialism or other historical ties. This state is a relatively small state, located in the middle of Europe, where quite good security conditions prevail.<sup>1</sup> The army consists of about 23,000 military personnel (Army CR 2020). Two of the neighboring states (Poland and Germany) have armies that are several times larger. Neighboring states which are closer to the Czech Republic in terms of population and landmass (Austria and Slovakia), have slightly smaller armies (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2019: 2–14). The key is to examine what shapes the decision to involve Czech soldiers and whether there are some necessary conditions for participation or not. The research seeks to answer the question of what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for the involvement of the CR in NATO's PSOs. Qualitative comparative analysis is used for these purposes. So far, very little research has been conducted on NATO's PSOs involvement. Most research focuses on UN missions and the motives of large states. This research should therefore complement and expand existing knowledge about the motives of small states.<sup>2</sup> The text first defines the theoretical model on which the research is based and clearly defines the individual categories of motives. This includes economic, political, security, institutional and normative reasons. A description of the qualitative comparative analysis and coding process follows. The main part of the text is devoted to the analysis of the participation of the Czech Republic in PSOs. In conclusion, the results that are the product of the analysis are clarified and summarised.

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1 Good security conditions mean, in particular, that there has been no armed conflict in Central Europe for several decades (Egry 2018: 1–6).

2 A small state is most often defined on the basis of population size. Sometimes other quantitative criteria are used, such as the size of the area or GNP values (Maass 2009: 70–73). The size of the army is very much related to the size of the population. The size of the army and technological capacity are used to measure the strength of the state. According to most of the mentioned criteria, the Czech Republic is one of the small states (Maass 2009: 71–76).

## Theoretical Framework

Several expert studies have been written about the participation of large countries such as France and Germany. An example is a text written by Marianne Takle, which deals with German participation in international military operations. She describes the change that Germany has undergone since the 1990s when it was unwilling to participate in foreign military operations. At the same time, it provides several reasons for a change, like government political changes or generational changes (Takle 2010: 1–3). Another similar work is an article written by Torsten Stein, who describes Germany's constitution and participation in international peacekeeping operations (Stein 2010: 33–40). An example of research focused on France is the work of Manuel Lafont-Rapnouil, who focuses on the reasons for the involvement of French soldiers in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (Lafont-Rapnouil 2013: 2–4).

Attention is paid mainly to large states, but several studies also focus on the motives of small states' participation. The small European States have played a key role in several foreign operations and were considered equal partners to large states, as they contributed large numbers of soldiers and equipment to the operations. This is the case of the KFOR peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, where Austria, Hungary and Slovenia are among the most represented countries (Arquivo 2019). Studies focusing on small and medium-sized countries mostly include some selected countries of southern Europe such as Portugal and Greece or some Central European countries, in particular Slovenia and Hungary. This is also the case of the work of Maria Do Céu Pinto Arena, who focuses on the rationale of small and medium-sized states for involvement in the PSOs, specifically Italy and Portugal (Pinto Arena 2017: 1–4). She points out that the reasons for small and medium-sized states to participate in missions do not differ and the attitude of Portugal and Italy to the public service obligation can be explained by the use of the constructivist theory of changing norms and the logic of proportionality. Their involvement is based primarily on the *a priori* mainstreaming of specific values and beliefs about international security enshrined in the doctrine and practice of organisations. According to her, security reasons are the most important (Pinto Arena 2017: 8–10). Dimitrov (2009) shares a similar view, describing Bulgaria's involvement in NATO operations as primarily for security reasons. Bulgaria's main reason, which is publicly declared, is to protect the home country from threats that are far beyond its territorial borders (Dimitrov 2009: 1–8). Hungary's involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa is described in a study by Besenyo (2013). He also argues that security reasons and gaining new experience are crucial in making decisions about the deployment in the mission (Besenyo 2013: 2–13). On the other hand, Zupančič (2015) comes to different conclusions. According to him, small states strive to enter international society as credible actors in inter-

national relations. A well-deserved place in the international community can be achieved by becoming a credible member of NATO. This includes participating in missions and demonstrating one's abilities (Zupančič 2015: 463–468). From this, it can be concluded that, according to him, international commitment is crucial in Slovenia's decision to participate in the missions.

Some authors who have sought to explore the reasons for Germany's involvement in PSOs use the theory of the logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences, which controls the so-called logic of action (Čapovová 2015: 19–23). This theory, formulated by March and Olsen, argues that the logic of consequences focuses on interest, the promotion of interest should lead to the desired consequence (March and Olsen 1998: 951–954). States are seen as rational actors and interests are primarily security and economic goals. The logic of appropriateness is governed by a rule that determines what is appropriate. It should be added that the rules increase the competence and effectiveness of action and at the same time reduce uncertainty in the political environment (March and Olsen 1998: 952–956). The actions of the actors are thus considered to be based on rules (respectively norms), which are considered natural and legitimate. However, identity membership in political groups and institutions also plays an important role in shaping human behavior. Thus, acting according to the rules of the logic of appropriateness involves accepting an identity or role and then adapting the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. This theory has also been used in other research. It was applied to the motives for the involvement of the CR in UN peacekeeping operations by Urbanovská (2016: 3–4). She concludes that the logic of consequences is more applicable than the logic of appropriateness. In the case of the logic of consequences, security interests are most important for the Czech Republic (Urbanovská 2016: 3–4). However, this theoretical framework is outdated and the two logics very often overlap, which is also noted by Urbanovská.

Chand, who focuses on the motives of Asian states for UN peacekeeping operations, uses a completely different theoretical framework. He argues that there are four categories of reasons. Political interests, economic interests, domestic factors and international factors (Chand 2019: 82–100). The main problem of his work is the unclear definition of some categories. According to him, domestic factors include political history, humanitarian reasons or efforts to support the UN. International factors include UN principles and efforts to influence the functioning of the organisation. The author does not define the first two categories, and efforts to support and influence the functioning of the UN overlap (Chand 2019: 82–100).

The most specific theory that can be applied across cases has been described by Bellamy and Williams (2013). They examined fourteen (large and medium-sized) states between 2000 and 2013 and concluded that there are five reasons why states participate in foreign operations (Bellamy and Williams 2013:

423–425). These five rational reasons are currently the most relevant and comprehensive model to explain states’ motivations. This approach is the most comprehensive, based on real cases, and was able to cover all the cases examined during Bellamy and Williams’ research. The model covers the so-called United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), so far it has not been applied exclusively to NATO-led PSOs. However, for reasons of complexity, this model is used in this research. For each of the five reasons, the authors described several motives that lead to participation, but also inhibitors that can reduce the chance of participation. For this research, it is crucial to determine which motives most often shape the decision of the Czech Republic to participate in the PSOs. The following table summarises all five reasons.

**Table 1: Reasons for state’s participation**

| REASONS                     | MOTIVATION                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i><b>POLITICAL</b></i>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>National prestige</i></li><li>• <i>To influence international affairs</i></li><li>• <i>Other foreign policy goals</i></li></ul> |
| <i><b>ECONOMIC</b></i>      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Financial rewards (individuals, companies, states, ministries, and militaries)</i></li></ul>                                    |
| <i><b>SECURITY</b></i>      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Contribute to global peace</i></li><li>• <i>Resolve regional conflict</i></li></ul>                                             |
| <i><b>INSTITUTIONAL</b></i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Gain operational experience</i></li><li>• <i>Improve interoperability</i></li><li>• <i>Legitimized armed forces</i></li></ul>   |
| <i><b>NORMATIVE</b></i>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Humanitarian motives</i></li><li>• <i>Support NATO/UN system</i></li></ul>                                                      |

Source: Bellamy and Williams (2013, p. 423).

This theory is also used by some other authors. An example is a work of Fauzia (2018), which seeks to analyse Indonesia’s motives for participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Based on the analysis of all Indonesian cases, she concludes that previous studies tended to address this phenomenon in one dimension, creating a gap in the comprehensive understanding of the government’s decision-making process. However, this conceptual framework can provide a comprehensive understanding and cover all cases (Fauzia 2018: 69). For these reasons, the theory is considered the most appropriate.

**Definition of Reasons**

The five reasons for deployment in missions are defined in this chapter. Security reasons can be one of the reasons for the Czech Republic’s participation in the PSOs. At the end of the Cold War, the international environment changed dra-

matically, new threats and a new world order arose. Wars have been transformed accordingly. There has been a rapid decline in interstate wars and, conversely, an increase in domestic wars, in which various non-state actors are involved, such as warlords, terrorist groups and insurgencies (Coleman 2007: 5). The security of regional security complexes seems to be very important, but globalisation also brings together actors who were not so close before. New threats such as cyber-attacks, misinformation and propaganda can hit anywhere. Ensuring security is therefore very difficult for states and increases their potential areas of involvement in new spheres. New threats also include conflict spillovers, which can spread across regions and destabilise several states (Bosker and de Ree 2009: 2–7). States can try to prevent this destabilisation through the PSO. In recent years, moreover, there has been a rapid migration of refugees from African and Asian countries to EU countries. Hosting refugees and migrants brings, directly and indirectly, some security, economic and health problems to European states, so they could be trying to suppress these migratory waves by providing better security conditions in the migrants' home state. All these motivations in order to stop or eliminate security threats and to end and resolve the conflict or to supervise the peaceful implementation of agreements and post-conflict settlements belong to security reasons for involvement in missions. If the conflicts are located in the geographical vicinity of the Czech Republic, or the last few years there has been an increase in the threat to the Czech Republic in connection with the region/state (e.g. increase in terrorist attacks, a rapid increase in illegal migrants and asylum seekers in the Czech Republic), these reasons were evaluated as present.

Political reasons may be another motive for deployment in operations. Participation in operations can be seen as a tool to achieve political goals. States hope to increase their national prestige and influence in international affairs through their participation. It can also be important to gain allies in the international environment or to establish completely new relations. These motives can sometimes be difficult to detect before or during operations (Bellamy and Williams 2013: 418–419). However, to determine whether the political motives have been met, the subsequent political relations and cooperation between the Czech Republic and the state where the PSOs took place will be examined. In the case of deepening relations or a new form of political cooperation, it can be assumed that political reasons were present. A deepening of the national prestige can be expected for each PSO, therefore no attention is paid to it.

Peace is an important prerequisite for economic development. Economic interests can also be a reason for participation. The goal of each country in our international capitalist pre-set is economic prosperity, access to international markets, or the import of strategic natural resources. Medium-strength EU countries in terms of military capabilities (the Czech Republic included) may be interested in maintaining the status quo, as maintaining this status will bring

them relative prosperity and influence (Neack 1995: 181–196). The emergence or development of business relationships or new markets is one of the positive outcomes of the PSO. This can generate profit and thus fulfill the national interests of the participating states. For participating states, the possibility of awarding various types of contracts and investments of an economic nature in the countries where the mission was conducted also opens up (Neack 1995: 181–196). These reasons are very difficult to observe. However, it is possible to focus, for example, on the current state of imports and exports, and how closely the countries are linked in this field. Import and export, therefore, play an important role in qualitative comparative analysis, based on which it was decided if the condition was met or not.

The fourth category is institutional reasons. Civil-military relations influence the state's decision to participate in the PSO. The state is more likely to participate when a military institution can use this contribution; for example, if the armed forces think that a given PSO provides its soldiers with vast international experience, the state can send more peacekeeping forces. This is often a better choice than letting soldiers interfere in internal affairs and be politicised (Bellamy and Williams 2013: 20). For Peace Support Operations for which it was officially declared that the goal was gaining new experience or deepening the existing experience, institutional reasons were present. This can also be said about PSOs which took place in the 1990s because at that time the Czech Republic did not have much experience with deployment in foreign operations.

Normative reasons most often include humanitarian motives. States see participation in a PSO as a strategic way to deepen their ideology of a good humanitarian state. The state, as a sovereign actor, exists, among other things, to provide protection for the fundamental human rights to its citizens and to prevent crimes against humanity. If they do not receive this protection, the international community has the right to intervene and protect the citizens of that state (Nardin – Williams 2006: 1–20). Human rights violations are key in this case. Intervention can in some cases be considered a moral obligation of states. However, a humanitarian catastrophe may not only be caused by the policy of the state concerned, but also by a natural disaster. Besides, there is a wide-ranging debate that these foreign interventions do not improve the human rights situation but, on the contrary, worsen it (Nardin – Williams 2006: 1–13). However, normative reasons may include pressure from allies and the organisation itself. In this case, there may be pressure from the whole organisation. Following Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it is stated that an attack against one member of the alliance is considered an attack against all. This does not apply to their allies and areas of interest outside the territory of member states (NATO 2006: 2–10). This legal pressure should therefore not be justified. The second type of pressure may be pressure from a Member State. This is very difficult to classify. It is assumed that if the members of the government spoke about international

partners' pressure and requirements or the need of the Czech Republic to meet the expectations placed on it, the situation was assessed as present.

## **Qualitative Comparative Analysis**

Most authors do not distinguish between EU-led missions, NATO-led missions or missions under the auspices of the United Nations. This research focuses on NATO-led Peace Support Operations, as it represents most of the operations in which the Czech Republic has participated over the years (Army CR 2020). The aim is to examine the PSOs that took place with the Czech participation and those that did not. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is used to determine whether there are necessary or sufficient conditions for the participation of the Czech Republic. This method was chosen because it is the most objective method which can examine a medium number of cases (20–40) that can be affected by several variables (Ragin 2008: 4–12). The dependent variable has two values – the Czech Republic's participation in NATO's PSOs (code 1, the fulfillment of the condition) or no participation of the Czech Republic in NATO's PSOs (code 0, non-compliance). The Czech Republic's participation in NATO's PSOs is defined as personnel or material support of the mission. Five independent variables (conditions) were coded – economic reasons, security reasons, political reasons, normative reasons and institutional reasons. If the condition was present, it was assigned a value of 1, otherwise a value of 0. The period is limited to years from 1995 (the first mission the Czech Republic participated in) to 2019.

The five mentioned conditions defined in the theoretical part can be considered as specific reasons for deployment in missions. If state exports and imports make up at least 1% of the total volume or the given states maintain further trade ties, the condition of economic reasons has been met. In the case of normative reasons, the humanitarian crisis was considered. This includes the value of the freedom house, which, if it was low or the state required humanitarian aid, these reasons were met. Besides, normative reasons included when pressure from alliance partners or organisations was publicised. The condition of security reasons was fulfilled if the given state is located in the immediate vicinity of the Czech Republic, there is a rapid migration from this state to the Czech Republic (related asylum applications) or it poses a threat from the point of view of terrorism. Political reasons were assessed based on cultural, trade and political cooperation between the states. If these conditions were developed and deepened during and several years after the mission, these conditions were met. Institutional reasons were present if the CR officially declared its intention to gain new experience or deepen its existing experience. This also applied to operations which took place in the 1990s, because at that time the Czech Republic did not have much experience with deployment in foreign operations.

Subsequently, the analysis itself was performed. In the first step, an analysis of the necessary conditions was created. This is because if any of the conditions are classified as necessary they must be part of the most sufficient output combinations. This analysis determines the consistency and coverage of the conditions. Consistency determines the extent to which the output is a subset of the necessary conditions (the ratio of cases with output and condition and cases with only given output). Ideally, it has a value of 1. In practice, there is usually a threshold of 0.9. Coverage represents the relevance of the necessary condition (ratio of cases with output and condition to cases only with the condition without output). If a given condition exceeds a specified consistency threshold, it is assumed to have a high coverage value. If this is not the case, the condition is trivial, the set of conditions is greater than the set of output. Subsequently, a truth table was created in the program. Then, an analysis of sufficient conditions was performed. The consistency threshold for a condition to be declared a sufficient condition is 0.75 (Ragin 2008: 39). The so-called parsimonious solution was used. This solution has lately been preferred by most scientists. Toshkov (2020) describes the reasons why a parsimonious solution should be preferred over a complex one. He argues that only a parsimonious solution can provide a causal conclusion from QCA data in a standard social ontology, due to the monotony of the relation of necessity and sufficiency (Toshkov 2020). An interesting contribution to the debate is the work of Baumgartner and Thiem (2017), who provided a comprehensive evaluation of all three types of solutions in their work. In all their sets of inverse search tests, the intermediate and complex solutions proved to be unsuitable. Both of these types of solutions often committed causal delusions of varying degrees by presenting conclusions that violated the causal structure itself. For complex solutions the errors were in the range of 12% – 82%, which in practice meant that the accuracy of the solution sometimes did not exceed 10% (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017: 19–20). For these reasons, this research uses a parsimonious solution.

## Participation of the Czech Republic in PSOs

The Czech Republic has been a member of NATO since 1999, when, together with Poland and Hungary, it became the first country in the former Eastern bloc (the former Warsaw Pact, the former main enemy of NATO) to join the alliance (NATO 2020). The membership has numerous benefits for the CR, but it certainly also has obligations towards the alliance.<sup>3</sup> This includes the necessary budget for defense or partnership under the Partnership for Peace and Training program. The key legal documents on the issue of the participation of

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3 The advantages are mainly security. NATO has an integrated air defense system, inventory management by sharing resources and the Nuclear Sharing Agreement (NATO 2020).

units of the Army of the Czech Republic (hereinafter ACR) in foreign missions are the Constitution and constitutional laws. According to Articles 39 and 43 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter the Constitution), the government decides on the deployment of armed forces outside the state as well as on the placement of armed forces of other states in its territory, both for a maximum of 60 days. In cases of more than 60 days, government decisions are subsequently subject to approval by both chambers of parliament. At the same time, the government is obliged to immediately inform both chambers of the parliament of its decision. The government's position must then be confirmed by the consent of an absolute majority of all deputies as well as an absolute majority of all senators of the upper house. Parliamentary assent, therefore, requires the consent of the absolute majority of the representatives of both chambers of parliament (Parliament of the Czech Republic 1993).

Over the past two decades, soldiers of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) have become active and frequent participants in military operations outside the territory of the Czech Republic. Deployment of soldiers in areas from the former Yugoslavia to Afghanistan has gradually become a commonplace part of Czech foreign policy and has been mostly perceived as beneficial. However, at the same time military missions have often been the subject of serious, sometimes intense and widely publicised political discussions which became an important part of Czech public discourse. Every year, the Center for Public Opinion Research organises a survey of the Czech Republic's views on NATO and the Czech Republic's activities in this organisation. Public opinion has generally been constant over the last ten years, with around 59% of the population satisfied with the Czech Republic's activity in NATO (Aktuálně 2019). There are debates among politicians regarding the participation of the CR in the PSOs, especially in the Chamber of Deputies, whose hearings are open to the public. Sometimes there is a conflict of interest and disagreement with the mission. Participation in the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the deployment of an anti-chemical unit to Kuwait in 2003 (not a PSO of NATO) can be considered the most controversial missions (Karásek 2010: 29–49). Politicians most often cite ethical reasons, different interests of the Czech Republic or non-initiation by local authorities where the mission took place as reasons against participation. In the case of deployment in Kosovo, some politicians considered it a problem that NATO lacked a clearly defined and valid UN Security Council authorisation (Karásek 2010: *ibid*).

If we focus on the geographical area where the PSOs with Czech participation took place or are taking place, in the vast majority of cases these are geographically close areas. The largest number of missions took place in Europe, specifically in Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Army CR 2020). Some operations have taken place in the Middle East, notably Afghanistan. Only a very small number of operations took place outside these areas. Thus,

the Czech Republic usually tries to select geographically close areas. Last year (2020), soldiers participated in only one mission, namely the ISAF/RSM mission in Afghanistan, which involved more than 2,000 soldiers (Army CR 2020). In addition to the PSOs, the Czech Republic sends soldiers abroad for training, education and support. They have been sent, for example, to the USA, Lithuania or Latvia. The Czech Republic also participates in UN and EU missions.

The following table shows PSOs with Czech participation, and at the same time for the need for qualitative comparative analysis, missions without Czech participation were also selected. For all these missions, five conditions were coded – economic reasons (eco), security reasons (sec), political reasons (pol), institutional reasons (inst) and normative reasons (norm). The fsQCA 3.0 software was used to evaluate the necessary and sufficient conditions. All five conditions, their presence and their absence were included in the analysis. The necessary conditions are those whose consistency limit is higher than 0.9. At the same time, the value of coverage, which should also be relatively high is also important.

**Table 2: Participation and non-participation of the Czech Republic in PSOs**

| Case                                   | Eco | Sec | Pol | Inst | Norm | Participation |
|----------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|------|---------------|
| Essential Harvest (Macedonia)          | 0   | 0   | 1   | 0    | 0    | 1             |
| ISAF (Afghanistan)                     | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 1             |
| AMIS (Sudan)                           | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 1             |
| Eagle Eye (Kosovo)                     | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 1    | 1             |
| Allied Harbour (Kosovo)                | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 1    | 1             |
| Joint Guardian (Kosovo)                | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 1    | 1             |
| Joint Enterprise (Kosovo)              | 0   | 1   | 1   | 0    | 1    | 1             |
| Joint Endeavour (BiH)                  | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 1    | 1             |
| Joint Guard (BiH)                      | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 1    | 1             |
| Joint Forge (BiH)                      | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 1    | 1             |
| Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan) | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 1             |
| NTM (Iraq)                             | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 1             |
| Active Fence (Turkey)                  | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 1             |
| Deny Flight (BiH)                      | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 0    | 0             |
| Sea Guardian (Mediterranean Sea)       | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0             |
| Amber Fox (Macedonia)                  | 0   | 0   | 1   | 0    | 0    | 0             |
| Allied Harmony (Macedonia)             | 0   | 0   | 1   | 0    | 0    | 0             |
| Joint Guarantor (Kosovo)               | 0   | 1   | 1   | 1    | 0    | 0             |
| Unified Protector (Libya)              | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 0             |

| Case                                       | Eco | Sec | Pol | Inst | Norm | Participation |
|--------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|------|---------------|
| NATO support for the AU mission in Somalia | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 0             |
| Ocean Shield (Somalia)                     | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 0             |
| Allied Protector (Gulf of Aden)            | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 0             |
| Allied Provider (Gulf of Aden)             | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 1    | 0             |
| Active Endeavour (Mediterranean Sea)       | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0    | 0    | 0             |

Source: Army of the Czech Republic (2019), BusinessInfo (2021), MZV (2021), Natoauktual (2021), etc.

In table n.2, the reasons why the Czech Republic as a small state actively contributes to NATO-led military operations are coded. Certain motives are often mentioned in the literature, but they cannot be examined in more detail. Small states certainly seek to improve their status and reputation to remain relevant and gain protection (Pedersen 2019: 16–32). So there is a certain logic of prestige, although it is also very much related to security reasons. Thus, rather than the selection of specific operations, this type explains why small states are generally involved, but it no longer explains the specific selection of operations. Moreover, states gain a certain form of prestige during all foreign operations.

**Table 3: Necessary conditions**

| Condition | Consistency | Coverage |
|-----------|-------------|----------|
| Sec       | 0.923077    | 0.857143 |
| ~Sec      | 0.076923    | 0.100000 |
| Eco       | 0.000000    | 0.000000 |
| ~Eco      | 1.000000    | 0.619048 |
| Pol       | 0.615385    | 0.666667 |
| ~Pol      | 0.384615    | 0.416667 |
| Inst      | 0.461538    | 0.750000 |
| ~Inst     | 0.538462    | 0.437500 |
| Norm      | 0.923077    | 0.705882 |
| ~Norm     | 0.076923    | 0.142857 |

Source: Own

The analysis of the necessary conditions for the deployment in missions revealed that one of the given conditions, specifically ~Eco (no economic reasons), can be considered a necessary condition from the point of value of consistency which is one – the ideal value that the necessary condition should have. On the other hand, the value of coverage is 0.6, so this condition cannot be considered nec-

essary. From a logical and theoretical point of view, this result is also not justified, it can be assumed that it is rather a banal condition (Ragin 2008: 31–42). On the contrary, the value of consistency for security reasons and normative reasons is high. This value is on the breaking line because in practice a value higher than 0.9 is mostly sufficient for the condition to be declared necessary. The coverage value of security reasons is also very good in this case (over 0.8), so this condition can be considered a necessary condition. It follows from the logic of values that there are some cases for which this condition does not apply, but this is very common in practice (Ragin 2008: 33–39). There is only one case where this condition was present and the Czech Republic did not participate in the PSO, which is the case of Deny Flight (BiH). In this case, it can be assumed that the result was affected by the timing of the mission. The mission took place between 1993 and 1995 and at that time, the CR was not ready to participate in the mission. The first involvement of the CR in foreign operations was only in 1995 (Army CR 2019). The second case to which this condition (sec) cannot be applied is Essential Harvest (Macedonia), where security reasons were not present, but the CR still participated in the PSO. In this case, the political reasons were present, these reasons were probably combined with some other reasons that the chosen theoretical framework was not able to capture. The decision to join the PSO could have, for example, been influenced by the fact that Czech soldiers were already present in the area and had experience with similar operations (Natoaktual 2021). Normative reasons have a high consistency value; however, the value of the coverage is not enough, as it is only 0.7. For these reasons, normative reasons cannot be considered a necessary condition.

Analysis of sufficient conditions revealed one configuration. The same results were obtained by a complex solution after reduction. The analysis makes it clear that security and normative reasons are the most important. The solution coverage is 0.923077, as the results are not able to explain the deployment in Operation Essential Harvest (Macedonia). The primary reasons for deployment in Macedonia are not entirely clear. It can only be concluded that it was about prestige, training and establishing relationships. Czech soldiers participated in the mission at the request of the Macedonian president (Natoaktual 2021). The results of the analysis are also confirmed by very good coverage values for individual sufficient conditions and overall consistency coverage. There is no case when the conditions for deployment in the mission were present and the Czech Republic did not participate in the mission.

The parsimonious solution provides only one configuration that leads to the deployment of Czech soldiers. The configuration includes the presence of security reasons and normative reasons. This configuration has high coverage and explains almost all operations involving the Czech Republic. All PSOs, except one in the Balkans, are explained by this combination. In the 1990s, there was a rapid increase in migration from the Balkan states to the Czech Republic

**Table 4: Sufficient conditions**

| Parsimonious solution       |              |                 |             |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Configuration               | Raw Coverage | Unique Coverage | Consistency |
| Sec*Norm                    | 0.923077     | 0.923077        | 1           |
| Solution coverage: 0.923077 |              |                 |             |
| Consistency coverage: 1     |              |                 |             |

Source: Own

(Włodarczyk 2013: 24–64). During the war in Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic granted asylum to more than 6,000 people, which is the highest number in the history of the modern Czech Republic (Encyclopedia of Migration 2017). There are several reasons why the Czech Republic was the destination for migrants. These reasons could be cultural or linguistic proximity, as well as present family. Also, the Balkans are geographically relatively close to the Czech Republic. All these reasons shaped decisions. With the war in Yugoslavia and, subsequently, in the newly independent states, a large part of the population was hit by a humanitarian crisis. Some cases involved the pressure of international allies, as with Turkey and Afghanistan. From a security perspective, Afghanistan posed a threat to Europe in terms of terrorism. Also, there has been and is a rapid increase in migration from this country to the EU (Mixed Migration Platform 2017). In the case of Turkey, migration also played a role. In this case, it was not citizens of Turkey, but other Middle Eastern states who lived in refugee camps in Turkey. In the case of the Czech Republic's deployment in Afghanistan, indirect pressure from the USA is often mentioned (Natoaktual 2018). In the case of Turkey, President Erdogan has openly called on the EU on several occasions to increase financial contributions to refugees in Turkey. He mentioned several times that he would send refugees from Turkey to Europe if his demands were not met (Aljazeera 2020). This put pressure on the Allies to address the issue of refugees in Turkey.

From the above analysis, it is clear that security reasons appear to be the most important and what shapes the Czech Republic's decision to participate in missions. In most cases, normative reasons including pressure from Allies and humanitarian motives also play a role. However, unlike security reasons, normative reasons cannot be considered a necessary condition. On the contrary, economic reasons are completely irrelevant. Besides, the analysis of sufficient conditions confirmed that the absence of economic reasons is not a necessary condition. This was already proven by low coverage values. Political and institutional reasons are very common, but these reasons influence the final decision only to a very limited extent. The analysis revealed that neither political nor institutional reasons can be considered a necessary or sufficient condition for Czech participation in NATO's PSOs.

## Concluding Remarks

The Czech Republic regularly participates in the PSOs under the leadership of NATO, the EU, the UN and its allies. Czechoslovak soldiers gained their first experience with missions abroad in 1990 in the first Gulf War. This confirms that the newly formed states of Central and Eastern Europe had to prove to NATO membership that they would be full-fledged members, not passive consumers of security. Their involvement in the missions continued in the following years, even before the Czech Republic became part of NATO. They joined the Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout 1995 and 1996. After joining NATO in 1999, the number of operations increased rapidly and they were present not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in Kosovo and Macedonia. The geographical proximity of states was important for the Czech Republic, but with the transformation and growth of new global threats, there was also involvement in more remote areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

An important task of this article was to reveal the reasons based on which the Czech Republic decides which PSOs to actively participate in. Even though the Czech Republic participated in a large number of PSOs under the leadership of NATO (thirteen operations) there is also a similarly large number of operations in which the Czech Republic did not participate. Based on Bellamy and Williams' theory, five conditions have been defined. As a qualitative comparative analysis was used to examine the conditions, this number of conditions seems to be appropriate to a given number of examined cases. Also, if a higher number of conditions were used, distortion and inaccurate estimation would occur. These five conditions are security reasons, economic reasons, political reasons, institutional reasons and normative reasons. The analysis revealed that there is a necessary condition for participation – security reasons. Security reasons achieved very good values of coverage (0.923077) and consistency (0.857143), so this can be considered as the most important. Besides, this condition occurred in all cases where the Czech army was involved in the PSOs, except for one case, the Essential Harvest (Macedonia). In the case of Macedonia, it can be concluded that the political reasons and the presence and experience of the Czech army in the area were important. Also, this analysis confirmed the conclusions of other authors who dealt with the motivations of small states and considered security reasons to be the most important. The conclusions are identical with Pinto Arena's study, which cited security reasons as Portugal's main reason in foreign operations (Pinto Arena 2017: 8–10). Dimitrov reached the same conclusions in the case of Bulgaria, and Besenyo in the case of Hungary (Dimitrov 2009: 1–8; Besenyo 2013: 2–13).

There is only one configuration – a sufficient condition which, in the case of the Czech Republic, leads to deployment in the mission. It is a combination of security reasons and normative reasons, which has caused the majority of

cases of Czech deployment in missions. That explains PSOs in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq or Sudan. This configuration has coverage of 0.923077, which in practice means that it explains all the cases where the Czech army was involved except for one case (Essential Harvest Macedonia). The value of coverage is very good – 1, which in practice means that this configuration did not occur in any case where there was no deployment of Czech soldiers. The conclusions can therefore be considered valid and relevant.

The analysis of the reasons revealed that security reasons are the most important, and indeed it is an aspect that primarily formulates the Czech decision. On the contrary, economic motivation is completely irrelevant for a small state like the Czech Republic. There may be several reasons why economic reasons do not play a leading role, but this should be explored in more detail. We can only assume that the lucrative nature of the state can affect the decision – most PSOs took place in countries that are not economically attractive (there are no natural resources such as oil or natural gas, there are no headquarters of large corporations, etc.). The reason may also be the economic stability and prosperity of the state participating in the operation. The state may consider its current economic relations to be sufficient and does not long for new expansion opportunities. We can find some reasons, but this is only hypothetical. Other reasons described by Bellamy and Williams (2013) in their work – normative, institutional, political and security reasons – were present in a large number of cases; however, not all can be considered important and necessary for the final decision (Bellamy and Williams 2013: 423–425). From these results, it can be concluded that this theory does not apply in all cases, especially in those of small states such as the Czech Republic. For a more comprehensive assessment of the theory, it would be appropriate to apply this analysis to other small countries, such as Austria or Slovakia.

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